International Technology Transfer: Who Gains and Who Loses?*

When one country has a superior technology in all commodities, a Ricardian model with two goods and two countries is used to examine uncompensated transfers of superior technology in one or both goods. A transfer of the superior but second‐best technology always benefits the advanced country because it was improting that good initially and now gets it cheaper. But the free gift of the first‐best technology can also benefit the advanced country if a certain productivity condition is satisfied because that country may now export its former import good at an even better terms of trade.     

A Model of Spillovers Through Labor Recruitment

This paper develops a model where spillovers can be generated through domestic firm recruitment of employees at a multinational corporation (MNC) where more advanced technologies are employed. It is shown that both spillover and no-spilover equilibria are possible in the model, depending on the marginal costs and benefits of recruitment. Spillover benefits depend on demand parameters and the technological capabilities of the domestic firm, and spillover costs are determined by the MNC's internal wage. Compared with the no-spillover equilibrium, spillovers lead to fewer technology transfers by the MNC and higher market prices. [031, F23]     

Designing effective transfers: Lessons from India’s school meal program

We estimate attendance gains for primary school children from a cost‐neutral change in the design of India’s school meal program. Municipal schools in the capital region of Delhi shifted from packaged food to cooked meals in 2003, with no change in payments to meal providers. Using the staggered implementation of this transition and child‐level panel data, we estimate a 3 percentage point increase in average monthly attendance, with large effects for early grades. We also find that girls are more responsive to the cooked meals, but because they attend morning schools, whereas boys attend afternoon schools, this may simply reflect benefits from better‐timed meals. Our study illustrates how better‐designed transfers can improve outcomes within tightly constrained budgets.     

Global Innovation Races,Offshoring and Wage Inequality

In the 1970s and 1980s the US position as the global technological leader was increasingly challenged by Japan and Europe. In those years the US skill premium and residual wage inequality increased substantially. This paper presents a two‐region, quality‐ladder growth model where the lagging economy progressively catches up with the leader. As the innovation gap closes, the advanced country experiences fiercer foreign technological competition that forces its firms to innovate more. Faster technical change increases the skill premium and residual inequality. Offshoring production and innovation plays a key role in shaping the link between international competition and inequality.     

Physical capital,knowledge capital,and the choice between FDI and outsourcing

Abstract There exist two approaches in the literature concerning the multinational firm’s mode choice for foreign production between an owned subsidiary and a licensing contract. One approach considers environments where the firm transfers primarily knowledge‐based assets and assumes that knowledge is non‐excludable. A more recent approach takes the property‐right view of the firm and assumes that physical capital is fully excludable. This paper combines both forms of capital assets in a single model. There are subtleties, and added structure is needed to establish what ex ante seems a straightforward testable hypothesis: relatively physical‐capital‐intensive firms choose outsourcing while relatively knowledge‐capital‐intensive firms choose FDI.     

COMPETITION OR COOPERATION IN URBAN SERVICE DELIVERY?

ABSTRACT: Inter‐municipal cooperation is now as common among US local governments as for profit privatization. This article uses data from a national survey in 2007 to explore the benefits of cooperation – economies of scale, service coordination across the metropolitan region and greater community control. While privatization reforms have focused on harnessing the benefits of a competitive market, cooperation may be the new frontier where economies of scale and efficiency gains can be achieved with governments working together in a new form of collaborative service delivery.     

A Welfare Analysis of Policy Responses to the Skilled Wage Premium

I build a model with heterogeneous agents which is consistent both with rising wage inequality across education levels and with an increasing relative number of college graduates. I use the model to investigate the welfare implications of policies which influence the structure of net wages. Each policy affects agents directly through taxes and subsides and indirectly as wages respond to changes in the relative supply of skilled and unskilled workers. I find that as wage inequality grows due to skill-biased technological change, policies which promote a more egalitarian wage structure can become increasingly acceptable to all agents and that for nearly all agents, education subsidies may be preferred to direct transfers as a means of decreasing wage inequality. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E60, I28, H52.     

Government policy under price uncertainty: A source of volatility in illegal immigration

This paper provides an alternative explanation for why illegal immigration can exhibit substantial volatility. We develop a model economy where migrants make decisions in the face of uncertain border enforcement and transfers from the host country. The uncertainty is extrinsic, a sunspot, and arises due to ambiguity regarding government policy; the sunspot manifests itself as uncertainty in the commodity price of money. Immigration volatility stems from both the trade‐off between the marginal benefits and costs (transfers and enforcement) to migrating and the existence of a sunspot. Finally, we examine the impact of changes in government policies on migration levels.     

A Dynamic Incentive‐Based Argument for Conditional Transfers*

We compare the long‐run effects of replacing unconditional transfers to the poor by transfers conditional on the education of children. Unlike Mirrlees’ income taxation model, the distribution of skill evolves endogenously. Human capital accumulation follows the Freeman–Ljungqvist–Mookherjee–Ray OLG model with missing capital markets and dynastic bequest motives. Conditional transfers (funded by taxes on earnings of the skilled) are shown to induce higher long‐run output per capita and (both utilitarian and Rawlsian) welfare, owing to their superior effect on skill accumulation incentives. The result is established both with two skill levels, and a continuum of occupations.     

NATIONAL TREATMENT AT THE WTO: THE ROLES OF PRODUCT AND COUNTRY HETEROGENEITY*

This paper analyzes the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) national treatment (NT) clause in a two‐country model where quality of goods and/or market size are heterogenous across countries. When market size is symmetric across countries, a reciprocal NT agreement (i) benefits the high‐quality country, (ii) hurts the low‐quality country, and (iii) delivers higher aggregate world welfare. However, such an agreement can arise in equilibrium if the high‐quality country's market is relatively bigger and the quality gap between goods is small (i.e., goods are sufficiently alike). The qualitative nature of these results does not change when quality is endogenously determined.     

HEALTH INSURANCE AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION: WHAT LEGAL RECOGNITION DOES FOR SAME‐SEX COUPLES

Using Current Population Survey data, I examine how same‐sex couples' labor force participation and health insurance coverage change as a result of their unions being legally recognized. The results indicate female same‐sex couples switch from arrangements where both members work to arrangements where only one member of the couple works. Being able to gain health insurance through a spouse's employer seems to play a major role in this change. Male same‐sex couples experience no change in their labor force participation or health insurance. (JEL J08, I13, J18)     

Coalitional Colonel Blotto Games with Application to the Economics of Alliances

In Borel’s Colonel Blotto game two players simultaneously allocate their respective endowments of a resource across n battlefields, the higher allocation wins each battlefield, and players maximize the number of battlefields won. Here we examine two players who may form an alliance before separately competing in two disjoint Colonel Blotto games against a common adversary. Despite a lack of common interests, unilateral transfers—in a direction consistent with the exploitation hypothesis—arise for a range of parameter configurations. Such transfers alter the adversary’s strategy and the combination of the direct and strategic effects benefits both allies.     

DID THE GREAT RECESSION REDUCE VISITOR SPENDING AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR NATURE‐BASED RECREATION? EVIDENCE FROM 2006 AND 2009

Outdoor recreation is a large industry that can diversify public land‐based economies that have traditionally relied upon resource extraction. However, what happens to nature‐based recreation visitor spending and benefits during times of national economic recession? To address this question, we replicate a 2006 high mountain recreation study in the same region 3 years later during the 2009 recession. Results indicate that nature‐based public land recreation in this area did not experience reductions in most categories of visitor spending or total number of visits during the recession. These results imply that nature‐based recreation may represent an economically stable industry in public land mountain economies. Total benefits to the visitors are also quite stable, only dropping from $129 per person per trip in 2006 to $120 in 2009. This 7% drop in willingness to pay is not statistically significant at conventional levels. (JEL Q26)     

should Transfers To Poor Families Be Conditional On School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective*

This article considers the welfare implications of transfers to poor families that are conditional on school attendance and other forms of investment in children's human capital. Family decisions are assumed to be the result of (generalized) Nash bargaining between the two parents. We show that, as long as bequests are zero, conditional transfers are better for children than unconditional transfers. The mother's welfare may also be improved by conditional transfers. Thus, conditioning transfers to bequest‐constrained families have potentially desirable intergenerational and intragenerational welfare effects. Conditioning transfers to unconstrained families make every family member worse off.     

Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogenous Tasks and NIMBY Problems

We study the allocation of collectively owned indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible. We restrict our attention to incentive‐compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently. Among these mechanisms, we characterize those that respect the identical preferences lower bound: each agent should be at least as well off as in a hypothetical economy where all agents have the same preference as hers, no agent envies another, and the budget is balanced.     

Substituting Distribution for Growth: The Political Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers in the Russian Federation

Given limited resources and economic realities, how do politicians distribute monetary transfers in order to retain office? Previous work has largely focused on two models – a core model of rewarding loyal supporters and a swing model of purchasing the support of easily swayed voters. Empirical results have proven mixed, however. In this article, we argue that these mixed results are due to economic factors, which condition politicians' distributive strategies. In our model, we consider that politician and voters are involved in a repeated game, where past expectations condition future strategy. Current (core) supporters who receive few benefits and perceive themselves worse off than other, less loyal, groups are likely to be less loyal themselves tomorrow. In our model, politicians avoid this by providing their supporters consumption benefits directly, in the form of transfers, or indirectly, via strong economic growth. Where economic growth is good, politicians can distribute less to core supporters, who benefit from the rising economy. Where economic growth is weak, however, politicians make transfers to their core supporters to ensure future loyalty. We test our theory using data on federal transfers from the Russian Federal government to 78 Russian Regions from 2000–2008.     

Environmental Protection and Urban Unemployment: Environmental Policy Reform in a Polluted Dualistic Economy

This paper explores sufficient conditions for the welfare‐improving environmental policy reform in the Harris–Todaro economy. A rise in the pollution tax rate in the urban manufacturing has spillover effects on the two labor market distortions: the less‐than‐optimal manufacturing employment and the urban unemployment. If both are weakened the welfare improves. Otherwise, we need to develop an alternative sufficient condition. It is shown that there exists a range of welfare‐improving pollution tax rates, and that it corresponds to the lower values of tax rate. This range may shrink by the wage subsidy policy and the technological change toward less pollution‐intensive techniques.     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.     

Opting out and topping up reconsidered: Informal care under uncertain altruism

We study the design of public long‐term care (LTC) insurance when the altruism of informal caregivers is uncertain. We consider non‐linear policies where the LTC transfer depends on the level of informal care, which is assumed to be observable, while children's altruism is not. Our policy encompasses two policies traditionally considered in the literature: topping up policies consisting of a transfer independent of informal care, and opting out policies entailing a positive transfer only if children fail to provide care. We show that both total and informal care should increase with the children's level of altruism. This is obtained under full and asymmetric information. Public LTC transfers, on the other hand, may be non‐monotonic. Under asymmetric information, public LTC transfers are lower than their full information level for the parents whose children are the least altruistic, while it is distorted upward for the highest level of altruism. This is explained by the need to provide incentives to highly altruistic children. In contrast to both topping up and opting out policies, the implementing contract is always such that social care increases with informal care.