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1.
Permit markets lead polluting firms to purchase abatement goods from an eco‐industry which is often concentrated. This paper studies the consequences of this sort of imperfectly competitive eco‐industry on the equilibrium choices of the competitive polluting firms. It then characterizes the second‐best pollution cap. By comparing this situation to one of perfect competition, we show that Cournot competition on the abatement good market contributes not only to a nonoptimal level of emission reduction but also to a higher permit price, which reduces the production level. These distortions increase with market power, measured by the margin taken by the noncompetitive firms, and suggest a second‐best larger pollution cap. 相似文献
2.
The authors present a simple diagrammatic exposition of a pollution-permit market in which both firms that generate pollution and consumers who are harmed by pollution are allowed to purchase permits at a single market price. They show that the market equilibrium is efficient if and only if the endowment of permits is equal to the efficient level of pollution. Furthermore, if consumers actually participate in the market, then the equilibrium is not efficient. Welfare can be improved by decreasing the endowment of permits and thereby pricing consumers out of the market. 相似文献
3.
Prices versus Quantities in a Second-Best Setting 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Philippe Quirion 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2004,29(3):337-360
The choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed by two distinct research traditions. The first proceeds from Weitzman's partial equilibrium stochastic model and concludes that a tax should be preferred if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal environmental benefit curve. The second utilises deterministic general equilibrium models with pre-existing distortionary taxes. It concludes that non-revenue-raising instruments (e.g., grandfathered tradable permits) are costlier than revenue-raising ones (e.g., a tax on every unit of pollution or auctioned permits). To build a bridge between these two traditions, we introduce in Weitzman's model a positive cost of public funds due to pre-existing distortionary taxes. The tax admits a greater comparative advantage over the permits, as compared to Weitzman's classical result. Then, we assume that the regulated industry blocks any proposal that poses it too high an expected burden. This may require a transfer to firms, in the form of freely-allocated permits or lump-sum tax rebate. It turns out that if this acceptability constraint is binding, then the comparative advantage of taxes over permits is still reinforced. Quantitatively, even if the marginal benefit function is 50% more steeply sloped than the marginal cost function, the price instrument should be preferred. We also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a contingent instrument which leads to the ex post optimum. The superiority of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is higher than in first-best. 相似文献
4.
We analyze oligopolistic exhaustible-resource depletion when firms can trade forward contracts on deliveries – a market structure relevant for some resource markets (e.g., storable pollution permits, hydro-based power pools) – and find that trading forwards can have substantial implications for resource depletion. We show that when firms’ initial resource-stocks are the same, the subgame-perfect equilibrium path approaches the perfectly competitive path as firms trade forwards frequently. But when the initial stocks differ, firms can credibly escape part of the competitive pressure of forward contracting. It is a unique feature of the resource model that equilibrium contracting and the degree of competition depends on resource endowments. 相似文献
5.
Maria Bas 《Review of International Economics》2012,20(2):315-331
This paper develops a model of trade that features heterogeneous firms, technology choice and different types of skilled labor in a general equilibrium framework to explain within‐industry increase in the relative demand for skilled workers. Its main contribution is to investigate the impact of firms' export and technology choice decisions on skill upgrading. Only firms in the upper range of the productivity distribution produce for the foreign market using high‐technology. Since this technology is skilled‐biased, exporters that resort to modern technologies are more skill intensive. Empirical evidence is also provided to support the model's main predictions using plant‐level panel data from Chile's manufacturing sector (1990–1999). 相似文献
6.
ABSTRACTA large body of the literature showed that related variety at local level is more relevant than unrelated variety for explaining the innovation performance of firms. Knowledge relatedness is usually measured by considering activities within the same industry (i.e. the same two-digit code) while activities in different industries are associated with unrelated variety. This approach is challenged by the increasing relevance of transversal technologies, i.e. technologies that are developed and applied in rather different sectors. As a result, between industry variety (i.e. unrelated variety) is expected to be more important than within industry variety (i.e. related variety). We test this hypothesis by examining the innovation activities of firms in the textile and clothing industry. The innovation model of these firms is characterized by low investment in R&D, little capabilities for autonomous innovation and dependence from knowledge suppliers belonging to different sectors. The empirical analysis, carried out over the 1996–2014 period at the EU NUTS2 level, shows that between industry variety has a greater impact than within industry variety for the innovative performance of firms. 相似文献
7.
Halvor Briseid Storrøsten 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2014,59(2):275-293
Technological improvements have proven essential in mitigating environmental problems such as climate change, depletion of the ozone layer and acid rain. While it is well-known that price- and quantity-based regulatory instruments provide different investment levels, the effects on the choice between different technologies have received scant attention. This paper expands on the prices versus quantities literature by investigating firms’ technology choice in the face of demand and supply side uncertainty. I show that the regulator can not design tradable emissions permits and an emissions tax such that the two regimes are equivalent, even in terms of expected values. Moreover, a tax encourages the most flexible abatement technology if and only if stochastic costs and the equilibrium permit price have sufficiently strong positive covariance, compared with the variance in consumer demand for the good produced. Finally, the firms’ technology choices are socially optimal under tradable emissions permits, but not under an emissions tax. 相似文献
8.
We consider a pollution permit market with a large firm and fringe of competitive firms. To smooth compliance towards a long-run
emissions goal, firms are initially allocated a stock (i.e., bank) of permits that can be gradually consumed. We first show
how the large firm can credibly manipulate the spot market in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Motivated by features observed
in the US market for sulfur dioxide emissions, we then show that the introduction of stock transactions has no effects on
market power, but that forward trading and incomplete observability of stock holdings do have pro-competitive effects.
Both authors are also Research Associates at the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. 相似文献
9.
This paper presents a menu-auction model in which firms lobby the government to make an environmental regulation less burdensome. In this lobbying game, industrial interests are opposed by an environmental interest group. We compare political outcomes under two institutional arrangements. In the first, firms must join an organization that represents the interests of the industry. In the second, firms would lobby the government individually. The two arrangements result in strikingly different equilibrium outcomes. Only a small fraction of firms join the lobby group under collective lobbying, but all firms participate in lobbying activities when there is no such group. Thus, an attempt by firms to solve the apparent collective action problem through coordination would effectively backfire. The reason is that coordination among firms would increase the leverage available to the government, to demand high political contributions. We also evaluate the desirability of the two lobbying regimes from the private perspective of individual firms, and from the perspective of society as a whole. This permits us to evaluate possible restrictions on lobbying activities. 相似文献
10.
This paper develops an international trade model where firms in a duopoly may diversify their technologies for strategic reasons. The firms face the same set of technologies given by a tradeoff between marginal costs and fixed costs, but depending on trade costs firms may choose different technologies. Market integration may induce a technological restructuring where firms either diversify their technologies or switch to a homogeneous technology. In general, market integration improves welfare. However, a small decrease of trade costs which induces a switch from heterogeneous technologies to a homogeneous technology may locally reduce global welfare. The model also shows that productivity differences lead to intra‐industry firm heterogeneity in size and exports similar to the “new–new” trade models with monopolistic competition. 相似文献
11.
The paper presents the results of an economic experiment in which the effects of fees on allocative efficiency of tradable
utilization permits (e.g. pollution permits) are explored. Laboratory subjects (university students) play the roles of firms
whose generic product requires a specific input or permits. Scarcity is exogenously introduced by a fixed supply of tradable
production permits. Three treatments are compared: No fee imposed (N); a fixed tax per permit (T); and partial retraction
of permits and subsequent redistribution by auction (A). Treatments T and A represent two different ways of imposing fees,
which are designed to be revenue equivalent. Our results indicate that, after controlling for deviation of permit prices from
a prediction based on fundamentals, fees have an impact on distribution of permits. Interestingly, a fixed tax enhances efficiency
compared to the case of no fees while retraction and reallocation by auction tends to reduce efficiency. Apparently, subjects’
decision making is affected by the imposition of fees, but how and to what extent depends on the method used. 相似文献
12.
Price and quantity regulation in general equilibrium 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
David L. Kelly 《Journal of Economic Theory》2005,125(1):36-60
We consider a general equilibrium model with a production externality (e.g. pollution), where the regulator does not observe firm productivity shocks. We examine quantity (permit) regulation and price (tax) regulation. The quantity of permits issued by the regulator are independent of the productivity shock, since shocks are unobserved. Price regulation implies use of the regulated input is an increasing function of the productivity shock because firms take advantage of a good productivity shock by increasing input use. Thus price regulation generates higher average, but more variable, production. Therefore, we show that in general equilibrium the relative advantage of quantity versus price regulation depends not only on the slopes of marginal benefits and costs, but on general equilibrium effects such as risk aversion. The general equilibrium effects are often more important than the slopes of the marginal benefits and cost curves. In the simplest model, a reasonable risk aversion coefficient implies quantity regulation generates higher welfare regardless of the benefit function. 相似文献
13.
Makoto Tanaka 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2012,51(1):61-77
This paper presents a multi-sector model of tradable emission permits, which includes oligopolistic and perfectly competitive
industries. The firms in oligopolistic industries are assumed to exercise market power in the tradable permit market as well
as in the product market. Specifically, we examine the effects of the initial permit allocation on the equilibrium outcomes,
focusing on the interaction among these product and permit markets. It is shown that raising the number of initial permits
allocated to one firm in an oligopolistic industry increases the output produced by that firm. Under certain conditions, raising
a “clean” (less-polluting) firm’s share of the initial permits can lead to reductions in both the product and permit prices.
We discuss criteria for the socially optimal allocation of initial permits, considering the trade-off between production inefficiency
and consumer benefit. 相似文献
14.
In this paper, we investigate the effect of market power on equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms
can bank current permits for use in later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (potentially
dominant) firm and competitive fringe with rational expectations. We characterize the equilibrium solution for different permits
allocations and discuss the large firm’s stock-holding constraints needed for credible market manipulation. 相似文献
15.
Fernando Vega-Redondo 《Spanish Economic Review》1999,1(1):21-54
A game-theoretic intertemporal model of industrial competition is proposed where firms choose their optimal technological
strategies as part of some (Markov Perfect) equilibrium with potential entry and exit. The main novel feature of the approach
is that technological change is modelled along a directed graph of technologies, which permits a rigorous consideration of
key issues such as technological gaps, switching costs and gradual innovation. The paper provides some sufficient conditions
for existence and ergodicity of the equilibrium, partially studies the induced population dynamics, and explores a number
of other issues by means of numerical simulations. 相似文献
16.
LUIS GAUTIER 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2017,19(2):461-489
Industries characterized by differentiated products are important contributors of greenhouse gases and currently subject to market‐based policies such as emission taxes. In the context of developing countries, fears about foreign investment leaving the country are often used as an argument not to address industry emissions through emission taxes. This paper develops a Cournot model with product differentiation in the presence of abatement efforts where host and foreign firms are subject to an emission tax. The analysis indicates that abatement efforts and differences in pollution intensity coefficients across firms may play a significant role in the characterization of optimal policy. The analysis also suggests that the government may opt to encourage foreign, less pollution‐intensive firms via higher taxation. Additionally, this paper examines how an optimal emission tax may be adjusted as products become more differentiated; industry emissions may fall/rise as a result of more differentiated products. One important contribution of this paper is that it emphasizes the role of abatement efforts, product differentiation, and differences in pollution intensity coefficients across firms in the characterization of the optimal emission tax. 相似文献
17.
Wage and Technology Dispersion 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
This paper explains why firms with identical opportunities may use different technologies and offer different wages. Our key assumption is that workers must engage in costly search in order to gather information about jobs (Stigler (1961)). In equilibrium, some firms adopt high fixed cost, high productivity technologies, offer high wages, and fill job openings quickly. Other firms adopt less capital-intensive technologies and offer low wages, hiring mostly uninformed workers. In equilibrium, the amount of wage dispersion leaves workers indifferent about whether to gather information, and the fraction of informed workers leaves firms indifferent about their wage and technology choice. We show that worker search, which would appear to be a rent-seeking activity in partial equilibrium, may be efficiency-enhancing in general equilibrium. 相似文献
18.
Andrew Yates 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2002,4(4):641-660
A pollution permit market is decentralized when firms are allowed to trade permits across time, regions or pollutants. Using a model in which firms have better information about their abatement costs than a regulator, we develop a comparative advantage formula that delineates whether or not pollution permit markets should be decentralized. When the damage from pollution is described by a separable function, the formula implies a simple sufficient condition for not allowing decentralization. 相似文献
19.
ANTONIO MINNITI 《The Japanese Economic Review》2009,60(1):110-132
In this paper we introduce strategic interaction between firms in an R&D growth model which captures both the intra‐industry competition between firms operating within an industry and the inter‐industry competition between firms in different industries. We show that the more substitutable the goods produced within each industry (across industries) are, that is, the more intense the intra‐industry (inter‐industry) competition, the higher is the growth rate. In the comparison between social optimum and a decentralized economy, it is shown that the market outcome is characterized by inefficiently high entry of firms within each industry and insufficient productivity growth. 相似文献
20.
The merits of different types of regulatory tools in eliminating pollution and at the same time inducing innovation have long
been an interest of researchers in both environmental economics and industrial organization. Although there is a substantial
theoretical literature investigating the potential for various environmental policies to attain these dual goals, this is
a challenging empirical problem because every industry has its own inherent characteristics that play an important role in
determining the performance of different regulatory tools. The majority of the work to date focuses on pollution abatement
while leaving pollution prevention understudied. In most of the literature firms are also assumed to be symmetric. Asymmetries
among firms add another degree and level of complexity to their strategic interactions, and affect the performance of different
regulatory tools. This paper investigates the performance of two alternative regulatory tools, an emissions performance standard
and an emissions tax, in reducing pollution and inducing pollution prevention and abatement R&D in the US pulp and paper industry.
We construct a model representing the industry in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly framework, calibrate the model to disaggregated
industry data, and run scenarios to replicate the behavior of the firms in an imperfectly competitive output market. Our results
suggest that pollution prevention R&D can respond quite differently than abatement R&D to different policy instruments. The
results indicate that R&D spillovers among firms play crucial role in technology development and strategies of the firms.
Our results also suggest that strategic interactions between firms in an imperfectly competitive industry can have significant
impacts of the levels of both types of R&D.
相似文献