The Shift to Defined Contribution Pension Plans

Abstract

There has been a strong shift away from defined benefit (DB) pension plans toward defined contribution (DC) pension plans in the United States over the last 20 years. A variety of reasons for this shift have been proposed. In another paper in this issue, Krzysztof Ostaszewski presents a new hypothesis to explain the shift to DC plans in the United States. He argues that the decline in importance of DB plans is due to a shift in the way relative returns to macroeconomic factors of production, that is, capital and labor, are being rewarded in the national economy.

This paper attempts to test the Ostaszewski hypothesis using Canadian data. In Canada there has been only a slight decrease in DB plan coverage. It is shown that the Ostaszewski theory does not fit the Canadian experience well. Instead, it is argued that pension regulation and tax legislation play a crucial role in pension design and reform. It is also argued that the difference in pension regulation and taxation in Canada versus the United States has directly influenced plan sponsors in considering their pension objectives, costs, and risks. Differences in the proportion of the workforce that is unionized may also be important. The paper concludes that pension regulation and taxation are more important variables than are macroeconomic reward systems in the use of DB versus DC pension plans.     

Issues for Implementing Phased Retirement in Defined Benefit Plans

Abstract

U.S. society is aging. The nature of work has changed from work that requires physical strength to work based on knowledge. As a result, workers are beginning to phase into retirement rather than going directly from full-time work to full retirement. From a retirement income perspective, many final-average-pay defined benefit plans have features that make phased retirement difficult at best and detrimental at worst. U.S. pension law and regulations present barriers to phased retirement if the phased retiree wants to receive a portion of available pension benefits during phased retirement.

This paper examines private sector options to encourage phased retirement and to eliminate the disincentives that currently affect defined benefit plans. It offers alternative calculations of final average pay that do not penalize the part-time worker. It also demonstrates that the plan’s early retirement reduction and late retirement increase can be set to maintain actuarial equity throughout phased retirement. The paper presents benefit calculations with equal actuarial values for various payout patterns.

The paper discusses the coordination between phased retirement and subsidized early retirement. Finally, the paper notes some of the changes in ERISA that will be needed to facilitate phased retirement in defined benefit plans, especially for participants who want to receive pension distributions while working part time.     

Supplementary Pension Coverage in Britain

The 1986 Social Security Act introduced far-reaching changes to the supplementary pension environment in Britain, encouraging the growth of defined contribution pension plans and especially personal pensions. This paper examines the pattern of supplementary pension coverage of employees in Britain five years after the implementation of the Act, using cross-sectional data from the Family Resources Survey 1993–94. Two-thirds of employees in Britain are covered by private contracted-out pension scheme. Employer-provided defined benefit pension schemes remain the dominant type of supplementary pension scheme. The growth of personal pension plans is more marked among manual, less-skilled, workers in smaller establishments. The paper concludes that, in the absence of further pension reform, adverse labour market conditions will exert downward pressure on private pension coverage. JEL classification:I38, J32, J38.     

Impact of Replacing a Defined Benefit Pension with a Defined Contribution Plan or a Cash Balance Plan

Abstract

Four pension plan conversions are examined to determine the impact on retirement benefits of workers. The study was based on interviews with top management, employee surveys, and actuarial analysis of retirement benefits under the old and new pension plans. In general, workers who leave the firm prior to the age of early retirement can expect increased benefits under the new defined contribution and cash balance plans, whereas older, more senior workers can expect to accrue smaller benefits after the plan conversions. Recognizing these potential adverse effects, the employers in our studies provided various types of transition benefits to existing workers or gave employees the choice of remaining in the old defined benefit plan. Employee surveys reveal that younger workers are more supportive of the new pension plans than are older workers. These case studies also indicate that communication by managements with their employees is very important to the successful implementation of plan conversions.     

A Computationally Efficient Algorithm for Estimating the Distribution of Future Annuity Values Under Interest-Rate and Longevity Risks

Abstract

This paper proposes a computationally efficient algorithm for quantifying the impact of interestrate risk and longevity risk on the distribution of annuity values in the distant future. The algorithm simulates the state variables out to the end of the horizon period and then uses a Taylor series approximation to compute approximate annuity values at the end of that period, thereby avoiding a computationally expensive “simulation-within-simulation” problem. Illustrative results suggest that annuity values are likely to rise considerably but are also quite uncertain. These findings have some unpleasant implications both for defined contribution pension plans and for defined benefit plan sponsors considering using annuities to hedge their exposure to these risks at some point in the future.     

Wages,productivity, and retirement

Pensions, both state provided and privately provided, affect incentives to retire. But private pensions are part of the long term compensation package, and altering pensions not only affects retirement incentives, but also wages. A key factor in determining whether retirement occurs at the appropriate age is the relation of productivity to alternatives. When wages, coupled with public and private pension accrual, deviate from worker productivity, private retirement incentives are distorted. Sometimes this results in too much early retirement, creating fiscal difficulties. Sometimes, it results in a desire for delayed retirement, which argues for mandatory retirement rules. Pay compression, where wages do not vary across individuals as much as productivity, exacerbate distortions. Defined benefit pension plans tend to create incentives to retire after a certain number of years of work. Defined contribution plans do not have this feature. Public plans should be designed noting their interaction with incentives that are already inherent in the private wage and pension schemes.     

Risk Allocation in Retirement Plans: A Better Solution

The corporate world is reconsidering the cost‐effectiveness of defined benefit pension plans while contemplating a change to defined contribution plans. This article begins by examining the three primary risks faced by sponsors of most DB pension plans—investment risk, interest rate risk, and longevity risk—and shows how shifting these risks to employees through a DC plan would affect both the corporation and the individual. Although DC plans clearly help companies manage risks, they provide at best an incomplete solution for individual participants. This article describes an innovation in pension design—the Retirement Shares Plan (RSP)—that combines many of the best features of DB and DC plans. An RSP provides:

• ? predictable and stable cost to the plan sponsor, with little chance of unfunded liabilities;
• ? lifetime income, guaranteeing that retirees will never outlive their benefits;
• ? a benefit accrual pattern comparable to that of traditional pension plans that preserves value for older, long‐service employees; and
• ? potential inflation protection for retirees.

The RSP accomplishes this by allocating risk to sponsors and individuals differently than either a traditional DB plan or a DC plan. Unlike most DB plans, the RSP shifts investment and interest rate risks from plan sponsors to participants. Unlike DC plans, the RSP keeps longevity risk with the sponsor.     

Comparing Costs and Risks of Retirement Plans for Sponsors

This stochastic simulation analysis compares funding costs and volatilities for private sponsors of traditional defined benefit (DB), pension equity (PE), cash balance (CB), and defined contribution (DC) retirement plans. Plan provisions of equivalent benefit generosity in the different plan types are determined. The modeling includes current funding requirements and practices as well as a comprehensive set of uncertainties in asset and labor markets. The results show that costs and risks for sponsors vary significantly with plan types, investment and funding strategies, and participant demographics. The hybrid PE and CB plans exhibit characteristics of cost efficiency, as in the DB plan, and risk reduction, as in the DC plan, for plan sponsors under conventional investment strategies. These features are more saliently observed in the CB plan, but it is also more difficult to implement effective asset–liability management strategies for it.     

Private benefits of control and firm leverage: An analysis of Korean firms

This paper investigates the leverage choices of an entrenched controlling party. If debt effectively curbs the private benefits of control, the controlling shareholder is given incentives to avoid debt. Using estimates of the private benefits of control and financial statement data from selected Korean firms, we find that a controlling party with large private benefits tends to lower debt. This relationship was concentrated after the Asian financial crisis. However, before the crisis, firms that affiliated with Korean conglomerates, chaebols, used more debt as private benefits increased. A financial reform program triggered by the crisis seems to have actuated the disciplining role of debt. JEL Classification G32, G34     

Cash-Balance Plan Conversions: Evidence on Excise Taxes and Implicit Contracts

Firms that wish to switch from a traditional defined‐benefit pension plan to a defined‐contribution‐type plan have a choice between converting to a cash‐balance plan or replacing the defined‐benefit plan with a full‐fledged defined‐contribution plan. According to Ippolito and Thompson's (1999; Industrial Relations, 39: 228‐245) excise tax avoidance hypothesis, a number of firms have switched to cash‐balance plans because conversion allows the firm to avoid excise taxes on its excess pension assets. In contrast to existing studies, our evidence supports the excise tax avoidance hypothesis. Cash‐balance plan conversions also have been criticized for imposing pension losses on older employees. The implicit contract theory of pensions predicts that poorly performing firms would be the ones that would impose losses on employees. However, our evidence indicates that firms converting to cash‐balance plans typically are not poor performers.     

Making a successful transition to cash balance. Using employee choice and financial education

As employee work patterns change, the need for flexible plan design has increased. Hybrid plans such as cash balance plans offer a plan design variation that incorporates elements of the traditional defined benefit plan as well as those of defined contribution plans. This article examines plan design trends and discusses both negative and positive reactions to those trends. Finally, the solution of offering choice to plan participants is suggested, and the issues that must be considered are discussed.     

Socially responsible investment in Japanese pensions

As the level of retirement-related assets has grown, so too has public and private interest in so-called “Socially Responsible Investment” (SRI), an investment strategy that employs criteria other than the usual financial risk and return factors when selecting firms in which to invest. This study evaluates whether SRI indices would alter portfolio risk and return patterns for the new defined contribution pension plans currently on offer in Japan. We conclude that SRI funds can be included as an option, albeit with some cost; consequently, mandatory investment in SRI portfolios cannot reasonably be justified.     

The Earnings Implications of Pension Expense

Abstract

Recent challenges to the actuarial pension model and a movement to harmonize international accounting standards both suggest that the current Canadian standards for pension accounting, CICA 3461, may see substantial revision during upcoming years. To understand better the implications of these possible accounting changes, this paper presents the results of a stochastic analysis that quantifies how the volatility of pension expense for a sample of ten Canadian companies sponsoring defined benefit plans will be increased by the adoption of immediate recognition accounting. For certain companies this increase is significant and is shown to have a material earnings impact. The implications of this earnings volatility for the future of defined benefit pension plans are also explored.     

Own company stock in defined contribution pension plans: A takeover defense?

If managers induce employees to hold company stock in defined contribution pension plans as a form of takeover defense, then changes in state laws that enhance managerial protection should lead to a reduction in employer stock in 401(k) plans. Delaware's mid-1990s validation of the poison pill in conjunction with a staggered board was followed by a significant decline in employee ownership within defined contribution plans for firms incorporated in Delaware. Evidence using governance data suggests that this is due to responses of firms with staggered boards. Binary choice models confirm that employee ownership in defined contribution plans lowers takeover probabilities.     

Here it comes: defined contribution health care

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act includes provisions to make the individual health insurance marketplace one where all Americans, including those with preexisting health conditions, can obtain affordable coverage. At the same time, the act has failed to address, in any significant way, many of the underlying flaws in the current U.S. health care system that have caused costs to spiral out of control. The combination of persistent U.S. health care cost increases and a viable individual health insurance marketplace will cause a sea change in employer-sponsored health care offerings that is similar to that seen among employer-sponsored retirement benefit plans: movement away from defined benefit approaches and toward defined contribution designs. Although the authors show parallels between the evolution of employers' health care and retirement offerings, they explain why certain key developments will need to occur before defined contribution approaches become as prevalent in employer-sponsored health care plans as they are in today's employer-sponsored retirement plans.     

Pension Contributions and Firm Performance: Evidence from Frozen Defined Benefit Plans

We study the impact of freezing defined benefit (DB) pension plans and replacing them with defined contribution (DC) plans on liquidity, financial leverage, investment, and market value of a sample of firms over 2001‐2008. We find evidence that the pension freeze tends to attenuate the drain on corporate liquidity and relieve the pressure to borrow to pay for mandatory contributions (MCs) associated with underfunded DB plans. Although investors seem to favor the pension freeze as evidenced by positive announcement abnormal stock returns, there is little reliable evidence that the freeze increases investment efficiency and long‐term stock performance.     

The 1/n Pension Investment Puzzle

Abstract

This paper examines the so-called 1/n investment puzzle that has been observed in defined contribution plans whereby some participants divide their contributions equally among the available asset classes. It has been argued that this is a very naive strategy since it contradicts the fundamental tenets of modern portfolio theory. We use simple arguments to show that this behavior is perhaps less naive than it at first appears. It is well known that the optimal portfolio weights in a mean-variance setting are extremely sensitive to estimation errors, especially those in the expected returns. We show that when we account for estimation error, the 1/n rule has some advantages in terms of robustness; we demonstrate this with numerical experiments. This rule can provide a risk-averse investor with protection against very bad outcomes.     

Corporate taxes and defined benefit pension plans

The Tepper–Black arguments for tax-arbitrage opportunities from overfunding pension plans are critically examined and modifications proposed. Tax status, a function of current marginal tax rates and expected future taxable income, is predicted to determine funding policy. Tests of this modified tax benefits view suggest that 1) tax status declines are associated with pension contribution reductions, 2) reductions in contributions are related to previous excess contributions as well as non-pension tax shield increases causing the decline in tax status, and 3) cross-sectionally, tax status is related to fund levels, choice of actuarial variables, and the use of defined benefit plans.     

Die Abgrenzung beitragsbezogener Pensionspläne aus Sicht des Asset-Liability-Managements

As a first step towards establishing models for the asset liability management (ALM) of contribution based pension plans of German pension funds it is important to characterize the essential properties of such plans. It is shown that it is not appropriate to assume an equivalence between such plans and a ?Beitragszusage mit Mindestleistung” (contribution based pension plan with investment guarantee). Although the plans under consideration grant the participation in the asset returns generated by the pension fund, they also guarantee a benefit level. This shows clearly that it is impossible to apply traditional ALM models for defined contribution plans — which in general provide no minimum benefit guarantee — to German pension funds without substantial alterations.