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Ralph Walkling 《实用企业财务杂志》2008,20(1):28-46
Two of America's most prominent shareholder activists discuss three major issues surrounding the U.S. corporate governance system: (1) the case for increasing shareholder “democracy” by expanding investor access to the corporate proxy; (2) lessons for public companies in the success of private equity; and (3) the current level and design of CEO pay. On the first of the three subjects, Robert Monks suggests that the U.S. should adopt the British convention of the “extraordinary general meeting,” or “EGM,” which gives a majority of shareholders who attend the meeting the right to remove any or all of a company's directors “with or without cause.” Such shareholder meetings are permitted in virtually all developed economies outside the U.S. because, as Monks goes on to say, they represent “a far more efficient and effective solution than the idea of having shareholders nominate people for the simple reason that even very involved, financially sophisticated fiduciaries are not the best people to nominate directors.” Moreover, according to both Jensen and Monks, corporate boards in the U.K. do a better job than their U.S. counterparts of monitoring top management on behalf of shareholders. In contrast to the U.S., where the majority of companies continue to be run by CEO/Chairmen, over 90% of English companies are now chaired by outside directors, contributing to “a culture of independent‐minded chairmen capable of providing a high level of oversight.” In the U.S., by contrast, most corporate directors continue to view themselves as “employees of the CEO.” And, as a result, U.S. boards generally fail to exercise effective oversight and control until outside forces—often in the form of activist investors such as hedge funds and private equity—bring about a “crisis.” In companies owned and run by private equity firms, by contrast, top management is vigorously monitored and controlled by a board made up of the firm's largest investors. And the fact that the rewards to the operating heads of successful private equity‐controlled firms are typically multiples of those received by comparably effective public company CEOs suggests that the problem with U.S. CEO pay is not its level, but its lack of correlation with performance. 相似文献
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The success of Dell--it provides extraordinary rewards to shareholders, it can turn on a dime, and it has demonstrated impeccable timing in entering new markets--is based on more than its famous business model. High expectations and disciplined, consistent execution are embedded in the company's DNA. "We don't tolerate businesses that don't make money," founder Michael Dell tells HBR. "We used to hear all sorts of excuses for why a business didn't make money, but to us they all sounded like 'The dog ate my homework.' We just don't accept that." In order to double its revenues in a five-year period, the company had to adapt its execution-obsessed culture to new demands. In fact, Michael Dell and CEO Kevin Rollins realized they had a crisis on their hands."We had a very visible group of employees who'd gotten rich from stock options," Rollins says. "You can't build a great company on employees who say, 'If you pay me enough, I'll stay.'" Dell and Rollins knew they had to reignite the spirit of the company. They implemented an employee survey, whose results led to the creation of the Winning Culture initiative, now a top operating priority at Dell. They also defined the Soul of Dell: Focus on the customer, be open and direct in communications, be a good global citizen, have fun in winning. It turned outto be a huge motivator. And they increased the focus on developing people within the company. "We've changed as individuals and as an organization," Rollins says. "We want the world to see not just a great financial record and operational performance but a great company. We want to have leaders that other companies covet. We want a culture that makes people stick around for reasons other than money." 相似文献
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von Pierer H 《Harvard business review》2005,83(2):114-22, 150
In his 12 years at the helm of Siemens, CEO Heinrich von Pierer designed and directed a major transformation. Taking this German icon from a technically superb but slow-moving industrial giantto a disciplined yet nimble multinational has posed enormous challenges. Since 1992, Siemens has revamped its portfolio of businesses, expanded its reach into 192 countries, and created a more local-market-driven culture, gaining recognition as one of the best-managed and most competitive companies in the world. In this edited interview with HBR editor Thomas A. Stewart and consulting editor Louise O'Brien, von Pierer describes the requirements for transformation and culture change and how he broke down historical barriers at Siemens. He shares his insights about portfolio restructuring, his lessons from competing with GE, and the pros and cons of being based in Europe versus America. He reflects on the true start of globalization after the fall of the Berlin wall and on how dramatically the company needed to change in order to counter the resulting pricing pressures across all of its businesses. He talks, too, about the biggest challenge on his successor's desk-"the particular challenge of China;" he says. Amid all these topics, von Pierer reiterates the importance of people: "We all talk about people as our most important resource, but as a matter of fact, who's really taking care of people?... We need [their] backing. We can't afford to run into a situation where people no longer accept what we do." 相似文献
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Hassan F 《Harvard business review》2006,84(7-8):90-7, 188
Most CEOs who specialize in turning around struggling companies focus on costs. But for Fred Hassan, chairman and CEO of Schering-Plough, the primary focus in a turnaround is the top line. Since 2003, when Hassan took the helm at the global pharmaceutical company, he has overseen a remarkable recovery in performance. And consistent with his philosophy, the turnaround started with sales. Considering sales reps as less than crucial to strategy, Hassan cautions, is a big mistake. At Schering-Plough, he has concentrated on motivating and organizing salespeople to create trusting relationships with doctors. "You have to differentiate the salesperson in the customer's mind--just like you differentiate brands," he explains. A doctor may see 60 pharmaceutical reps on a regular basis but actually trust far fewer. To earn a spot in this inner circle, Schering-Plough reps try to turn each customer encounter into an occasion to help doctors provide better care for their patients. Schering-Plough also restructured its sales forces so that reps carry not just one kind of product, as they do in most pharmaceutical companies, but several. Covering a broad range of treatments gives reps more ways to build value-adding relationships with doctors. In this interview, Hassan discusses his success at Schering-Plough and his experiences at other pharmaceutical companies. During his career, he has built a reputation for being in tune with the front lines, as well as for reaching out to the managers who supervise salespeople. He has found that this level of personal attention not only makes reps feel respected but also gives him valuable strategic insights. 相似文献
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Wasserstein B 《Harvard business review》2008,86(1):106-13, 138
Few deal makers have been at it as long, and at such a high level, as Bruce Wasserstein, the chairman and CEO of the financial advisory and asset-management firm Lazard. In this edited interview, two HBR editors explore how he creates value as a manager, as a deal maker, and as a counselor to CEOs. Wasserstein, who has been a major figure in mergers and acquisitions for more than 30 years, talks about attracting and managing talent, building and sustaining a knowledge business, sizing up industries and companies, and crafting advice to help CEOs unlock value. At the heart of his approach is a singular ability to dissect a strategy's underlying premises in order to figure out whether a plan or deal "makes sense." Part of that determination involves understanding the broader context: Where is the industry going? What external factors will affect it? Such sensemaking informs every move Wasserstein makes, and it has paid off handsomely. In his career, he has helped broker more than a thousand deals, worth hundreds of billions of dollars. His intellect, creativity, and doggedness are what allow him to pick apart the most complex problems and devise novel solutions. In an age of specialization, he recognizes the importance of connecting the dots; he draws on the knowledge and skills of creative generalists as well as industry and regional specialists when setting up and executing deals. Wasserstein studied at Harvard University's business and law schools and at Cambridge University, helped lead First Boston's M&A practice, cofounded the investment-banking firm Wasserstein Perella Group, and then joined Lazard, which he famously took public in 2005 after disassembling a century and a half of family ownership. He is the 2007 recipient of Harvard Law School's Great Negotiator Award. 相似文献
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Palmisano S 《Harvard business review》2004,82(12):60-70, 148
Lou Gerstner's was a hard act to follow. As CEO in what were arguably IBM's darkest hours, Gerstner brought the company back from the brink. After nearly ten wrenching years, in which the big-machine manufacturer remade itself into a comprehensive software, hardware, and services provider, business was looking good. So the challenge for Sam Palmisano, when he took over as CEO in 2002, was to come up with a mandate for a second act in the company's transformation. His primary aim was to get different parts of the company working together so IBM could offer customers "integrated solutions"--hardware, software, services, and financing--at a single price. As part of this effort, he asked all of IBM's 320,000 employees, in 170 countries, to weigh in on a new set of shared corporate values. Over a 72-hour period, thousands of IBMers throughout the world gave Palmisano and his executive team an earful in an intranet discussion dubbed "Values-Jam," an often-heated debate about the company's heart and soul. Twenty-four hours into the exercise, at least one senior exec wanted to pull the plug. The jam had clearly struck a chord with employees, but it was a dissonant one, full of rancor and discontent. Palmisano let the discussion continue, and the next day, the mood began to shift. The criticism became more constructive. Out of the million words generated by the jam grew a set of values that, as Palmisano explains in this interview, are meant to guide the operational decisions made by IBM's employees-and, more important, to serve as Palmisano's mandate to continue the reinvention of the company. 相似文献
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抑制资本市场“老鼠仓”行为之法律思考 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
背信犯罪是一种破坏诚实信任关系并侵害他人财产的犯罪,我国现行<刑法>规定了多种特殊的背信犯罪.是否应设立普通背信罪,从1997年<刑法>修订至今,争论不休.本文通过对"老鼠仓"事件的探讨,分析背信罪的本质和构成要件,揭示增设背信罪的必要性在于弥补法律漏洞,增强<刑法>的稳定性和灵活性,从而更好地保障市场经济的健康发展. 相似文献
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