Smoothing Mechanisms in Defined Benefit Pension Accounting Standards: A Simulation Study*

The accounting for defined benefit (DB) pension plans is complex and varies significantly across jurisdictions despite recent international convergence efforts. Pension costs are significant, and many worry that unfavorable accounting treatment could lead companies to terminate DB plans, a result that would have important social implications. A key difference in accounting standards relates to whether and how the effects of fluctuations in market and demographic variables on reported pension cost are “smoothed". Critics argue that smoothing mechanisms lead to incomprehensible accounting information and induce managers to make dysfunctional decisions. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these mechanisms may vary. We use simulated data to test the volatility, representational faithfulness, and predictive ability of pension accounting numbers under Canadian, British, and international standards (IFRS). We find that smoothed pension expense is less volatile, more predictive of future expense, and more closely associated with contemporaneous funding than is “unsmoothed” pension expense. The corridor method and market‐related value approaches allowed under Canadian GAAP have virtually no smoothing effect incremental to the amortization of actuarial gains and losses. The pension accrual or deferred asset is highly correlated with the pension plan deficit/surplus. Our findings complement existing, primarily archival, pension accounting research and could provide guidance to standard‐setters.     

THE EFFECT OF SFAS 87 ON CORPORATE FUNDING OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS

Statement of Financia1 Accounting Standards No. 87 (SFAS 87) modifies the method of accounting for pensions by requiring companies sponsoring defined benefit pension plans to (1) recognize a balance sheet liability for unfunded pension benefits and (2) disclose their obligation for pension benefits based on expected future compensation levels (the projected benefit obligation). These requirements may affect users' perceptions of a company's financial position, especially if these plans are underfunded. This research examines whether the requirements of SFAS 87 result in increased funding of corporate pension plans to counteract possible adverse perceptions of users about these plans. The results indicate that early adopters (companies adopting SFAS 87 in 1985 and 1986) increased the funding of their defined benefit pension plans in response to SFAS 87 ; however, later adopters did not do so. These findings provide evidence that companies may alter economic policies when faced with significant changes in financial disclosure requirements. Further analysis suggests that the effect of SFAS 87 on the pension expense recognized by the sample companies provided impetus for early adoption of this pronouncement.     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

The Shift to Defined Contribution Pension Plans

Abstract

There has been a strong shift away from defined benefit (DB) pension plans toward defined contribution (DC) pension plans in the United States over the last 20 years. A variety of reasons for this shift have been proposed. In another paper in this issue, Krzysztof Ostaszewski presents a new hypothesis to explain the shift to DC plans in the United States. He argues that the decline in importance of DB plans is due to a shift in the way relative returns to macroeconomic factors of production, that is, capital and labor, are being rewarded in the national economy.

This paper attempts to test the Ostaszewski hypothesis using Canadian data. In Canada there has been only a slight decrease in DB plan coverage. It is shown that the Ostaszewski theory does not fit the Canadian experience well. Instead, it is argued that pension regulation and tax legislation play a crucial role in pension design and reform. It is also argued that the difference in pension regulation and taxation in Canada versus the United States has directly influenced plan sponsors in considering their pension objectives, costs, and risks. Differences in the proportion of the workforce that is unionized may also be important. The paper concludes that pension regulation and taxation are more important variables than are macroeconomic reward systems in the use of DB versus DC pension plans.     

“On the Merger of Two Companies,” Hans Gerber and Elias S. W. Shiu,July 2006

Abstract

Bankruptcy risk falls to pension plan participants if a plan sponsor fails when a defined benefit (DB) pension plan is underfunded. This article examines the incidence of that risk and how it changes when public policy provides a guarantee fund. Although government-based guarantee funds are in a unique position to provide pension protection, primarily because of the extent to which the risk of sponsor default is systematic in nature, a looming question is the extent to which such guarantees are exposed to moral hazard. The article focuses on that question using data from four Canadian provinces, including one (Ontario) that operates a guarantee fund for pensions. The findings show that plan assets per DB-plan participant increase with the earnings of workers and decrease with higher unemployment, and that level of assets also is moderated by the influence of taxes, with higher plan assets observed when and where tax rates are higher. Plans in Ontario had on average $20,035 less in asset value per participant, and Ontario plans covered by the guarantee fund had an average of $16,497 less per participant than other Canadian DB plans not backed by a guarantee fund. A separate model finds the presence of a guarantee fund to be one of a very small number of variables significant in explaining variability in the plans’ funded ratios. These empirical results are consistent with the existence of moral hazard.     

Managing Pension Risks: A Corporate Finance Perspective

Defined benefit (DB) pension plans of both U.S. and European companies are significantly underfunded because of the low interest rate environment and prior decisions to invest heavily in equities. Additional contributions and the recovery of stock markets since the end of the crisis have helped a bit but pension underfunding remains significant. Pension underfunding has substantial corporate finance implications. The authors show that companies with large pension deficits have historically delivered weaker share price performance than their peers and also trade at lower valuation multiples. Large deficits also reduce financial flexibility, increase financial risk, particularly in downside economic scenarios, and contribute to greater stock price volatility and a higher cost of capital. The authors argue that the optimal approach to managing DB pension risks relates to the risk tolerance of specific companies and their short and long‐term strategic and financial priorities. Financial executives should consider the follow pension strategies:

• Voluntary Pension Contributions: Funding the pension gap by issuing new debt or equity can provide valuation and capital structure benefits—and in many cases is both NPV‐positive and EPS‐accretive. The authors show that investors have reacted favorably to both debt‐ and equity‐financed contributions.
• Plan de‐risking: Shifting the pension plan's assets from equity to fixed income has become an increasingly popular approach. The primary purpose of pension assets is to fund pension liabilities while limiting risk to the operating company. The pension plan should not be viewed or run as a profit center.
• Plan Restructuring: Companies should also consider alternatives such as terminating and freezing plans, paying lump sums, and changing accounting reporting.

     

The Many Challenges of Pension Accounting

Accounting for defined benefit pension plans has long been a major issue in accounting. Standard‐setters are grappling with revisions to pension accounting standards, and much change has already occurred in the United Kingdom. This paper identifies and discusses most of the major issues that standard‐setters must confront in developing new approaches to financial reporting for pensions. Key issues concern how to report the impact of changes in assumptions, how to recognize pension costs on the balance sheet and income statement, and how to reconcile the differences between accountants' and actuaries' approaches to pensions. Current standards assume that accounting estimates are independent of actuarial assumptions, and yet require a direct comparison of the accounting liability with the pension plan assets, when in fact they are incompatible measures based on differing assumptions and differing methodologies. As well, accounting has been complicit in managers' wishes to hide the volatility inherent in a pension plan investment strategy that focuses on higher‐risk equities to fund estimated monetary liabilities that have been discounted at low‐risk interest rates. Drawing on studies and research done largely in Europe, this paper attempts to consolidate some of the current thinking on the topic and to propose some preferred approaches to dealing with the problems of pension accounting.     

Discretionary accounting choices: the case of IAS 19 pension accounting

Based on a sample of 3207 firm-year observations for the years 2005–2013, we investigate how stock-listed companies in France, Germany and the UK use two discretionary choices in their accounting for defined benefit pension plans under International Accounting Standard (IAS) 19 Employee Benefits. We first analyse companies’ decision whether to voluntarily early adopt the equity method of accounting for actuarial gains and losses. Second, we analyse companies’ choice to present pension interest cost and expected return on plan assets, or, in 2013, net pension interest cost, in operating or financial income. Our findings provide evidence that companies’ decisions to early adopt the equity method in 2005, the first year this accounting choice was available, were motivated by short-term effects on equity. Our analyses also indicate that the choice regarding where to present interest cost and expected return on plan assets in the income statement is associated with the resulting effect on Earnings before Interest and Tax. Finally, we document country-specific differences in the use of the discretion provided under IAS 19, suggesting that discretionary pension accounting choices may impede comparability.     

The Public Role of Actuaries in Private Pensions in Canada

Abstract

Actuaries have played prominent public roles in the development of occupational pension plans and social security arrangements in Canada. These roles include advising governments and government-appointed committees about regulatory structures, establishing funding standards, actively participating in regulatory functions, and pioneering valuation work for pension plans covering public sector employees. The formation in 1965 of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries led to the accreditation of actuaries in pension and tax legislation and to the development of actuarial standards of practice for pension work.     

Defined Benefit or Defined Contribution? A Study of Pension Choices

We solve an empirically parameterized life‐cycle model of consumption and pension choices to show how expected earnings growth and risk affect the benefits of final‐salary defined benefit (DB) pension plans, relative to pension plans that are defined contribution (DC) in nature. We use micro data on the pension choices of individuals to provide evidence consistent with the model predictions: (1) individuals who expect a higher growth rate of earnings are more likely to choose DB final‐salary schemes, and (2) individuals who face a higher variance of persistent income shocks are less likely to choose DB final‐salary schemes. We control for cohort and age fixed effects in the empirical analysis.     

Macroeconomic Aspects of Private Retirement Programs

Abstract

The decline in importance of private defined benefit plans in relation to defined contribution plans in the United States is a major issue of interest to pension actuaries. This decline has been attributed to numerous factors: costs of government regulation, societal and cultural changes, changed employer attitudes, and employees’ lack of understanding of defined benefit plans. It has also caused some observers to proclaim the end of private defined benefit plans. This paper analyzes possible macroeconomic factors contributing to the crisis of defined benefit plans and proposes an alternative hypothesis for the cause of the crisis: the decline of the relative attractiveness of defined benefit plans in relation to defined contribution plans when these are viewed as investments, that is, as securities in capital markets.     

Risk Allocation in Retirement Plans: A Better Solution

The corporate world is reconsidering the cost‐effectiveness of defined benefit pension plans while contemplating a change to defined contribution plans. This article begins by examining the three primary risks faced by sponsors of most DB pension plans—investment risk, interest rate risk, and longevity risk—and shows how shifting these risks to employees through a DC plan would affect both the corporation and the individual. Although DC plans clearly help companies manage risks, they provide at best an incomplete solution for individual participants. This article describes an innovation in pension design—the Retirement Shares Plan (RSP)—that combines many of the best features of DB and DC plans. An RSP provides:

• ? predictable and stable cost to the plan sponsor, with little chance of unfunded liabilities;
• ? lifetime income, guaranteeing that retirees will never outlive their benefits;
• ? a benefit accrual pattern comparable to that of traditional pension plans that preserves value for older, long‐service employees; and
• ? potential inflation protection for retirees.

The RSP accomplishes this by allocating risk to sponsors and individuals differently than either a traditional DB plan or a DC plan. Unlike most DB plans, the RSP shifts investment and interest rate risks from plan sponsors to participants. Unlike DC plans, the RSP keeps longevity risk with the sponsor.     

Equity Financial Assets: A Tool for Earnings Management—A Case Study of a Chinese Corporation

With China’s adoption of principles-based international accounting standards and its convergence with International Accounting Standard 39 (IAS 39), Chinese companies have discretion under the original Accounting Standards for Enterprises 22 (CAS 22) as to how they account for the initial measurement, sale, and subsequent reclassification of financial assets. We use a Chinese company (‘Company A’) as a case study to illustrate how earnings are managed to exploit this discretion. We document that the company re-classifies its available for sale equity investments as long-term equity investments to decrease the volatility of the company’s apparent profits. We also make some predictions regarding how the company will handle its financial assets under the new standard, which is the same as IFRS 9. Our research contributes to the continuous improvement of China’s accounting standards and has implications for regulators of the capital market.     

Pension roulette: have you bet too much on equities?

In the 1990s, funding pension obligations by investing in stocks looked smart. By 1999, the bull market had poured a collective $260 billion surplus into the pension coffers of the S&P 500, permitting the companies to record the year-to-year increases as additional income. But just two years later, the bear market had obliterated those gains, replacing them with a cavernous $240 billion deficit--which had to be offset by the unlucky firms' ongoing cash flows, wreaking havoc on their earnings, debt levels, and stock prices. Corporate executives may be blamed for this debacle. But they were only following the rules. Current accounting guidelines keep companies from recording pension liabilities and assets on their balance sheets, instead relegating them to the footnotes. That makes it hard to see the risk that market drops expose companies to. Board members and top executives need to look beyond distorted accounting numbers to the economic realities of pension plans. Once they do, they may be surprised to find that they would gain far greater value and flexibility by passively investing their pension funds entirely in bonds. A bond portfolio can be designed to meet precisely, and with virtual certainty, a company's pension obligation, thus eliminating the chance of a funding gap. The predictability of bond investments also stabilizes earnings and cash flow. The expanded corporate debt capacity that results can then be used to fuel growth or reduce the firm's overall cost of capital. Even without an overhaul of today's misguided accounting rules, there's little reason for companies' pension funds to hold anything other than bonds.     

Domestic Practice, Comparative International Analyses and Accounting Discretion—Italian Savings Banks' Pension Cost Accounting

In countries where the use of financial statements is minimal and relative accounting debate less intense, domestic practices may gain benefit from being consistently applied. Comparison with foreign experience is crucial. It leads to questioning of the appropriateness of practices that might otherwise never be discussed, particularly where they are developed in such a way as to favour the stakeholders controlling the accounting process. A salient example evidencing the above claims is to be found in the Italian savings banks (hereafter 'banks') accounting for the cost of defined benefits pension plans. The Italian financial system is credit-based. While banks play a predominant role, the financial industry itself enjoys significant autonomy in setting its accounting standards. This is especially so in respect of the accounting for the cost of pensions as savings banks have offered the most significant and almost unique example of employees' defined benefit pension plans in Italy.
  The present article compares some aspects of the long debated international and Anglo-Saxon standards' recommendations with the infrequently questioned Italian domestic practice. The substantial deviations that emerge in the Italian system favour particularly management and proprietorship by allowing a significant degree of discretion regarding the labour cost figure, thereby enhancing the banks' salary bargaining strength.     

Issues for Implementing Phased Retirement in Defined Benefit Plans

Abstract

U.S. society is aging. The nature of work has changed from work that requires physical strength to work based on knowledge. As a result, workers are beginning to phase into retirement rather than going directly from full-time work to full retirement. From a retirement income perspective, many final-average-pay defined benefit plans have features that make phased retirement difficult at best and detrimental at worst. U.S. pension law and regulations present barriers to phased retirement if the phased retiree wants to receive a portion of available pension benefits during phased retirement.

This paper examines private sector options to encourage phased retirement and to eliminate the disincentives that currently affect defined benefit plans. It offers alternative calculations of final average pay that do not penalize the part-time worker. It also demonstrates that the plan’s early retirement reduction and late retirement increase can be set to maintain actuarial equity throughout phased retirement. The paper presents benefit calculations with equal actuarial values for various payout patterns.

The paper discusses the coordination between phased retirement and subsidized early retirement. Finally, the paper notes some of the changes in ERISA that will be needed to facilitate phased retirement in defined benefit plans, especially for participants who want to receive pension distributions while working part time.     

Adoption of IAS 19R by Europe's premier listed companies: Corridor approach versus full recognition: Summary of an ACCA research monograph

This report provides a summary of a research monograph sponsored by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) [Fasshauer, J., Glaum, M., & Street, D. L. (2008). Adoption of IAS 19R by Europe's premier listed companies: Corridor approach versus full recognition. An ACCA research report, London] and is based on our in-depth analysis of the defined benefit pension plan disclosures provided in the year 2005 by companies constituting the premier segments of 20 European exchanges. Most importantly, the study identifies the method these companies selected under International Accounting Standard (IAS) 19 for the recognition of actuarial gains/losses, provides insight into factors affecting the policy choice between the methods allowed under IAS 19 for the recognition of actuarial gains/losses, and assesses the impact on profit and loss (P&L) and the balance sheet of using the new IAS 19 option of full recognition through the Statement of Recognized Gains and Losses (SORIE), in contrast to the traditional corridor approach. We also benchmark key pension assumptions against relevant country or industry averages.As accounting for defined benefit pension plans continues to evolve with the amendment of IAS 19, the recent issuance of SFAS 158 in the U.S., the release of The Financial Reporting of Pensions in Europe, and most notably the release of Preliminary Views on Amendments to IAS 19 Employee Benefits by the IASB, our research provides timely empirical evidence regarding important issues to be addressed in the IASB's current retirement benefits project.     

Determinants of Actuarial Valuation Method Changes for Pension Funding and Reporting: Evidence from the UK

This study examines various factors that potentially explain cross‐sectional variations in UK corporate managerial discretion to switch towards a market‐based actuarial pension valuation method for pension funding and reporting purposes. Evidence is based on accounting, actuarial and share market data for an industry‐matched pair sample of 90 UK firms. Consistent with our hypotheses we find that companies have a greater propensity to switch actuarial methods if they use lower discount rates, lower flow funding ratios and sponsor larger pension plans in the pre‐switch valuation year. These findings are consistent with the traditional perspective, which implies that UK corporate switching decisions are explained by characteristics of their defined benefit pension funds. The results run contrary to the findings of earlier US based studies that find that such choices can be explained from an alternative corporate financial perspective.     

A Computationally Efficient Algorithm for Estimating the Distribution of Future Annuity Values Under Interest-Rate and Longevity Risks

Abstract

This paper proposes a computationally efficient algorithm for quantifying the impact of interestrate risk and longevity risk on the distribution of annuity values in the distant future. The algorithm simulates the state variables out to the end of the horizon period and then uses a Taylor series approximation to compute approximate annuity values at the end of that period, thereby avoiding a computationally expensive “simulation-within-simulation” problem. Illustrative results suggest that annuity values are likely to rise considerably but are also quite uncertain. These findings have some unpleasant implications both for defined contribution pension plans and for defined benefit plan sponsors considering using annuities to hedge their exposure to these risks at some point in the future.     

What determines corporate pension fund risk-taking strategy?

Corporate sponsors of defined benefit pension plans generally assume low investment risk when they have low funding ratios and high default risk, consistent with the risk management hypothesis. However, for financially distressed sponsors and sponsors that freeze, terminate, or convert defined benefit to defined contribution plans, the risk-shifting incentive (moral hazard) dominates. Pension fund risk-taking is also affected by labor unionization and sponsor incentives to maximize tax benefits, restore financial slack, and justify the accounting choices of pension assumptions. Sponsors shift toward an aggressive risk strategy when their pension plans emerge from underfunding, bankruptcy risk is reduced, or marginal tax rate decreases. Overall, we show that corporate sponsors adopt a dynamic risk-taking strategy in their pension fund investments.