The Public Responsibility of Actuaries in American Pensions

Abstract

This article traces the history of the public responsibility of actuaries concerning American pension plans. It includes both defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans for employees of both private and public employers. It does not include Social Security. Actuaries have provided innovative approaches to plan design, funding, funding instruments, accounting, and legal and regulatory requirements. Actuaries have made substantial contributions that have enabled pension plans, together with Social Security, to provide economic security for millions of workers and their dependents when employment ends. However, many Americans still lack assurance of a retirement income that is initially adequate, continues for life, and keeps pace with inflation. Thus, challenges will continue to face pension actuaries in the years ahead.     

Developing Mortality Improvement Formulas

Abstract

Longevity improvements have contributed to widespread underfunding of pension plans and losses in insured annuity portfolios. Insurers might reasonably expect some upside from the effect of lower mortality on their life business. Although mortality improvement scales, such as the Society of Actuaries Scale AA, are widely employed in pension and annuity valuation, the derivation of these scales appears heuristic, leading to problems in deriving meaningful measures of uncertainty. We explore the evidence on mortality trends for the Canadian life insurance companies, data, using stochastic models. We use the more credible population data to benchmark the insured lives data. Finally, we derive a practical, model-based formula for actuaries to incorporate mortality improvement and the associated uncertainty into their calculations.     

Financing Gaps of Public Pension Schemes and Market Potential for the Private Retirement Market

Abstract

Increasing longevity, declining birth rates, and high unemployment severely threaten the financial basis of many public pension plans. These problems are most pronounced in continental Europe, where public pension plans tend to be relatively generous and are usually funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. Given the demographic development, future pension payments exceed the expected contribution payments. The resulting financing gaps can be seen as implicit public debts (net pension liabilities), which often exceed the value of GDP figures and are in many cases higher than the explicit public debt figures. If people would decide to cover these financing gaps via life insurance, life insurance premiums would triple in Germany, more than double in Italy, and double in Canada and France. The increase would be only moderate in the U.S. and particularly small in the U.K.     

The Earnings Implications of Pension Expense

Abstract

Recent challenges to the actuarial pension model and a movement to harmonize international accounting standards both suggest that the current Canadian standards for pension accounting, CICA 3461, may see substantial revision during upcoming years. To understand better the implications of these possible accounting changes, this paper presents the results of a stochastic analysis that quantifies how the volatility of pension expense for a sample of ten Canadian companies sponsoring defined benefit plans will be increased by the adoption of immediate recognition accounting. For certain companies this increase is significant and is shown to have a material earnings impact. The implications of this earnings volatility for the future of defined benefit pension plans are also explored.     

Multivariate Analysis of Pension Plan Mortality Data

Abstract

This paper uses the logistic regression model to examine private pension plan data for 1989–95 collected by the Retirement Plans Experience Committee of the Society of Actuaries. When only one explanatory variable, such as annuity class size, is used in modeling mortality rates, the model provides a reasonable fit to the data. Multiple explanatory variables give less satisfactory results.     

Issues for Implementing Phased Retirement in Defined Benefit Plans

Abstract

U.S. society is aging. The nature of work has changed from work that requires physical strength to work based on knowledge. As a result, workers are beginning to phase into retirement rather than going directly from full-time work to full retirement. From a retirement income perspective, many final-average-pay defined benefit plans have features that make phased retirement difficult at best and detrimental at worst. U.S. pension law and regulations present barriers to phased retirement if the phased retiree wants to receive a portion of available pension benefits during phased retirement.

This paper examines private sector options to encourage phased retirement and to eliminate the disincentives that currently affect defined benefit plans. It offers alternative calculations of final average pay that do not penalize the part-time worker. It also demonstrates that the plan’s early retirement reduction and late retirement increase can be set to maintain actuarial equity throughout phased retirement. The paper presents benefit calculations with equal actuarial values for various payout patterns.

The paper discusses the coordination between phased retirement and subsidized early retirement. Finally, the paper notes some of the changes in ERISA that will be needed to facilitate phased retirement in defined benefit plans, especially for participants who want to receive pension distributions while working part time.     

An examination of state and local government pension underfunding – Implications and guidance for governance and regulation

State and local government pension underfunding has become a major focus of public policy debate due in large part to recent Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) actions that have brought national attention to the issue. The extent of these plans underfunding has been debated, along with the necessity for state government intervention and the level of regulatory actions that should be enacted by state legislatures. State and local public pension plans do not fall under the enumerated powers of the federal government in the Constitution and are therefore left to each individual state to regulate. The amount of plan underfunding and enacted public policy by state varies greatly. Additionally, in contrast to numerous state balanced-budget laws, legal directives for fully funding public pensions are virtually non-existent. This paper analyzes the state and local public pension crisis, examines current and long-term risk, studies public employee fiscal conditions, considers the societal impacts of these plans, considers the strengths and weakness of pension plan types, recommends public policy and regulation, and offers strategies for managers, board members, and public officials to adopt.     

The Shift to Defined Contribution Pension Plans

Abstract

There has been a strong shift away from defined benefit (DB) pension plans toward defined contribution (DC) pension plans in the United States over the last 20 years. A variety of reasons for this shift have been proposed. In another paper in this issue, Krzysztof Ostaszewski presents a new hypothesis to explain the shift to DC plans in the United States. He argues that the decline in importance of DB plans is due to a shift in the way relative returns to macroeconomic factors of production, that is, capital and labor, are being rewarded in the national economy.

This paper attempts to test the Ostaszewski hypothesis using Canadian data. In Canada there has been only a slight decrease in DB plan coverage. It is shown that the Ostaszewski theory does not fit the Canadian experience well. Instead, it is argued that pension regulation and tax legislation play a crucial role in pension design and reform. It is also argued that the difference in pension regulation and taxation in Canada versus the United States has directly influenced plan sponsors in considering their pension objectives, costs, and risks. Differences in the proportion of the workforce that is unionized may also be important. The paper concludes that pension regulation and taxation are more important variables than are macroeconomic reward systems in the use of DB versus DC pension plans.     

Life Expectancy in the Future

Abstract

The public responsibility of life insurance actuaries has changed from supervisory compliance with detailed state laws to certifying adherence to more general regulatory objectives complemented by actuarial standards of practice.     

Growth of the Public Responsibility of Actuaries in Life Insurance

Abstract

The public responsibility of life insurance actuaries has changed from supervisory compliance with detailed state laws to certifying adherence to more general regulatory objectives complemented by actuarial standards of practice.     

Making Federal Pension Policy Work

Abstract

Millions of Americans retire while they are still productive. Of these, many will have the resources to enjoy all of their golden years. Unfortunately, many others will face economic hardships after they have exhausted their own resources but have become too frail to return to work. Part of the problem is that the current pension system is fraught with financial incentives that push ablebodied elderly workers into retirement just when they should instead be encouraged to remain in the workforce to accumulate additional retirement assets. This paper recommends a number of ways to change federal pension laws in order to encourage elderly workers to remain in the workforce. For example, this paper recommends toughening the penalty on premature distributions, repealing the minimum distribution rules, and repealing the exceptions to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act that permit retirement plans to provide early retirement incentives and subsidies.

This paper also considers whether the government should require that all retirement plans be neutral as to the timing of retirement. In an age-neutral world, workers would always accrue more benefits if they kept working. Consequently, more workers would remain in the workforce, accumulating additional assets for their eventual retirement.

Finally, this paper also considers how federal pension policy could help counteract the tendency of Americans to retire too early because they underestimate their life expectancies, overestimate their financial resources, and fail to understand the deleterious effects of inflation. In particular, this paper recommends that the government require that virtually all retirement plans pay at least a portion of their benefits in the form of an inflation-adjusted annuity.     

“On the Merger of Two Companies,” Hans Gerber and Elias S. W. Shiu,July 2006

Abstract

Bankruptcy risk falls to pension plan participants if a plan sponsor fails when a defined benefit (DB) pension plan is underfunded. This article examines the incidence of that risk and how it changes when public policy provides a guarantee fund. Although government-based guarantee funds are in a unique position to provide pension protection, primarily because of the extent to which the risk of sponsor default is systematic in nature, a looming question is the extent to which such guarantees are exposed to moral hazard. The article focuses on that question using data from four Canadian provinces, including one (Ontario) that operates a guarantee fund for pensions. The findings show that plan assets per DB-plan participant increase with the earnings of workers and decrease with higher unemployment, and that level of assets also is moderated by the influence of taxes, with higher plan assets observed when and where tax rates are higher. Plans in Ontario had on average $20,035 less in asset value per participant, and Ontario plans covered by the guarantee fund had an average of $16,497 less per participant than other Canadian DB plans not backed by a guarantee fund. A separate model finds the presence of a guarantee fund to be one of a very small number of variables significant in explaining variability in the plans’ funded ratios. These empirical results are consistent with the existence of moral hazard.     

An analysis of risk-taking behavior for public defined benefit pension plans

This paper presents the first comprehensive study on the determinants of public pension fund investment risk and reports several new important findings. Unlike private pension plans, public funds undertake more risk if they are underfunded and have lower investment returns in the previous years, consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis. Furthermore, pension funds in states facing fiscal constraints allocate more assets to equity and have higher betas. There also appears to be a herding effect in that CalPERS equity allocation or beta is mimicked by other pension funds. Finally, our results suggest that government accounting standards strongly affect pension fund risk, as higher return assumptions (used to discount pension liabilities) are associated with higher equity allocation and portfolio beta.     

Impact of Replacing a Defined Benefit Pension with a Defined Contribution Plan or a Cash Balance Plan

Abstract

Four pension plan conversions are examined to determine the impact on retirement benefits of workers. The study was based on interviews with top management, employee surveys, and actuarial analysis of retirement benefits under the old and new pension plans. In general, workers who leave the firm prior to the age of early retirement can expect increased benefits under the new defined contribution and cash balance plans, whereas older, more senior workers can expect to accrue smaller benefits after the plan conversions. Recognizing these potential adverse effects, the employers in our studies provided various types of transition benefits to existing workers or gave employees the choice of remaining in the old defined benefit plan. Employee surveys reveal that younger workers are more supportive of the new pension plans than are older workers. These case studies also indicate that communication by managements with their employees is very important to the successful implementation of plan conversions.     

养老金计划与个人所得税政策

不同税制模式和个人所得税征税方式对养老金计划的影响不同,而养老金计划的个人所得税政策如何定位又主要取决于公共政策对储蓄以及不同储蓄形式的态度。比较国际实践,从税制模式、储蓄传统和长期资产管理来看,我国公共政策不需要鼓励养老金储蓄,但从金融体系的稳定和长远发展来看,又需要对养老金储蓄形式给予一定的鼓励。因此,我国个人所得税政策应该对其给予适当税收激励,但不需要很大力度。考虑到我国分类征收的个人所得税制,本文认为,我国个人所得税对养老金计划应该采取TEE模式(养老金缴款不允许税前扣除、对未支付的资本收益或资本利得不征税、对领取的全部养老金收入不征税)。     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

“Author’s Reply: Critique of Mexico’s New Social Security Act”, Octavio Maupomé-Carvantes,July, 1999

Abstract

This paper considers the pension plan as part of the capital structure of the sponsoring employer. This enables lessons from financial theory concerning capital structure to be used to answer the question, “What assets should a pension fund hold?” The standard Modigliani-Miller framework is expanded on to consider the implications of corporate tax. This leads to the conclusion that bond investment for pension plans has tangible advantages over holding risky assets (e.g., equities). The paper considers a case study of the pension plan of the Boots Company, a U.K. pharmacy retailer with a pension fund of around £2.3 billion ($3.5 billion), where these ideas were put into practice. Finally, the paper discusses the value released to shareholders and the extra security members of the pension fund have derived from putting theory into practice.     

Macroeconomic Aspects of Private Retirement Programs

Abstract

The decline in importance of private defined benefit plans in relation to defined contribution plans in the United States is a major issue of interest to pension actuaries. This decline has been attributed to numerous factors: costs of government regulation, societal and cultural changes, changed employer attitudes, and employees’ lack of understanding of defined benefit plans. It has also caused some observers to proclaim the end of private defined benefit plans. This paper analyzes possible macroeconomic factors contributing to the crisis of defined benefit plans and proposes an alternative hypothesis for the cause of the crisis: the decline of the relative attractiveness of defined benefit plans in relation to defined contribution plans when these are viewed as investments, that is, as securities in capital markets.     

Guaranteeing Defined Contribution Pensions: The Option to Buy Back a Defined Benefit Promise

After a long commitment to defined benefit (DB) pension plans for U.S. public sector employees, many state legislatures have introduced defined contribution (DC) plans for their public employees. In this process, investment risk that was previously borne by state DB plans has now devolved to employees covered by the new DC plans. In light of this trend, some states have introduced a guarantee mechanism to help protect DC plan participants. One such guarantee takes the form of an option permitting DC plan participants to buy back their DB benefit for a price. This article develops a theoretical framework to analyze the option design and illustrate how employee characteristics influence the option's cost. We illustrate the potential impact of a buy‐back option in a pension reform enacted recently by the State of Florida for its public employees. If employees were to exercise the buy‐back option optimally, the market value of this option could represent up to 100 percent of the DC contributions over their work life.     

Risk Allocation in Retirement Plans: A Better Solution

The corporate world is reconsidering the cost‐effectiveness of defined benefit pension plans while contemplating a change to defined contribution plans. This article begins by examining the three primary risks faced by sponsors of most DB pension plans—investment risk, interest rate risk, and longevity risk—and shows how shifting these risks to employees through a DC plan would affect both the corporation and the individual. Although DC plans clearly help companies manage risks, they provide at best an incomplete solution for individual participants. This article describes an innovation in pension design—the Retirement Shares Plan (RSP)—that combines many of the best features of DB and DC plans. An RSP provides:

• ? predictable and stable cost to the plan sponsor, with little chance of unfunded liabilities;
• ? lifetime income, guaranteeing that retirees will never outlive their benefits;
• ? a benefit accrual pattern comparable to that of traditional pension plans that preserves value for older, long‐service employees; and
• ? potential inflation protection for retirees.

The RSP accomplishes this by allocating risk to sponsors and individuals differently than either a traditional DB plan or a DC plan. Unlike most DB plans, the RSP shifts investment and interest rate risks from plan sponsors to participants. Unlike DC plans, the RSP keeps longevity risk with the sponsor.