Stock market margin requirements and volatility: Implications for regulation of stock index futures

This article reexamines the evidence on the relationship between stock market margin buying and volatility, and discusses the implications for the regulation of futures markets margin requirements. Post-war data provide no evidence of a link between the initial margin requirements set by the Federal Reserve and stock market volatility. Over the entire period in which the Federal Reserve has set margin requirements (1934-present), there is a correlation between margin requirements and margin debt on the one hand and volatility on the other. However, margin debt is not primarily associated with downside volatility and margin requirements are not primarily associated with upside volatility, as would be expected if margin buying were the cause of the volatility. Thus, the experience with stock market margin requirements provides no support for regulating futures markets margins in order to curb volatility. While this evidence does not rule out the possibility that margin buying contributed to the speculative boom of the 1920s and the 1929 crash, margin debt represented a much greater fraction of the 1929 stock market than have stock market futures in the 1980s. Even taking the experience of the 1920s into account, therefore, there is still no justification for regulating futures margins in order to curb volatility.This article was prepared for the Columbia Center for the Study of Futures Markets Conference on Regulatory and Structural Reform of Stock and Futures Markets.     

Margin Regulation and Stock Market Volatility

Using daily and monthly stock returns we find no convincing evidence that Federal Reserve margin requirements have served to dampen stock market volatility. The contrary conclusion, expressed in recent papers by Hardouvelis (1988a , b ), is traced to flaws in his test design. We do detect the expected negative relation between margin requirements and the amount of margin credit outstanding. We also confirm the recent finding by Schwert (1988) that changes in margin requirements by the Fed have tended to follow rather than lead changes in market volatility.     

Initial margin policy and stochastic volatility in the crude oil futures market

This article examines the relationship between the volatilityof the crude oil futures market and changes in initial marginrequirements. To closely match changes in futures market volatilitywith the corresponding changes in margin requirements, we inferthe volatility of the futures market from the prices of crudeoil futures options contracts. Using a mean-reverting diffusionprocess for volatility, we show that changes in margin policydo not affect subsequent market volatility.     

Race to the center: competition for the Nikkei 225 futures trade

This paper examines the impact of changes in margin requirements on returns, transaction volume, and price volatility of the Nikkei 225 futures traded on the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE) and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). An increase in margin requirement on one exchange reduces its trading volume and shifts trade to the competing exchange. Both conditional price volatility and returns are not systematically affected by changes in margin requirements. The loss of OSE's market share of the Nikkei futures trade from 1990 to 1993 is partly due to the increased transactions costs (relative to SIMEX), including the margin requirement.     

Margin requirements and stock volatility

Since 1934 the Federal Reserve Board has had the power to set separate limits on the amount of credit that can be extended to purchasers of common stock. There has been much recent debate about the efficacy of these margin regulations. This article argues that the Fed has responded to increases in stock prices by raising margin requirements. The increase in prices has been associated with a decrease in volatility. There is no evidence that changes in margin requirements reduce subsequent stock return volatility. Also, trading halts have not had much effect on volatility in the past. Trading halts that were associated with banking panics were associated with high stock return volatility, but halts without bank panics were not associated with high levels of volatility.This article summarizes discussion that was presented at the Columbia Center for the Study of Futures Markets Conference on Regulatory Reform of Stock and Futures Markets, May 12, 1989.     

Collateral smile

We analyze the impact of funding costs and margin requirements on index options traded on the CBOE. Assuming differential borrowing and lending rates, we derive no-arbitrage bounds for European options. We show that funding costs and the CBOE’s margin requirements lead to a price increase, which translates into skew and smile patterns for implied volatility curves even under constant volatilities. Empirical tests confirm that our model-implied slopes have significant statistical power in explaining the slopes observed in the market. Hence, at least in part, funding costs and collateral requirements offer an institutional explanation of the volatility smile phenomenon.     

Impact of FDICIA internal controls on bank risk taking

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 was designed, among other things, to introduce risk-based deposit insurance, increase capital requirements, and improve banks’ internal controls. Of particular interest in this study are the requirements for annual audit and reporting of management’s and auditor’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control for banks with $500 million or more in total assets (raised to $1 billion in 2005). We study the impact of these requirements on banks’ risk-taking behavior prior to the recent financial crisis and the consequent implications for bank failure and financial trouble during the crisis period. Using a sample of 1138 banks, we provide evidence that banks required to comply with the FDICIA internal control requirements have lower risk taking in the pre-crisis period. Specifically, the volatility of net interest margin, the volatility of earnings, and Z score show less risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, these banks are less likely to experience failure and financial trouble during the crisis period.     

Filtered Historical Simulation for Initial Margin of Interest Rate Swap Under Korean Market

We discuss how to determine the margin of interest rate portfolio under Korean interest rate market when the trades are cleared through a clearing house. The analysis is based on the filtered historical simulation using the EWMA and GARCH model for the interest rate process. Due to the irregular feature in the short tenor rates, we observe the instabilities of the filtered processes by the EWMA model, and we propose how to mitigate the instability. We also explain the properties of the inferred volatility processes depending on the volatility model, the observation interval of the interest rate series, and the parameter choice.     

Initial margin requirements and stock returns volatility: Another look

This article investigates the relationship between initial margin requirements and stock return volatility. Volatility is measured using a GARCH in Mean model. We find no evidence of an empirical relationship between margin requirements and the volatility of the S&P 500 index portfolio's excess returns. Evidence from short-sale data, and model sensitivity analysis are presented which support the hypothesis of no margin-volatility relationship. The results are consistent with the intertemporal CAPM model of Merton (1973) with an aggregate relative risk aversion measure of 4.1. In addition, we find evidence of long-term memory in conditional return distributions' volatility.The analysis and conclusions of this article are those of the author and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff, by the Board of Governors, or by the Federal Reserve Banks.     

Information, Trading Demand, and Futures Price Volatility

We examine the relation between futures price volatility and trading demand by type of trader in the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500-stock index futures market. We find that volatility covaries negatively with signed speculative demand shocks but is positively related to signed hedging demand shocks. No significant relation between volatility and demand shocks for small traders is found. Our results suggest that changes in positions of large hedgers destabilize the market, whereas changes in positions of large speculators stabilize volatility. Consistent with models with asymmetrically informed traders, we find that large speculators are likely to possess superior forecasting ability, large hedgers behave like positive feedback traders, and small traders are liquidity traders.     

Initial Margin Requirements, Volatility, and the Individual Investor: Insights from Japan

Initial margin requirements represent: (1) a cost impediment to the wealth constrained investor and (2) a potential way of mitigating excessive volatility. However, prior empirical research finds that margins are not an effective tool in reducing volatility. We consider the possibility that margins primarily affect certain stocks and investors. Specifically, we test whether margins affect individuals who, as a group, we believe to be the investors most affected when margin requirements change. Our initial empirical tests, however, do not support this contention.     

An Empirical Analysis of Futures Margin Changes: Determinants and Policy Implications

Margin regulation raises two policy concerns. First, an alignment of margins to volatility can amplify procyclicality, leading to a build-up of excess leverage in good times and a forced deleverage in bad times. Second, competition among central counterparties (CCPs) can result in lower margin levels in order to attract more trading volume, which is referred to as a “race to the bottom.” Motivated by these issues, we empirically analyze the determinants of margin changes by using a data set of various futures margins from Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Group. We first find that CME Group raises margins quickly following volatility spikes but does not immediately lower margins following volatility declines, implying that margin-induced procyclicality is more of a concern in recessions than in expansions. In addition, we find some evidence that the margin difference between CME Group and its competitor, Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), is an important driver of margin changes after changes in other margin determinants are controlled for, implying that competition may be factored into margin setting.     

Margin Requirements, Volatility, and Market Integrity: What Have We Learned Since the Crash?

This study assesses the state of the policy debate that surrounds the federal regulation of margin requirements. A review of the literature finds no undisputed evidence that supports the hypothesis that margin requirements can be used to control stock return volatility and correspondingly little evidence that suggests that margin-related leverage is an important underlying source of excess volatility. The evidence does not support the hypothesis that there is a stable inverse relationship between the level of Regulation T margin requirements and stock returns volatility nor does it support the hypothesis that the leverage advantage in equity derivative products is a source of additional returns volatility in the stock market.     

Samuelson Hypothesis & Indian Commodity Derivatives Market

Samuelson (1965) devised that futures price volatility increases as the futures contract approaches its expiration. The relation amid the volatility and time to maturity has significant inference for hedging strategies. Interestingly, so far the empirical evidence in favor of the Samuelson Hypothesis (maturity effect) is mixed in various markets. Considering no significant work to examine the relationship is so far carried out in commodity derivative markets of India, this paper ordeal the Samuelson Hypothesis on 8 commodities traded on Multi-Commodity Exchange (MCX), India. We have examined the issue by applying different regression techniques to test the hypothesis for 8 commodities (Aluminium, Nickel, Copper, Gold, Silver, Natural Gas, Crude Oil and Wheat) using inter-day data on MCX India. In order to test the Samuelson’s hypothesis, tests have been conducted using a series of GARCH, EGARCH and TGARCH models by including trading volume, open interest and time-to-maturity in the conditional variance equation. From our results, it is concluded that Samuelson’s hypothesis does not hold true for majority of commodity contracts considered. Our results also find that volatility series depend on the trading volume, compared to the time-to-maturity or open interest. As Samuelson hypothesis does not hold true for majority of commodity contracts, traders in Indian commodity derivative markets should not bias their decisions solely based on the time-to-maturity, but should also consider trading volume and open interest as they are an important determinant of price volatility. They should also consider the possibility of leverage effect while predicting future price volatilities, and the associated margin requirements.     

Heterogeneous expectations and long-range correlation of the volatility of asset returns

Inspired by the recent literature on aggregation theory, we attempt to relate the long-range correlation of the stock return volatility to the heterogeneity of the investors' expectations concerning the level of the future volatility. Based on a semi-parametric model of investors' anticipations, we make the connection between the distributional properties of the heterogeneity parameters and the auto-covariance/auto-correlation functions of the realized volatility. We report different behaviors, or change of convention, the observation of which depends on the market phase under consideration. In particular, we report and justify the fact that the volatility exhibits significantly longer memory during phases of a speculative bubble than during the recovery phase following the collapse of a speculative bubble.     

Double leverage cycle,interest rate,and financial crisis

We view mortgage as a risky derivative of its underlying house collateral and combine no-arbitrage valuation with equilibrium valuation approaches to develop a dynamic model of leverage cycle and interest rate. This model provides a unified explanation to pro-cyclical optimism, asset prices, and leverage, and counter-cyclical volatility and interest rate. In addition, the model shows that tightening funding margin in the mortgage securities market dampens optimism, asset prices, and leverage, whereas it raises volatility and interest rate in the housing market. A double leverage cycle leads to more volatile markets and a severe leverage cycle, thus resulting in worse financial crises.     

Modeling volatility and changes in the swap spread

We investigate the determinants of changes in U.S. interest rate swap spreads using a model that explicitly allows for volatility interactions between swaps of different terms to maturity. Changes in the swap spread are found to be positively related to interest rate volatility, to changes in the default risk premium in the corporate bond market, and to changes in the liquidity premium for government securities. Swap spread changes are negatively related to changes in the level of interest rates and changes in the slope of the term structure. We also find that there is a strong and significant volatility interaction among spreads for swaps of different maturities and that the process for the conditional variance of the spread is highly persistent across all maturities.     

Hot Money and Business Cycle Volatility: Evidence from Selected ASEAN Countries

This study investigates the linkage between speculative capital and business cycles in Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore from 1981:Q1 to 2012:Q4. We use the multivariate Markov-switching intercept autoregressive heteroskedasticity vector autoregressive (MSIAH-VAR) model and observe that while speculative shocks during the tranquil period temporarily promoted Malaysia’s economic growth, they temporarily damaged economic growth in Thailand and Singapore. Moreover, speculative capital flows from abroad exacerbated economic volatility and damaged economic growth prospects for all these countries during the crisis period. Thus, it may be important for policymakers to take appropriate actions against the potential risk of economic instability and market volatility from speculative capital.     

Animal Spirits,Margin Requirements,and Stock Price Volatility

A simple overlapping generations model is used to characterize the effects of initial margin requirements on the volatility of risky asset prices. Investors are assumed to exhibit heterogeneous preferences for risk-bearing, the distribution of which evolves stochastically across generations. This framework is used to show that imposing a binding initial margin requirement may either increase or decrease stock price volatility, depending upon the microeconomic structure behind fluctuations in economy-wide average risk-bearing propensity. The ambiguous effect on volatility similarly arises when the source of heterogeneity is noise trader beliefs.     

Margin requirements and equilibrium asset prices

This paper studies the effect of margin requirements on asset prices and trading volume in a general equilibrium asset pricing model where Epstein-Zin investors differ in their degree of risk aversion. Under the assumptions of unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution and zero net supply of riskless assets, I show analytically that binding margin requirements do not affect stock prices. This result stands in contrast to previous partial equilibrium analysis where fixed margin requirements increase the volatility of stock prices. In this framework, binding margin requirements induce a fall in the riskless rate, increase its volatility, and increase stock trading volume.