The Delisting Bias in CRSP Data

I document a delisting bias in the stock return data base maintained by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I find that delists for bankruptcy and other negative reasons are generally surprises and that correct delisting returns are not available for most of the stocks that have been delisted for negative reasons since 1962. Using over-the-counter price data, I show that the omitted delisting returns are large. Implications of the bias are discussed.     

Mutual Fund Incubation

Incubation is a strategy for initiating new funds, where multiple funds are started privately, and, at the end of an evaluation period, some are opened to the public. Consistent with incubation being used by fund families to increase performance and attract flows, funds in incubation outperform nonincubated funds by 3.5% risk‐adjusted, and when they are opened to the public they attract higher flows. Postincubation, however, this outperformance disappears. This performance reversal imparts an upward bias to returns that is not removed by a fund size filter. Fund age and ticker creation date filters, however, eliminate the bias.     

Rating mutual funds: Construction and information content of an investor-cost based rating of Danish mutual funds

We develop a new rating of mutual funds: the atpRating. The atpRating assigns crowns to each individual mutual fund based upon the costs an investor pays when investing in the fund in relation to what it would cost to invest in the fund's peers. Within each investment category, the rating assigns five crowns to funds with the lowest costs and one crown to funds with the highest costs.We investigate the ability of the atpRating to predict the future performance of a fund. We find that an investor who has invested in the funds with the lowest costs within an investment category would have obtained a risk-adjusted excess return that is approximately 3–4 percentage points higher per annum than if the funds with the highest costs had been invested in.We compare the atpRating with the Morningstar Rating. We show that one reason why the atpRating and the Morningstar Rating contain different information is that the returns Morningstar uses as inputs when rating funds are highly volatile whereas the costs the atpRating uses as inputs when rating funds are highly persistent. In other words, a fund that has low costs one year will most likely also have low costs the following year, whereas the return of a fund in a certain year generally contains only little information about the future return that the fund will generate.Finally, we have information on the investments in different mutual funds made by a small subgroup of investors known to have been exposed to both the atpRating and the Morningstar Rating. We find that investors have clear preferences for funds rated high by both the atpRating and the Morningstar Rating.     

Management team structure and mutual fund performance

We investigate the relationship between performance and portfolio management team structure of open-end mutual funds during 1997–2004. We first analyze differences in performance and risk taking between single-manager and multiple-manager mutual funds and find that the latter underperform the single-manager funds in terms of risk-adjusted returns during the 2001–2004 bear market. This underperformance is more evident among growth-oriented funds. There are no differences observed in the 1997–2000 bull market. Not all multiple-manager funds, however, are managed by pure teams. When we compare the performance of single-manager and pure-team funds we do not find any differences in performance. The underperformance of multiple-manager funds documented in previous studies comes from multiple-manager funds that employ many investment advisors and, therefore, their exact management structure is unknown. We also document differences in management structure reporting between Morningstar and CRSP.     

Caveat Compounder: A Warning about Using the Daily CRSP Equal-Weighted Index to Compute Long-Run Excess Returns

This paper issues a warning that compounding daily returns of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) equal-weighted index can lead to surprisingly large biases. The differences between the monthly returns compounded from the daily tapes and the monthly CRSP equal-weighted indices is almost 0.43 percent per month, or 6 percent per year. This difference amounts to one-third of the average monthly return, and is large enough to reverse the conclusions of a paper using the daily tape to compute the return on the benchmark portfolio. We also investigate the sources of these biases and suggest several alternative strategies to avoid them.     

Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance

We estimate parameters of standard stock selection and markettiming models using daily mutual fund returns and quarterlymeasurement periods. We then rank funds quarterly by abnormalreturn and measure the performance of each decile the followingquarter. The average abnormal return of the top decile in thepost-ranking quarter is 39 basis points. The post-ranking abnormalreturn disappears when funds are evaluated over longer periods.These results suggest that superior performance is a short-livedphenomenon that is observable only when funds are evaluatedseveral times a year.     

On Mutual Fund Investment Styles

Most mutual funds adopt investment styles that cluster arounda broad market benchmark. Few funds take extreme positions awayfrom the index, but those who do are more likely to favor growthstocks and past winners. The bias toward glamour and the tendencyof poorly performing value funds to shift styles may reflectagency and behavioral considerations. After adjusting for style,there is evidence that growth managers on average outperformvalue managers. Though a fund's factor loadings and its portfoliocharacteristics generally yield similar conclusions about itsstyle, an approach using portfolio characteristics predictsfund returns better.     

European Mutual Fund Performance

This paper presents an overview of the European mutual fund industry and investigates mutual fund performance using a survivorship bias controlled sample of 506 funds from the five most important mutual fund countries. The latter is done using the Carhart (1997) 4-factor asset-pricing model. In addition we investigate whether European fund managers exhibit 'hot hands', persistence in performance. Finally the influence of fund characteristics on risk-adjusted performance is considered. Our overall results suggest that European mutual funds, and especially small cap funds are able to add value, as indicated by their positive after cost alphas. If we add back management fees, four out of five countries exhibit significant out-performance at an aggregate level. Finally, we detect strong persistence in mean returns for funds investing in the UK. Our results deviate from most US studies that argue mutual funds under-perform the market by the amount of expenses they charge.     

On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance

Using a sample free of survivor bias, I demonstrate that common factors in stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds' mean and risk-adjusted returns. Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser's (1993) “hot hands” result is mostly driven by the one-year momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) , but individual funds do not earn higher returns from following the momentum strategy in stocks. The only significant persistence not explained is concentrated in strong underperformance by the worst-return mutual funds. The results do not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio managers.     

Fund Manager Succession in Closed-End Mutual Funds

Managing the succession process by the hiring and firing of key executives is one of the important functions of a board of directors. In this research we study successions of fund managers in the closed‐end mutual fund industry. The agency issues inherent in closed‐end mutual funds makes them a unique laboratory for such a study. Our results suggest that while the overall abnormal returns of these manager changes are statistically insignificant, that the returns are more positive for funds with large expense ratios and for funds trading at a discount. We also find the abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of inside director stock ownership. Corporate bond funds and international equity funds react more negatively to these announcements than other types of funds. The abnormal returns do not appear to be related to board composition, but board composition does vary across fund type, and may therefore indirectly influence the results.     

Mutual fund corporate culture and performance

In this paper we test if a mutual fund's own corporate culture predicts fund performance. To do this we use Morningstar's corporate culture ratings for mutual funds and then examine the ability of these corporate culture ratings to predict risk-adjusted performance of domestic equity funds over the period 2005–2010. Using methods that are robust to survivorship bias, we find there is little significant evidence that corporate culture predicts better fund performance. Indeed, we find that no individual component of the Morningstar stewardship rating including board quality, fees, manager incentives and regulatory issues is able to consistently predict fund performance.     

Measuring Mutual Fund Performance with Characteristic-Based Benchmarks

This article develops and applies new measures of portfolio performance which use benchmarks based on the characteristics of stocks held by the portfolios that are evaluated. Specifically, the benchmarks are constructed from the returns of 125 passive portfolios that are matched with stocks held in the evaluated portfolio on the basis of the market capitalization, book-to-market, and prior-year return characteristics of those stocks. Based on these benchmarks, “Characteristic Timing” and “Characteristic Selectivity” measures are developed that detect, respectively, whether portfolio managers successfully time their portfolio weightings on these characteristics and whether managers can select stocks that outperform the average stock having the same characteristics. We apply these measures to a new database of mutual fund holdings covering over 2500 equity funds from 1975 to 1994. Our results show that mutual funds, particularly aggressive-growth funds, exhibit some selectivity ability, but that funds exhibit no characteristic timing ability.     

On the Timing Ability of Mutual Fund Managers

Existing studies of mutual fund market timing analyze monthly returns and find little evidence of timing ability. We show that daily tests are more powerful and that mutual funds exhibit significant timing ability more often in daily tests than in monthly tests. We construct a set of synthetic fund returns in order to control for spurious results. The daily timing coefficients of the majority of funds are significantly different from their synthetic counterparts. These results suggest that mutual funds may possess more timing ability than previously documented.     

Do Managerial Skills Vary Across Fund Managers? Results Using European Mutual Funds

This paper uses stochastic dominance techniques to examine whether managerial skills vary across fund managers in European equity funds. The use of these techniques allows us to compare different investment alternatives in an uncertain setting under very simple assumptions regarding investor behaviour. The results for style-adjusted returns are consistent with varying degrees of managerial skill and cannot be explained by the impact of the choice of style-adjustment procedure, country, fee policy, and fund age, fund size or survivorship bias. This result allows us to conclude that style-adjusted returns may provide a reliable guide for selecting European investment funds.     

Taiwanese Mutual Fund Performance Under Different Central Bank of China Monetary Policy Environments

This study examines the performance of mutual funds under different Central Bank of China monetary policy environments in the emerging Taiwan market. To measure monetary policy changes effectively, we exploit changes in the discount rate and further categorize the monetary environment as either restrictive or expansive. We consider a restrictive monetary environment to be a period in which the discount rate rises, whereas an expansive monetary condition is a period in which the discount rate drops. It is found that all mutual funds, both domestic and international funds, exhibit a higher mean return, lower risk, and higher Sharpe and Treynor ratios under expansive monetary policy environments. Regression results show that domestic mutual fund returns are related significantly to local monetary policy. Furthermore, after controlling for the possible effect of macro factors on the association between the monetary policy dummy variable and mutual fund returns, the significant influence of monetary policy on domestic mutual fund returns remains robust. In contrast, changes in U.S. monetary policy stringency, in general, do not affect the performance of either domestic or international mutual funds in Taiwan.     

Mutual Fund Performance: Evidence from the UK

This paper uses a large sample containing the complete return histories of 2300 UK open-ended mutual funds over a 23-year period to measure fund performance. We find some evidence of underperformance on a risk-adjusted basis by the average fund manager, persistence of performance and the existence of a substantial survivor bias. Similar findings have been reported for US equity mutual funds. New findings not previously documented for other markets include evidence that mutual fund performance varies substantially across different asset categories, especially foreign asset categories. We also identify some new patterns in performance related to the funds' distance from their inception and termination dates: underperformance intensifies as the fund termination date approaches, while, in contrast, there is some evidence that funds (weakly) outperform during their first year of existence.     

Performance Chasing,Fund Flows and Fund Size in Real Estate Mutual Funds

Real estate mutual funds have grown dramatically in number, size, scope and assets under management over the last 15 years, but little assessment is evident. The present study addresses this limitation. Better prior period performance is associated with greater shares of fund inflows for a period. Returns, however, are negatively associated with increased fund flows and fund size. Investors chase past performance limiting fund managers’ ability to optimize investments. Under normal market conditions, but departing from typical mutual fund performance, real estate mutual fund returns generally exceed relevant benchmarks on a before expenses basis and match benchmark returns after expenses. The ability to meet and exceed benchmark returns, however, does not hold during the financial crisis period. Overall, more established funds are shown to have higher returns while fund turnover is not a determinant of returns.     

Time Variation in Mutual Fund Style Exposures

Despite the wide acceptance of return-based style analysis,the method has several limitations. One important drawback isthe assumption that style exposures are time-invariant. We applyresults on break tests developed in Bai and Perron (1998, 2003)to test for style breaks. We find strong evidence against thehypothesis of constant time exposures in daily return data forEuropean equity funds. All funds exhibit at least one break,and 60% exhibit more than one break. We show that the main reasonfor style breaks is the mutual funds' reliance on conditionalinvestment strategies based on public information and volatilityestimates.     

Macroeconomic Forces and Mutual Fund Betas

This paper develops and tests a model in which fund betas are linearly related to changes in macroeconomic factors. Tests using monthly returns for 171 mutual funds over 1978–1991 were run. Results indicate that equity funds betas, on average, are negatively related to inflation changes and default risk premia while bond fund betas, on average, are negatively related to changes in risk-free rates, industrial production growth, and the term structure. Betas for passive portfolios, however, are not related to the macroeconomic factors examined.     

The Mismatch Between Mutual Fund Scale and Skill

I demonstrate that skill and scale are mismatched among actively managed equity mutual funds. Many mutual fund investors confuse the effects of fund exposures to common systematic factors with managerial skill when allocating capital among funds. Active mutual funds with positive factor-related past returns thus accumulate assets to the point that they significantly underperform. I also show that the negative aggregate benchmark-adjusted performance of active equity mutual funds is driven mainly by these oversized funds.