Development through synergistic reforms

For many less developed countries production of high quality output is a precondition for firms to become exporters. Institutional deficiencies that raise costs of high quality production therefore limit the positive impact that trade facilitation can have on income. Consequently, institutional reforms that reduce costs of high quality production and trade reform have synergistic effects. In contrast, institutional reforms that reduce costs of low quality production (e.g., reforms that disproportionately benefit small businesses) interfere with the impact of trade reform. We obtain these results in a heterogeneous firm model that displays standard “industry rationalization” responses to reduced trade costs.     

Law, trade, and development

This paper uses a Ricardian model to generate predictions about the influence of institutions on trade in differentiated (complex) and commoditized (simple) products and then uses a rich international trade data set for empirical tests. The model draws the distinction between the role of international transaction costs and domestic production costs in the trade of complex and simple products. The effects of institutions predicted by the model are identified with a three-step estimation procedure. We find that when countries have low quality institutions, institutional reform primarily influences production costs and has little influence on the volume of trade. Institutional reform, however, increases the diversity of exports in complex goods markets. Conversely, in countries with more developed institutions, institutional reform primarily influences transaction costs and is associated with gains in the volume and the diversity of complex exports.     

A natural experiment for identifying the impact of ‘natural’ trade barriers on exports

The paper investigates the relative importance of trade policy and ‘natural’ sources of export taxation in Malawi, a landlocked African economy. These sources of export taxation are in turn used to explore how export supply would respond to trade liberalisation as opposed to measures which lower other international trade costs. The findings indicate that trade policy barriers are now only a limited source of ‘true’ export taxation and that trade policy reform needs to be complemented with reforms to reduce international trade, including transport, costs.     

Labour Market Regulations and the Sectoral Reallocation of Workers: The Case of Trade Reforms

In this paper I highlight the importance of incorporating the institutional features of local labour markets into the analysis of trade reforms. A trade reform is often deemed beneficial because the elimination of trade barriers allows labour to reallocate towards those sectors in the economy in which the country has a comparative advantage. The amount and speed of the reallocation, however, and the post-reform behaviour of output, productivity and welfare, will depend on how regulated the labour market is. First, I document that high firing costs slow down the intersectoral reallocation of labour after a trade reform. Second, in order to isolate the effect of firing costs on labour reallocation, output and welfare after a trade reform, I build a dynamic general equilibrium model. I find that if a country does not liberalize its labour market at the outset of its trade reform, the intersectoral reallocation of workers will be 30% slower, and as much as 30% of the gains in real output and labour productivity in the years following the trade reform will be lost. From a policy standpoint, the message is that while trade reforms are desirable, they need to be complemented by labour market reforms in order to be fully successful.     

What explains trade costs? Institutional quality and other determinants

This paper investigates the impact of institutional quality on trade costs across 133 countries during 1995–2014. The results show that good institutional quality significantly reduces the three types of trade costs, that is, total trade costs, trade costs of agricultural goods, and trade costs of manufactured goods. Furthermore, the effect of institutional quality is significant in reducing trade costs with regard to the different trading country pairs, the different subperiods, the components of institutional quality, and the endogeneity issue. This paper contributes to the literature by confirming a significant and negative relationship between institutional quality and trade costs from a global perspective.     

Are complementary reforms a “luxury” for developing countries?

This paper investigates the impact of complementarity reforms on growth and how it depends on GDP per capita. Based on reform data for six policy areas compiled from various sources during the period 1994–2006 for over 100 countries, we compute composite indicators of reform level and complementarity. We provide qualitative justification for the existence of pair-wise complementarities among policy areas. We then use cross-section and panel data estimates to test the effect of reform level and complementarity on GDP per capita growth. We found reforms to be positively related and their dispersion (or the inverse of complementarity) negatively related to growth, controlling for initial conditions, monetary stability and other structural and institutional variables, as well as endogeneity of reform level and complementarity. We show that the effect of policy complementarity is a stronger condition for sustainable growth in developing than in advanced countries, to conclude that complementary reforms are not a ‘luxury’ for developing countries.     

Is there a “reform fatigue” in the euro area?

The absence of monetary policy within a currency union increases the need for structural reforms that make the participating economies more flexible. However, the absence of exchange rate risk with respect to the other members of the union may reduce the urgency for such reforms. A number of other considerations also suggest that theory is ambiguous about the impact of participating in a currency union on progress in structural reforms. This paper addresses this issue empirically for the euro area. The results suggest that reforms in the euro area seem to have decelerated following the introduction of the euro, but from a fast pace. The paper discusses a number of possible explanations, including “reform fatigue,” the absence of “market punishment,” and “good-times” complacency. Estimates from an empirical growth model suggest that the slowing of reforms may slow down annual output growth by up to 0.2%. However, the results are preliminary and depend on the area of reform considered. Furthermore, the reform dynamics may change with the euro area starting slowing at the end of 2007.     

Foreign determinants of local institutions: Spatial dependence and openness

There are both empirical and theoretical arguments for the thesis that foreign factors have an impact on domestic institutional quality. Yet the literature is divided over whether exposure (openness to the world economy) or the kind of institutions in surrounding countries (relative location) determines the quality of local institutions. This paper confronts these hypotheses empirically, addressing the issues of strong cross-sectional dependence and the endogeneity of openness. In a 107-country cross-section, both trade openness and relative location have a positive impact on local institutions. The institutional quality of neighbouring countries is not found to be statistically significant when considering openness to foreign direct investments instead of trade, but the statistical performance of that model is poorer.     

The Political Economy of India's Economic Reforms*

This paper analyzes the history of the relationship between the state and the private sector in India. It concludes that India's economic reforms, which made development policy more dependent on international trade and private initiative, depended on the evolution of technocratic and political conviction. Reformers needed the support of financial crises for overcoming the powerful vested interests opposed to reforms. Successful reforms involved largely homegrown strategies of policy and institutional change. They have produced impressive growth rates and have benefited the rich and the middle class. The challenge for development and sustainable reforms is to make it more inclusive for poor farmers and unorganized workers.     

Understanding the evolution and performance of water markets and allocation policy: A transaction costs analysis framework

Water markets and associated allocation policy reforms have struggled to achieve their intended goals in many water-stressed rivers, in part due to the institutional friction imposed by transition and transaction costs. This paper elaborates a transaction costs analysis framework to examine the evolution and performance of water markets and allocation policy reforms. This analysis rests on three pillars: i) a synthesis of three theoretical traditions of institutional analysis (Williamson, North, and Ostrom) often considered independently; ii) a framework to examine the types and interactions of transaction costs in market-based water allocation over time; and iii) an illustrative analysis of three large river basins – the Colorado, Columbia and Murray–Darling – with varying levels of success in market-based water policy reforms. The resulting framework accounts for water's complexity as an economic good. This framework and the case studies lead to the identification of several policy implications including the need for: a multiphase sequencing of reform, strategic investment in institutional transition costs, and institutional choices that preserve future flexibility to adjust water rights and diversion limits to manage social and environmental externalities.     

The Response to Reform in a Growing Economy: The Role of Rent-Seeking Technology

Individuals engaged in rent seeking accumulate sector-specific human capital through learning-by-doing. If agents specialize, small reforms of the trade regime may fail to reduce the level of the rent-seeking activity. The size of the reform necessary to induce movement out of rent seeking is increasing in the time that controls have been in place. If rent seeking and production are complementary activities, agents will not specialize in either, and will fully respond to a small reform of the trade regime. This is true even though they accumulate human capital specific to rent seeking.     

State-led or market-led green revolution? Role of private irrigation investment vis-a-vis local government programs in West Bengal's farm productivity growth

We estimate the role of private investments in irrigation in farm productivity growth in West Bengal, India between 1982 and 95. Using a state-wide farm panel, we find that falling groundwater costs generated significant growth in value added per acre for farms. These resulted from investments in minor irrigation which was stimulated by tenancy registration programs implemented by local governments. This helps account for substantial spillover effects of the tenancy reform on non-tenant farms noted in an earlier study. Hence the West Bengal Green Revolution of the 1980s benefited from complementarity between private investment incentives and state-led institutional reforms.     

An exploratory study on the impact of pro-market reforms on the Indian corporate sector

Pro-market reforms were expected to increase competition, improve efficiency and reduce agency costs by improving the institutional environment in emerging markets. In an attempt to establish the macro–micro linkages of these goals, this paper aims to analyse the impact of reforms on the performance of firms belonging to different ownership categories. We find that while state owned enterprises have shown signs of convergence, the performance of other domestic firms has stagnated. Meanwhile multinational subsidiaries have shown consistently better performance, raising questions on the motive and direction of reforms. We end by discussing the policy implications and avenues for future research.     

评估地方政府层面的制度改革:一个有待研究的领域

在地方政府层面,对制度改革政策的评估是目前政策评估领域中很少涉及的内容。文章将相关的方法运用到制度改革政策的评估中,从而对该领域的研究做出一些探索。文章将制度方面的政策(如地域性和功能性改革)概括为一类特殊的公共政策,并从概念上和方法上将其与普通的实体政策相比较。文章探讨了评估过程中存在的诸多问题,包括交易成本的确定和找寻制度改革的度量指标等。文章最后提出了关于功能性和地域性改革评估的分析框架,以便区别制度评估和绩效评估。此外,该框架还可以应用于比较性的评估研究中。     

Institutional quality and the effectiveness of aid for trade

Trade policy barriers and high transaction costs hinder developing countries from taking the full advantages of the global trading system. In order to help developing countries overcome the problem, the World Trade Organization (WTO) launched the Aid for Trade (AFT) initiatives in its Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong in 2005. We examine the effects of AFT inflows on bilateral trade costs facing 133 developing countries while accounting for differences in their location on the contours of various measures of institutional quality. Our results from the estimation of a mixed effects (random-intercept and random-coefficient) model indicate that institutional quality significantly affects the extent to which AFT reduces bilateral trade costs. An important policy implication of our findings is that an economically robust and sustainable reduction in bilateral trade costs facing developing countries requires the presence of both promulgated and effectively functioning institutions such as regulatory power and the rule of law.     

Trade liberalization and institutional reforms1

The accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the European Union (EU) is expected to lead to the new member countries becoming more like the older members, including in terms of trade. In this paper, we focus on two factors promoting CEE–EU trade integration: trade liberalization and institutional reforms. Measures of trade liberalization undertaken by both parties during the 1990s were very substantial, but did not always produce the expected upsurge of regional trade flows. Much less progress has been made in improving the functioning of CEE institutions (e.g., progress in the privatization process or in reducing corruption). Countries where most important changes at the institutional level occurred were also those that most increased their trade with the EU. Comparing the impact of these two factors, we find that improving institutions in CEE countries can generate as much trade as the removal of all tariff and non‐tariff barriers. The paper also addresses the issue of the presence of reversed causality between trade and institutions, and the pro‐trade effect of institutional similarity.     

Unemployment,institutions, and interdependencies: identifying successful reforms

Labor market reforms, which reduce institutional rigidities, are assumed to be a well-suited approach to lower unemployment. However, it is still not perfectly clear which reforms actually lead to a fall in unemployment. One crucial issue is that reforms do not work in isolation, but have labor market effects which depend on other institutional factors. Such institutional interactions have rarely been considered in empirical macroeconomic studies in a systematic way, mainly due to model uncertainty. As a solution to this problem, a Bayesian model averaging approach is adopted in this paper to identify robust and significant institutional interactions for unemployment. Using a panel data-set for 17 OECD countries from 1982 to 2005, five robust and significant interaction terms are identified, and country-specific reform effects for the institutional indicators are derived.     

Trade liberalization and unemployment: Theory and evidence from India

A widely held view among the public is that trade liberalization increases unemployment. Using state and industry-level unemployment and trade protection data from India, we find no evidence of any unemployment increasing effect of trade reforms. In fact, our state-level analysis reveals that urban unemployment declines with trade liberalization in states with flexible labor markets and larger employment shares in net exporter industries. Moreover, our industry-level analysis indicates that workers in industries experiencing greater reductions in trade protection were less likely to become unemployed, especially in net export industries. Our results can be explained within a theoretical framework incorporating trade and search-generated unemployment and some institutional features of the Indian economy.     

Redistribution,trade and corruption: an empirical assessment

ABSTRACT

This article explores the role of institutional quality in the trade and inequality nexus. Does corruption shape the relationship between trade and inequality through its impact on redistribution? Our answer to this question builds on the hypothesis that trade raises inequality and that governments may want to intervene through appropriate redistribution schemes that aim at taxing the gains from trade in a way that offsets the negative effects of trade on inequality. Moreover, we argue that this mechanism may be distorted by corruption and bad institutions in general. Quite to the contrary to common wisdom, we find that trade reduces inequality in countries with high institutional standards by means of a low level of corruption but increases inequality in countries with low levels of institutional quality.