Restrictions on Foreign Investments and the Relocation of Firms

We analyse why the Chinese government sets restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus our analysis on the percentage of shares in relocated firms that the government allows to be foreign‐owned. The government's decision on this percentage depends on the entry cost, the number of firms that relocate and the weight of the consumer surplus in the objective function of the government. We show that by its choice of this percentage, the Chinese government may restrict or encourage FDI to its country. We also find that if the government may subsidise the fixed entry cost, it provides a subsidy only when the producer surplus has a greater weight than the consumer surplus in weighted welfare. In that case, the subsidy encourages relocation by both firms and permits the government to allow a lower percentage of shares to be foreign‐owned in relocated firms.     

Technology sourcing versus technology exploitation: an analysis of US foreign direct investment flows

The traditional paradigm of foreign direct investment (FDI) suggests that FDI is undertaken principally to exploit some firm-specific advantage in a foreign country which provides a locational advantage to the investor. However, recent theoretical work suggests a model of FDI in which the motivation is not to exploit existing technological advantages in a foreign country, but to access such technology and transfer it from the host economy to the investing multinational corporation via spillover effects. This paper tests the technology sourcing versus technology exploiting hypotheses for a panel of sectoral FDI flows between the United States and major OECD nations over a 15 year period. The research makes use of Patel and Vega’s (Research Policy, 28, 145–55, 1999) taxonomy of sectors which are likely a priori to exhibit technology sourcing and exploiting behaviour respectively. While there is evidence that FDI flows into the United States are attracted to R&D intensive sectors, very little support is found for the technology sourcing hypothesis either for inward or outward FDI flows. The results suggest that, in aggregate, firm-specific ‘ownership’ effects remain powerful determinants of FDI flows.     

中国对外直接投资企业的竞争优势与投资绩效研究

近年来,中国对外投资加速发展,这在一定程度上反映了所有权优势在中国公司中逐渐形成。本文通过实证研究,考察处于改革开放环境下中国对外直接投资企业所特有的竞争优势,并探讨中国企业特有的竞争优势和海外区位优势对其海外子公司经营绩效和竞争地位的影响。研究结果显示中国对外投资企业最重要的两项优势是产品质量与技术优势以及国内市场的支持与经验。优秀的国际化管理人才和良好的合作者与企业海外子公司的经营绩效显著正相关。企业商品的知名度与其全球竞争地位正相关。区位因素中与绩效显著相关的指标包括“政府官员及公众对外资的态度”、“外资企业税率”、“政治稳定性”、“许可证的获得手续”和“短期资金的可获得性”。区位因素中与企业竞争地位显著相关的因素是当地政府的激励措施。     

Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market: FDI versus Joint Ventures

We study the effect of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime of a host country (South) on a multinational's decision between serving a market via greenfield foreign direct investment to avoid the exposure of its technology or a North–South joint venture (JV) with a local firm, which allows R&D spillovers under imperfect IPRs. JV is the equilibrium market structure when R&D intensity is moderate and IPRs strong. The South can gain from increased IPR protection because it encourages a JV, whereas policies to limit foreign ownership in a JV gain importance in technology‐intensive industries as complementary policies to strong IPRs.     

Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration

This paper examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of multinational firms. Furthermore, we show that an increase in domestic ownership of multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular, the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms.     

INTERNATIONALIZATION STRATEGIES IN OLIGOPOLY WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS

This paper examines the foreign direct investment (FDI) versus exports decision of foreign oligopolistic firms under cost heterogeneity. An additional motivation for firms to invest abroad is the technological sourcing via spillovers, which flow from the host more efficient firm to foreign less advantaged firms. For intermediate values of the set‐up costs associated with FDI entry, it is shown that foreign firms choose opposite entry strategies. An equilibrium where the less efficient foreign firm exports whereas the more efficient invests is more likely to happen when foreign firms become more heterogeneous, the larger the trade costs and not too big oligopolistic profitability. Interestingly, the opposite may also be an equilibrium thus finding that the more efficient firm does not choose to invest, a result that emphasizes the relevance of the strategic setting under consideration. The latter result identifies a market failure since welfare in the host market is higher when both firms undertake FDI; a finding that calls attention to how appropriate are host government policies towards internationalization strategies.     

FDI Policy,Greenfield Investment and Cross‐border Mergers

This paper examines a multinational's choice between greenfield investment and cross‐border merger when it enters another country via foreign direct investment (FDI) and faces the host country's FDI policy. Greenfield investment incurs a fixed plant setup cost, whereas the foreign firm obtains only a share of the joint profit from a cross‐border merger under the restriction of the FDI policy. This trade‐off is affected by market demand, cost differential, and market competition, among other things. The host country's government chooses its FDI policy to affect (or alter) the multinational's entry mode to achieve the maximum social welfare for the domestic country. We characterize the conditions shaping the optimal FDI policy and offer intuitions on FDI patterns in developing and developed countries.     

Multinational Firms and Technology Transfer

We construct an oligopoly model in which a multinational firm has a superior technology compared to local firms. Workers employed by the multinational acquire knowledge of its superior technology. The multinational may pay a wage premium to prevent local firms from hiring its workers and thus gaining access to their knowledge. In this setting, the host government has an incentive to attract FDI due to technology transfer to local firms or the wage premium earned by employees of the multinational firm. However, when FDI is particularly attractive to the multinational firm, the host government has an incentive to discourage FDI.
JEL classification : F 13; F 23; J 41; L 13; O 14; O 33; O 38     

Competing to Outsource in the South

This paper analyzes foreign direct investment (FDI) competition in a three‐country framework: two Northern countries and one Southern country. We have in mind the competition of Airbus and Boeing in a developing country. The host‐country government endogenizes tariffs, while Airbus and Boeing choose domestic output and FDI. Wages and employment in the home countries are negotiated. We find that in the unique equilibrium, both Airbus and Boeing compete to undertake FDI in the developing country. This arises because the host country can play off the multinationals, which in turn stems from three factors: (a) oligopolistic rivalry; (b) quid pro quo FDI; (c) strategic outsourcing—FDI drives down the union wages at home if the host‐country wage is sufficiently low. However, if the host‐country wage is sufficiently high, the union wage increases under FDI. In such cases, FDI competition benefits the multinationals, the labor unions, as well as the host country.     

FDI Flows and Domestic Investment: Overview

The paper surveys theories of FDI and supporting evidence. Anew theory flashes out a unique feature of FDI: hands on managementstyle that enables investors to react in real time to changingeconomic environments. Equipped with superior intangible knowhow in screening firms, foreign direct investors can out bidportfolio equity investors for the top productivity firms. Theimplications of the theory are that investment is both moreefficient (namely, made dependent on the firm-specific productivity)and, in plausible cases, also larger. The theory can explainboth two way flows of FDI among developed economies, and oneway flows between developed and developing economies. Thesepredictions of the theory are consistent with panel data: largerFDI coefficients in domestic investment and output growth regressions,than those of the debt and portfolio equity coefficients. Theyare also consistent with gravity equations which explain FDIinflows by informational variables and degree of corporate transparencyin the host country.(JEL F2)     

A political economy perspective on horizontal FDI in a dynamic Cournot-oligopoly with endogenous entry

Entry in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly is excessive if and only if there is business-stealing (Amir et al., 2014). The excessive entry prediction has been derived primarily for closed economies and using a welfarist benchmark. We extend this framework and allow for (1) horizontal FDI in a multi-period setting and (2) interest group-based government behaviour. Opening the market to greenfield investments from abroad tends to aggravate the entry distortion. Moreover, market opening may reduce welfare if a more pronounced entry distortion dominates the gain in consumer surplus. Finally, a government, which places sufficiently little weight on the interests of consumers, will object to market opening, even if welfare rises.     

Brotherhood of competition: Foreign Direct Investment and domestic mergers

We examine the effects of mergers on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and on shaping national policies regarding FDI. In this work we develop a partial equilibrium model of an oligopolistic industry in which a number of domestic and foreign firms compete in the market for a homogeneous good in a host country. It is assumed that the number of foreign firms is endogenous and can be affected by the government policy in the host country. The government sets the policy (subsidies) to maximise social welfare. We allow domestic mergers. Our main results suggest that when the host country government imposes discriminatory lump-sum subsidy in favor of foreign firms, a merger of domestic firms will increase the number of FDI if the subsidy level is exogenous. With an endogenous level of subsidy, a merger of domestic firms will decrease (increase) the welfare if the domestic firms are more (less) efficient.     

Home market effect in the presence of multinational activities: location and nationality

This study examines the phenomenon of home market effect (HME) through a framework where firms can serve a foreign market either via trade or via foreign direct investment (FDI). The results show that HME holds when determined through both location-based and nationality-based criteria. However, compared to the original measure of HME in the absence of FDI, the magnitude of the location-based HME is smaller whereas that of the nationality-based HME is larger. Comparative statics indicate that an increase in trade barriers reduces the magnitude of the location-based HME and that an increase in operative barriers facing foreign affiliates reduces the magnitude of the nationality-based HME. Also, larger restrictions on the foreign ownership of capital accentuate the location-based HME but attenuate the nationality-based HME.     

知识产权保护与跨国公司对外直接投资策略

本文通过构建一个三方参与的两阶段动态博弈模型,来分析东道国的知识产权保护政策对于FDI的影响。分析结果表明,对于东道国政府而言,提供适度且有效率的知识产权保护政策,不仅可以增加FDI的流入量,而且可以引进较为先进的技术,从而通过降低成本和提高产量,实现东道国社会福利最大化。同时,东道国政府在提供有效率的知识产权保护条件下,允许跨国公司按利润最大化原则选择其股权份额,是符合东道国自身利益的。而仅当东道国政府无法提供有效率的知识产权保护时,限制外商投资比例才不失为一种次佳的政策选择。     

National levels of corruption and foreign direct investment

We model the relationship between bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) and the level of corruption in multinational firms’ (MCNs’) home and host countries. We construct and test a model of bilateral FDI between countries that differ in their levels of corruption. FDI is affected negatively both by the level of corruption in the host country and by differences in home- and host-country corruption. Our model emphasizes that MNCs develop skills for dealing with home-country corruption, and these skills become a competitive advantage in similarly corrupt host countries. We test the model using data on bilateral FDI stocks among a large number of home and host countries, using a variety of specifications and estimation strategies to provide robustness. Our results show that the effects of host-country corruption and of differences in corruption levels between home and host countries are statistically and economically significant.     

Vertical foreign direct investment: Make,buy, and sell

According to conventional wisdom, multinational enterprises (MNEs) undertake vertical FDI to take advantage of cross‐border factor cost differences and source inputs from abroad at better terms. However, recent empirical studies document many instances in which intrafirm trade between parent firms and their vertically related foreign affiliates is absent. We provide theoretical support for these findings, demonstrating that a firm can engage in vertical FDI to exploit its intangible assets in another country and improve its input sourcing terms domestically by enhancing its cross‐threat. Furthermore, we show that the welfare implications of vertical FDI on the home and host country are neither always positive nor aligned.     

Testing the principle of ‘growth of the fitter’: The relationship between profits and firm growth

This paper is an empirical investigation of the evolutionary principle of ‘growth of the fitter’. Previous studies suggest that growth does not discriminate between firms according to their fitness, when this latter is proxied by productivity. We use the profit rate (operating surplus/value added) as a proxy for fitness and explore its influence on subsequent growth rates by tracking 8405 French manufacturing firms over the period 1996–2004. We overcome problems of unobserved firm-specific effects, persistence and endogeneity by using the ‘system GMM’ estimator developed by Blundell and Bond [Blundell, R., Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 87, 115–143]. Whilst non-parametric plots do not reveal any obvious relationship between profit rates and subsequent growth, regression analysis identifies a small positive influence. Considering the reciprocal influence of growth on profit rates, positive and significant results suggest that ‘Penrose effects’ are not a dominant feature of firm dynamics.     

Global corporations and local politics: income redistribution vs. FDI subsidies

Income inequality has been used empirically to explain the mixed performance of developing countries in attracting FDI. This paper sets up a theoretical model that links the skewness of the income distribution to a host government's willingness to subsidize FDI. Large skewness makes government subsidies less likely because the median income person prefers redistribution. Little skewness, however, does not guarantee FDI. In addition, host governments may switch from positive to no subsidies if a shift in economic variables changes how the policymaker trades off the FDI benefits and income redistribution, thereby offering an alternative to the conventional hold-up story.     

Ownership structure and access to finance in developing countries

Microsurvey data are used to explore the impact of ownership structure and other firm-specific characteristics on firms’ access to finance in 136 developing countries. The analysis uses a consistent and large data set from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (ESs). The results show that ownership structure is a significant predictor of firms’ access to finance but with qualifications. Specifically, private and foreign ownership are more robust predictors of firms financing constraints in developing countries, whilst government ownership and large owners appear significant in accordance with the controlling conditions and mostly in low-income countries. The predictive power and direction of firms’ ownership structure is mitigated by both the specific characteristics of firms and the manner in which country-level factors affect the level of economic and financial activity in a country as well as the individual and social behaviour towards financial contracting.     

Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and fixed capital investment in the setting of a corrupt country. Using different measures of corruption – registered cases of bribe taking and incidents of experienced corruption by the population – we find a negative relationship between investment and corruption. We then address the problem of endogeneity of corruption using an instrumental variables approach: when corruption is instrumented with freedom of the press and violations of journalists' rights, we find an even bigger negative effect. Disaggregating investment by ownership-type shows that only private investment is affected by corruption, but not investment made by state-owned companies. The negative effect is larger for companies with full or partial foreign ownership. Additionally, we look at the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI): similar to the investment in fixed capital, we find a negative relationship; however, its statistical significance varies across specifications with different data sources for FDI and different corruption measures.