Are capital buffers pro-cyclical?: Evidence from Spanish panel data

We estimate the relationship between the Spanish business cycle and the capital buffers held by Spanish commercial and savings banks in an incomplete panel of institutions covering the period 1986–2000, which comprises a complete cycle. After controlling for other potential determinants of the surplus capital we find a robustly significant negative relationship between the position in the cycle and capital buffers. From a quantitative standpoint, an increase of 1 percentage point in GDP growth might reduce capital buffers by 17%. This relationship is, moreover, asymmetric, being closer during upturns.     

What do private firms do after losing political capital? Evidence from China

This paper studies the real effects of losing political capital by exploiting exogenous shocks from the sudden deaths of politically connected independent directors in Chinese firms. Using difference-in-differences estimation, we find that upon losing political capital, a firm boosts its physical capital expenditures by 28%, or 2.93 percentage points, which is an order of magnitude larger than estimates from the United States. The loss of political capital leads to a decrease in the economic benefits a firm can obtain, in terms of bank loans, tax benefits, and government subsidies, and an increase in its production costs. Our evidence suggests that private firms use physical capital investment as a substitute for political capital.     

How do banks resolve firms’ financial distress? Evidence from Japan

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate how banks resolve firms?? financial distress in Japan. Our results show that distressed firms that have more unsecured bank debt are more likely to restructure debt successfully out of court. Second, private debt restructuring is conducted during the year in which a financially distressed firm would be compelled to report negative net worth because of substantial accounting losses if no debt restructuring plans were implemented. Third, firms that are already in a negative net worth situation are more likely to receive debt forgiveness and/or debt-for-equity swaps. Finally, both the 1-year-lagged total liabilities-to-assets ratio and accounting losses are positively related to the private workout level. These results suggest that banks resolve firms?? financial distress in shareholders?? and creditors?? interests. We argue that, along with bankruptcy laws, the stock exchange rules and the fact that banks are allowed to hold shares in these firms affect the resolution of firms?? financial distress.     

How do firms overcome financial constraint anxiety to survive in the market? Evidence from large manufacturing data

In so far as financial constraints affect firm performance, they may expose firms to survival risks. Using a large panel of Chinese firms observed from 1998 to 2013, I analyse the causal relationship between firm survival and financial constraints and how firm performance impacts this relationship. I find that financial constraints play an important role in influencing firm survival. Moreover, financial constraints are the mechanism underlying the relationship between firm performance and survival, and productive and profitable firms can alleviate financial constraints. Privately owned and foreign-owned firms with more leverage face more difficulties surviving in the market; however, state-owned enterprises with more leverage can ease their financial limitations. Finally, I provide evidence that high dependency and high coverage ratios can facilitate firms' survival through alleviating financial constraints.     

Do insurers adjust prices for the adoption of loss prevention technologies? Evidence from Danish municipal contracts

Using data from 40 Danish municipalities on building characteristics, loss prevention technologies, insurance claims, and insurance bids from 2008 to 2019, we investigate whether and how loss prevention technologies influenced contract prices. The insurance bids cover a variety of municipal buildings across a range of risks including fire, water leakage, and building security as well as structure detection and alarm systems. The study shows that the magnitude of historical claims may affect both pricing offers and interest in loss prevention technologies. We do not find that loss prevention technologies have any significant influence on contract price. This suggests inefficiencies in the market from imperfect information.     

When should firms share credit with employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds

We study the choice between named and anonymous mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers.     

When and why do IPO firms manage earnings?

There is significant disagreement about whether, when, and why IPO firms manage earnings. We precisely identify the timing and motives behind earnings management by IPO firms. The period around an IPO is characterized by two events: the IPO itself and the lockup expiration. Both the raising of capital at the IPO and the exit by pre-IPO shareholders at lockup expiration create incentives for firms to manage earnings. To disentangle the effect of these events, we examine quarterly, rather than annual, abnormal accruals. We find no evidence of income-increasing earnings management before the IPO. However, IPO firms exhibit positive abnormal accruals in the quarter before and the quarter of the lockup expiration. Positive abnormal accruals are concentrated in less scrutinized firms and firms with high selling by pre-IPO shareholders. Moreover, we find that these accruals subsequently reverse and that such reversals contribute to long-run IPO underperformance.     

Why do firms engage in selective hedging? Evidence from the gold mining industry

The widespread practice of managers speculating by incorporating their market views into firms’ hedging programs (“selective hedging”) remains a puzzle. Using a 10-year sample of North American gold mining firms, we find no evidence that selective hedging is more prevalent among firms that are believed to possess an information advantage. In contrast, we find strong evidence that selective hedging is more prevalent among financially constrained firms, suggesting that this practice is driven by asset substitution motives. We detect weak relationships between selective hedging and some corporate governance measures but find no evidence of a link between selective hedging and managerial compensation.     

Do firms have leverage targets? Evidence from acquisitions

In the context of large acquisitions, we provide evidence on whether firms have target capital structures. We examine how deviations from these targets affect how bidders choose to finance acquisitions and how they adjust their capital structure following the acquisitions. We show that when a bidder's leverage is over its target level, it is less likely to finance the acquisition with debt and more likely to finance the acquisition with equity. Also, we find a positive association between the merger-induced changes in target and actual leverage, and we show that bidders incorporate more than two-thirds of the change to the merged firm's new target leverage. Following debt-financed acquisitions, managers actively move the firm back to its target leverage, reversing more than 75% of the acquisition's leverage effect within five years. Overall, our results are consistent with a model of capital structure that includes a target level and adjustment costs.     

How do firms learn? Evidence from corporate cash holdings during the COVID-19 pandemic

We examine the impact of COVID-19 on US corporate cash holdings. Our findings suggest that greater pandemic exposure is associated with higher corporate cash holdings and that firms learn from prior experiences as they manage their cash policies. More specifically, the level of cash holdings in firms that experienced severe financial constraints during the 2008 credit crisis and firms with prior severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and H1N1 exposure is significantly lower than that of firms with no prior epidemic or financial constraints experience. Overall, our findings support the learning behaviour of cash and contribute to corporate cash holdings literature by providing insights on the extent to which firms learn from prior experiences to manage their liquidity.     

Do productive firms get external finance? Evidence from Chinese listed manufacturing firms

Due to information asymmetry problem in financial markets good quality firms often find it difficult to prove to external finance providers about their true quality and to distinguish themselves from bad quality firms. We argue that instead of sending indirect signals to financial market good quality firms could focus on improving their productivity to obtain external finance. Besides relying solely on firms' balance sheet information external finance providers using firms' TFP or labour productivity information would have a true knowledge of firms' efficiency and risk. Overall, using a panel of 1591 Chinese listed manufacturing firms between 2003 and 2016 we find that productivity measured by TFP or labour productivity is statistically and economically important and positive in determining firms' external finance, i.e. total leverage, new issue of equity and long-term debt. We find that productivity is helpful for firms to raise new equity finance, but only some weak results for total leverage and long-term debt. Such results hold for both the whole sample and private firm sample. We also find that large and/or old firms and exporting firms are able to make better use of their productivity to gain external finance than their respective counterparts, i.e. small young firms and non-exporting firms. The causality of the regression results is also confirmed by difference-in-difference tests using an exogenous industrial policy shock.     

Government auditing and corruption control: Evidence from China’s provincial panel data

Since its foundation, China’s government auditing system has played a very important role in maintaining financial and economic order and improving government accountability and transparency. Though a great deal of research has discussed the role of government auditing in discovering and deterring corruption, there is little empirical evidence on whether government auditing actually helps to reduce corruption. Using China’s provincial panel data from 1999 to 2008, this paper empirically examines the role of government auditing in China’s corruption control initiatives. Our findings indicate that the number of irregularities detected in government auditing is positively related to the corruption level in that province, which means the more severe the corruption is in a province, the more irregularities in government accounts are found by local audit institutions. Also, post-audit rectification effort is negatively related to the corruption level in that province, indicating that greater rectification effort is associated with less corruption. This paper provides empirical evidence on how government auditing can contribute to curbing corruption, which is also helpful for understanding the role of China’s local audit institutions in government governance and can enrich the literature on both government auditing and corruption control.     

How do firms react to the prohibition of long-lived asset impairment reversals? Evidence from China

New Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) released on February 15, 2006, prohibit the reversal of long-lived asset impairments, effective for reporting periods beginning January 1, 2007 and later. This development in the Chinese market provides a unique experimental setting to directly investigate how firms react to the ban on previously-allowed long-lived asset impairment reversals, especially firms that use impairment charges as “cookie jar reserves.” By contrasting write-off recognition and reversal across the pre- and post- new CAS announcement regimes, we show that firms listed on Chinese stock exchanges recognized less impairment charges during the “transition” period—after announcement of the new standard and before the effective date—than in pre-announcement periods. Meanwhile, firms with substantial previous write-downs reversed more impairment charges to achieve their earnings targets in the transition period. The new CAS also constraints “big bath” reporting by loss firms. As US GAAP prohibits these reversals and IFRS allows them, our empirical evidence depicts firms’ possible reactions in other regimes contemplating doing away with such reversals.     

Opportunistic earnings management or performance-related effects? Evidence from dividend-paying firms

We propose that much of the variation in standard (accruals and real-activities) earnings management metrics can be explained by firms' performance trajectories. We test our proposition using dividend change to distinguish high from low performance trajectory firms. We find that standard earnings management metrics have a stronger relation with performance trajectories than with unexpected earnings, a presumed target of earnings management. Firms that appear to manage earnings more are likelier to increase their dividends, but standard earnings management metrics do not explain changes in firm value around dividend change announcements. Applying standard earnings management metrics without taking performance trajectories into account can result in mistaking managers' efforts to increase firm value for earnings management.     

Do investors find carbon information useful? Evidence from Italian firms

The usefulness of carbon disclosures has been questioned in the literature because they do not truly reflect firm’s carbon performance, suggesting that they may not be useful for risk evaluation and investment decisions. This study empirically tests the usefulness of carbon information voluntarily disclosed by the Italian firms. Our results based on the price model show that there is a positive association between the stock price and carbon disclosures, suggesting that investors find carbon information useful for their investment decisions. We find similar results based on the market valuation model. Additionally, the results reveal that the positive association is especially strong for firms that have established environmental committees on a voluntary basis and also for firms from the highly polluting industries defined by the EU_ETS program, confirming that investors’ positive response is especially strong to carbon disclosures by firms from the highly polluting industries. We also find that the market reacts positively to carbon disclosures by firms with a higher percentage of independent directors on their corporate boards, but the positive association is marginally significant.     

Good deeds earn chits? Evidence from philanthropic family controlled firms

This study examines whether charitable family controlled firms have lower default risk. Using Taiwan data that provide clear information about firms’ benevolent intention and avoid endogeneity issue of risk and charitable activities, we show that charitable family controlled firms have lower default risk, which is proxied by value-at-risk and expected shortfall measures. Our finding shows that charitable activities bring benefits of lower risk to shareholders. This study also provides various channels that can lower default risk for the charitable firms. That is, these firms appear to have higher credit ratings, engage less in earnings management, and have higher worker productivity. This study argues that the benevolent mindset of decision makers at firms help lower default risk.     

Do firms underreport information on cyber-attacks? Evidence from capital markets

Firms should disclose information on material cyber-attacks. However, because managers have incentives to withhold negative information, and investors cannot discover most cyber-attacks independently, firms may underreport them. Using data on cyber-attacks that firms voluntarily disclosed, and those that were withheld and later discovered by sources outside the firm, we estimate the extent to which firms withhold information on cyber-attacks. We find withheld cyber-attacks are associated with a decline of approximately 3.6% in equity values in the month the attack is discovered, and disclosed attacks with a substantially lower decline of 0.7%. The evidence is consistent with managers not disclosing negative information below a certain threshold and withholding information on the more severe attacks. Using the market reactions to withheld and disclosed attacks, we estimate that managers disclose information on cyber-attacks when investors already suspect a high likelihood (40%) of an attack.     

Do investors prefer round stock prices? Evidence from Israeli IPO auctions

We find round number clustering in orders submitted by investors in Israeli IPO auctions. Explanations offered for price clustering, such as dealer collusion or implicit agreement to simplify negotiations, cannot explain price clustering in this market. Therefore, this is direct evidence that investors prefer round numbers.     

Do stock prices influence corporate decisions? Evidence from the technology bubble

We study the capital investment, stock issuance, and cash savings behavior of non-tech manufacturers (old economy firms) during the 1990s technology bubble. Our empirical results show that high stock prices affect corporate policies because they relax financing constraints. During the tech bubble, constrained non-tech firms' investment responded strongly to “high stock prices” (specifically, the component of price that is not captured by fundamentals). They also issued stock in response to that overvaluation effect, saving part of the proceeds in their cash accounts. We find no such patterns for unconstrained non-tech firms, nor for tech firms. Our findings are not consistent with the notion that managers systematically issue overvalued stocks and invest in ways that transfer wealth from new to old shareholders. More broadly, they suggest that what appears to be overvaluation in one sector of the economy may have positive externalities for other sectors.     

Do foreign investors insulate firms from local shocks? Evidence from the response of investable firms to monetary policy

Extant research shows that stock returns of investable firms are highly sensitive to foreign market and global information shocks, suggesting that having foreign investors might insulate investable firms from shocks to local fundamentals. Examining 24 emerging markets, we find that both investable and non-investable firms are sensitive to local monetary policy shocks. This allays the concern that emerging-market opening reduces the efficacy of local monetary policy. We also find that in 11 countries (46% of our country-sample), investable firms are more sensitive to local shocks than non-investable firms. Differences in leverage, stock liquidity, size, domestic product-market exposure, or industry cyclicality do not drive this finding.