When is upstream collusion profitable?

Motivated by the recent antitrust cases in which Japanese auto parts suppliers colluded to raise supply prices against their long‐term collaborators, the Japanese carmakers, we study the conditions under which an upstream collusion is profitable even after compensating downstream direct purchasers. Oligopoly competition in successive industries is shown to give rise to a vertical externality and a horizontal externality. If a collusive price of intermediate goods better balances the two externalities, the collusion will raise the joint profit of all firms in the two industries and is therefore profitable for the upstream after compensation of downstream firms.     

When do peers matter?: A cross-country perspective

We assess the importance of industry peers for a firm's own decision making strategy, using a rich sample of data covering 47 countries and 87 different industries between 1990 and 2011. Following the instrumental variable approach suggested by Leary and Roberts (2014), we find that, similar to U.S. firms, foreign firms do follow their peers when they make financial policy decisions. A standard deviation increase in peer firms' average leverage leads to about 5 percentage point increase in a firm's own leverage. We also find evidence that firms are more likely to follow their peers when investor protection laws including information disclosure and minority shareholder protection are weak, when creditor rights laws are strong, and when equity markets are more developed, suggesting that peers matter the most when firms have the greatest need to learn and to demonstrate their quality. These results hold even when we perform the analysis on a matched sample of firms.     

When fund management skill is more valuable?

Does fund management skill allow managers to identify mispriced securities more accurately and thereby make better portfolio choices resulting in superior fund performance when noise trading – a natural setting to detect skill – is more prevalent? We find skilled fund managers with superior past performance to generate persistent excess risk‐adjusted returns and experience significant capital inflows, especially in high sentiment times, high stock dispersion, and economic expansion states when price signals are noisier. This pattern persists after we control for lucky bias, using the ‘false discovery rate’ approach, which permits disentangling manager ‘skill’ from ‘luck.’     

When is good news really good news?

The impression management literature suggests that managers often resort to biased disclosures. However, there is little systematic evidence on what types of strategies management uses to achieve this bias. Do managers simply lie? Or, do they use more subtle ways of introducing positive bias into corporate narratives, such as selecting specific information items which result in a more positive impression (‘selectivity’) or by keeping their narratives vague and general (‘vagueness’)? In order to differentiate between the two scenarios, I re-examine the positive forward-looking statements examined by Schleicher and Walker (2010) and compare, across firms with improving and deteriorating financial performance, the managerial choices made in relation to eight forecast attributes.

I make two observations. First, there are significant differences in the characteristics of good- and bad-news firms’ positive statements. In particular, bad-news firms’ positive statements involve more non-specific time horizons, more segmental forecasts, and more references to conditions and aims and objectives, but fewer directional forecasts, fewer numbers, and fewer reinforcing qualifiers. Second, the identified differences in good- and bad-news firms’ positive statements can be exploited for classification purposes: including into a classification model additional regressors that measure a positive forward-looking statement's level of selectivity and vagueness significantly increases the model's ability to separate firms with improving financial performance from firms with deteriorating financial performance. Overall, my results are consistent with (a) impression management operating predominantly through selectivity and vagueness and (b) selectivity and vagueness being an important signal for future financial performance.     

How much discretion for risk regulators?

We analyze the regulation of firms that undertake socially risky activities but can reduce the probability of an accident inflicted on third parties by carrying out non verifiable effort. Congress delegates regulation to an agency, although these two bodies may have different preferences toward the industry. The optimal level of discretion left to the agency results from the following trade‐off: the agency can tailor discretionary policies to its expert knowledge about potential harm, but it implements policies that are too “pro‐industry.” The agency should be given full discretion when the firm is solvent; partial discretion is preferred otherwise. We then investigate how this trade‐off changes as the political and economic landscapes are modified.     

When does relationship lending start to pay?

This paper empirically characterizes relationship lending using data from more than 20,000 loans of a Spanish bank to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The study analyzes the pricing determinants of loans to firms based on the entire previous bank–firm relationship, allowing for the identification of nonlinear pricing patterns in the bank–firm relationship. We show that firms only start capitalizing the gains of relationship lending when the relationship extends beyond two years. This reduction in the loan rate spread charged is driven by the opaque firms, for which the acquisition of “soft” information is especially relevant. Finally, we find that relationship lending significantly mitigates the increased costs of refinancing loans along two dimensions: relationship duration and having additional contracts—other than loans—with the bank.     

When and Why Do Takeovers Lead to Fraud?

This paper develops a model explaining how acquisitions of controlling block ownership can facilitate post‐takeover fraud by new managers when investor protection is poor. Based on disclosures of embezzlement or breach of fiduciary duty in Korean firms, we find that the probability of explicit looting in takeover targets is 13%, almost five times as large as a matched sample of non‐targets. Post‐takeover frauds are primarily driven by transfers of minority blocks, while the corresponding probability in majority acquisitions is statistically indistinguishable from the non‐targets. These findings may explain why minority acquisitions of controlling blocks are popular under poor investor protection.     

Insurance and Endogenous Bankruptcy Risk: When is it Rational to Choose Gambling,Insurance, and Potential Bankruptcy?

We examine the coexistence of insurance and gambling in the context of limited liability. We develop a model where actuarially fair insurance is available to a risk-averse decision maker for a liability risk with non-bankrupting severity. The remaining wealth may be invested in a zero expected value risky project (i.e., gambled). The risk of bankruptcy is endogenous since either fully insuring or forgoing the project will guarantee solvency. We show that, for a range of parameters, it is optimal to both insure and gamble. The amounts insured and invested are chosen to create the potential for bankruptcy. Our results are robust to the cases where the risky project can cause bankruptcy without a liability loss and where the risky project’s expected return is nonzero.     

When is a MAX not the MAX? How news resolves information uncertainty

A well-known asset pricing anomaly, the “MAX” effect, measured by the maximum daily return in the past month, depicts stocks’ lottery-like features and investor gambling behaviour. Using the comprehensive stock-level Dow Jones (DJNS) news database between 1979 and 2016, we consider in a empirical setting how the presence of news reports affects these lottery-type stocks. We find an augmented negative relationship between MAX stocks without news and expected returns, whereby MAX with news coverage generates return momentum. The differing future return relationships between MAX stocks with and without news appears to be best explained by information uncertainty mitigation upon news arrival. Overall, our findings suggest that news plays a role in resolving information uncertainty in the stock market.     

How is macro news transmitted to exchange rates?

Macro news can affect currency prices directly and indirectly via order flow. Past research shows that the direct effects of scheduled macro news account for less than 10% of daily price variance. This paper shows that the arrival of macro news can account for more than 30% of daily price variance. Two features of our analysis account for this finding: (1) We consider the broad spectrum of macro news items that market participants observe, not just scheduled announcements. (2) We allow the arrival of news to affect prices indirectly via its impact on the volatility of order flow. Our analysis shows that order flow variations contribute more to currency price dynamics following the arrival of public macro news than at other times. This is not consistent with news effects being common knowledge that is impounded in price directly. Roughly two-thirds of the total effect of macro news on the DM/$ exchange rate is transmitted via order flow.     

What is the investment loss due to uncertainty?

We investigate the effect of uncertainty on investment. We employ a unique dataset of 25,000 Greek firms' balance sheets for 14 years covering the period before and after the eurozone crisis. A dynamic factor model is employed to proxy uncertainty. The investment performance of 14 sectors is examined within a dynamic investment model. Robust GMM estimates of the investment rate model reveal a high degree of heterogeneity among these sectors. Overall uncertainty affects negatively investment performance and this effect substantially increased in the years of crisis. Agriculture and Mining are the least affected and the most affected ones include Manufacturing, Real Estate and Hotels. Focusing on the response of investment to uncertainty, it emerges that (relative) smaller firms are affected more compared to larger ones.     

When times get tough, what happens to TQM? Case study

When Mueller Chemical Company's biggest customer, Ameriton, demanded that MCC install a total quality management system five years ago, the effort seemed worth it. Morale improved dramatically at the German company, as did quality and productivity. But now, in this fictional case study, Ameriton has gone bankrupt. As a result, MCC has had to cut its work force, and senior managers are meeting to decide whether TQM should be part of the downsized MCC. Horst Koblitz, director of TQM, and Division Manager Eva Stichen both vote yes. Stichen's division, which never supplied Ameriton, has turned its process-control system into the company's best thanks to TQM. The division is more cost-efficient, product defects are nearly nonexistent, and its safety record is spotless. As Koblitz notes, Ameriton's failure is no reason to abandon all that MCC has built. Furthermore, shareholders and customers would think that MCC was panicking. MCC just needs to tailor its TQM program to a smaller organization. But CFO Georg Becker doesn't think MCC has the time or resources for fine-tuning. And as he sees it, that might be just as well. The distractions that came with TQM took MCC away from its goal of becoming the chemicals market leader in Europe. While the company organized teams, developed measurement systems, and filled out quality reports, its competitors took away much of the market share MCC was after. TQM was a good long-term approach, but it didn't come with a plan for MCC's current situation. And CEO and Chairman Dieter Mueller won't compromise; TQM must either stay or go.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

Is there a dark side to exchange traded funds? An information perspective

We examine whether an increase in ETF ownership is accompanied by a decline in pricing efficiency for the underlying component securities. Our tests show an increase in ETF ownership is associated with (1) higher trading costs (bid-ask spreads and market liquidity), (2) an increase in “stock return synchronicity,” (3) a decline in “future earnings response coefficients,” and (4) a decline in the number of analysts covering the firm. Collectively, our findings support the view that increased ETF ownership can lead to higher trading costs and lower benefits from information acquisition. This combination results in less informative security prices for the underlying firms.     

How much inflation is necessary to grease the wheels?

Tobin's proposition that inflation “greases” the wheels of the labor market is studied using a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric wage adjustment costs. The simulated method of moments is used to estimate the nonlinear model based on its second-order approximation. Optimal inflation is determined by a benevolent government that maximizes the households’ welfare. Econometric results indicate that nominal wages are downwardly rigid and that the optimal level of grease inflation for the U.S. economy is about 0.35% per year, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 0.04% to 0.87%.     

How important is capital structure policy to firm survival?

If there is an economically important optimal capital structure, then firms that deviate too far from the optimum will face greater risk of failure or acquisition. Using data from the oil industry we find no significant evidence that capital structure policy affects acquisition or failure probability. Firms appear to increase leverage when they face attractive growth opportunities or when poor operating performance reduces equity value or compels borrowing. Firms are acquired when rapid growth has reduced financial slack. In a clinical examination, we address the question of how firms with persistently low leverage can operate and survive for many years without being targeted for acquisition. Our evidence supports the pecking-order hypothesis, including acquisition among potential financing sources.     

The financial crisis: What is there to learn?

Many are currently studying the origins of the financial crisis in an attempt to answer two seemingly simple questions: why did it happen, and can another crisis be prevented? Those two questions have proved incredibly divisive. The majority opinion of The United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was submitted with two dissenting positions. Furthermore, The 2010 Economic Report of the United States President does not perfectly align with any opinion presented in that report. Few studies, however, provide proper consideration to the evolution of macroeconomic thought and lengthening of the business cycle preceding the current crisis.     

Should you take your brand to where the action is?

When markets turn hostile, it's no surprise that managers are tempted to extend their brands vertically--that is, to take their brands into a seemingly attractive market above or below their current positions. And for companies chasing growth, the urge to move into booming premium or value segments also can be hard to resist. The draw is indeed strong; and in some instances, a vertical move is not merely justified but actually essential to survival--even for top brands, which have the advantages of economies of scale, brand equity, and retail clout. But beware: leveraging a brand to access upscale or downscale markets is more dangerous than it first appears. Before making a move, then, managers should ascertain whether the rewards will be worth the risks. In general, David Aaker recommends that managers avoid vertical extensions whenever possible. There is an inherent contradiction in the very concept because brand equity is built in large part on image and perceived worth, and a vertical move can easily distort those qualities. Still, certain situations demand vertical extensions, and Aaker examines both the winners and the losers in the game. Managers may find themselves facing a situation that presents both an emerging opportunity and a strategic threat, and alternatives to vertical extensions may have even higher risks and costs. Furthermore, a number of brands have been extended vertically with complete success. If after assessing the risks and rewards you conclude that a vertical extension is on the horizon, proceed with caution. And keep in mind that your challenge will be to leverage and protect the original brand while taking advantage of the new opportunity.     

How resilient is the German banking system to macroeconomic shocks?

Macroeconomic stress testing studies often rely on rather short sample periods due to the limited availability of banking data. They may fail to appropriately account for the cyclicality in the interaction between the banking system and macroeconomic developments. In this paper, we use a newly constructed data set on German banks’ income and loss statements over the past 39 years to model the interaction between the banking sector and the macroeconomy. Our VAR analysis indicates that the level of stress in the banking sector is strongly affected by monetary policy shocks. The results rationalize the active behavior of central banks observed during periods of financial market crises.