论制度演化视阈中的认知与理性

制度既不是纯粹理性设计的产物,也不是纯粹自发演化的无意识的产物,而是两者综合作用的产物。人类具有高度认知的能力,可以在经由认知积累的心智结构的基础上展开推理和思索,这样的推理和思索为制度的理性设计准备了心理冲动和智力支持。制度正是在这样的认知和理性的作用下,在群体中扩散着,并且动态地演化着。     

我国海洋渔业资源利用中个体理性与集体理性的矛盾及其协调

本文论述了海洋渔业资源中个体理性与集体理性矛盾产生的根源，指出并分析了协调这些矛盾的措施：一是限制渔船的数量，二是采取各种措施恢复海洋渔业资源，三是实施配额捕捞制度。在前述分析的基础上作者提出了完善这些措施的对策和建议。     

关于信任的博弈分析——基于个体的自利理性和社会理性

信任的根本在于不完全信息和有限理性,信任是个体弥补自己理性不足的一种策略.所以,信任分析无法在个体的自利理性下完成,需要扩展个体理性的范畴.将个体理性扩展为自利理性和社会理性,利用理性的这种二元特性,重新解释了两个具有代表性的博弈模型--蜈蚣博弈和信任博弈.这不但对信任问题提出了一种新的分析框架,而且还解决了博弈分析的困境.这说明,对个体理性的扩展是合适的,个体的社会理性是经济学不可忽视的一部分.     

会计信息真实之程序理性观与结果理性观

本文通过对两份问券调查结果的分析,发现上市公司经理人与投资人对会计信息真实性的看法存在显著的视角差异,前者持会计信息真实的程序理性观,而后者持会计信息真实的结果理性观。从目前我国证券市场的现状来看,投资人处于信息严重不对称的弱势地位,上市公司会计信息失真使投资者蒙受了巨大损失。文章据此认为：对上市公司会计信息生成、审计和披露的监管,应偏重于会计信息真实的结果理性观,以保护投资者利益,降低经理人与投资人之间的信息不对称性。     

Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach

Two long-lived players play a repeated coordination game. I show the restrictions on players' beliefs which imply that cooperation is optimal play. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D83.     

有限理性、规范内化与利他行为:一个演化视角

本文沿着有限理性的理论进路,通过规范内化对利他行为做出一个解释。以往的理论通过规范提供的外在奖惩解释利他行为,但无法解释在外在奖惩不存在的情况下出现的纯利他行为。本文认为,这些利他行为可以通过规范内化来解释,而后者则是有限理性的一个自然结果。为了阐明规范内化如何产生,本文给出了一个形式化的复制者动态,其结果表明,在考虑有限理性的前提下,社会交往越复杂,人类处理复杂性的认知能力越有限,规范内化出现的可能性就越大。针对复制者动态模型的局限,本文还运用基于行为主体建模对规范内化过程进行了模拟。模拟结果显示,当人类理性计算能力相对于社会生活的复杂程度越小,规范内化出现的可能性越大,该结果与之前分析结论一致。本文的分析结果再次支持了Herbert Simon对利他行为的解释,即利他行为是人类有限理性的结果,虽然利他行为自身减少个体适应性,但由于它是规范内化所产生的一个自然结果,所以利他行为因为规范内化所具有的适应性而留存。     

会计信息的程序真实抑或结果真实

真实性是会计信息透明度最基本的质量要求。会计信息的真实具有相对性、动态性和结果评价的主观性等特点,而且过分强调结果理性会诱导管理当局操纵会计信息披露以达到预定的结果。会计规则制定权合约安排实施要遵循程序理性,而法律实践追求程序公正,会计信息真实性是遵循程序理性观的真实性。因此,会计信息的真实性应建立在"程序理性为主,结果理性为辅,两者相互促进"的观念之上。     

The Moral Imperative and Social Rationality of Government-Guaranteed Employment and Reskilling

Unemployment exacts a high cost to its victims, not only in lost income, but also in terms of quality of life (insecurity, depression, abandoned families, divorce, suicide and poorer health). It also exacts a high cost to society in terms of lost output, foregone tax revenue, depreciating human capital, and increased costs of welfare, crime and health care. Yet modern wealthy societies have, principally for the sake of price stability and to avoid the budget costs of a full remedy, chosen to tolerate a substantial level of permanent unemployment. This article explores the moral conditions of this social choice and its rationality in terms of social welfare. It makes and develops support for two claims: society's tolerance of involuntary unemployment is morally wrong, and it is socially and economically irrational. It concludes that government should guarantee employment by serving as employer of last resort and where appropriate provide for retraining.     

Post-Keynesian Economic Policies: The Case of Sweden

This paper attempts to present the basic features that would define a model of behavior suited to an institutional and post-Keynesian approach. To facilitate explanation, human behavior is divided into three phases: motivation, cognition and reasoning and decision-making. Motivation appears as a process directed toward the satisfaction of a complex structure of various needs and wants. The role of emotions and the social and cognitive aspects of motivation are recognized. Moreover, it is also recognized that human beings have limited cognitive and rational capacities, and it is accepted that they are potentially creative. Partly as a consequence of that, cognition becomes a social act and knowledge of reality is subject to fundamental uncertainty. Finally, human rationality (or intelligence) is associated with a search for good solutions, and it includes elements of procedural rationality, creativity and emotional rationality. The role of habits and institutions in all these phases is stressed.     

程序正义视阈中中国行政决策听证制度建设

行政决策听证作为一种法律程序,应当符合程序正义的基本要求。中国现阶段行政决策听证制度缺乏统一的听证规则;听证参与人缺少应有的法理属性;听证的抗辩性不强;缺乏对听证代表意见的回应和救济机制等。完善中国行政决策听证制度,应当强化程序观念,提高全体公民的听证权意识;制定统一的听证规则;完善听证主持人制度和代表遴选制度;建立对听证意见的回应与救济机制。     

理性的边界与个体主义方法论的局限性

本文致力于弄清三个方面的问题：（1）通过梳理在确定性和不确定性条件下理性偏好的最新研究成果,指出理性的边界,揭示主流经济学个体主义方法论的局限性。（2）通过考察阿罗不可能性定理的条件,提出阿罗不可能性定理的逆否命题,探索摆脱阿罗不可能性定理的途径和社会福利函数存在的条件。（3）根据阿罗不可能性定理,指出个体主义方法论在分析个人理性和集体理性、微观经济学和宏观经济学、个人效用和社会福利之间的关系时遭遇的困难,进而提出用整体主义方法论解决此类问题的思路。本文认为,制度和规则是社会的灵魂,在规则的语境下新古典经济学和制度经济学不是对立而是互补的。     

Habit,Decision-Making,and Rationality: Comparing Thorstein Veblen and Early Herbert Simon

The article aims to contribute to the convergence between institutional and neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary economics. It intends to help unify the behavioral foundations of these two strands of thought by returning to the original views of their main historical inspirations. It thus proposes a comparative analysis of the theory of human behavior developed by Thorstein Veblen and Herbert Simon, respectively. The article notably discusses how Simon’s early work links together the notions of habit, rationality, and the decision-making process, and explores the extent to which his views are consistent with, complementary to, or divergent from Veblen’s. The article highlights several commonalities between Simon and Veblen’s views on habits. However, Simon departs from Veblen in developing a dual model of human behavior which clearly differentiates habit-based from decision-based behaviors. The article argues that neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary economists should go beyond this binary model and build on the pragmatist-Veblenian approach, in which these two dimensions are intimately entangled. This process could allow the economists in question to take advantage of the most valuable insights of institutional economics regarding the interactions between individual choices and habits and institutions.     

Individual Rationality and the “Zonal Attachment” Principle: Three Stock Migration Models

Shared fish stocks migrate across borders between different countries’ exclusive economic zones. This paper discusses the individual rationality of fish-sharing agreements based on the zonal attachment of such stocks. Three types of migrations are considered: (i) a common stock that grows and reproduces and is then distributed in given proportions between two countries’ zones at the beginning of each fishing season; (ii) sub-stocks that breed and grow independently in their separate zones but spill over between zones according to relative abundance; (iii) a stock that grows and breeds in one country’s zone but migrates into the zone of another if it exceeds a certain size. It is shown that in all these cases the minor partner in a fish-sharing agreement may not have an incentive to cooperate unless he gets a larger share of the cooperative profits than that corresponds to his share of the stock. This is particularly likely to happen when the unit cost of fish does not depend on the stock. An exception could occur if stock migration depends on the stock level; the major partner could then keep the entire stock by fishing it down to a critical level.     

Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice

We develop a model which reflects the tendency of people to simplify the decision problems they face. The decision maker chooses among alternate strategies only on the basis of the payoff she assesses she would obtain from them, and these assessments do not explicitly take into account her subjective judgements regarding the likelihood of alternate states of the world. At each stage, the decision maker chooses the strategy that she assesses to give the highest payoff. She updates her assessments adaptively. We show that such behavior leads to maxmin choices. We also consider the decision maker who experiences shocks. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D8.     

Uncertainty,Rationality and the Study of Social Institutions

The insight that both ontological and epistemological perspectives are intertwined is certainly correct, but at the same time insufficient to differentiate mainstream from heterodox approaches to economic institutions. As this paper argues, it is important whether one starts from ontological or epistemological considerations first. The paper suggests that the difference can be described in terms of function versus rules and demonstrates that an intersubjective ontology for institutions requires also an intersubjective epistemology. Otherwise, ontological precepts contradict the epistemological ones with important repercussions for understanding knowledge, rationality and institutions.     

Norms and Rationality in the Evolution of Economic Systems: A View from Asian Villages

The evolution of economic systems is viewed as a process in which various informal arrangements are experimented with for improving efficiency under changed economic environments, some of which may survive and become established as new social norms. The process is illustrated by a micro case study of Philippine villages. It reveals the ability of peasants subsisting on small farms to resolve a major disequilibrium between labour's marginal productivity and the wage rate resulting from the intro duction of modern rice technology, by creating, on the basis of their traditional experience, an appropriate institution consistent with their cultural norm. Concurrently, large estate farms were seen to arrive at an inferior outcome because of their inability to utilize the peasant community's norm, thereby demonstrating the existence of multiple equilibria
JEL Classification Numbers: D23, O17, P51     

Understanding the Remittance Gender Gap among Hispanics in the US: Gendered Norms and the Role of Expectations

Using the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS), this study analyzes the existence of a gender gap in favor of men in the monetary remittance behavior of Hispanics residing in the United States. Findings indicate that cultural gender norms and expectations in the country of origin play a key role. The study shows that women migrants are less likely to remit than men and, when they do, they transfer smaller amounts. The remittance gender gap is not universal among subgroups, since it is only observable among Hispanics who came to the US to improve their economic situation, plan to return to their home country, and have low income and low schooling. An index on migrants’ perceptions of gender roles as a proxy for cultural gendered norms is constructed and shows that more traditional gender views are associated with a significant gender gap in favor of men in remittances.     

贸易政策合理性的评价标准初探——反倾销合理性争论引发的思考

长期以来,反倾销的合理性一直是人们争论的话题.反倾销属于贸易政策的范畴,贸易政策的合理性是对贸易政策的评价问题,对事物进行评价首先应当确立相应的评价标准.评价一项贸易政策是否具有合理性的标准有四项,即合乎理性、合价值性、合规律性、合发展性.     

Complexity of economic structures and emergent properties

This concept revolves around differences of embeddedness of organizations in the macro patterns of routines (economic policy regimes), which in turn may differentially provide them–and the system as a whole–with ‘procedural rationality’ in dealing with identified problems in their relevant complex environment. Regularities of interdependence are specified between different regime patterns and the variety of coordination routines between and inside micro organizations. Corresponding regularities are also observed for internal governance routines of organizations, which in turn determine the behavioral adaptation by self-organization that may be rationally in a local perspective, but–contingent on the organization’s embeddedness in the coordination structure–not necessarily so in a comprehensive one.

有限理性下中美投资者对财富和消费偏好的比较研究

投资和消费是人们最重要的经济决策,而投资和消费的选择是由对财富和消费的偏好决定的。在效用最大化的前提下,构建有限理性的效用函数,来比较中国和美国投资者对于消费和财富的偏好。研究的结果表明,相对中国人而言美国人是更加偏好消费的,而中国人更偏重于财富。这样的差异形成的原因可能在于中国的金融市场发达程度不如美国,中国的社会保障体系不如美国完善。