余额宝改变银行

这是一个全民理财的时代。如果你有1万元,通过银行活期存款,一年的利息只有35元,但通过余额宝,1万元一年或许可以产生收益300元至400元。马云曾经讲过,如果银行不改变,我们就改变银行。6月13日支付宝联合天弘基金推出的屌丝理财产品——余额宝,似乎又一次兑现了马云的豪言壮语。7月1日,余额宝和天弘基金共同宣布,6月13日上线的余额宝服务,截至6月30日24点,累计用户数已经达到251.56万,累计转入资金规模     

“余额宝”又一次“改变”了银行

马云曾经讲过,如果银行不改变,我们就改变银行。近期余额宝的出现,似乎又一次"兑现"了马云的"豪言壮语"。余额宝自今年6月13日问世以来,即受到社会的广泛关注,被认为是继支付宝之后又一次"改变"互联网金融的历史性事件。短     

余额宝:马云欲与银行“抢钱”

"余额宝"存款业务悄然上线,用户存留在支付宝的资金不仅能拿到"利息"……6月13日,阿里巴巴支付宝的"余额宝"存款业务悄然上线,用户存留在支付宝的资金不仅能拿到"利息",且与银行活期存款利息相比收益更高。余额宝问世余额宝的"利息"是用户通过购买货币基金产生的投资收益,其运作流程为:基金公司将其基金直销系统内置到支付宝网站中,用户将资金转入余额宝的过程中,支付宝和     

金融战略蓝图“余额宝”是先锋?

2013年6月13日,在"信用支付"推出仅两个月之后,支付宝与天弘基金高调推出"余额宝",并在短短20天之内助力天弘"增利宝货币基金"成为"中国用户数最多货币基金",一时成为金融市场热议的焦点话题。虽然市场对于"余额宝"创新褒贬不一,但对于阿里巴巴而言,却绝非局限于追求多重现时利益。在落地实施集团金融战略蓝图的背后,是悄然拓展电商业务边界、改变金融行     

“余额宝”或将倒逼利率市场化改革

近日第三方支付平台支付宝推出名为“余额宝”的增值服务,用户只要将钱转入“余额宝”,就可以获得一定的收益。拥有与活期存款相差无几的流动性,货币基金收益却远高干银行活期存款收益,这无疑是对市场极大的诱惑。     

分析“余额宝”的发展模式及对银行金融的冲击

“余额宝”是由第三方支付平台支付宝打造的,相当于“支付宝＋货币基金”组合营销的产物.这种简单的互联网金融模式在中国刮起了一阵旋风,打着高于银行10倍活期利息的口号迅速地发展起来,从6月中旬推出以来,到6月底,仅仅半个月的时间,“余额宝”规模达到了大约 66 亿,客户规模 250 万, 户均余额 2600 元.（据《中国证券报》报道,截止 7 月 15 日,“余额宝”规模已经超过 100 亿,客户规模或以超过 400 万）.笔者分析了“余额宝”能如此迅猛的发展,成功基因是什么,潜在的规模有多大,规模发展后有哪些困难和瓶颈, 是否会对传统的银行业产生巨大的冲击.     

余额宝从0到2500亿：天弘基金的奇迹

随着2013年四季度基金业绩报告的披露,人们看到了余额宝给天弘基金——一这家不起眼的小基金公司所带来的“奇迹”。根据报告,基于余额宝平台的天弘增利宝货币基金四季度实现利润14．22亿元。而与此同时,该基金的规模也一举突破2500亿元,超越华夏基金2400多亿元的规模,而创造这一奇迹仅仅用了200多天。     

余额宝背后的货币基金

2013年6月诞生的余额宝,在11月14日资金规模就突破了1000亿元。仅仅不到半年时间,资金规模已接近一个中小型银行的水平,这成为互联网金融的“引爆点”,随后,类金融宝们争相亮相。余额宝的创新利器是什么？银行业需要借鉴与研究,迎接冲击与挑战。货币基金对银行的影响 对于银行来说,从储户那里吸纳存款需要一定的成本,比如需要大量资金来维持网点的运转。而余额宝通过互联网可以低成本地吸纳散户的小额资金,凝聚起来后通过货币基金投向货币市场,成本并不高,只需要付出足够多的利息,就可以获得资金。对于网点较少、存款较少的银行来说,这种方式可以帮助银行获得更多资金。     

余额宝的风险及防范研究

余额宝的上线,是互联网金融的一次伟大革命,丰富了人们的理财途径,但不可否认,余额宝的产生伴生了巨大的风险,本文从四个方面对余额宝当前面临的风险进行分析,并提出应对相应风险的政策建议。     

你真的了解余额宝吗？

最近余额宝收益率逐渐下滑,又不断爆出,央行针对第三方支付连出狠招,不仅叫停了新推出的虚拟信用卡,还有意限制网络支付。一众多使用余额宝和理财通的人非常担心余额宝会不会被取缔,而记者身边的朋友也一直担忧余额宝的风险,不敢碰余额宝这类闲钱理财的工具。     

农发行支农服务持续推进

2011年初在农发行召开的系统会议上,行长郑晖提出了要实施以继续支持农副产品收购为一个轮子,以粮棉油收储、加工、流通为重点的全产业链信贷业务,在确保支持收储不出大问题的基础上,使信贷支持贯穿粮棉油产前、产中、产后全过程,打造支持粮棉油全产业链发展的主导银行品牌;     

改革农村金融，解三农之需

未来的农村金融市场必将出现投资主体多元化、竞争主体多元化、农村资金供给不断增加、农户资金需求得到更好满足的良好局面。     

我国银行业实现创新与监管"双赢"的模式探讨

西方国家市场经济的实践表明,银行业只有实现监管保护下的创新和创新推动下的监管,即创新与监管的“双赢”,才能获得竞争、安全、高效的发展环境空间。由于具有特殊的国情背景,我国银行业一直以来没有关注创新与监管的博弈关系,甚至使二者对立起来,出现监管制约创新、创新缺乏监管保障的现象,致使银行业创新与监管二者均在低水平状态徘徊。作者以西方国家的实践为例,全面分析了创新与监管的博弈关系,指出我国与西方市场经济国家在创新与监管实现市场化“双赢”问题上的差距及可借鉴的经验,提出了适合我国国情的“以监管护创新,以创新促监管”的“双赢”模式。     

MARKET TIMING ABILITY OF POOLED SUPERANNUATION FUNDS JANUARY 1981 TO DECEMBER 1987

The performance of pooled superannuation funds is analysed within a framework that recognises that risk management or ‘market timing’ is an important aspect of the fund manager's decision-making. Two broad appraoches to the issue of ‘market timing’ are adopted: first, the performance evaluation model developed by Henriksson and Merton [1981] which allows for return differentials to arise from both security selection and market timing; and second, the recursive residuals methodology of Brown, Durbin and Evans [1975] which identifies points in chronological time when the risks of the funds underwent a change. The results indicate that only 5 out of 16 funds had significant shifts in their risk over the period of the study, all of which occurred in late 1986 to early 1987. It follows that the usual Jensen measure of performance is inappropriate for these funds since one component of their performance is due to market timing activities. The return performance of these market timing activities is significantly negative for 15 to 16 funds indicating that their timing ability is perverse. To some extent this is an artifact of the market crash of October 1987 and that all funds had a positive exposure to equities. However, due to their asset allocation policies all funds are assigned significantly positive security selection performance.     

MARKET TIMING IN REGRESSIONS AND REALITY

We compare price‐to‐earnings ratios and dividend yields, which are indirect measures of sentiment, with the bullish sentiment index, which is a direct measure. We find that the sentiment index does better as a market‐timing tool than do P/E ratios and dividend yields, but none is very reliable. We do not argue that market timing is impossible. Rather, we observe that stock prices reflect both sentiment and value, both of which are difficult to measure and neither of which is perfectly known in foresight. Successful market timing requires insights into future sentiment and value, insights beyond those that are reflected in widely available measures.     

MARKET TIMING AND MUTUAL FUND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION

This study uses a methodology that is independent of beta estimates to provide empirical evidence on the success of market timing by mutual fund managers. A fund's success at market timing is evaluated by determining if the percentage of the portfolio invested in stocks increases prior to an upturn in the general level of stock market prices and declines prior to a downturn in the level of stock prices. No evidence is found that managers possess, as a group, any market timing ability.     

EVIDENCE OF SHIFTS IN PORTFOLIO ASSET COMPOSITION AS A MARKET TIMING TOOL

Previous research has investigated portfolio timing success by analyzing possible shifts in the beta of professionally managed portfolios. The methodology used by these studies usually involves calculating the betas of portfolios under varing market conditions using ex post holding period yields. Since a portfolio's beta can shift for reasons other than timing efforts, the results and interpretation of this type of analysis are limited. This paper takes a more direct approach to the analysis of timing by analyzing shifts in the asset composition of professionally managed portfolios. The asset composition is first analyzed to determine if portfolio managers are attempting to adjust risk exposure. Any shifts that are identified are compared to the market conditions that existed subsequent to the shift to determine if the shift was appropriate in terms of correct timing.     

DAY OF THE WEEK EFFECTS: A TEST OF THE INFORMATION TIMING HYPOTHESIS

Many explanations have been offered for the negative Monday effect. An obvious conjecture is that the negative return might be due to firms timing the release of information after the market closes on Friday. We test this conjecture on a sample of 233 firms for 1986. Using a firm's board meeting date as a proxy for high information days we find that a firm's Monday return near a board meeting date is more likely to be negative than other Monday returns. Also the remaining days of the week tend to be more positive than similar days further away from the board meeting. Our results appear to explain part of the negative Monday effect.