TALKING,SEARCHING, AND PRICING*

I study the implications of interpersonal communication for incentives for consumers to acquire information and firms’ pricing behavior. Firms market a homogeneous product and choose its price; consumers acquire price information at some cost to themselves. Also, each consumer accesses the information acquired by a sample of other consumers—interpersonal communication. An exogenous increase in the level of interpersonal communication decreases the information that consumers acquire, and, when search costs are low, firms price less aggressively. In an extension, consumers may choose to invest in interpersonal communication at some cost. A decrease in the costs of interpersonal communication decreases firms’ competition.     

The value of information in a simple duopoly model

This paper is concerned with the evaluation of information in a duopoly model in which the cost functions are subject to uncertainty. It explores how changes in information about the costs available to either firm affects the welfare of both firms along with the welfare of consumers. By comparing the ten possible types of information structures, it is shown that information may be detrimental, that improved information for one firm may or may not benefit the other firm and/or the consumer, and that it may be more desirable for a firm to gather information about the rival's cost rather than its own. All of these “irregular” results depend on the values of the variances of the costs and their correlation coefficient.     

Search less for a better price

In many markets, sellers must spend resources to learn the costs of providing goods/services. This paper considers consumer searches in such markets. The findings show that: (i) even with ex ante identical consumers and sellers, there is price dispersion in the equilibrium, (ii) despite price dispersion and minimal search costs, it could be optimal to search just two sellers and (iii) the optimal number of searches can increase with sellers' information costs.     

EXCESSIVE COMPETITION ON HEADLINE PRICES

In a variety of purchasing situations, consumers may focus primarily on headline prices, disregarding the full costs associated with acquiring and maintaining a product or service contract. Even when this is the case, the literature has delineated various circumstances where intense competition can protect consumers through the so-called “waterbed effect.” In this article, we however show that when consumers have context-dependent preferences, competition may rather exacerbate their and society's harm by distorting product choice and provision. Then, consumer protection policy must sufficiently constrain hidden fees so that competition, along with high-quality firms' incentives to educate consumers, can restore efficiency.     

Process and Product Innovation: Complementarity in a Vertically Differentiated Monopoly with Discrete Consumer Types

This paper examines the complementarity between process and product innovation where process innovation reduces the marginal cost of quality. In the context of a vertically differentiated monopolistic market with discrete consumer types, we investigate how the nature of (fixed versus variable) innovation costs and the distribution of consumers over different types affect the complementarity between process and product innovation. We show that under variable innovation costs a process innovation is more likely to occur alone than both innovations together when taste diversity (or consumer heterogeneity) is not significant and/or when there are more low-type than high-type consumers.     

Geographical dispersion of consumer search behaviour

This article investigates whether consumer search behaviour differs across zip codes within the U.S. As an application, daily gasoline price data covering virtually all gas stations within the U.S. are employed to estimate the distribution of search costs in each zip code. The results show that there are significant differences across zip codes regarding the expected number of searches achieved before consumers purchase gasoline. In order to have a systematic explanation, such differences are further connected to geographic, demographic, and economic conditions of the zip codes in a secondary analysis. The corresponding results imply several strategies for gas stations in order to maximize profits/markups; suggestions follow for policy makers and regulators to reduce redistributive effects of information barriers across locations.     

Market frictions: A unified model of search costs and switching costs

It is well known that search costs and switching costs can create market power by constraining the ability of consumers to change suppliers. While previous research has examined each cost in isolation, this paper demonstrates the benefits of examining the two types of friction in unison. The paper shows how subtle distinctions between the two costs can provide important differences in their effects upon consumer behaviour, competition and welfare. In addition, the paper also illustrates a simple empirical methodology for estimating separate measures of both costs, while demonstrating a potential bias that can arise if only one cost is considered.     

Masterful Meisters? Voluntary Certification and Quality in the German Crafts Sector

Voluntary certification systems potentially reduce search costs in markets with imperfect information. Service markets with many heterogeneous firms – such as the crafts market – are prone to information imperfections and can therefore potentially benefit from such informational mechanisms. We examine if the Meister qualification in the German crafts sector improves service quality as perceived by consumers. We find a significant and positive relationship between the Meister title and consumer ratings and conclude that the certificate is a credible sign of quality.     

Consumer support for environmental policies: An application to purchases of green cars

This paper focuses on how consumer motivation can be tapped in order to encourage the adoption of cleaner technologies. Consumers are heterogeneous — they may be guided by intrinsic motivation or extrinsic motivation. While information provision policies (such as the energy label for cars) may be effective in encouraging certain consumers to adopt green cars, financial incentive schemes (such as subsidies or fines) may be more persuasive for extrinsically-motivated consumers. We develop a dynamic theory of adoption of environmental innovations, in which information-provision policies are followed by financial incentives (first ‘carrot’, then ‘stick’ incentives). Analysis of a survey dataset of Swiss households observes considerable heterogeneity in terms of support of information-provision or financial incentive policies, in line with our conjectures. Our results will be of particular interest to policymakers interested in guiding consumers towards cleaner technologies.     

Estimating consumer preferences for online music services

This article analyses consumer preferences with regard to important attributes of online music services. Conjoint analysis and a random coefficient discrete choice model using Bayesian approach with Gibbs sampling are used to estimate the preferences. Based on the quantitative results, we use simulation to look at how a new pricing strategy and the threat of legal penalty for file sharing would influence the online music market. Findings include these: estimated willingness to pay for downloading one music file is significantly less than the actual price of the file; consumers are sensitive to longer search and download times for music files and very sensitive to the threat of legal action; and consumers are not sensitive to online music services broadening their catalogues. Finally, the simulation shows that a combination of increased transaction costs for illegal file sharing and lower-priced digital music files would inhibit illegal file sharing and bolster the number of people purchasing music legally from the online services.     

隐私关注与中国B2C电子商务客户忠诚度实证研究

个人信息对于B2C电子商务网站商家改善服务水平和促进销售有较大促进作用,但是当个人信息披露给网站商家后,还少有研究消费者不同的隐私关注程度对其网络购物行为和客户忠诚度是否或如何影响。本文通过问卷调查方式,基于沟通隐私管理理论,发现消费者在提供更多个人真实信息给网站商家后,隐私关注程度高的用户具有更强的网络购物忠诚倾向,而隐私关注程度低的用户具有较低的网络购物忠诚倾向。结果显示在线零售商应该重视对隐私关注度高的用户,并通过改善个人消费者隐私保护、网站安全水平,从而改善与消费者的信任关系,促进网站销售。     

Optimal pricing when rational consumers anticipate monitoring cost

This article considers a monopolistic firm’s optimal pricing decision over two periods among dynamic pricing, preannounced pricing and single pricing. In the models, consumers rationally determine whether to exhibit strategic waiting by weighing their costs against prospectively lower price. Our analysis yields three main results. First, single pricing that completely eliminates strategic waiting surely would be dominated by intertemporal pricing when facing rational consumers. Second, preannounced pricing may actually yield lower revenue than dynamic pricing when considering its effect on the reduction of consumer monitoring cost. Only when monitoring costs under dynamic pricing and under preannounced pricing are equal, is firm revenue weakly greater under preannounced pricing than under dynamic pricing. Third, in dynamic pricing equilibrium, increasing monitoring cost may increase firm revenue, consumer surplus and social welfare simultaneously.     

Advertising,consumer search costs and prices in a professional service market

Since stigler's (1961) seminal article on the economics of information it has been argued that producer advertising is a substitute for consumer search. This view of advertising has been implicit in recent liberalization of restrictions on advertising by professionals (e.g. lawyers, doctors, accountants, etc.). Using th e model of the price discriminating professional developed by Masson and Wu (1974) the impact of solicitor advertising on the level of conveyancing fees charged by a sample of Scottish Solicitors is estimated. The analysis distinguishes between different forms of advertising. The advertising-of-information theory cannot be rejected for some forms of advertising in one (property value) submarket but it can be in the other (higher property value) submarket. The evidence here rejects (i) the view that all advertising is a substitude for consumer search and (ii) the view that actions to reduce search costs (such as advertising) necessarily reduce price discrimination.     

金融消费者保护:市场失灵、政府介入与道德风险的防范

金融消费者保护成为次贷危机后金融改革的一个重要方面。文章认为,在金融交易中,金融消费者处于弱势地位,金融消费者需要保护。市场可以对消费者提供一定的保护,但是由于市场失灵,无法给金融消费者提供充分的保护,也无法从根本上解决金融消费者保护问题。金融消费者需要政府(管理部门)来提供保护,但是政府并不必然比市场聪明,也会出现监管失灵。监管者的专业知识要高于普通消费者,关键是要不断提高政府提供保护(监管者保护)的有效性,防止政府失灵。加强金融消费者保护的同时,必须防范道德风险和逆向选择。     

Bringing economic opportunity into line with environmental influence: A discussion on the Coase theorem and the Porter and van der Linde hypothesis

Environmental concerns and tightened environmental policy parameters have been associated with the notion of additional costs of compliance rather than with innovation and sustainability. The contrary, has also been suggested, claiming that strict environmental legislation merely serves as a catalyst for firms to retain obvious economic and environmental mutual gains–so called win–wins–laying around waiting to be collected. Such implications can be seen from the Porter and van der Linde writings, heavily criticised by Palmer et al. as being built on faulty examples. This paper supports that conclusion and uses property rights and transactions costs theories to find private incentives to explore the win–wins for those actors who have the largest potentials to diminish the pressure on our environment. By applying the Coase theorem, emphasising transaction costs and property rights, this paper argues that strong public support is needed to create private incentives for exploring economic and environmental win–win innovations. The public support suggested is to (A) extend producer responsibilities–where the same costs which may be neglected by the end consumers will, if transferred to the design owner, be viewed as a production cost–and to (B) enforce environmental public procurement. Both may be combined with a support to (C) actors (such as non-governmental organisations and consumer agencies) positioning themselves as information bridges by informing the consumers. The negative effects of asymmetric information among actors can, thereby, be diminished as well as the low interest to primarily care for the environment among common consumers.     

QUALITY-ASSURING PRICE AND BREACH OF EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY

If consumers cannot discern quality prior to purchase, firms may use both court enforcement and the market mechanism to assure quality. But the level of warranty protection that firms choose to offer depends on the efficiency of the market. As the ability of consumers to communicate information concerning quality among themselves (market efficiency) increases, the level of warranty protection that maximizes consumer surplus falls. In highly efficient markets, producers do not offer a warranty. Thus, courts should not imply a warranty if producers do not specify one. In addition, the level of warranty protection depends on the courts' ability to distinguish between producer and consumer moral hazard.     

A welfare analysis of the principle of mutual recognition

Countries set norms to protect consumers against ill-functioning products. In the absence of coordination, countries can set different norms and still achieve the same level of consumer protection. Such differences in specifications create barriers to trade because exporting firms incur adaptation costs. The principle of mutual recognition addresses the problem by ensuring that products lawfully manufactured in one country are acceptable in other countries, even without adaptation. The principle shifts the transaction costs of adapting to several norms from firms to consumers. We identify the winners and the losers, and we show that this principle is a source of disparity.     

消费者购物介入成本分析

本文对比分析了购物活动中不同决策情形下的消费者介入成本,并给出介入成本的构成,在此基础上设计了考虑消费者介入成本的购物决策模型.求解表明消费者花费的搜索时间与时间限制有关.时间越宽松,投入的搜索时间越多;工资率越高,投入的搜索时间就越少;由搜索时间引致风险降低而节约的成本越多,投入的搜索时间就越多.通过比较从商店直接选购和从网上购物的两种介入成本,阐述了开展B-C电子商务的企业优势和劣势,并提出了企业用以降低消费者介入成本的措施.     

Costly Search, Capacity Constraints, and Bertrand Equilibrium Price Dispersion

This article analyzes the impact of transaction (search) costs and capacity constraints in an almost competitive market with homogeneous firms that compete on price. We characterize conditions under which Nash equilibria with price dispersion exist; in equilibrium, firms play pure strategies in prices and consumers adopt a symmetric mixed search strategy. Price dispersion is possible even though consumers all have the same search cost and valuation for the item and prices charged by all firms are common knowledge.     

Regulation and the provision of quality to heterogenous consumers: The case of prospective pricing of medical services

This paper analyzes the welfare implications of fixed-price regulation of services in a model in which consumers are heterogenous and a firm can endogenously quality discriminate. We consider two different scenarios: The first scenario is when the consumer is also the payer. The second scenario is when the payer (usually the government) is not the consumer. Our major result is that fixed-price regulation causes a distributional welfare loss. We show that it is not possible for fixed-price regulation to induce providers to supply all consumer types with the first-best quality even under perfect information, under either pricing scenario. We show that high and low demand types may receive more than their respective first-best qualities, less than their first-best qualities, or one type may receive more and the other type less depending on the level of the regulated price. It is always true that when consumers are payers, quality is higher for both types than when consumers are not the payers. In this paper, we motivate and discuss the results in terms of price regulation of hospitals where consumers are patients and patient types vary by severity of illness.