Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction

S. Modica and A. Rustichini (1994, Theory and Decision37, 107–124) provided a logic for reasoning about knowledge where agents may be unaware of certain propositions. However, their original approach had the unpleasant property that nontrivial unawareness was incompatible with partitional information structures. More recently, Modica and Rustichini (1999, Games Econ. Behav.27, 265–298) have provided an approach that allows for nontrivial unawareness in partitional information structures. Here it is shown that their approach can be viewed as a special case of a general approach to unawareness considered by R. Fagin and J. Y. Halpern (1988, Artificial Intelligence34, 39–76). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D80, D83.     

A Backward Induction Experiment

This paper reports experiments with one-stage and two-stage alternating-offers bargaining games. Payoff-interdependent preferences have been suggested as an explanation for experimental results that are commonly inconsistent with players' maximizing their monetary payoffs and performing backward induction calculations. We examine whether, given payoff-interdependent preferences, players respect backward induction. To do this, we break backward induction into its components, subgame consistency and truncation consistency. We examine each by comparing the outcomes of two-stage bargaining games with one-stage games with varying rejection payoffs. We find and characterize systematic violations of both subgame and truncation consistency. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C78.     

The Refined Best Reply Correspondence and Backward Induction

Fixed points of the (most) refined best reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg et al. (2013), in the agent normal form of extensive form games with perfect recall have a remarkable property. They induce fixed points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of every subgame. Furthermore, in a well‐defined sense, fixed points of this correspondence refine even trembling hand perfect equilibria, while, on the other hand, reasonable equilibria that are not weak perfect Bayesian equilibria are fixed points of this correspondence.     

腐败与反腐败的博弈经济分析

腐败与反腐败一直是公众关注的话题。腐败对经济发展和社会公平都是一个很大的威胁。目前,我国公务员腐败现象较为严重,政府反腐的力度也很大。公务员腐败有多方面的原因,既有政治体制方面的因素,也有利益驱使等其他方面的原因。本文从政府、寻租人和公务员的概率因素出发,通过博弈分析方法分析三者的期望效用,得到他们的最优策略,最后根据模型分析的结论,提出反腐的政策建议。     

Implementation by Iterative Dominance and Backward Induction: An Experimental Comparison

We report experimental results on the relative performance of simultaneous and sequential versions of the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism. Under the simultaneous version, subjects typically use undominated strategies, but apply only a limited number of iterations of dominance. Consequently the unique strategy surviving iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies is rarely observed. Under the sequential version, subjects also typically use undominated strategies, but apply only a limited number of steps of backward induction. Thus the backward induction outcome is also rarely observed. The sequential version results in fewer observed outcomes corresponding to the predicted outcome than the simultaneous version. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number(s): C72, C92.     

Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining

We did experiments in a three-round bargaining game where the (perfect) equilibrium offer was $1.25 and an equal split was $2.50. The average offer was $2.11. Patterns of information search (measured with a computerized information display) show limited lookahead rather than backward induction. Equilibrium theories which adjust for social utilities (reflecting inequality-aversion or reciprocity) cannot explain the results because they predict subjects will make equilibrium offers to “robot” players, but offers to robots are only a little lower. When trained subjects (who quickly learned to do backward induction) bargained with untrained subjects, offers ended up halfway between equilibrium and $2.11. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C9.     

浙江经济发展与环境保护的博弈分析

目前我省经济发展状况良好,但是在环境保护方面存在着一定的问题。本文根据博弈论的知识,探讨了在经济发展过程中各经济主体之间的利益矛盾,提出了要致力于建设符合各博弈主体经济利益为目标的协同合作机制,以实现经济发展和环境保护的双赢,走经济与环境可持续发展道路。     

城市低保对象救助与就业问题博弈分析

如何平衡救助与就业之间的关系,是各国社会救助政策需要攻克的难题之一.我国城市低保制度经过10余年的发展,"应保尽保"目标早已实现.但是,随着城市低保制度的发展完善,有劳动能力低保对象却逐渐成为低保对象的主体.低保群体的制度依赖倾向越来越明显.本文通过分析政府与低保对象在不同模式下救助、就业问的博弈问题,旨在寻找城市低保制度中救助与就业的最佳平衡点,建立促进有劳动能力低保对象积极就业的利益导向机制,以期为我国低保制度的制定与完善提供依据和参考.     

构筑企业核心竞争力的三大体系

我国加入WTO后，企业面临着更为激烈的竞争环境。企业要想在市场竞争中胜出，就必须具有不易被竞争对手效仿的能带来超额利润的独特能力——核心竞争力。那么，企业的核心竞争力如何形成，是否仅仅靠技术?本文旨在对企业核心竞争力的构建进行探索，提出了核心竞争力不仅仅是技术，而应是一个完整的系统。     

我国企业采取绿色营销的博弈分析及成因

本文运用博弈理论分析了我国企业采用绿色营销的状况,并指出了我国企业不愿意采用绿色营销的宏观和微观原因。对我国企业实施绿色营销具有重要的现实意义。     

价格战的博弈分析

彩电业的价格战一直是人们关注的焦点,对此的评价也是众说纷纭。本文主要从博奕论的角度去讨论价格战、价格同盟的最终结果,以及对彩电业竞争的最后出路发表作者自己的一点看法。     

交易费用和制度变迁的分析与启示

交易费用与制度变迁都涉及到经济生活中的具体操作方面,比如资源优化配置和效率问题。中国在深化改革的过程中,不仅必须考虑到资源优化配置、改革成本和经济运行效率,而且更应以此作为检验改革成效的标尺。这些又与特定的制度安排有着内在联系,因此,只有认真研究交易费用和制度变迁的相关问题,才能保证中国改革的进一步深化。     

Fisheries Management in Congested Waters: A Game-Theoretic Assessment of the East China Sea

Environmental and Resource Economics - Fisheries in the East China Sea (ECS) face multiple concerning trends. Aside from depleted stocks caused by overfishing, illegal encroachments by fishermen...     

农村小额信贷中的外部性效应分析

通过对农村小额信贷的外部性效应进行分析,解释了农村小额信贷促进农村经济增长时未能达到帕累托最优状态的原因,即缺乏足够的激励机制和小额贷款公司未能享受到当地经济增长带来的收益。利用庇古税和科斯定理制定合理的解决方案,即通过对小额信贷公司的农村信贷行为给予相应补贴、减少其税负和让其获取农村经济增长的收益权。     

基于博弈论的核心员工激励模型的探讨

本文在对核心员工的特性进行全面而深入的分析基础上，借鉴博弈论和目标设置理论的有关理念，提出了一个针对核心员工的激励模型。本激励模型型从激励主体与激励对象两个角度出发，在核心员工和企业各自所拥有的信息基础上，双方进行博弈，最终达到均衡，并以契约的形式实现，以此为目标来更好地激励核心员工的行为，使得核心员工和企业双方利益达到最大化，进而达到公司与核心员工的双赢的局面。     

博弈与共赢(上)--论应对入世的十大关系

入世以来 ,无论在宏观层面的行政管理体制改革 ,市场开放的扩大 ,涉外经济法律体系的调整适应 ,还是在中微观层面的中介组织的建立、企业改革与企业主体的确立 ,均取得了阶段性成果。在一个历经2500年封建专制社会 ,100多年半殖民地、半封建的内忧外患与武装斗争以及40多年计划经济束缚的传统文化底蕴丰厚的土壤里 ,我们接受起核算、效益、利润、回报、竞争、市场、厂商、民营、财富以及透明度、非歧视、法人治理、资本市场、民生民本、和谐共赢、产权保护、民贵官轻、国际规范、行政法治、民主政治、自由贸易、全球化与一体化等等具有经济…     

创业家与风险投资家所有权与控制权的博弈

分析了委托——代理理论与囚犯困境研究创业家与风险投资家关系上存在的不足，在此基础上，从风险投资的特点以及企业家成功创业的角度出发，运用博弈理论的思想，探究高技术创业企业在快速成长这一阶段，创业家与风险投资家所有权与控制权的冲突、制衡以及博弈过程与结果，并对企业家提出一些有利于创业成功的建议。     

城市化、全球化与落后区域中心城市的发展方向与城市建设

中国进入了城市化和全球化双重力量推动经济发展的全新发展时期。落后区域的中心城市在这一新的宏观背景之下,面临着城市化和全球化的双重冲击,既是机遇,更是挑战。在运用区域经济学和城市经济学理论的基础上,对落后区域中心城市的城市化与全球化进行研究,从理论上可以肯定落后区域中心城市的城市化与全球化相结合发展的问题可以决定其是能够追赶发达区域、发达城市;还是更加走向落后,甚至丧失中心城市的地位。     

资源基础演化视角下的后进企业技术追赶战略

本文从资源基础观的演化视角对后进企业的技术追赶进行分析,认为后进企业技术追赶及技术能力的形成归根到底是内生的演化过程。后进企业的技术追赶战略是通过建立联系、资源杠杆化利用和技术学习来进行的,其最初获取的资源具有不太稀缺、可以模仿和可以转移的特点,后进企业通过战略性地进入一个资源可以获得并且可以模仿与转移的行业,并且通过对所获得的资源进行杠杆性地利用,来实现技术追赶。