投资成本不对称的核电投资期权博弈分析

核电工程具有项目周期长、投资巨大、技术复杂、安全风险高、竞争者较多等特点,常用的净现值法、实物期权法难以实现核电项目投资决策的科学性与柔性管理。文章建立了初始投资成本不对称的核电投资期权博弈模型,给出了领先者、追随者和同时投资者的收益函数及对应的最优投资临界值,并分析了初始投资成本不对称时序贯均衡、抢先均衡和同时均衡成立的条件。     

成本收益差异的房地产不对称双头期权博弈模型分析

文章运用不对称双寡头期权博弈模型考察在房地产开发项目中企业的策略投资决策。模型中,房地产开发企业的项目投资有固定的建设周期,项目产生现金流是在建成以后;并且,投资具有投资成本先动优势和投资收益后动优势,即追随企业的投资成本和租金流均高于领先企业。分析表明,建设周期、投资成本、投资成本先动优势、垄断投资收益、后动投资收益、商品房市场需求波动度等因素都影响企业的投资决策。存在投资成本差异的阈值,将两企业均衡投资策略划分为先占均衡、序列均衡和等待均衡。     

不同需求结构条件的企业技术创新与市场细分

利用性能门槛和净效用门槛解释消费者的异质性偏好特征,分析异质性偏好所形成的需求结构形态,进而讨论不同需求结构下技术创新策略的选择表明:当细分市场的消费者之间偏好重叠较少时,企业宜专注于固有市场;当偏好重叠程度高且对称时,企业可选择工艺创新降低成本,以满足对方市场低端用户的需求;在偏好重叠程度高但不对称的情况下,企业应采取产品创新与工艺创新相结合的策略。     

扩展Hotelling模型下双寡头制造商的低碳策略选择

在一个扩展的Hotelling模型中,研究了双寡头制造商在考虑了消费者低碳偏好情况下的低碳策略选择问题。消费者对低碳效用的偏好程度直接影响到制造商的收益,从而影响到两个制造商在竞争关系下的低碳策略选择。分别求得了在四种情形下两个制造商各自的最优价格及其收益,通过比较分析,得到两个制造商进行低碳策略选择的均衡状态。通过数值仿真,比较了两个制造商在不同选址条件下的盈利情况。研究结果表明:当消费者低碳意识薄弱时,两个制造商均不采用低碳策略;当消费者低碳意识较强时,两个制造商均采用低碳策略。     

为什么民间金融市场在中国重要？

本文构建一个信息不对称的寡头垄断的融资模型来研究民间金融市场。研究表明,当投资者的监督强度较高时,均衡融资利率较低,融资额较大,企业家投资好项目;反之,均衡融资利率较高,融资额较小,企业家投资坏项目。在中国农村地区,因为投资者和企业家之间的相互了解程度较高,且企业家往往投资于生产技术相对落后的劳动密集型产品,所以投资者易于监督企业家。因此,民间金融市场均衡是低利率、高融资额、企业家投资好项目的均衡。这样,本文可以部分地解释Allen et al．（2005）的经验研究结果：在中国,虽然法律没有很好地保护投资者利益,但民间金融市场发达,支持着非正规部门的发展。本文的研究还表明,可能正是低效率的正规金融体制才导致高利率均衡的存在,从而易于诱发地方性的金融危机。因此,政府可以通过提高正规金融体制效率和建立中小民营银行来有效地遏制地方性金融危机。     

双边道德风险条件下的收益激励与信息租金——基于有信息委托人的视角

文章特征化了一个在投资能力方面具有私人信息的委托人,和一个在努力水平上具有私人信息的代理人,在联合生产产品时所面临的双边道德风险问题。为研究结构性信息不对称对收益激励的影响,建立了双边道德风险奈件下的收益激励模型。研究结果表明,在风险中性的委托人和严格风险规避的代理人联合生产产品时,激励努力的次优契约可以达到,只是不能为代理人提供完全的保险;在双边道德风险条件下,隐藏信息不再是有信息的局中人的最优策略,而私人信息的交换与共享可以促成次优转移均衡的实现,这说明和单边的信息不对称造成的单边道德风险相比较,结构性的信息不对称并不一定使得双边道德风险问题更严重。     

双边用户多归属的电商平台增值服务投资均衡策略研究

以竞争电商平台为研究对象，考虑消费者异质性、网络外部性以及增值效用，研究双边用户多归属时电商平台的增值服务投资决策问题。通过构建两个电商平台均不投资/ 均投资增值服务和单一平台投资增值服务三种情形下的收益决策模型，求解平台收益最大化时平台的最优定价、增值服务投资水平和双边市场规模，进一步探讨电商平台增值服务投资的均衡策略。研究发现：（1）若平台增值服务投资的边际成本较小，则单一平台投资增值服务；（2）若平台增值服务投资的边际成本较大，则两个平台均投资增值服务；（3）两个平台均不投资增值服务不是均衡策略。     

部分国有化企业与外资企业之间的空间竞争问题

本文利用Hotelling模型讨论了一个部分国有化企业和一个外资企业的空间竞争问题.研究表明:企业的均衡位置与国有企业国有化程度的大小密切相关.当国有化程度比较低时,两个企业选择市场端点;当国有化程度处于中间状态时,外资企业仍然选择市场端点,但部分国有化企业选择市场内部;当国有化程度比较高时,两个企业都会选择市场内部.另外,相对于社会最优选址而言,企业的均衡选址相距较远,但随着国有企业国有化程度的增加,均衡选址逐渐向社会最优选址靠近;当部分国有企业变为完全的国有企业时,企业的均衡选址与社会最优选址恰好重合.     

外生单向溢出效应下纵向差异化产品Cournot和Bertrand竞争均衡的比较研究

研究价格(Bertrand)和数量(Cournot)竞争模式下,单向溢出对企业质量选择、利润的影响。以纵向差异化市场结构为例,建立了基于单向质量溢出的不对称寡头竞争模型,运用赋值计算对模型的均衡解进行了比较分析,结论是:1给定溢出因子和学习效应的合理取值范围,领先和跟随企业的质量与利润在价格竞争下都小于数量竞争;2质量间的单向溢出效应、跟随者的学习努力都会导致领先者初始质量的下降,但在价格竞争时,这种"逆向选择"效应的程度较低;3跟随者的学习激励随着溢出效应的提高而降低,并不受竞争策略变化的影响。这些发现可以解释中国轿车产业竞争模式对合资和自主创新企业关系变化的影响。     

基于模糊博弈的盈余管理策略研究

不确定环境下研究盈余管理问题是一个新的研究课题。文章基于模糊策略问题,首先,根据管理者和股东双方的模糊策略信息,建立双方的模糊收益模型,进而建立基于模糊策略的双方博弈收益模型。然后,根据双方建立的模糊策略收益矩阵,给出基于模糊策略的双方博弈纳什均衡值求解方法,提出信息不对称环境下盈余管理的最优决策策略。最后,通过仿真算例验证该方法的可行性和有效性。     

EQUIVALENCE OF COMPETITION MODE IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH DELEGATION

This paper aims to examine the equivalence of competition mode in a vertically differentiated product market with the relative performance delegation. It demonstrates the equivalence of product quality and social welfare in this delegation game, irrespective of modes of product competition. In addition, in a three‐stage game of quality‐delegation‐quantity (or price), it shows that the delegation coefficient is different between high‐quality and low‐quality firms in an asymmetric vertical differentiated model, and a high‐quality firm makes better use of the delegation than a low‐quality firm.     

“Low-Balling” and Efficiency in a Two-Period Specialization Model of Auditing Competition*

This paper develops a simple, two-period specialization model to analyze the effect of start-up costs on auditing competition. Audit firms in the model make strategic specialization and pricing decisions. Through specialization, an audit firm achieves a comparative cost advantage over its competitors for all clients whose characteristics are closer to its area of specialization. This comparative cost advantage is further fortified by the presence of start-up costs. As a result, each audit firm obtains some market power and is able to price-discriminate across clients by offering “specialization-and-relationship-specific” audit fee schedules. This paper demonstrates that the practice of “low-balling” is a natural consequence of competition among audit firms. However, low-balling occurs only in a certain market segment where audit firms compete fiercely. This paper also shows that a policy of banning low-balling acts as a substitute for the commitment of the audit firms to partially collude their pricing policies and results in increased profits for audit firms and increased fees. However, it also results in audit firms choosing specializations in a more efficient way, thereby reducing total auditing costs.     

Endogenous Price Leadership and the Strategic Acquisition of Information

We model a differentiated Bertrand duopoly in which a firm's earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading. In such a setting with second‐mover advantage, we then study the firms’ incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game. Both (i) neither firm acquiring information and (ii) one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium, but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome, even if information is free. Information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition.     

企业资源与竞争优势的关系研究

竞争规律是优胜劣汰,适者生存。企业资源是竞争优势的基础和源泉,竞争优势是企业生存发展的基石。本文认为研究企业资源与竞争优势的关系,就是研究企业资源与竞争优势形成的关系、企业资源与竞争优势持续的关系。企业资源的异质性决定了竞争优势的形成,而企业资源的不完全模仿性、不完全流动性和不完全替代性决定了竞争优势的持续性。     

Quality and Quantity Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly

This article proposes a Cournot model of two‐stage competition to examine the patterns of vertical product differentiation in a multiproduct duopoly. Firms simultaneously choose the number of products and their qualities at the first stage and compete in quantities at the second stage. We show that when the fixed setup cost of a product is high enough to result in a monopoly outcome, the monopolist always sells a single product. Moreover, in any equilibrium of a multiproduct duopoly, quality differentiation between them will develop into a nonsegmented pattern because each firm desires to avoid a strong effect of cannibalization. The set of equilibria reveals the properties of quality differentiation between multiproduct firms. In a multiproduct duopoly, the profit from a high‐quality product can be lower than that from a low‐quality product. This finding sharply contrasts with the literature on single‐product firms, which finds the high‐quality advantage.     

Comparative and Competitive Advantage

This paper reviews the relevance of the concepts of comparative and competitive advantage for the developing countries of the Asian-Pacific region. It argues that the competitive advantage supporters' attack on the comparative advantage concept rests partly on a misunderstanding of comparative advantage and partly on a false analogy–that between the determinants of the success of a single firm and the success of a nation. The central theme is that for a developing country, as for any other, while competitive advantage may be relevant for the performance of firms, comparative advantage remains as relevant as ever for the performance of the nation.     

比较优势理论及其政策应用争论述评

文章通过对比较优势理论及其政策应用争论的系统梳理,从理论脉络上勾勒其基本研究成果.研究发现:各种理论对比较优势原理持有两种不同的态度,对比较优势的形成原因、作用、内涵等有不同的解释,这是比较优势的影响因素随经济发展而演变的反映.研究比较优势理论的发展和现实演变,对于发展中国家利用、转换本国的比较优势,从而贯彻落实科学发展观,提升本国产业结构、培养国家竞争优势有着积极的意义.     

不对称市场、技术获取与FDI的区位选择

在Bjorvatn和Eckel(2006)研究的基础上,本文引入技术获取因素,通过建立一个垄断市场模型,在不同政策背景下,比较了技术获取和市场大小对FDI区位选择的影响。研究表明,无论是否存在政策竞争,FDI均能提高东道国的收益。与Bjorvatn和Eckel(2006)的研究相比,仅当两国市场容量差距较大时,政策竞争将导致较大市场容量的国家对FDI更具有吸引力。同时,从两国整体来看,政策竞争改善了FDI所引致的两国整体福利,从某种程度上起到了一种优化资源配置的作用。     

Resource-Exhausted City Transition to continue industrial development

Resource-rich locations often rely on exporting the resources to prosper, but resource depletion is a matter of time. An industrial transformation is necessary to sustain economic growth when the comparative advantage fades away. This paper concerns the Resource-Exhausted City Transition program, a large-scale place-based policy of the Chinese state government. It applies firm data and examines impacts on industrial development in places suffering from resource-exhaustion. Estimation shows that the program has stimulated capital investment largely and fostered employment and efficiency as well, leading to a boost in output. The program does not favor the resource sector with little comparative advantage. It facilitates an industrial upgrade by extending the value chain towards the downstream and stimulating higher value-add activities. Effects are heterogeneous among firms with different capital intensity, age, size, ownership type, or regions.