CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives

Abstract:   We test the hypothesis that the risk incentive effects of CEO stock option grants motivate managers to take on more risk than they would otherwise. Using a sample of mergers we document that the ratio of post‐ to pre‐merger stock return variance is positively related to the risk incentive effect of CEO stock option compensation but this relationship is conditioned on firm size, with firm size having a moderating effect on the risk incentive effect of stock options. Using a broader time‐series cross‐sectional sample of firms we find a strong positive relationship between CEO risk incentive embedded in the stock options and subsequent equity return volatility. As in the case of the merger sample, this relationship is stronger for smaller firms.     

商业银行实施激励股票期权若干问题研究

近年来,激励股票期权在我国商业银行中逐渐被重视,并即将成为重要的激励方式.本文在阐述商业银行实施激励股票期权重要意义的基础上,指出应合理定位法律在实施激励股票期权过程中充当的角色,法律不宜过多介入商业银行激励股票期权方案的实施,但对激励股票期权实施过程是否公正、实施结果是否合理等情况则应保留相当程度的审查权与裁判权.同时,指出以股价、财务会计手段作为业绩测量标准来界定银行业绩的含义均存在一定缺陷,授予业绩或指数期权而非固定溢价期权应为更佳选择;本文还对激励股票期权的授予数量、持有时间和期权重新定价等问题进行了剖析.     

商业银行实施激励股票期权若干问题研究

近年来,激励股票期权在我国商业银行中逐渐被重视,并即将成为重要的激励方式.本文在阐述商业银行实施激励股票期权重要意义的基础上,指出应合理定位法律在实施激励股票期权过程中充当的角色,法律不宜过多介入商业银行激励股票期权方案的实施,但对激励股票期权实施过程是否公正、实施结果是否合理等情况则应保留相当程度的审查权与裁判权.同时,指出以股价、财务会计手段作为业绩测量标准来界定银行业绩的含义均存在一定缺陷,授予业绩或指数期权而非固定溢价期权应为更佳选择;本文还对激励股票期权的授予数量、持有时间和期权重新定价等问题进行了剖析.     

The Subjective Valuation of Indexed Stock Options and Their Incentive Effects

We analyze the potential role of indexed stock options in future pay‐for‐performance executive compensation contracts. We present a unified framework for index‐linked stock options, discuss their incentive effects, argue that indexation schemes based on the capital‐asset pricing model (CAPM) are the most suitable for executive compensation, and derive a subjective pricing model for the class of CAPM‐based indexed stock options. Contrary to earlier work, executives would not be motivated to take on investment projects with high idiosyncratic risk once their lack of wealth diversification and degree of risk aversion are factored into the analysis.     

The Valuation of Executive Stock Options in an Intensity-Based Framework

This paper presents a general intensity-based framework to value executive stock options (ESOs). It builds upon the recent advances in the credit risk modeling arena. The early exercise or forfeiture due to voluntary or involuntary employment termination and the early exercise due to the executive's desire for liquidity or diversification are modeled as an exogenous point process with random intensity dependent on the stock price.Two analytically tractable specifications are given where the ESO value, expected time of exercise or forfeiture, and the expected stock price at the time of exercise or forfeiture are calculated in closed-form.     

Optimal Incentive Contracts for Loss‐Averse Managers: Stock Options versus Restricted Stock Grants

This paper provides an explanation for the widespread use of stock option grants in executive compensation. It shows that the optimal incentive contract for loss‐averse managers must contain a substantial portion of stock options even when it should consist exclusively of stock grants for “classical” risk‐averse managers. The paper also provides an explanation for the drastic increase in the risk‐adjusted level of CEO compensations over the past two decades and argues that more option‐based compensation should be used in firms with higher cash flow volatility and in industries with a higher degree of heterogeneity among firms.     

Incentive Efficiency of Stock versus Options

This paper examines the relative incentive costs of using stockversus options in management incentive contracts that use market priceas the performance measure. We establish that if the manager'seffort has little or no effect on a firm's operating risk, thenthe cost of incentive risk is less using stock rather than options.However, this result is reversed if the manager's effort has asignificant impact on the firm's operating risk.     

Employee stock options with performance conditions: do commonly used valuation heuristics work?

Valuation heuristics are widely used to value traditional time vesting option plans. This study analyses if these heuristics also qualify for valuing performance vesting plans. We examine performance conditions tied to the underlying stock, the stock's performance relative to a stock index, and an earnings measure. The differences between the approximated option values and the values assuming optimal exercise are overall smaller with the performance conditions than without them. In particular, this result holds when the heuristic exercise assumptions are based on the case without performance conditions, which is a considerable simplification in practice.     

Executive stock option vesting conditions,corporate governance and CEO attributes: evidence from Australia

We investigate the association between executive stock option (ESO) vesting conditions, corporate governance and CEO attributes. Using observations from the 250 largest Australian firms, we find that stronger corporate governance is positively associated with the length of the vesting period and the use of performance hurdles. We also find that when CEOs approach retirement, firms are more likely to grant longer time‐vesting options but are less likely to impose performance hurdles. Further, more powerful CEOs appear to influence the granting of ESOs with less restrictive vesting conditions. Our findings suggest that both corporate governance and CEO attributes significantly shape the design of ESOs.     

Stock Option Measures and the Stock Repurchase Decision

The major purposes of this study are two fold. First, we investigate whether or not the dilutive effect from stock options on the denominator of earnings per share is associated with the incurrence of stock repurchases. We use the FASB dilution and the economic dilution as the direct dilution measures and examine their relationship with stock repurchase decision. Second, we explore which of the extant measures of stock options can better explain the incurrence of stock repurchases. Six extant measures of stock options from previous studies are used: (1) the FASB's treasury-stock EPS dilution method, (2) the economic dilution measure based on Core, Guay and Kothari (2002), (3) the number of employee stock option exercises, (4) the number of stock option grants, (5) the number of total stock options outstanding, and (6) the number of exercisable stock options.Using a pooled cross-sectional sample from 1996–2000, we find a positive association between the likelihood of stock repurchases and the FASB dilution as well as the economic dilution in EPS, respectively. Thereby providing support for the undo-dilution hypothesis. The highest incremental explanatory power is found when we add the number of stock options exercisable to the baseline model. However, further analysis does not support the option-funding hypothesis suggested by Kahle (2002). We provide two explanations for why exercisable stock options better explain the stock repurchase decision.     

What determines early exercise of employee stock options in Australia?

Employee stock options (ESOs) are a popular way of remunerating employees. We analyse factors at the firm and option level affecting the employee's decision to exercise ESOs before they mature. Exercises over the period 1998–2004 are analysed and the key factor influencing early exercise is found to be dividends. Exercises frequently occur well before maturity, but in most cases little time value is sacrificed. Our findings have implications for the ‘fair’ valuation of ESOs in companies’ financial statements, as required by the relevant Australian accounting standard, AASB 2.     

Valuing executive stock options: performance hurdles, early exercise and stochastic volatility

Accounting standards require companies to assess the fair value of any stock options granted to executives and employees. We develop a model for accurately valuing executive and employee stock options, focusing on performance hurdles, early exercise and uncertain volatility. We apply the model in two case studies and show that properly computed fair values can be significantly lower than traditional Black–Scholes values. We then explore the implications for pay-for-performance sensitivity and the design of effective share-based incentive schemes. We find that performance hurdles can require a much greater fraction of total compensation to be a fixed salary, if pre-existing incentive levels are to be maintained.     

股指期权合约规格设计研究——基于全球股指期权市场对比的视角

为了探索股指期权产品合约规格设计的一般规律,对全球主要市场中股指期权产品业务实践进行了调查、对比分析与总结。分析结果表明,全球主要市场的股指期权以欧式行权与现金交割的方式为主,注重近月合约月份,在行权价格间距、行权价格序列、合约乘数以及报价单位的设计上会综合考虑它们对流动性等因素的影响,合约编码主要采用交易代码、合约到期日、合约类型以及行权价格四个要素依次排列的结构。这些都为未来在境内市场推出股指期权产品,开展股指期权业务提供了重要参考。     

Should there exist secondary markets for executive stock options?

This paper investigates the potential disadvantages of the secondary markets for executive stock options (ESOs). The benefits of such markets are evident, but they might also have negative effects for shareholders. Executives might, for example, use inside information to time their ESO selling. We investigate two personal motives of managers that can be assumed to affect their optimal selling decision, that is, managers' personal portfolio management issues and the use of inside information. We explore these motives by analyzing unique data from Finland, where there are secondary markets for ESOs. The results of the study support the traditional portfolio diversification hypothesis according to which managers tend to sell their ESOs when holding an ESO is equivalent to holding the underlying stock; that is, in such a case a manager's wealth is closely tied to the stock price of the firm. With respect to the use of inside information the results indicate that ESO selling activity is not related to future stock price behaviour, suggesting that managers do not use inside information to determine the selling time of their ESOs. These results imply that the existence of secondary markets for ESOs does not weaken the usefulness of ESOs as the management compensation, although the benefits of such markets are evident.     

Stock option vesting conditions,CEO turnover,and myopic investment

Corporations have been criticized for providing executives with excessive incentives to focus on short-term performance. This paper shows that investment in short-term projects has beneficial effects in that it provides early feedback about Chief Executive Officer (CEO) talent, which leads to more efficient replacement decisions. Due to the threat of CEO turnover, the optimal design of stock option vesting conditions in executive compensation is more subtle than conventional views suggest. For example, I show that long vesting periods can backfire and induce excessive short-term investments. The study generates new empirical predictions regarding the determinants and impacts of stock option vesting terms in optimal contracting.     

Options with Constant Underlying Elasticity in Strikes

Closed-form solutions are derived and interpreted for European options, with stochastic strike prices, that maintain constant elasticity of the strike with respect to the price of the underlying asset. We refer to such options as CUES. CUES preserve the relative shares of exercise price risk for both the buyer and writer of the option, regardless of whether the price of the underlying asset moves up or down. The relevance of the CUES concept is established through applications in two distinct fields. First, it is established that CUES-like options are embedded in private equity investments. This concept is then used in a novel application to determine the equity share of a private company corresponding to a given level of investment. Secondly, the advantages that CUES would provide over traditional executive stock option grants are considered and it is shown that CUES can provide enhanced incentive-alignment without increasing options expense to the company. JEL Classification: G130     

The Valuation of Volatility Options

This paper examines the valuation of European- and American-style volatilityoptions based on a general equilibrium stochastic volatility framework.Properties of the optimal exercise region and of the option price areprovided when volatility follows a general diffusion process. Explicitvaluation formulas are derived in four particular cases. Emphasis is placedon the MRLP (mean-reverting in the log) volatility model which has receivedconsiderable empirical support. In this context we examine the propertiesand hedging behavior of volatility options. Unlike American options,European call options on volatility are found to display concavity at highlevels of volatility.     

Maturity and exercise price of executive stock options

Using a simple three-period model in which a manager can gather information before making an investment decision, this paper studies optimal contracts with various stock options. In particular, we show how the exercise price of executive stock options is related to a base salary, the size of the option grant, leverage, and the riskiness of a desired investment policy. The optimal exercise price increases in the size of grant and the base salary and decreases in leverage and the riskiness of a desired investment policy. Other things equal, the optimal exercise price of European options with a longer maturity should increase more for an increase in the base salary and the size of grant and decrease more for an increase in leverage than the one with a shorter maturity. The optimal exercise price of American options is determined by the optimal exercise prices of European options with different maturities. Given the fixed exercise price, the size of the option grant does not decrease in the face value of debt.     

Convertible Securities,Employee Stock Options and the Cost of Equity

We provide a method for calculating the cost of equity and the cost of capital in the presence of convertible securities and employee stock options. We demonstrate how this approach can be applied if a company already has issued convertible claims or if it is considering doing so for the first time. We provide several numerical examples illustrating the significance of errors in estimating the cost of capital that can result when (1) employee stock options are ignored or (2) the observable stock price is used as a proxy for the unobservable underlying asset.     

An IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (R) Compatible Model for the Valuation of Employee Stock Options

In this paper, we show how employee stock options can be valued under the new reporting standards IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (revised) for share-based payments. Both standards require companies to expense employee stock options at fair value. We propose a new valuation model, referred to as Enhanced American model, that complies with the new standards and produces fair values often lower than those generated by traditional models such as the Black–Scholes model or the adjusted Black–Scholes model. We also provide a sensitivity analysis of model input parameters and analyze the impact of the parameters on the fair value of the option. The valuation of employee stock options requires an accurate estimation of the exercise behavior. We show how the exercise behavior can be modeled in a binomial tree and demonstrate the relevance of the input parameters in the calibration of the model to an estimated expected life of the option. JEL Classification G13, G30