集体主义文化维系下的柔性组织与模糊契约--浙江民营企业发展的自组织模式揭示

浙江民营企业在自我发展的过程中，通过竞争和协同会自发形成与市场体制适应的组织形式，这种有效的市场组织形式可以明确表述为一种与集体主义文化相适应的柔性组织和模糊契约，通过对柔性组织和模糊契约问题的详细分析，可以对浙江民营企业的超强竞争力和发展壮大给一个合理的解释和演绎。     

技术转移效率及产权治理——基于不完全契约的视角

技术转移的核心是知识转移.论文运用契约经济学理论,从不完全契约的视角研究了研发管理中的技术转移效率问题及产权治理机制.将事前契约看作事后权利参考点,由于技术创新知识边界模糊,包括不可缔约的隐性知识和可缔约的显性知识,而隐性知识更多地体现在研究人员的人力资本中,因此,事后技术转移过程中不可避免的存在技术转移效率损失.研究认为当创新价值和研发成本的不确定性大时,采用一体化组织形式并且技术创新成果知识产权赋予公司的技术转移效率高.     

从心理契约看职业生涯管理

心理契约理论认为,员工一旦进入企业,成为企业的一员,就与企业形成了一种契约关系。它不仅包括显性的、以劳动协议形式体现的经济契约关系,还包括隐性的、非正式的心理契约关系。经济契约使企业和员工以劳动合尉的形式联系起来,标志着企业和员工合作关系的开始。心理契约则使这种合作得以深化, 成为企业和员工共同发展的内在推动力。而且心理契约始终处于不断变更和     

煤电一体化与内部转移价格规制

近年来,煤电矛盾是我国经济运行中的一个焦点问题。在众多的关于煤电矛盾治理的机制中．煤电纵向一体化被认为是一种可取的组织形式,国家相关的产业政策管理部门也表示出支持和鼓励煤电一体化的倾向。煤电一体化使电力企业可以直接控制煤炭的生产、能够获得稳定和灵活的供应来源。相对于其他的纵向交易模式,一体化避免了契约的违约风险,有利于节约市场交易成本。但是,一个现实的问题是．在目前上网电价仍然是政府按照成本定价的原则核定的情况下,对于煤电一体化的发电企业,政府如何来衡量其发电成本,进而确定上网电价？很显然,一体化的煤电企业要将煤炭的成本转移到受规制的电价上．     

组织柔性的影响因素分析及实证

多数成功企业的经验表明,柔性是企业在剧烈变化的环境中求得生存和发展的一个非常重要的因素.文章从柔性的定义、分类和维度入手,在国内外有关柔性文献综述的基础上,提出了组织柔性的内源潜在变量,建立了这些因素之间的关系模型.实证研究发现我国企业在知识转化柔性方面存在较大障碍.     

浅议企业集团信息化建设

企业集团是现代企业发展的高级组织形式之一，是以一个或少数几个大型企业为中心，通过资本、契约、产品、技术等不同的利益关系，将一定数量的法人企业联合起来，组成的一个具有共同经营战略和发展目标的多级法人结构经济联合体。企业集团的突出特点表现为规模大型化、产业金融一体化、经营多样化、成员多元化、布局分散化、结构层次化等，各成员内部之间存在着紧密的经济关系和严格的行政关系。企业集团的特点，决定了集团信息化建设的重要性。     

商品煤铁路运输的网络组织特征

传统理论认为 ,大多数商务关系要么是纵向一体化关系 ,即企业内的交易 ;要么是市场契约关系 ,即企业间的交易。实际上 ,商务关系的构成是相当复杂的 ,中间性组织 (长期契约关系 )的出现 ,使企业与市场之间的界限模糊了。本文从商品煤铁路运输涉及的双方关系入手 ,从单一的连接说明煤炭铁路运输的网络实质 ,提出煤炭铁路运输应采用网络组织治理模式加以管理。一、企业、网络组织与市场的比较分析根据分工理论 ,企业只是从生产和服务过程中截取某些阶段从事分工活动 ,它从事与自身能力相应的活动 ,而把其他活动留给市场。由于分工活动的相互依…     

企业组织结构的发展与变化

就企业发展问题探讨了企业的产生、发展与变化趋势，研究了企业组织结构在演进过程中表现出来的几种主要形式及各自的优缺点，指出企业组织结构正在从刚性向柔性、从金字塔型向大森林型方向变化，企业组织也从常规型向集团型和细微型方向发展。     

我国产学研合作创新的具体形式、特点及其发展趋势研究

产学研合作创新指的是企业、高校与科研院所之间为实现各自的价值目标,通过一定的组织形式而建立起来的合作创新机制.本文在总结我国产学研合作创新的具体形式和分析其特点的基础上,进一步探讨了经济一体化下我国产学研合作创新的发展趋势.     

石油销售系统推行代销制的思考

石油销售系统推行代销制的思考宋克明代理制是指流通企业通过合同契约形式与生产企业订立代销协议，买断产品销售权，从而形成生产企业与流通企业之间长期稳定的产销合作关系，来衔接生产与需求，组织产品流通的贸易形式。采用这种经济贸易形式，目的是建立利益共享、风险...     

Infrastructure Contracts: Trust and Institutional Updating

This paper discusses trust and trust perceptions in infrastructure contracts and supporting institutions. We focus on perceptions of the trustworthiness of the government purchasers of infrastructure services by the supplying companies and by the governments themselves. In particular, we allow for trust updating and trust misalignments, which may give rise to ‘undertrusting’ and ‘overtrusting’. The core of the paper sets out a game theoretic model of contracts with dynamic adjustment of trust perceptions, which we use to explore the impact of trust misalignment both on economic efficiency (measured by expected welfare) and on investment levels. We explore flexible contracts with and without pre-payments, rigid contracts (which do not allow for post-investment renegotiation), and hybrid contracts. We then compare the efficiency of the flexible contracts to that of hybrid contracts using as a criterion the expected welfare implications of each contract. The model is used to shed light on current issues on the sustainability of private investment infrastructure contracts in developed and in developing countries, including the role of regulatory institutions.     

Outcome attributability in performance-based contracting: Roles and activities of the buying organization

In buyer-supplier exchanges that feature services or service elements, performance-based contracts have gained increasing popularity. One key problem in such contracts is the possible lack of attributability of performance outcomes to supplier inputs and efforts; suppliers are reluctant to be penalized for performance shortfalls that they are not responsible for. Prior literature has indeed argued that in case of low performance attributability (or: high outcome uncertainty), performance-based contracts are less effective, but has studied this uncertainty mainly in relation to external factors. Attributability of performance has not been studied in terms of the responsibilities of the supplier and the buying organization in service design and production. In addition, there has been little literature on how buyer activities during contract execution can help address some of the problems. This paper aims to fill this gap by developing a conceptual model on how outcome attributability relates to the roles of the buying organization in the service exchange, and how contract management activities can attenuate the effects of (low) outcome attributability on the level of supplier inputs and effort, which directly affects actual performance. We engage in theory elaboration to formulate a conceptual model based on two cases of performance-based contracting of cleaning services.     

建筑工程合同体系的协调

在工程项目中，业主为了成功的实施工程就要签订一系列合同，这些合同构成了建筑工程合同体系，这些合同之间应该协调，尤其在内容、技术、价格、时间和组织上。     

Performance-based and functional contracting in value-based solution selling

Solution sellers increasingly use value-based selling and pricing strategies to market and monetize their offerings. Performance-based contracts constitute a key component of value-based pricing strategies. The present study explores solutions to the challenges solution sellers may encounter while developing value-based selling processes and implementing value-based pricing. The research design builds on the explorative action research methodology. While our study confirms earlier research on barriers to value-based selling and pricing, we also identify legal-technical contract design issues as an important but previously unknown barrier. We further identify integration as the appropriate theoretical framework for conceptualizing the barriers. Finally, we identify functional contracting as a solution for value-based sellers to overcome the barriers arising from deficient precontractual integration. The study highlights the role of contracts as barriers to be overcome by legal sales efforts when implementing value-based selling and pricing strategies. Further, the study stresses the utility of functional contracting in pre-contractual integration.     

Do resource differences between manufacturers and suppliers help or hinder product innovation of manufacturers? The moderating role of trust and contracts

It is a common practice of manufacturers to involve suppliers in new product development (NPD). Extant literature indicates that supplier integration has mixed effects on manufacturers' NPD and the contradicting findings result from either the external contingent factors or the tactical integration practices. We argue instead that the mixed effects are rooted in resource differences between manufacturers and suppliers. Further, we examine the functions of trust and contracts as the resource integration and coordination mechanisms to manage the effects of resource differences on product innovation of manufacturers. Based on a survey among 189 manufacturing firms, our research shows that resource differences follow an inverted U-shaped effect on product innovation of manufacturers and that trust strengthens while contract complexity attenuates the curvilinear relationship. As such, our research extends the existing body of literature to account for the divergent outcomes of supplier integration from the perspective of resource differences. Moreover, it demonstrates the double-edged effects of trust and contracts as devices of resource integration and coordination. Our research offers useful research and managerial implications.     

Coordinating a channel with asymmetric cost information and the manufacturer's optimality

In a manufacturer-retailer system with private retail cost information, we find that a set of incentive-compatible contracts consisting of wholesale and buyback prices can coordinate the channel for any retail cost. We then design two wholesale-buyback contracts by imposing a cutoff point on the retail cost. The first contract maximizes the manufacturer's expected profit while ensuring the channel is coordinated. The second contract assumes the same contractual structure without considering the effect on the channel. Both contracts are exactly solved. We find from numerical study that the manufacturer in the first contract can perform closely to the second one in many cases, and cases exist where both the manufacturer and the channel can do better in the first contract versus the second one.     

Use of the written contract in long-lasting business relationships

While contracts are signed in most business dealings, they are seldom used. These contracts are drawn up for different purposes: as a communication tool, to reduce uncertainty, or simply because it is customary. This study investigates how contracts are used in long-lasting business relationships and what factors influence the use of contracts. A number of studies claim that the negotiation process and the relationships developed during that process influence the subsequent use of contracts. In many cases, parties conduct business without contracts as they develop trust-based relationships. A conceptual framework is developed, which is then used to analyze three in-depth case studies. Findings show that the contract itself, rather than the negotiation process, has the greatest influence on how the contract is used.     

Safeguarding or coordinating? Unfolding the dual-function of contracts in manufacturer-distributor relationships

By unfolding the simultaneous presence of the safeguarding function (i.e., contract monitoring) and coordinating function (i.e., joint action) of contracts, the current research operationalizes the dual-function of contracts and ascertains their effects on stimulating interfirm relationships. Analyzing the data collected from 512 manufacturers, we find that, first, contract specificity is positively associated with contract monitoring and joint action. Second, contract monitoring mediates the negative relationship between contract specificity and distributors' opportunistic behavior, while joint action mediates the positive relationship between contract specificity and channel cooperative performance. Third, while joint action directly improves channel performance, contract monitoring does not directly influence channel performance; rather, it promotes channel performance through inhibiting distributors' opportunism. In addition, contract monitoring and joint action substitute for each other in their influence on distributors' opportunism. Overall, we enrich and add insights into the literature on contractual governance by operationalizing the dual-function of contracts and investigating the underlying mechanisms of the dual-function in their influence over different channel outcomes     

Labor Contract Duration,Indexation, and Wage Adjustment: Interdependence and Inflation Propagation Mechanisms

We study simultaneously the three main outcomes of collective bargaining negotiations, namely indexation, non‐indexed wage adjustment, and contract duration. The wage adjustment equation accommodates varying degrees of wage indexation in the current and previous contracts. The elasticity of indexation, a latent variable, deals with both the incidence and intensity of wage indexation and links consistently with the wage equation. Duration, which may change between contracts, is shown to depend on indexed and non‐indexed wage adjustment, obviating the need for expected inflation in the empirical duration equations of earlier work. Complex intra‐ and inter‐contract inflation propagation mechanisms involve expected inflation and inflation uncertainty in an essential way. The model accounts for the secular doubling of contract duration and dramatic decrease in indexation and non‐contingent wage adjustment.     

基于合约化质量管理框架下的质量创新模式研究

本文首先从现代合约理论出发，对传统质量概念中的合约化内涵进行发掘和深化，并进一步对质量合约的风险特征及原理进行讨论。在此基础上，进行质量创新理论的探析，研究表明：绝对质量价值管理、相对质量价值管理和证券化质量价值管理都是基于合约化质量理念下的质量创新的新模式——质量价值管理的三种形态，是在不同的竞争环境、不同的发展时期、具有不同质量风险特征的企业的不同选择而已。但从质量风险收益来看，证券化质量价值管理代表着质量创新模式的发展方向。