Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model

This paper reports on a two‐task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece‐rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece‐rate contracts. Many principals reward high effort on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high effort on both tasks. In contrast, almost all agents with a piece‐rate contract focus on the first task and disregard the second. Principals understand this and predominantly offer bonus contracts. This behavior contradicts the self‐interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness.     

You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses,Perceived Income and Effort

Abstract. Consider a principal–agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. This paper provides conditions such that no success bonus induces the agent to exert more effort and the optimal contract is independent of success. Moreover, success bonuses may even reduce effort and thus the probability of success. The reason is that bonuses increase the perceived income of the agent and can hence reduce his willingness to exert effort. This perceived income effect has to be weighed against the incentive effect of the bonus. The tradeoff is determined by the marginal effect of effort on the success probability in relation to this probability itself (success hazard‐rate of effort). The paper also discusses practical implications of the finding.     

HOW TO DESIGN INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS IN A WARMING WORLD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS*

We analyze how long‐term uncertainty, for example, regarding future climate conditions, affects the design of concession contracts and organizational forms in a principal–agent context, with dynamic moral hazard, limited liability, and irreversibility constraints. The prospect of future, uncertain productivity shocks on the returns on the firm's effort creates an option value of delaying efforts, a course that exacerbates agency costs. Contracts and organizational forms are drafted to control this cost of delegated flexibility. The possibility for the agent to delay investment in response to uncertainty and irreversibility also elicits preference for unbundling different stages of the project through short‐term contracts. Our analysis is relevant to infrastructure sectors that are sensitive to changing weather conditions and sheds a pessimistic light on the relevance of public–private partnerships in this context.     

Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition

This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents’ effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal.     

Explicit versus implicit contracts for dividing the benefits of cooperation

Experimental evidence has accumulated highlighting the limitations of formal and explicit contracts in certain situations, and has identified environments in which informal and implicit contracts are more efficient. This paper documents the superior performance of explicit over implicit contracts in a new partnership environment in which both contracting parties must incur effort to generate a joint surplus, and one (“strong”) agent controls the surplus division. In the treatment in which the strong agent makes a non-binding, cheap talk “bonus” offer to the weak agent, this unenforceable promise doubles the rate of joint high effort compared to a baseline with no promise. The strong agents most frequently offered to split the gains of the high effort equally, but actually delivered this amount only about one-quarter of the time. An explicit and enforceable contract offer performs substantially better, increasing the frequency of the most efficient outcome by over 200% relative to the baseline.     

On the Competition of Asymmetric Agents

Abstract. Rank-order tournaments are usually implemented in organizations to provide incentives for eliciting employees' effort and/or to identify the agent with the higher ability, for example in promotion tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by experimentally analyzing a ceteris paribus variation of the prize spread – being the major design feature of tournaments – in a symmetric and an asymmetric setting. We find that effort significantly increases with the prize spread as predicted by standard theory. However, only for sufficiently large prize spreads weak players competing against strong players strain themselves all the more and sorting of agents is feasible.     

Cost Behaviour of Chinese State-owned Manufacturing Enterprises in the 1980s

This paper aims to model the cost behaviour of Chinese state-owned enterprises in the 1980s. Given production autonomy and profit-related bonus incentives, state firms are expected to increase profits and therefore bonuses by changing their cost behaviours more rationally. However, since institutional constraints remain and distort the rational demand of the firm for input factors, the changes cannot go as far as expected by the standard neoclassical cost minimisation theory. Based on this, we derived a total cost function for Chinese state firms restricted by the government control over their total wage bills. We then test it using a panel data of 386 state manufacturing enterprises in the period 1983–87. It is found that the model predicted well. Despite the constraints, the reform did lead the firms to respond to both changes in factor prices in the directions expected by cost minimising behaviour and to bonus incentives to produce more efficiently.     

Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: The dark side of public financing

We develop a game‐theoretic model of private–public contribution to a long‐term project with sequential actions and moral hazard. A private agent is one who is in charge of both the financial contribution and the management effort, these two actions entailing private costs and uncertain ex‐post private and social benefits. A public agent is one who decides the amount of public funding to this quasi‐public good, knowing that the size and the probability of attaining a surplus ex post depend on the private agent's effort. We consider four public‐funding scenarios: benefit‐sharing versus cost‐sharing crossed with ex‐ante versus ex‐interim government intervention. We test our theoretical predictions by means of an experiment that confirms the main result of the model: Cost‐sharing public intervention is more effective than benefit‐sharing in boosting private financial contribution to the project. Furthermore, when public intervention comes after private contribution ( ex‐interim government intervention), both public‐funding scenarios have a negative impact on the private management effort. In our model, the latter result is explained by the private agent's high degree of risk aversion. These results have policy implications for strategic investments with long‐term social consequences. In deciding the optimal timing and method of the contribution, governments should also consider the indirect effects on agents’ long‐term management efforts.     

Multistage Contracting with Applications to R&D and Insurance Policies

An agent undertakes a nonobservable first‐stage effort. The principal observes whether the effort results in a successful project or not. If the project succeeds, only the firm observes its interim quality, and can further improve it with a nonobservable second‐stage effort. If the agent accepts penalties when the first‐stage fails, moral hazard and asymmetric information do not prevent the principal from implementing her first‐best outcome. However, if the agent is bounded by the maximum loss he can bear when the first‐stage fails (limited liability), the principal induces the agent to exert a first‐stage effort below the first‐best level and a second‐stage effort above the first‐best level when the interim quality of his project is low. This distortion in efforts implies that the ex post rent left to the agent with a project of high interim quality is above the first‐best level. This provides a rationale for the optimality of expanding the use of the “carrot” (second‐stage rent) when the use of the “stick” (first‐stage penalty) is restricted. Implications of the theory for R&D, bank, job, and insurance contracts are discussed.     

Regulation and Coordination of International Environmental Externalities with Incomplete Information and Costly Public Funds

In this article, we study cross-border externalities in a game played by two principal-agent pairs with adverse selection. Each firm/agent is located in one country and generates pollution by producing complementary or substitute goods, sold on a common market. A fraction of pollution is transferred from one country to another. Each regulator/principal is imperfectly informed about the marginal cost of his domestic firm and accordingly uses secret incentive contracts with costly public funds. We show the necessity of cooperation between competing regulators to effectively internalize all the damages caused to the environment, while reaching the first best. If the level of uncertainty is sufficiently low, we obtain an infinity of noncooperative Bayesian differentiable equilibria, which may necessitate competing regulators to coordinate on an equilibrium. Such coordination constitutes an incentive for competing regulators to cooperate. Our major result states that under some circumstances asymmetric information relaxes the transborder externality problem. Indeed, we show that, when there is a major transfer of pollution and firms' marginal costs are sufficiently high, competing regulators are better off under uncertainty. Therefore, asymmetry of information can have the very consequence of generating regulation that is too strict from the domestic viewpoint but that improves social efficiency when the benefits to both countries are taken into account.     

Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered

A principal wants two sequential tasks to be performed by wealth-constrained agents. Suppose that there is an outcome externality; i.e., a first-stage success can make second-stage effort more or less effective. If the tasks are conflicting, the principal's profit-maximizing way to induce high efforts is to hire one agent to perform both tasks (so that the prospect to get a larger second-stage rent after a first-stage success motivates the agent to work hard in the first stage). In contrast, when there is an effort externality (i.e., first-stage effort reduces or increases the probability of a second-stage success), then the principal prefers to hire two agents whenever the tasks are conflicting.     

Endogenous market structures and the optimal financial structure

Abstract We characterize the optimal financial structure as a strategic device to optimize the value of a firm competing in a market where entry is endogenous. Debt financing is always optimal under quantity competition, and, contrary to the Brander‐Lewis‐Showalter results based on duopolies, we show the optimality of moderate debt financing also under price competition with cost uncertainty (but not with demand uncertainty). We derive the formulas for the optimal financial structure, which does not affect the strategies of the other firms but reduces their number.     

Collusion and biased tournaments

Tournaments are vulnerable to collusion. This paper finds that biased tournaments can be more effective at preventing collusion than unbiased ones. When agents can collude to exert low effort, introducing some bias into tournaments generates opposite effects on favored and disfavored agents׳ respective incentives to exert high effort and provides strong incentives for the favored agent to deviate from collusion. Introducing an adequate degree of bias reduces the principal׳s incentive cost for preventing collusion; however, granting excessive bias instead increases the incentive cost. We show that the optimal level of bias can be endogenously determined.     

Contest architecture

A contest architecture specifies how the contestants are split among several sub-contests whose winners compete against each other (while other players are eliminated). We compare the performance of such dynamic schemes to that of static winner-take-all contests from the point of view of a designer who maximizes either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. For the case of a linear cost of effort, our main results are: (1) If the designer maximizes expected total effort, the optimal architecture is a single grand static contest. (2) If the designer maximizes the expected highest effort, and if there are sufficiently many competitors, it is optimal to split the competitors in two divisions, and to have a final among the two divisional winners. Finally, if the effort cost functions are convex, the designer may benefit by splitting the contestants into several sub-contests, or by awarding prizes to all finalists.     

Theories of behavior in principal-agent relationships with hidden action

In a laboratory experiment, we investigate behavior in a principal-agent situation with moral hazard. We evaluate the predictive success of two theories. One is the standard agency theory, which assumes that the agent will accept any contract offer that satisfies his participation constraint, typically requiring zero expected utility. The other is the “fair-offer” theory suggested by Keser and Willinger [2000. Principals’ principles when agents’ actions are hidden. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18 (1), 163-185], which requires that the principal provide full insurance against losses to the agent and leave him a share of at most 50% of the generated surplus. The treatment variable of our experiment is the cost of effort. As effort costs increase, expected net surplus of a contract decreases. We observe that fair-offer theory generally predicts observed contract offers better than standard agency theory. However, the predictive success of the fair-offer theory decreases, while the one of standard agency theory increases with decreasing expected net surplus.     

Present-biased preferences,self-awareness and shirking

We model a mechanism design problem in which the principal owns a project that requires work effort by an agent, but agents may have time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences and lack complete self-awareness of these preferences. The self-control problem and naïveté of an agent may lead him to agree to a contract but later shirk or slack-off, even though doing so is observable. When the principal cannot severely punish shirking and agents are completely naïve, the second-best solution entails allowing a present-biased agent to slack-off in order to avoid a greater loss due to shirking. With greater self-awareness among present-biased agents, the principal may do better by screening some from accepting the contract. Furthermore, when shirking can be severely punished, this does not lead to contracts that eliminate effects of the self control problem. Instead the principal may exploit present-biased agents by offering a contract that allows them to slack-off (which agents fail to foresee they will choose to do) but at the expense of foregoing much compensation.     

Rewarding idleness

Market wages reflect expected productivity conditional on signals of past performance and past experience. These signals are generated at least partially on the job and create incentives for agents to choose high‐profile and highly visible tasks. When engaging in visible tasks can lead to losses for which the agent is not liable, a principal may profitably distort corporate investments and reward schemes to increase the opportunity cost of these tasks. This distortion may decrease welfare as it prevents the efficient discovery of workers’ talent. Heterogeneity in employee types induces substantial diversity in organizational and contractual choices, particularly regarding the extent to which conspicuous activities are tolerated or encouraged, the composition of corporate infrastructure, and contingent wages.     

Tournaments with Prize‐setting Agents*

In some tournaments, it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation. Union members bargain over wage distribution, and some firms allow self‐managed teams to freely determine internal resource allocation, incentive structure, and division of labor. We analyze, and test experimentally, a tournament where heterogeneous agents determine the spread between winner prize and loser prize. We investigate the relationship between prize spread, uncertainty, heterogeneity, and effort. We find that a large prize spread is associated with a low degree of uncertainty and a high degree of heterogeneity, and that heterogeneity triggers effort. By and large, our real‐effort experiment supports the theoretical predictions.     

Selective incentives and intragroup heterogeneity in collective contests

A group taking part in a contest has to confront the collective action problem among its members, and devices of selective incentives are possible means of resolution. We argue that heterogeneous prize‐valuations in a competing group normally prevent effective use of such selective incentives. To substantiate this claim, we adopt cost‐sharing as a means of incentivizing the individual group members. We confirm that homogeneous prize valuations within a group result in a cost‐sharing rule inducing the first‐best individual contributions. As long as the cost‐sharing rule is dependent only on the members’ contributions, however, such a first‐best rule does not exist for a group with intragroup heterogeneity. Our main result clarifies how unequal prize valuations affect the cost‐sharing rule and, in particular, the degree of cost‐sharing. If the relative rate of change of the marginal effort costs is decreasing, it is reduced by intragroup heterogeneity. If the rate is increasing, the cost is fully shared, but it cannot induce the first‐best contributions for the group.     

Uncertain contest success function

In this article, contestants play with a certain probability in Contest A and with the complementary probability in Contest B. This situation is called contest uncertainty. In both contests, effort is additively distorted by a contest noise parameter which affects the sensitivity of the contest success function (CSF). In Contest A (B), this parameter is linearly added to (subtracted from) effort. We analyze the interaction of contest uncertainty and contest noise on contestant behavior and profit. For symmetric contestants, contest noise has an ambiguous effect on effort and profit. We show that more contest uncertainty can imply greater effort. Furthermore, an introduction of an infinitesimal degree of contest uncertainty can have a large impact on effort and profit. Based on the analysis, this article presents the contest organizer's incentive to manipulate the degree of uncertainty in the contest. For profit or effort maximization, the contest organizer should always eliminate any uncertainty. If contestants are asymmetric, more contest noise increases effort as well as competitive balance if both Contests A and B have the same probability of occurrence.