上市公司自愿进行信息披露存在的障碍和改进措施

上市公司自愿性信息披露对市场交易行为、金融工具创新等资本市场发展的因素有着重要的影响.然而,当前中国上市公司自愿性信息披露的实践并不令人十分满意.我们应当从完善上市公司的治理结构、提升投资者素质以及调整相关政策法规入手,改善我国上市公司自愿披露的现状.     

我国上市公司自愿性信息披露现状及对策

为了增强上市公司自愿披露信息的积极性和有效性,本文通过研究自愿性信息披露的外部条件,阐述了上市公司自愿性信息披露的含义、背景、意义以及现状分析,得出了提升上市公司自愿性信息披露的外部性策略和方法,得出了关于上市公司自愿性信息披露相关制度的建议。     

上市公司自愿性信息披露对股票流动性影响的实证研究

以2007～2008年沪深两市A股上市公司年报作为研究基础,运用描述性统计和两阶最小二乘法分析了自愿性信息披露对上市公司股票流动性的影响。验证了自愿性信息披露会促进上市公司股票的流动性,同时发现自愿性披露信息中财务方面信息对上市公司股票流动性的提高作用最大。     

论浙江省民营上市公司自愿性信息披露

随着我国资本市场的不断发展与壮大,上市公司会计自愿性信息披露的质量问题成为当前社会关注的重点。目前,我国上市公司会计信息披露的质量监控存在严重的问题,这对于信息使用者———公司股东、资本市场投资者、银行债权人等造成了严重的信息不对称,同时,对于资本市场的规范和快速发展也有很大的负面影响。本文通过对浙江省民营上市公司自愿性信息披露的现状进行探讨,并提出自己的建议。     

我国上市公司自愿性信息披露现状及对策

为了增强上市公司自愿披露信息的积极性和有效性,本文通过研究自愿性信息披露的外部条件,阐述了上市公司自愿性信息披露的含义、背景、意义以及现状分析,得出了提升上市公司自愿性信息披露的外部性策略和方法,得出了关于上市公司自愿性信息披露相关制度的建议。     

上市公司自愿性信息披露中信息偏差研究

自愿性信息披露是上市公司管理层的一种信息权力,这些权力形成了管理层的信息租金,他们经常会对自愿性信息披露进行选择,产生一定的信息偏差,利用这种非对称信息达到寻租目的,有必要对上市公司的自愿性信息披露行为进行有效的管制,提高自愿性信息披露的质量。     

公司战略信息的自愿披露研究——基于零七股份案例分析

正随着我国证券市场的不断发展,对信息披露的期望越来越高,这要求上市公司要更多进行自愿性披露,战略信息就是其中之一。战略信息有助于人们理解企业未来增长性和盈利力,但这并不是上市公司强制披露的信息,本文从零七股份战略信息自愿披露纷争事件入手,分析战略信息自愿披露不当的原因及其市场反应,并据此提出完善公司战略信息自愿披露的建议。     

上市公司自愿信息披露

自愿信息披露是相对于强制信息披露而言的。在西方成熟的资本市场上，管理者自愿披露的信息已经成为强制信息披露的有益补充，对提升资本市场效率起到了重要作用。从信息披露渠道看．自愿披露的信息一般包括管理人员在财务报告中对公司的盈利预期、新闻报道、通过公司的网站和其他信息渠道披露的信息。近年来．电话会议逐渐成为西方许多上市公司重要的自愿信息披露渠道。     

上市公司自愿性信息披露的博弈分析

本文运用博弈论分析方法,对自愿性信息披露的主体、行为策略及支付函数等进行分析,以促使会计信息资源优化配置的效用达到"帕累托最优",实现自愿性信息披露的纳什均衡.并借助于博弈分析的结论,指出改善我国自愿性信息披露有关问题的对策建议.     

上市公司自愿性信息披露问题探究

随着中国证券市场的发展和经济环境的不断变化,信息使用者对会计信息披露提出了更有效、更高、更严的要求,单一强制性信息披露机制已不能充分满足资本市场发展的要求。自愿性信息披露是在原有强制性信息披露的基础上为了增加市场有效性而进行补充披露。研究中国上市公司自愿性信息披露对整个资本市场的发展与完善,有着极其重要的理论和现实意义。本文通过分析各行业自愿性信息披露存在的问题,并提出如何增强上市公司自愿披露信息的积极性和可靠性的建议与方法。     

Biased voluntary disclosure

We provide a bridge between the voluntary disclosure and the earnings management literature. Voluntary disclosure models focus on managers’ discretion in deciding whether or not to provide truthful voluntary disclosure to the capital market. Earnings management models, on the other hand, concentrate on managers’ discretion in deciding how to bias their mandatory disclosure. By analyzing managers’ disclosure strategy when disclosure is voluntary and not necessarily truthful, we show the robustness of voluntary disclosure theory to the relaxation of the standard assumption of truthful reporting. We also demonstrate the sensitivity of earnings management theory to the commonly made mandatory disclosure assumption.     

Incentives for voluntary disclosure

Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal–agent contracts between owners – contract designers – and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms’ voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news.     

Incentives for voluntary disclosure

Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal-agent contracts between owners – contract designers – and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms’ voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news.     

Shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure

We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the capital markets. One class of traders that finds less adverse selection unprofitable is activist investors who target mispriced firms whose valuations they can improve. Consistent with this idea, we find that managers issue earnings and sales forecasts more frequently when their firm is more at risk of attack by activist investors, and that these additional disclosures reduce the likelihood of becoming an activist’s target. These additional disclosures also prompt a positive price reaction, contain more precise guidance, and exceed prevailing market expectations. These findings imply that managers use voluntary disclosure to preempt activism at their firm, and that activists prefer to target relatively opaque firms.     

Determinants of voluntary disclosure of segment information: A re-examination of the role of diversification strategy

This paper explores the determinants of management's decision to voluntarily disclose segment information. It is an extension of McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) who investigate the role of six hypothesised determinants. Their results indicate that firm size, industry membership, ownership diffusion, and the level of minority interest are related to the voluntary disclosure of segment information. However, they find that leverage and diversification into related versus unrelated industries are not related to this disclosure. It is the diversification finding that motivates our work. This paper explores the effect of differences in data, differences in samples, and differences in the measurement of diversification on the McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) results. Using an alternative definition of diversification, we find diversification strategy, firm size, and the level of minority interest to be related to segment disclosure while the results for ownership diffusion and industry are mixed. We find no support for a leverage effect.     

Hedge fund ownership and voluntary disclosure

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Using 13F filings from 1996 to 2011, we document that hedge fund holdings are negatively associated with the subsequent frequency of portfolio...     

Mandatory information disclosure and innovation: Evidence from the disclosure of operational information

We use a quasi-natural experiment wherein the Shanghai Stock Exchange requires listed companies in certain industries to disclose operational information and a staggered difference-in-differences model to examine the impact of mandatory information disclosure on corporate innovation. We find that companies subject to mandatory operational information disclosure show significantly increased innovation. This effect is pronounced for companies classified as non-state-owned enterprises, facing severe financing constraints and a high degree of shareholder tunneling behavior and in competitive and high-tech industries. Although mandatory operational information disclosure reduces their competitive advantage, companies appear to compensate by increasing innovation. Our study highlights the positive impact of mandatory operational information disclosure, indicating that it contributes to the high-quality development of both capital markets and companies.     

Value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the annual report

This paper examines whether the level of voluntary disclosure affects the association between current returns and future earnings. Economic theory suggests that firms might find it advantageous to provide additional pieces of information (i.e. voluntary disclosure) to investors and analysts. Our results indicate that more voluntary disclosure does not improve the association between current returns and future earnings (i.e. current returns do not reflect more future earnings news). This finding raises the question of whether voluntary information in the annual report contains value‐relevant information about future earnings or if investors are simply not capable of incorporating voluntary information in the firm value estimates.     

Dynamic information disclosure

We study dynamic information disclosure by a sender attempting to persuade a partially informed receiver to take an action. We consider vertical and horizontal information. With vertical information, an optimal disclosure plan is static. If the sender cannot commit to the disclosure plan, there exists a simple Markov equilibrium with sequential disclosure. Shrinking the time interval to zero gives rise to full disclosure almost instantly. With horizontal information, the sender often benefits from sequential disclosure. Assuming partial commitment and a special receiver‐type space, a Markov equilibrium exists and almost instant full disclosure arises in the limit.