国有股权出售的国际比较

<正> 国际社会对国有股出售的叫法并不一致,有的叫私有化,如俄罗斯,有的叫做民营化,如英国。OECD认为,国有股流通是一种官方释股行为,国有企业上市过程就是国有企业民营化过程。尽管各国对国有股出售的叫法不完全一样,但目标基本相同,即都是通过转让国有股权改进国有企业股权结构,向本国居民或者其他投资者提供获取国有股权的机会,以增强国有企业活力。因此,本文中的民营化、私有化和国有股流通(出售)含义相同。国有股退出有两种基本的思路:一是减持国有股,二是国有股全部退出现有企业。上市流通是国有股减持的手段之一,但是减持国有股并不是一定要求将国有股上市流通不可。国有股流通一般涉及到     

大股东民营化与上市公司绩效

大股东民营化是否改善公司绩效,是一个深受关注的问题。本文在文献回顾和制度背景分析的基础上,对中国上市公司大股东民营化经济后果进行实证检验。单变量检验表明民营化公司的盈利能力和盈利质量显著提高,而控制权在国有股东之间转让的对比样本几乎无显著变化;但多变量回归结果表明,盈利能力和盈利质量的提高与民营化本身无显著关系,而是控制权转让后重大资产重组导致“盈余逆转”的结果。控制权转让后两年期的股票回报来看,民营化公司也未显著好于对比样本。     

上市公司第一大股东性质、股权比例与公司绩效关系的实证研究

第一大股东性质以及股权集中度与企业绩效的关系是国内外公司治理研究中关注的焦点之一。本文利用2002年在深沪两地上市交易的1181家上市公司的02~04连续三年数据,分析了第一大股东性质、股权比例与公司绩效之间的关系,结果发现:第一大股东为国有股(包括国家股和国家法人股)的上市公司的绩效显著高于第一大股东为非国有法人股的上市公司;国有股比例与公司绩效显著正相关,流通股比例与公司绩效显著负相关,而非国有法人股比例则与公司绩效关系不显著。     

如何减持国有股

当前,大家十分关心如何解决国有股控股比例过高的问题。十五届四中全会通过的《中共中央关行国有企业改革和发展若干重大问题的决定》指出：“从战略上调整国有经济布局和改组国有企业”,“在不影响国家控股的前提下适当减持部分国有股。”国有股减持成为解决国有股控股比例过高的一个重要手段。     

辽宁省上市公司国有股减持问题探讨

国有股问题作为我国证券市场的重大遗留问题和不规范之处,一直备受人们的关注.本文对辽宁省上市公司2005年6月30日的股权结构进行了分析,发现辽宁省上市公司同样具有国有股"一股独大"的特点.从国有股不流通的众多弊端来看,辽宁省国有股减持是一种必要的选择.出于笔者个人的观点,本文没有将目光投向减持方案设计上,而是从国有股减持的方向和总体思路入手进行了相关的分析.     

国有股减持新思路

在我国证券市场上,国家股、国有法人股占上市公司总股本比重约2/3.这种股权结构不利于上市公司建立规范的公司治理结构,国有股需要进行减持,但即使是存量调整,资本市场也无法承受.国有股减持新思路可以有效解决资本市场容量不足这一过去国有股方案所无法克服的障碍.同时,有利于规范上市公司的法人治理结构,从而使现代企业制度事半功倍.     

国有股减持 股权结构目标模式

理想的股权结构不仅要求公司股权具备足够的流通性,而且要求股权分布适度集中。对于国家不必继续控制的行业或企业所属的上市公司,国有投资主体应该一次性彻底退出,至少不再是第一大股东。从优化股权结构的角度出发,一个好的减持方案应该有助于塑造“积极的股东”。管理层熟悉公司经营管理活动、充分了解公司现实盈利水平以及未来发展潜力,让管理层成为大股东,不失为优化股权结构的一条途径。诸如认股权证、零息回购转债等期权类的减持方案也许有助于股权重新集中的过程。     

上市公司国有股流通试点行业的选择

国有股不流通，无法实施“国退民进”战略，在竞争行业中国有股一股独大的地位无法改变，企业经营机制得不到改善；国有股不流通，国有股难以形成合理价格，导致流通股价格泡沫较多，股市波动太大；国有股不流通，国有股大股东侵害流通股小股东利益事件就难以防范，影响股市发展。所以对国有股减持流通讨论直到现在没有停止。随着上市国企增多，国有股数量增多，国有股流通问题形势逼人。到目前为止，上市公司国有股股本规模已达到3251．09亿股，占总股本比例51％，国有股所含净资产达到8186．7亿元。再不解决国有股流通问题，随着国有大盘股的上市，积累的问题会越难解决，股市和国民经济发展所要付出的代价就更大。     

混合所有制公司中的国有股权——论国有股减持的理论基础

本文通过回答以下问题来建立国有股减持的理论基础 :国有股权在混合所有制公司中的作用是什么 ,以及国有股权比重应该如何调整。以截止 1 998年底的中国上市公司为样本 ,我们首次考虑了股权结构内生性可能 ,以及公司上市时 ,政府在决定国有股权比重过程中面临的逆向选择问题 ,即在上市前业绩较差的公司 ,由于其较差的初始业绩导致较低的可流通股发行额度 ,政府不得不保留更多的国有股 ,从而表现为上市前业绩越差 ,上市时国有股权比重越高的反向关系。给定中国上市公司面临的独特制度环境 ,我们有以下发现 :( 1 )公司上市后 ,国有股股东有助于改善公司业绩 ;( 2 )公司上市时 ,政府在决定国有股权比重过程中确实存在着逆向选择问题 ;( 3 )公司上市后 ,国有股权比重内生决定于公司利润最大化过程 ,上市后的业绩越差 ,国有股比例越低。分析结果的政策含义在于 :政府减持国有股不能“一刀切” ,而应以公司业绩为依据 ,首先在上市后业绩较差的公司进行减持。     

基于股东特质的控制权转移的 盈余管理研究

从股东特质角度研究控制权转移的盈余管理问题,笔者根据控制权的不同把上市公司区分为国有控股和民营控股。研究结果表明,当第一大股东由国有股权转化为民营股权时,第一大股东有盈余管理动机,即国有股权私有化过程中存在国有资产流失嫌疑。当第一大股东由民营转变为民营时,第一大股东变更前后盈余管理存在显著差异。即第一大股东变更发生在民营企业间时,由于民营企业是一种“理性经济人”,因而显著地存在对业绩的盈余管理问题。当第一大股东变更发生在国有企业之间时,无论是无偿转让还是有偿转让,盈余管理的动机都不明显。而民营转为国有的例子在我国当前几乎不存在,但未来有可能出现。     

私有化更有效率吗

本文对始自里根和撒切尔夫人主政时期的私有化浪潮提出了批评和质疑。本文认为,以解决政府失灵问题的私有化浪潮,可能导致更为严重的市场失灵问题。虽然在总体上私有企业比国有企业有更强的盈利能力,但这并不意味着私有企业比国有企业更有效率。即使能够证明私有企业比国有企业更有效率,也不能说私有化是可取的。     

Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets

We investigate the optimal behavior of a public firm in a mixed market involving private firms and one public firm. Existing works show that welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is suboptimal when the number of firms is given exogenously. We allow free entry of private firms and find that, in contrast to the case with the fixed number of firms, welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is always optimal in mixed markets. Furthermore, we find that mixed markets are better than pure markets involving no public firm if and only if the public firm earns nonnegative profits.     

Post-Lange Market Socialism: An Evaluation of Profit-Oriented Proposals

In recent years we have observed significant growth in the private sector in many higher education systems around the globe. This growth of private higher education is associated with high political expectations, notably concerning greater choice of programs and greater responsiveness of institutions to students' and labor markets' demands. Looking at the experience of several European and Latin American countries, this study analyzes the patterns of program diversification of public and private higher education and discusses the impact of the private sector for the diversification of higher education's supply. The results show a contrasting picture between political beliefs about privatization in higher education and its actual results, suggesting that private institutions tend to be far more specialized than their public counterparts.     

State versus private provision: How does China’s market‐oriented reform affect healthcare delivery?

The role of the government in health care provision remains a contested issue worldwide. Public hospitals dominate China’s health care industry. However, in the early 2000s, the eastern China city of Suqian privatized all its hospitals and relaxed entry barriers for private hospitals. We assess the impact of the pro‐market reform on hospital performance using a differences‐in‐differences approach. We find that the pro‐market reform decreased medical price and expenditure, improved self‐reported health outcomes, and reduced search time and cost for patients. We show that after the reform, Suqian residents had greater trust in doctors than did residents from other cities.     

Does privatization of daycare affect maternal employment?

This article is the first attempt to examine the privatization effects of daycare centres on the employment of mothers with preschool children. Analysing newly constructed municipality-level data for 2000, 2005 and 2010 in Japan, the results suggest that an increased proportion of private daycare centres has positive effects on mothers’ labour force participation, and the effects are large for municipalities in Tokyo metropolitan area.     

Divestment and Bank Competition

We determine optimal divestment (partial privatization) and entry in banking in the context of a mixed oligopoly. When banks compete in deposits, greater entry is associated with higher divestment. However, social welfare improves with entry only when the private entrants are more efficient than the public bank. Further, when banks compete in interest rates with differentiated products, the public banks behavior resembles that of a price leader and it earns less profit than the private bank, if government holding in the public bank is sufficiently high. Competition becomes excessive in this case, and social welfare maximization requires greater divestment.     

A duration analysis of privatization in the telecom sector

The paper attempts to identify the telecom-sector performance indicators, relevant economic variables, and institutional characteristics of a country that effect the process of privatization of state-owned telecom enterprises. Using standard duration analysis of a panel data, we demonstrate that the privatization incentives are not only shaped by the mobility of financial capital in a country but are also influenced by the degree of competitiveness of private sector participation in policy-making process. The empirical results also reveal the significant impact of productive efficiency in telecom service provision on its course to privatization. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. We are solely responsible for all mistakes.     

Lack of commitment to future privatization policies may lead to worst welfare outcome

We investigate the welfare consequences of a lack of commitment to future privatization policies. The government implements a privatization policy after the competition structure is determined by the entry of private firms. We find that in an equilibrium, the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) a public firm if private firms expect that the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) the public firm. This is because an increase in the number of firms entering a market increases the government's incentive to privatize the public firm, which mitigates future competition and stimulates entries. The full-privatization equilibrium is the worst privatization policy among all possible (either equilibrium or non-equilibrium) privatization policies for welfare because it causes excessive market entry of private firms. Partial commitment of a minimal public ownership share may mitigate this problem.     

Ownership transformation,firm performance and manufacturing growth in China

Many commentators and researchers have attributed the manufacturing success in China to its ownership reforms. Using a micro database from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, this paper documents and quantifies this development. With systematic and robust analyses, it shows that the development of private ownership indeed played an essential role in improving firm performance and the allocation and utilization of production resources in the Chinese manufacturing sector. In addition, the paper estimates the contributions of firms under different ownership to manufacturing growth, showing that the development of private ownership was the driving force of manufacturing growth in China. The strong credible evidence has important policy implications for further maintaining sustainable development in China.     

Partial privatization in mixed duopoly

We investigate a quantity-setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors. The private firm maximizes profits, while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration. We consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm. We find that neither full privatization (the government does not hold any shares) nor full nationalization (the government holds all of the shares) is optimal under moderate conditions.