透视金融危机持续影响下的中小企业经营困境——宜宾市22户中小企业典型调查

金融危机持续影响下的中小企业,国家虽然相继出台了一系列扶持政策,但这些政策在下行传递过程中,政策措施难以到位,政策意图难以落实,政策目标难以实现。甚至许多地方应对国家政策的“板子”却重重的打在企业身上。这里面既有政策和制度本身的矛盾问题,更多的是长期形成的“地方和部门利益法律化”的利益驱动对政策传递的逆向操作,给中小企业的生产经营增加了新的负担。     

对赤峰市设施农业发展情况的调查与思考

设施农业是现代农业的主要形式,也是传统农业向现代农业转变的重要标志．是夯实社会主义新农村建设的产业基础,是农业增效和农民增收最直接、最有效的途径。但由于设施农业发展过程中仍存在资金不足等问题,制约着设施农业的健康发展。因此,笔者对赤峰市设施农业发展状况进行了调查．透析存在的问题,并提出促进设施农业发展的对策建议。     

中小企业融资的国际比较与借鉴

本文通过对美国,德国和日本中小企业融资模式以及政府政策扶持的对比研究,总结出发达国家中小企业融资方面的积极措施与成熟经验,这些措施对分析和解决我国中小企业融资难的问题有非常好的借鉴意义,对促进我国中小企业的持续稳健发展有十分积极的作用。     

农信社支持县域经济的难点与对策

农信社组织存款难、不良资产盘活、贷款风险补偿难是一个不争的事实,尽快解决农信社支持县域经济的难点,是促进县域经济发展的当务之急。本文对此提出了一些具体的方法,供参考。     

印尼新能源发展扶持政策的经验与启示

积极探索新能源发展是印尼政府防范能源危机、追求能源自立的战略性选择。经过几年的努力,印尼在生物能源等新能源发展方面已渐成规模,形成了包括可再生能源发展战略、能源保护政策和乡村能源自立计划等政策框架。在实际运作过程中,印尼政府从立法规范、产业投资政策调整、资金支持以及配套产业扶持方面扶持新能源的发展。本文主要介绍印尼新能源发展战略的背景及其扶持政策的主要目标与基本框架．提出扶持政策的具体措施及其基本成效和面临的挑战,本文最后总结了印尼新能源发展与扶持政策对我国的启示。     

小额贷款公司的经营困境与求解探索:荣庆案例

我国缺少的不是金融机构而是有序的民间金融市场。因自身经营与制度设计之间的不协调,众多小额贷款公司陷入经营困境。因此,须对相关的税收、利率等政策做出必要的配套性规定。当然,小额贷款公司也应该立足于当前的定位,努力拓展低风险业务,加强和银行的沟通,建立主办银行制度等,从而实现可持续的发展。     

小额贷款公司的经营困境与求解探索: 荣庆案例

我国缺少的不是金融机构而是有序的民间金融市场.因自身经营与制度设计之间的不协调,众多小额贷款公司陷入经营困境.因此,须对相关的税收、利率等政策做出必要的配套性规定.当然,小额贷款公司也应该立足于当前的定位,努力拓展低风险业务,加强和银行的沟通,建立主办银行制度等,从而实现可持续的发展.     

台湾地区农业保险的发展模式与借鉴

在“二战”后台湾农业发展的三个阶段中,农业保险都被视为政策性保险。其特点主要表现为政府在农险发展过程中起主导作用,相关法律制度比较健全规范,农业救助体系相当完善。而我国大陆地区农业保险的困境却表现在需求旺盛而投保能力不足,农险产品有效供给不足,险种结构不合理,法律法规缺位。学习借鉴台湾地区的经验,我国大陆应加大对农业保险的政策支持力度,加强农业保险的立法和执法,积极发展农业组织,大力推进农业保险的团体险业务．构建农业巨灾风险的应急机制。     

金融海啸冲击下的民营制造业发展研究——兼评政府经济刺激计划的得失

如何科学评价政府经济刺激计划的得失?本文重点考察在金融危机背景下,中国民营制造业因为被政府经济刺激计划拒之门外,显得格外风雨飘摇。制造业资金密集的特点,决定了其在危机背景下必然陷入经营困境。作为国民经济的半壁江山,民营企业应该得到政策扶持。政府推行的经济刺激计划,理应兼顾我国民营制造业发展的现实需求。     

地方政府购买服务的规模、结构与趋势——基于北京市2018年部门预决算信息的分析

实施全面预算绩效管理是中央提出的财政领域新的重大工作部署,建成全方位、全过程、全覆盖的预算绩效管理体系要求对政府购买服务领域进行进一步严格的规范。北京市政府在全国范围内率先随部门预算对政府购买服务预算信息进行公开,本文利用2018年北京市市级部门公开的政府购买服务预算和决算信息,通过对各部门购买服务规模、购买服务结构和预决算偏离度进行分析,发现存在部门决算信息公开程度不高、预决算编制和执行不够严格、购买服务结构有待优化等问题,针对这些问题并结合全面预算绩效管理的要求,笔者提出了相应的改进建议。     

The Role of Private Equity in Life Sciences

In a roundtable published in this journal a year ago, there was a clear consensus that the R&D function in big pharma was inefficient and in need of major restructuring, possibly through increased investments by venture capital and private equity firms. In this discussion, an accomplished group of industry practitioners begins by looking at the prospects for both venture capital and private equity to play meaningful roles in financing early- and mid-stage drug development. In so doing, they explore questions like the following:

• • Are there ways for big pharma and biotech to reduce “science risk” and make R&D funding more profitable and attractive to venture capital and private equity—and perhaps even hedge funds?
• • What roles do you see for specialty PE firms like Symphony Capital and Paul Capital, which are now bundling mid-stage development assets and securitizing royalties?

Then the panelists turn to the broader life sciences industry and consider the outlook for leveraged private equity transactions involving marketed products, late-stage development, and services. Here they consider issues like the following:

• • Will PE be attracted to less-R&D-intensive activities like medtech and generics?
• • Have the recent consolidation through mergers and reorganization of big pharma into decentralized business units created opportunities for carve-outs of certain businesses?

For big pharma and life sciences companies in general, the answers to such questions point to greater specialization and focus achieved partly through strategic alliances with venture capital, private equity, and even hedge funds, and involving marketed products and services as well as early-stage drug development.     

Minimum Death Rates and Maximum Life Expectancy: The Role of Concordant Ages

Only five populations have achieved maximum life expectancy (or best practice population) more than occasionally since 1900. The aim of this article is to understand how maximum life expectancy is achieved in the context of mortality transition. We explore this aim using the concepts of potential life expectancy, based on minimum rates at each age among all high longevity populations, and concordant ages. Concordant ages are defined as ages at which the minimum death rate occurs in the population with the maximum life expectancy. The results show the extent to which maximum life expectancy could increase through the realization of demonstrably achievable minimum rates. Concordant ages are concentrated at increasingly older ages over time, but they have produced more than half of the change in maximum life expectancy in almost all periods since 1900. This finding is attributed to their quantity and position whereby concordant ages are concentrated at the ages that have the greatest impact on mortality decline in a particular period. Based on mortality forecasts, we expect that concordant ages will continue to lead increases in female maximum life expectancy, but that they will play a weaker role in male maximum life expectancy.     

The Life and Death of the Canadian Contingent Gains and Losses Accounting Standards Project*

In April 1994, the Canadian Accounting Standards Board formally approved a new accounting standard for contingent gains and losses. The new standard would have increased the frequency of recording contingent losses, enabled the accrual of some contingent gains, and enhanced disclosures for all contingencies. The changes would primarily have been achieved by requiring management, and their legal advisers, to make predictions, estimates, and disclosures that the existing accounting standard enabled them to avoid. Over two years later, and following numerous changes to the implementation date, the board ultimately decided not to release the new standard, and in July 1999, formally abandoned the contingencies project. This study provides a telling of the standard's genesis, development, and ultimate demise, which should prove instructive to those parties with an interest and a stake in accounting standard setting.     

The Determinants of Private Debt Holdings: Evidence From the Life Insurance Industry

Life insurers hold the majority of private debt. Lenders in the private debt market must have the ability to evaluate the credit quality of borrowers and to perform ongoing risk monitoring. The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of private debt holdings in the life insurance industry. The results suggest that larger insurers, insurers with higher financial quality, mutual insurers, publicly traded insurers, insurers facing stringent regulation, and insurers with greater cash holdings are more prevalent lenders in the private debt market.     

Understanding the Death Benefit Switch Option in Universal Life Policies

Universal life policies are the most popular insurance contract design in the United States. They provide either a level death benefit paying a fixed face amount or an increasing death benefit paying a fixed benefit plus the available cash value, and both types include the option to switch from one type to the other. In this article, we investigate the fact that—unlike a switch from level to increasing—a switch from an increasing death benefit to a level death benefit requires neither fees nor evidence of insurability. To assess the impact of the death benefit switch option, we develop a model framework of an increasing universal life insurance policy embedding this option. Consideration of heterogeneity with respect to mortality via a stochastic differential mortality factor enables an investigation of adverse exercise behavior. In a comprehensive simulation analysis, we quantify the net present value of the option from the insurer's perspective using risk‐neutral valuation under stochastic interest rates assuming empirical exercise probabilities. Based on our results, we provide policy recommendations for life insurers.     

蓝筹之殇

2012年是农历龙年,在中国股市,到目前为止行情是愈盘愈下。其中,有关方面一直提倡、鼓吹的买蓝筹的投资理念,不但未能得到市场的认同,反而不断被机构与个人投资者所抛弃,成了不折不扣的蓝筹之殇。有人假设说,如果一个股民昏迷了五年,那么当他苏醒过来之后,他的感想会是什么?如果这位股民手上持有的都是五年前的股票,他会感觉到惊喜还是无比的愤怒?恐怕一定是后者才对;如果他手上持有的是五年以前的     

The Future of Private Equity

After a period of robust growth, the private equity industry has experienced a marked decline. In the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, the future of the venture and buyout industries seems unclear. This speech discusses four possible scenarios for the future of the private equity industry by examining the short‐ and long‐run determinants of private equity supply and demand. Possible scenarios include Recovery, Back to the Future, The Limited Partners' Desertion, and A Broken Industry. Although support is given for each of the scenarios, a clear prediction for the future remains difficult. The future of the private equity market is likely to be the subject of debate for some time to come.     

The Future of Private Equity

A distinguished University of Chicago financial economist and longtime observer of private equity markets responds to questions like the following:

• ? With a track record that now stretches in some cases almost 30 years, what have private equity firms accomplished? What effects have they had on the performance of the companies they invest in, and have they been good for the economy?
• ? How will highly leveraged PE portfolio companies fare during the current downturn, especially with over $400 billion of loans coming due in the next three to five years?
• ? With PE firms now sitting on an estimated $500 billion in capital and leveraged loan markets shut down, are the firms now contemplating new kinds of investment that require less debt?
• ? If and when the industry makes a comeback, do you expect any major changes that might allow us to avoid another boom‐and‐bust cycle? Have the PE firms or their investors made any obvious mistakes that contribute to such cycles, and are they now showing any signs of having learned from those mistakes?

Despite the current problems, the operating capabilities of the best PE firms, together with their ability to manage high leverage and the increased receptiveness of public company CEOs and boards to PE investments, have all helped establish private equity as “a permanent asset class.” Although many of the deals done in 2006 and 2007 were probably overpriced, the “cov‐lite” deal structures, deferred repayments of principal, and larger coverage ratios have afforded more room for reworking troubled deals. As a result of that flexibility, and of the kinds of companies that get taken private in leveraged deals in the first place, most troubled PE portfolio companies should end up being restructured efficiently, thereby limiting the damage to the overall economy. Part of the restructuring process involves the use of the PE industry's huge stockpile of capital to purchase distressed debt and inject new equity into troubled deals (in many cases, their own). At the same time the PE firms have been working hard to rescue their own deals, some have been taking significant minority positions in public companies, while gaining some measure of control. Finally, to limit overpriced and overlev‐eraged deals in the future, and so avoid the boom‐and‐bust cycle that appears to have become a predictable part of the industry, the discussion explores the possibility that the limited partners and debt providers that supply most of the capital for PE investments will insist on larger commitments of equity by sponsors to their own funds and individual deals.