高管学术经历对企业现金股利政策影响研究

本文以2008-2020年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,实证分析高管学术经历对于企业现金股利分配政策的影响。研究表明,拥有学术型高管的企业更倾向于支付现金股利。同时学术型高管通过影响企业会计信息质量和社会责任来影响企业现金股利发放倾向;内部环境较差的企业,高管的学术经历对企业现金股利支付的促进作用更显著,而外部监管环境的差异对两者关系影响不显著。     

银行业结构、企业高管权力与企业现金持有

基于沪深两市A股上市公司2007~2012年的相关数据,本文研究宏观金融环境对微观企业资金配置的影响。研究发现:企业高管权力与企业现金持有成正比,这符合代理理论的解释。通过中介效应检验发现,集中的银行业结构可以改善企业融资环境、强化银行治理作用,进而降低企业现金持有水平,对高管依托权力的现金操纵行为起到一定的抑制作用,这与信息基础假说的解释相吻合,即集中的银行业结构有益于降低企业的信息不对称程度,改善企业融资环境的同时也增强了银行甄别、监督借款企业的能力。     

现金持有偏离对企业业绩的影响——基于中国制造业上市公司的实证分析

将企业实际持有的现金水平与正常水平的差额定义为现金持有偏离度,通过理论分析及实证回归构建样本企业正常现金持有水平的计算模型,并通过实证方法分析现金持有偏离对企业业绩的影响。研究结果表明,现金持有正向偏离和负向偏离都会对企业业绩产生负面影响,且现金持有发生负向偏离时对企业业绩产生的负面影响更大。     

上市公司现金持有水平对投资行为影响研究

企业持有现金是企业内部融资的一个重要手段,与投资行为密切相关。上市公司应持有多大规模的现金,才能使得现金持有成本和丧失投资机会的成本之和最低,这是企业管理层必须考虑的一个问题。该文旨在通过实证方法研究不同现金持有水平的公司在投资行为方面存在的差异以及投资效率的高低,并提出相应的建议对策,以期能够对公司的现金持有管理有所贡献。     

CFO地位对企业现金持有的影响研究

CFO作为高管团队中极为重要的一个角色,在企业现金持有决策中具有核心地位,其个人特质对现金持有的影响一直是学术界的研究热点.本文以2015—2019年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,基于固定效应模型实证检验了CFO地位对企业现金持有水平的影响以及风险文化和机构投资者对二者关系的调节作用.研究发现,CFO地位越高,企业现金持有水平越高.随着地区风险文化程度的加强,CFO地位对企业现金持有水平的正向影响也会增强.而机构投资者持股比例的提高会在一定程度上削弱CFO地位对企业现金持有水平的正向影响.本文不仅从理论上拓宽了CFO对公司现金持有决策影响的研究,也为完善公司的治理结构及决策程序提供了参考,有利于企业优化现金类资金的管理.     

企业持有现金价值研究文献综述

随着"现金为王"管理观念的悄然兴起,现金持有带来的经济后果到底是价值创造还是价值毁灭这一议题得到了学者的广泛关注。本文基于财务理论,从股东立场出发研究企业持有现金行为经济后果的一个方面——企业持有现金的价值效应。通过对研究企业持有现金价值影响因素相关文献的系统梳理,为以后相关研究奠定了理论基础。     

公司治理对我国上市公司现金持有的影响分析

＂自由现金流说＂认为较好的公司治理能迫使经理人将自由现金流返还给股东,现金持有水平会较低;＂现金花费说＂和＂股东权力说＂则认为公司治理好的情形下,现金持有水平会更高。对处于转型经济环境的我国来说,＂现金花费说＂和＂股东权力说＂能更好地解释上市公司现金持有行为。     

我国上市公司融资效率对其现金持有的影响研究

本文以2007-2011年沪深两市非金融类A股上市公司作为分析样本,运用数据包络分析法(DEA),定义了基于公司资本结构和资金使用率的融资效率变量,在此基础上研究了融资效率对现金持有水平的影响.实证结果显示,融资效率与现金持有具有显著的负相关关系,其中,国有上市公司融资效率较低,现金持有水平较高,与国有上市公司相比,民营上市公司融资效率对现金持有的影响并不显著.     

企业现金持有研究综述及启示

本文对现金持有理论、现金持有影响因素、现金持有价值及经济后果的文献进行梳理与综述,客观分析与总结当前现金持有研究的状况,并提出相应的启示。     

激进战略与企业现金持有——预防性动机还是代理动机

以2007-2016年A股非金融上市公司为样本,考察了公司战略激进程度对现金持有决策的影响,并从现金持有价值与竞争效应两个角度,探讨不同公司战略类型下现金持有经济后果的差异。研究结果显示：公司战略越激进,企业现金持有水平越高;并且战略越激进,现金持有价值越高,现金的竞争效应越强。进一步研究表明：随着融资约束和经济政策不确定性的提高,采取激进战略的公司,现金持有水平进一步提高。这说明公司战略是影响现金持有决策的重要因素,而战略激进的公司持有大量现金主要是出于预防性动机,而非代理动机。     

The Impact of Ambiguity on Managerial Investment and Cash Holdings

Standard finance theory suggests that managers invest in projects that, in expectation, produce returns that justify the use of capital. An underlying assumption is that managers have the information necessary to understand the distributional properties of the pay‐offs underlying the decision. This paper examines firm investment behavior when managers are likely to find it more challenging to develop expectations of pay‐offs, namely during periods of increased macroeconomic ambiguity. In particular, we examine how macroeconomic ambiguity – proxied by the variance premium (Drechsler, 2010 ) and the dispersion in forecasts of corporate profits from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (Anderson et al., 2009 ) – impacts managerial capital investment and cash holdings. Consistent with ambiguity theory, we find that macroeconomic ambiguity is negatively associated with capital investment and positively associated with cash holdings. These results are robust to alternative explanations related to risk, investor sentiment and economic conditions. Moreover, consistent with recent theoretical real options literature, we find that ambiguity reduces the value of investment opportunities, while risk increases the value of such opportunities. Overall, these findings provide initial empirical evidence on the economic distinction between ambiguity and risk with respect to managerial investment and cash holdings.     

企业的现金持有决策与公司治理分析

本文从公司治理的视角出发，以中国上市公司为研究样本探寻了企业现金持有量的经验决定因素。结果表明，在治理规则日渐完善的中国证券市场上，大股东侵蚀中小股东利益而中小股东仍无法有效保护自身利益的问题不容忽视。本文系统完整地回顾了企业现金持有量的经验文献；开辟了从企业决策行为角度来研究公司治理问题的新途径；结合中国证券市场的特有背景，提出了若干有关企业现金持有行为的理论假说，并用平行数据采用固定效应模型技术进行了证实或证伪；对经验分析结果的政策含义进行了相应的理论解释。     

企业的现金持有决策与公司治理分析

本文从公司治理的视角出发,以中国上市公司为研究样本探寻了企业现金持有量的经验决定因素。结果表明,在治理规则日渐完善的中国证券市场上,大股东侵蚀中小股东利益而中小股东仍无法有效保护自身利益的问题不容忽视。本文系统完整地回顾了企业现金持有量的经验文献;开辟了从企业决策行为角度来研究公司治理问题的新途径;结合中国证券市场的特有背景,提出了若干有关企业现金持有行为的理论假说,并用平行数据采用固定效应模型技术进行了证实或证伪;对经验分析结果的政策含义进行了相应的理论解释。     

The Influence of a Credit Rating Change on Corporate Cash Holdings and Their Marginal Value

We examine the influence of credit rating changes on corporate excess cash holdings. We find that downgraded firms increase excess cash holdings by approximately 3% of total noncash assets, compared to a matched sample of firms without a rating change. We largely observe no significant cash policy change following upgrades. While our findings support existing studies on the value of precautionary cash hoarding in the face of increased financial constraint, we find hoarding is value‐decreasing for shareholders. The marginal value of excess cash declines by at least 40% for downgraded firms and much more so when firms have histories of excess cash hoarding.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Executive Compensation

This paper examines the relationship between the compensation of the top five executives at a set of over 400 publicly listed Canadian firms and various internal and external corporate governance‐related factors. The media is full of stories suggesting a relationship between large executive compensation packages and failures in governance at various levels within organisations, but there exists little formal analysis of many of these relationships. Our analysis provides empirical evidence supporting some of these assertions, refuting others and documenting new relationships. We find that variances in internal governance related to differences across firms in the characteristics of the CEO, compensation committee and board of directors do influence both the level and composition of executive compensation, especially for the CEO. Considering external measures of corporate governance, we find that different types of shareholders and competitive environments impact executive compensation. We do not find that either the internal or external governance characteristics dominate.     

财务特征、公司治理与现金股利分配倾向

以2001～2008年间772家沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证分析财务特征和公司治理对现金股利分配倾向的影响得出,在财务特征方面,规模大和盈利能力强的公司倾向于分配现金股利,而成长性高和资产负债率高的公司则相反;在公司治理方面,国有控股、董事会规模大、高管薪酬高和由四大会计师事务所签证的公司倾向于分配现金股利,流通股比例高和独立董事规模大的公司却相反,而公司领导权结构的影响则不显著。概言之,财务特征显示上市公司有能力发放现金股利,但治理因素却表明上市公司并不希望发放现金股利。     

经济波动对现金持有量的影响：一个理论分析框架

宏观经济波动作为影响产业以及企业行为的外生性变量,对企业的现金持有水平在特殊时期起到十分关键的作用,本文从现金持有的权衡理论、融资优序理论和代理成本理论三个方面分析了宏观经济波动下企业持有现金的动机,从而揭示宏观经济波动对企业现金持有决策的作用机理,为研究企业现金持有量的决定因素开辟了新的视角。     

现金持有量的现金流敏感性实证研究:来自2000—2009年食品饮料行业上市公司的证据

本文对2000—2009年中国食品饮料行业上市公司的样本数据进行了实证研究,发现小规模公司现金持有量对其内部现金流表现出一定程度的敏感性,而大规模公司的现金持有量则对其内部现金流没有表现出敏感性。原因可能在于小规模公司比大规模公司面临更强的融资约束。     

The Impact of Mandated Cash Flow Disclosure on Bid‐Ask Spreads

Abstract:   This study provides evidence that mandatory cash flow disclosure required by Approved Australian Accounting Standard AASB 1026, Statement of Cash Flows (June 1992) was associated with a decline in bid‐ask spreads following the introduction of the regulation, even after controlling for changes in trading volume and price volatility. More pronounced decreases in bid‐ask spreads were associated with firms having lower correlations between reported CFO and estimates of CFO using balance sheet reconstructions. We conclude that mandatory cash flow disclosure reduces information asymmetry across market participants.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance Quality on Earnings Management: Evidence from European Companies Cross‐listed in the US

The study reported herein examines the impact of two central corporate governance mechanisms (internal audit function quality and board of directors’ quality) on the incidence of earnings management. Unlike most prior studies in the area, focused mainly on US firms, this study looks at European firms that are cross‐listed in the US and covers a long time span – before and after major changes were implemented in corporate governance policies (Sarbanes‐Oxley Act in the US and the 8th Company Law Directive in the European Union). Using novel and comprehensive measurement approaches for internal audit function quality and board of directors’ quality, we find that both mechanisms have a negative direct effect on the incidence of earnings management, while their interactive effect is positive. A longitudinal analysis of both mechanisms also reveals that internal audit function quality and the quality of boards of directors have increased significantly since the policy changes.