Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model

This paper reports on a two‐task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece‐rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece‐rate contracts. Many principals reward high effort on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high effort on both tasks. In contrast, almost all agents with a piece‐rate contract focus on the first task and disregard the second. Principals understand this and predominantly offer bonus contracts. This behavior contradicts the self‐interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness.     

Organizational Form Outside the Principal–agent Paradigm

This paper provides a review of theories of hierarchies in organizations where the rationale for hierarchical organization derives from agents’ limited capacities for acquiring and communicating information. In these circumstances, hierarchical organization of agents may serve to reduce the amount of time necessary for completion of production tasks, or to improve the quality of information for decision-making on how to undertake production tasks. An informal discussion of theories of hierarchy is provided as well as a formal presentation of key models and results. Limitations of existing approaches are considered.     

On the Multi-Country Version of the Solow–Swan Model

I study a multi-country version of the Solow–Swan model of capital accumulation. Capital is perfectly mobile and flows instantaneously to countries providing the highest return. I show that, in general, the model possesses infinitely many stationary equilibria that differ from each other in terms of the world interest rate and world output. Analysing the dynamics of the model, I find that multiple equilibria exist for any given initial allocation of capital. Finally, I discuss a generalization of the golden rule to the multi-country version of the Solow–Swan model and show that it satisfies a Nash equilibrium property.
JEL Classification Numbers: F20, O41     

从委托代理制度看国有企业管理中存在的问题

如何找到一种适合社会主义市场经济的管理模式．是经济体制改革的核心问题。本文通过对中国委托代理制度考察及与国际惯例的比较,阐明我国企业管理模式低下的原因是委托代理权责关系不明确,改革的根本出路在于建立合理有效的激励与约束机制．以解决国有企业委托——代理关系的制度缺陷。     

重构经济发展理论的"另类教规经济学"——评《穷国的国富论》

由贾根良教授参与编选并主持翻译的《穷国的国富论:演化发展经济学论文选》是在埃里克·S.赖纳特教授主持的"另类教规基金会"基础上系列研究的主要成果,它基本上刻画了"另类教规"所理解的经济学的基本观点.鉴于该思想对落后国家的不发达问题和赶超问题的深刻洞见,因而它对目前仍相对落后的中国来说具有极为深远的意义.     

关于代理人激励工资决定的一种模型

通过委托人与代理人的利润最大化原则,建立了线性报酬的最优决定模型。为使模型在实际中能求解,我们将连续模型离散化建立了差分方程模型。此差分方程模型实质上是委托人与代理人动态博弈的过程。在博弈过程中,委托人根据可观察到的信号一代理人对工资调整系数的反应,而决定下一期的工资调整系数,最终使工资调整系数收敛于理想的值。     

保险行业营销员管理缺失现象研究

自从保险营销机制被引进中国,对中国保险行业的发展起到重要的推动作用。但是由于经济环境的不断变化以及营销员数量的不断增多,原有的保险营销员管理机制越来越跟不上行业发展的需要。主要介绍当前形势下,保险营销员的管理缺失现象,并从行业和社会发展角度分析加强营销员管理的必要性。     

代理形态对企业经营绩效影响之研究

不同代理形态公司间对企业的经营绩效确实会有所影响，即在经营力、成长力及生产能力方面，实施代理制度公司显著优于未实施代理制度公司，但是在安定力上则显现相反的现象，也就是未实施代理制度公司优于实施代理制度公司，而获益力方面，此两类代理形态之公司无显著性差异存在。至于有关股权集中或分散法规条文彼此间冲突问题，经研究认为，宜应配合企业规模成长而重新检讨。     

Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship

We describe a principal–supervisor–agent relationship in which agent and supervisor may collude. To prevent collusion, the principal may contract on a noisy signal which is correlated with the occurrence of collusion. When the signal is informative enough, the principal uses it and no collusion occurs in equilibrium. These contracts, however, are ex post inefficient and are only optimal if the principal can commit not to renegotiate. With renegotiation it is never optimal for the principal to prevent collusion and, at the same time, condition contracts on the signal. In fact, when the signal is informative enough collusion occurs in equilibrium.     

A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem

A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. Ordinal efficiency implies (is implied by) ex post (ex ante) efficiency. A simple algorithm characterizes ordinally efficient assignments: our solution, probabilistic serial (PS), is a central element within their set. Random priority (RP) orders agents from the uniform distribution, then lets them choose successively their best remaining object. RP is ex post, but not always ordinally, efficient. PS is envy-free, RP is not; RP is strategy-proof, PS is not. Ordinal efficiency, Strategyproofness, and equal treatment of equals are incompatible. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D61, D63.     

我国大气污染治理全局优化省际合作模型

首先,结合目前我国大气污染的实际情况,提出了通过省际合作达到大气污染治理的两个基本假定。其次,通过构建全局优化模型和节余成本加权分配法,建立了大气污染治理全局优化省际合作模型。最后,以2009年SO2去除为例进行实证分析,结果显示了大气污染治理全局优化省际合作模型的有效性和实用性,而且模型的最优化模拟结果可以作为国家决策的重要参考,促使各省份合作共赢。     

事业单位会计改革问题研究

我国财政预算管理制度改革、西方国家非营利组织会计的影响和现行事业单位会计准则制度本身存在的缺陷是事业单位会计改革的主要原因。笔者论述了我国事业单位会计改革的主要问题:将事业单位会计改变为政府与非营利组织会计体系中的国有非营利组织会计、单独制定国有非营利组织会计准则、增加国库集中收付和政府集中采购经济业务会计核算的规定、将现行的净资产会计要素分为基金和结余两个会计要素等。     

代理理论与公司治理综述

委托-代理理论是目前公司治理研究中的主流分析框架,也是指导现实实践的一个重要理论根据.传统委托-代理理论所关注的是如何缓解股东与经理人之间的信息不对称程度,但是现实实践表明,公司治理中大股东与中小股东之间也存在着隐性代理关系.本文就代理理论在公司治理中的发展过程及逻辑进行了总结,并对代理理论发展方向进行了预测.     

环境问题别议

时下 ,各地对环境问题十分重视 ,硬环境、软环境、人文环境、法制环境、信用环境建设都提上重要议事日程 ,令人欣慰。也应注意到 ,一些地方抓环境建设有些走样和贪大求洋。何为环境？环境亦即周围的情况和条件。整洁的街道、宽阔的马路是环境 ,绿树成荫、卫生清洁是环境 ,流水潺潺、鲜花簇拥是环境 ,草坪广场、艺术雕刻是环境。居在城中 ,人在旅途 ,谁不企盼环境优美？如果脱离实际 ,仅仅把建广场视为环境 ,搞草坪视为环境 ,指导思想未免有失偏颇。建广场 ,是优化环境 ,但县县建广场 ,似乎没这必要。有个广场 ,让百姓休闲、散步有个好的去处…     

论《共产党宣言》中关于“消灭私有制”译法的正确性

2004年以来，在经济学界的研讨会上，人们不断地会听到这样一种说法，认为《共产党宣言》中“消灭私有制”这句翻译错了，“消灭”一词应译为“扬弃”，所以某些人提出“消灭私有制”应该改译为“扬弃私有制”，据说是取其精华、去其糟粕的意思。对于这种观点，我当然非常关注，因为《共产党宣言》不仅是每一位共产党人需牢记的奋斗宗旨，而且也是美国教育部门颁布的中学生必读书目之一。     

治理“地沟油”问题研究进展及评述

我国餐厨垃圾资源化行业正处于起步阶段,餐厨垃圾中的废油即俗称的"地沟油"流回餐桌的现象屡禁不止,与法律法规及行业标准欠缺、分段监管体制弊端等问题相关,也与正常的产业链通路还未成形有重要的联系。要从源头上切断"地沟油"黑色产业链,推动餐厨垃圾资源化产业的健康发展,需要国家对餐厨垃圾资源化产业进行长远规划,完善相关法律法规,理顺行业管理体制,制定行业发展政策,疏通餐厨垃圾资源化产业链通路,让"地沟油"有合理的出路。     

中国非可再生能源的区域优化配置

中国的能源利用效率还存在较大的区域差距,这在很大程度上制约了中国整体能源发展水平的提高。本文以能源效率的区域差异为基本依据,通过对非可再生能源区域优化配置问题进行理论解释并展开经验分析,探讨了中国非可再生能源区域优化配置的内在规律和现实可能性。本文还结合中国非可再生能源区域优化配置的要求提出了政策建议。     

Estimating the Parameters of Principal Agent Models

The estimation of principal agent models is a subset of inverse optimal problems. As of now there is no consistent method of estimating all its parameters. In general, some proxies for the parameters have been utilized to test plausible economic implications of such models. This study develops a method of estimation for all the parameters using a very limited time series data for one contracting pair. Progress towards empirical reality, based on stylized facts, has been achieved by iteratively modifying the theoretical models and econometric methods. One of these results provides a theoretical justification for the econometric tools utilized in practice as well. However, a fundamental modification of the underlying assumptions is necessary. Given the emphasis on contracts in economic exchange it is necessary to develop the methods further. The study also outlines some of the pertinent issues.