技术背景 CEO 对企业盈余平滑的影响研究

基于 2007-2019 年我国 A 股上市公司面板数据,考察了技术背景 CEO 对企业盈余平滑的影响。研究发现：技术背景 CEO 能够提高盈余平滑程度,其盈余平滑的动机表现为信息主义属性,在方式选择上倾向于真实盈余平滑。研究进一步从创新活动、CEO 能力、信息不对称以及投资者期望四个方面对技术背景 CEO 影响盈余平滑的机制进行分析,并探讨了盈余平滑的经济后果。研究结论深化了对 CEO 专业背景如何影响企业财务策略的理解,丰富了企业盈余平滑的影响因素和经济后果的研究。     

董事会资本与企业盈余质量

随着我国资本市场的不断开放,上市公司财务问题频出,企业盈余质量备受关注。董事会作为企业的重要经营决策机构,与企业的盈余质量有着千丝万缕的关系。基于董事会资本视角,采用2009-2020年A股上市公司数据,实证检验董事会资本的差异对企业盈余质量的影响。研究发现,由人力资本、经验资本与网络资本构成的董事会总资本分别与企业盈余质量呈显著正相关关系。进一步探究表明,CEO综合权力会减弱董事会特征对盈余质量的正向影响,即执行董事比例越大、CEO任期越长、CEO对公司拥有所有权和CEO与董事长两职合一时,这种正向关系会更弱。研究结果对提高企业盈余质量,促进企业健康长远发展具有重要意义。     

董事长-总经理异质性对企业碳信息披露水平的影响

碳减排工作已成为世界重点关注的环境问题，而企业作为碳减排的重要主体，碳减排及相关信息披露也就成为各界关注重点。以中国生态文明背景下发布社会责任报告的沪深A股上市公司2014—2018年的数据研究高管地缘关系对于碳信息披露工作的影响。研究发现：高管有相近地缘关系，会显著负向影响企业碳信息披露水平；与非高碳行业相比，高碳行业中高管地缘关系对于碳信息披露水平的影响会受到抑制；在外部制度环境较差、无政府环保补助的企业中，高管地缘关系对于碳信息披露水平的影响依旧存在。同时进一步补充了企业碳信息披露和社会责任文献，并为信息需求者了解和认识碳信息披露现状以及规律提供经验证据，便于其作出投融资和风险管理等决策。     

从选择性信息披露看盈余管理

选择性披露和危机盈余管理往往具有较强的关联性,在危机事件发生前期,上市公司会更多地进行选择性披露,当危机事件的影响无法通过选择性披露消解时,危机盈余管理就会出现.针对盈余管理行为,一要完善公司治理结构,提高会计师执业水平;二要大力发展机构投资和中介市场,增进市场信息的透明度.     

上市公司CEO薪酬与公司业绩相关性研究

文章以我国沪深两市2010年A股上市公司为样本,加入企业规模、公司所在地区、CEO持股比例、CEO性别、年龄、控股股东的性质以及行业因素对上市公司CEO薪酬与公司业绩进行研究发现:高管薪酬与会计业绩正相关,与市场业绩负相关;公司规模越大,CEO年龄越大,国有股比例越高,CEO薪酬越高;CEO持股水平越高,CEO薪酬越低;而CEO薪酬与CEO是否兼任以及CEO性别相关性不大。     

CEO变更与盈余管理——基于PSM和DID方法的分析北大核心CSSCISSCI

文章以2011-2015年我国沪深两市A股制造业上市公司为样本,采用倾向得分匹配法和双重差分法,对比分析发生和未发生CEO变更公司的盈余管理差异,探讨CEO变更对盈余管理的"净效应"。结果表明,发生CEO变更的公司盈余管理程度显著高于未发生CEO变更的公司。进一步研究发现,当CEO与董事长同时变更、CEO继任者为外部继任者或公司股权性质为非国有时,CEO变更导致的盈余管理程度更高;董事会会议次数与股权制衡度对CEO变更导致的盈余管理有一定抑制作用。     

CEO和CFO任期交错对盈余管理的影响

以高阶梯队理论为基础,分析任期交错的影响,运用创业板上市公司2012-2014经验数据进行检验,结果表明CEO和CFO任期交错与盈余管理程度存在显著的负相关关系,因此CEO和CFO任期交错能够抑制公司的盈余行为,据此提出为提高上市公司会计信息披露质量,应避免CEO和CFO长期共事。     

自愿性战略合作信息披露质量与公司经营风险

基于 2007-2018 年 A 股上市公司“战略框架协议公告”，采用文本分析法，实证检验上市公司战略合作信息披露质量对经营风险的影响，研究发现：（1）战略合作信息披露质量与上市公司经营风险呈显著负相关，即信息披露质量越高，经营风险越低。（2）进一步分析战略合作信息质量对经营风险的影响机制，分析结果表明：战略合作信息披露质量越低，则代理成本越高，企业经营效率越低，最终提高企业经营风险。（3）战略合作信息披露质量对企业经营风险的影响具有异质性。在微观方面，对于管理越规范、CEO 越集权与公司内控质量越好的公司，战略合作信息披露质量越能降低公司经营风险；在宏观方面，对于持股比例越高，市场化水平越高的公司，战略合作信息披露质量越能降低公司经营风险。研究为上市公司提高战略合作信息披露质量从而降低经营风险提供了经验证据，为上市民营公司降低融资成本、提高经营绩效提供了相关的政策参考。     

基于高管变更下的盈余管理研究——以沪市A股上市公司为例

文章以沪市A股上市公司2006²011年数据为研究样本,研究高管变更会导致怎样的盈余管理发生。研究结果显示:在CEO变更当年,企业倾向于采用应计项目负向盈余管理;在CEO变更后的一至二年内,企业倾向于运用应计项目和真实活动正向盈余管理,这源于新上任的CEO急于通过盈余管理调节来增加企业的会计盈余,从而粉饰自己上任后的经营业绩并向高层领导者展示自己的"能力"。     

业绩预告的类型会影响其准确性吗?——基于盈余管理动机视角

业绩预告的经验品属性使得资本市场如何预判业绩预告的准确性显得尤为重要,但已有研究难以为资本市场提供简单直接且便于观测的预判标准.本文通过挖掘业绩预告类型可能隐藏的盈余管理动机,以2010-2018年度在资产负债表日后披露业绩预告的A股上市公司为研究对象,实证考察盈余管理动机是否以及如何影响业绩预告准确性.实证研究发现,盈余管理动机越强,业绩预告的准确性越低;作用机制检验发现,审计师对盈余管理动机较强的公司进行了更多的审计调整,使得定期报告中的盈余水平偏离了业绩预告中的盈余水平,从而导致了业绩预告准确性的降低;在控制内生性问题和稳健性测试后实证结果保持不变.研究表明业绩预告类型隐藏的盈余管理动机信息,可以帮助资本市场预判业绩预告的准确性.     

CEO与CFO股权激励的治理效应之比较:基于盈余管理的实证研究

在西方发达国家,CFO与CEO拥有相同的法律地位,负有监督CEO的责任,在公司治理结构中拥有重要的地位。本文从盈余管理角度研究我国CFO股权激励的公司治理效应,并比较CFO与CEO股权激励的公司治理效应,发现:尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理呈负相关关系,而实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理的负相关关系显著变弱;尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率对盈余管理抑制的程度显著小于CEO。这表明,正式实施股权激励会诱发盈余管理行为,其它类型的CFO持股则会抑制盈余管理行为,并且CFO股权激励的积极治理效应显著小于CEO。     

Maintaining a Reputation for Consistently Beating Earnings Expectations and the Slippery Slope to Earnings Manipulation

This paper investigates whether maintaining a reputation for consistently beating analysts' earnings expectations can motivate executives to move from “within GAAP” earnings management to “outside of GAAP” earnings manipulation. We analyze firms subject to SEC enforcement actions and find that these firms consistently beat analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts in the three years prior to the manipulation period and continue to do so by smaller “beats” during the manipulation period. We find that manipulating firms beat expectations around 86 percent of the time in the 12 quarters prior to the manipulation period (versus 75 percent for control firms) and that manipulation often ends with a miss in expectations. We document that executives of manipulating firms face strong stock market and CEO pressure to perform. Prior to the manipulation period, these firms have high analyst optimism, growing institutional interest, and high market valuations, along with powerful CEOs. Further, we find that maintaining a reputation for beating expectations is more important than CEO overconfidence and is incremental to CEO equity incentives for explaining manipulation. Our results suggest that pressure to maintain a reputation for beating analysts' expectations can encourage aggressive accounting and, ultimately, earnings manipulation.     

Voluntary Disclosure,Information Asymmetry,and Insider Selling through Secondary Equity Offerings*

This paper examines the relation of voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts and information asymmetry to insider selling through secondary equity offerings. We hypothesize that the pattern of voluntary disclosure and level of information asymmetry prior to secondary equity offerings differs systematically based on the identity of the seller. Specifically, we predict a greater frequency of voluntary disclosure and decreased level of information asymmetry when managers sell their stock through a secondary offering. We examine this hypothesis in a cross-sectional analysis of 210 secondary equity offerings from 1984-91, using a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood simultaneous equations estimation procedure, which allows for possible endogeneity in the manager's decision to sell stock. Consistent with our predictions, we document a significantly positive association between managerial participation and voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts in the nine-month period prior to registration of the offering. We also document a significantly negative association between managerial participation and two proxies for information asymmetry. The findings provide evidence that managers act as if reduced information asymmetry correlates with a reduced cost of capital.     

The Relation between Strategy,CEO Selection,and Firm Performance

We examine whether a firm's strategic priorities influence its selection of a new CEO and what conditions enable such an appointment to add value to the firm. More specifically, this study investigates the value‐adding effect when prospector firms (i.e., those pursuing a prospector‐type strategy) select a CEO with high social capital. We argue that uncertainty, driven by a firm's strategy, will determine the decision to select a CEO with high social capital; such CEOs can use their networks to mitigate the uncertainty and thus can be valuable to the firm. However, prior research indicates that CEOs with high social capital can engage in behavior detrimental to firm value. To mitigate the potential for this to occur, we assess whether corporate governance can play a role in prospector firms who appoint CEOs with high social capital. Drawing on archival data of CEO successions over a 14‐year period, we find that prospector firms have greater incentives to appoint CEOs with high social capital. We also find that prospector firms who appoint a CEO with high social capital improve their performance. Furthermore, the value‐adding effect of this selection choice is stronger in prospector firms with good corporate governance.     

Compensation negotiation and corporate governance: the evidence from China

This paper examines CEO pay dispersion for the listed companies in China. We apply a two-tier stochastic frontier model to the CEO compensation framework where asymmetric information generates a surplus between the minimum wage that CEOs accept and the maximum payment that firms offer. This surplus leads to CEO pay dispersion coming from the negotiation power between the CEO and the firm. We generate the surplus extracted by each CEO-firm pair and analyze how corporate governance affects them. An empirical analysis finds that: (1) On average, CEOs are paid 23.26% more than the benchmark; (2) additionally, we examine the bargaining power in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). We find that CEOs in SOEs have less bargaining power due to compensation regulations. We then examine compensation for new CEOs hired externally and find that CEOs hired externally have less bargaining power on average; and (3) corporate governance has a significant effect on the salary bargaining power of each agent. More specifically, the CEO-Chairman dummy has a significant positive effect on the bargaining power of firms and CEOs, but the latter is larger. Board size has a negative effect on both. Independent directors help improve the bargaining power of the firms and board meeting times help enhance the bargaining power of the CEOs. Equity concentration has a significant negative effect on both sides.     

Management innovations in family firms after CEO successions: Evidence from Japanese SMEs

We examine management innovation of family and non-family firms after CEO successions by using data of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Japan. Consistent with predictions based on the resource-based view and agency theory, we find that family firms managed by non-family professional CEO successors are less innovative than those managed by family CEO successors or non-family firms. Further analyses indicate that limited access to family-based resources is a key determinant of the conservativeness of professional CEO successors. Our findings suggest the importance of the congruence of ownership and management in family firms due to CEOs’ access to family-based resources.     

江山靠谁守才不付东流?——控股家族非经济目标与经营权释出倾向实证研究

让子女接班还是将经营权释出给职业经理人,是代际传承时代背景下企业主的重要战略决策。文章基于委托代理理论,展示了家族/非家族高管在实现家族的非经济/经济目标上的各自优势,从控股家族非经济目标解释了企业CEO聘任决策,解构了能力与情感冲突的选择困境。根据全国工商联"中国非公有制经济健康状况评价"抽样调查数据发现,在家族成员与职业经理人都可兹聘任的情况下,那些更看重非经济目标的家族越不倾向于聘请职业经理人担任CEO作为企业下一代领导人。一代企业家的决策权力缺乏有效制衡将会强化非经济目标重要性与经营权释出之间的负效应;企业主与各级官员的频繁互动,加深社会联系巩固家族产权,有助于降低职业经理人的代理成本,显著地弱化非经济目标与经营权释出的负效用。文章的意义在于从控股家族所追求的目标解释为什么有的企业宁愿忍受企业绩效下降的经济后果仍然要雇佣家族成员担任CEO这个看似"非理性"现象。     

The CEO Arms Race

This article constructs a game‐theoretic model in which high chief executive officer (CEO) pay emerges as the outcome of an arms race, with each firm hiring a highly paid CEO to protect its competitive position against rivals who also hire highly paid CEOs. For an arms race to emerge, highly paid CEOs must generate idiosyncratic, privately known internal effects on profit, and CEO pay disparities must also generate asymmetric profit differences from external effects beyond the simple differences in pay. If the distribution of internal effects satisfies a key uniformity condition, an arms race emerges as the only equilibrium of the game.