公司股价崩盘风险影响审计费用吗?北大核心CSSCISSCI

2008年全球金融危机和2015年我国股市的大幅波动凸显了股价崩盘风险的重大研究价值,现有研究主要关注了股价崩盘风险的动因,而忽视了对其经济后果的直接检验。本文从审计费用角度研究股价崩盘风险的经济后果,旨在探讨审计师在审计决策时是否以及如何使用客户股价崩盘风险这一信息。研究发现,公司股价崩盘风险越高,审计师收取的审计费用越高,这表明审计师在做出审计决策时的确考虑股价崩盘风险信息;并且,公司股价崩盘风险与审计费用的正向关系在公司为国企、未完成股权分置改革、审计师规模较大以及公司所处地区市场化程度较高时更显著。进一步研究发现,公司股价崩盘风险越高,审计师花费的审计时间越长,这表明公司股价崩盘导致增加的审计费用包含了对审计努力的价格补偿。本文的研究结果表明,股价崩盘存在明显的溢出效应,会影响审计师的审计定价决策。这从审计师角度丰富了股价崩盘风险经济后果的相关研究。     

“监督”抑或“掩饰”：连锁股东与公司股价崩盘风险

文章以2007—2019年A股上市公司为研究样本，考察了连锁股东对公司股价崩盘风险的影响。结果表明：连锁股东的存在显著降低了股价崩盘风险，支持“监督效应”假说；影响机制分析发现，连锁股东能够降低管理层隐藏负面消息的动机和机会，进而降低公司股价崩盘风险；进一步分析发现，产品市场竞争程度和行业地位能够影响连锁股东与股价崩盘风险间的关系，并且连锁股东有助于提升公司的信息披露质量。研究结论为理解连锁股东这一角色提供了新的证据，同时对防范金融风险提供了有益启示。     

纵向兼任高管能降低股价崩盘风险吗?

纵向兼任高管究竟会加强大股东对管理层的监督,减少管理层机会主义行为,提升公司治理水平;还是会强化大股东对上市公司的控制,提升其私有权收益的获取能力,增加企业风险？为此,文章将以2007年-2017年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,探究纵向兼任高管如何影响企业的股价崩盘风险。研究发现,纵向兼任高管显著降低了公司未来股价崩盘风险;在进行Heckman两阶段模型、倾向得分匹配等稳健性检验后,这一结论依然成立。同时,文章进一步研究发现,纵向兼任高管在"监督效应"和"更少掏空效应"共同作用下降低了股价崩盘风险;且当纵向兼任高管权力越大时,即纵向兼任董事长时,对公司未来股价崩盘风险的降低作用越明显。文章不但深化了股价崩盘风险影响因素的研究,而且有助于我们全面认识纵向兼任高管这一关系在公司治理中的作用,这对于完善公司治理、防范股价崩盘风险,进而促进我国资本市场的健康发展有重要的意义。     

我国上市公司金融资产配置与股价崩盘风险关系研究

本文以2009-2016 年我国A 股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了公司的金融资产配置对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现,公司适度配置金融资产可以显著降低股价崩盘风险,支持了金融资产配置的“价值假说”。进一步分析发现,金融资产配置对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用只存在于经营业绩好和盈余波动性弱的公司中。上述结论在多项稳健性测试中保持稳健。本文的研究不 仅丰富了股价崩盘风险动因的研究成果,也有助于理论界和实务界更加全面认识金融资产配置的经济后果,为维护资本市场稳定、促进金融服务实体经济提供一定政策启示。     

CEO vs CFO:性别与股价崩盘风险

本文研究CEO和CFO的性别对股价崩盘风险的影响,并进一步考察CEO权力、外部市场态势和CEO年龄对女性CEO与股价崩盘风险关系的影响。研究发现:(1)女性CEO能显著降低股价崩盘风险,而女性CFO对股价崩盘风险的影响不显著;(2)CEO的权力越大,女性CEO降低股价崩盘风险的作用越大;(3)当股市为"熊市"或CEO年龄更大时,女性CEO降低股价崩盘风险的作用更为显著。本文的结论表明,在中国,女性CEO可以有效降低股价崩盘风险,起到稳定资本市场的作用,而女性CEO作用的发挥依赖于其在企业中权力的大小、外部市场态势和风险规避程度。此外,CFO会屈从于CEO,从而CFO的作用有限。     

股价崩盘风险、信息透明度与资本结构偏离度——基于沪深A股数据的实证分析

以中国A股上市公司为样本,文章考察了股票崩盘风险和信息透明度对资本结构偏离度的影响。研究表明:股价崩盘风险越大,资本结构偏离度越高;国有上市公司过度负债时,透明度越低资本结构偏离度越大;区分股权性质后的进一步研究表明,国有上市公司的资本结构受到股价崩盘风险和信息透明度的影响比非国有上市公司更加显著。上述研究说明在我国特殊的制度背景下,股价崩盘风险和信息透明度在资本结构的调整中起着重要的作用,稳定的资本市场和优越的信息环境有助于企业资本结构的优化。     

股权质押动因及风险防范对策研究

近年来,股权质押融资给企业提供融资便利的同时,也带来了个股股价崩盘的风险,引起政府与市场的高度关注。文章认为,股权质押动因可分为质权方风险规避动机和出质人套利投机动机。实证研究发现,股权质押比例与股价崩盘风险呈正相关,且在股价下跌时这种正相关会更强烈;市场偏好和平仓约束可以隔离股价崩盘风险,银行等非券商类质权方由于平仓操作的限制降低了企业的股价崩盘风险。但套利投机动因下,风险会绕过这些"防火墙",使其功能失效。因此,为防止股价崩盘引发的系统性风险,文章分别对风险规避情况和套利投机情况下股权质押引发的股价崩盘风险给出相应的应对策略,以期为相关部门提供政策建议,防止股价崩盘风险的发生。     

资本市场开放能够提高股票价格稳定性吗?:基于沪港通的经验证据

基于2012年11月至2016年11月上海证券市场的月度面板数据,文章通过双重差分固定效应模型,分别从不同期间、不同市场开放程度入手,研究沪港通对股票价格稳定性的影响。研究发现,沪港通的实施有效降低了标的股票的整体波动性,波动性在短期的增加只是一种暂时性的现象,沪港通的实施通过扩大股票投资者基础、优化市场投资者结构从而对股价稳定性带来积极影响。随着市场开放程度的增加,沪港通也会对股票的极端波动产生影响,降低公司股价跳升风险,有利于缓解A股市场的投机氛围,但同时也增加了公司股价崩盘风险,带来市场不稳定因素。沪港通实施后公司股票的崩盘风险与中国证券市场薄弱的信息披露环境有关,那些信息披露环境差的公司股票的崩盘风险显著增加。     

企业集团决策权配置与股价崩盘风险

文章从企业集团的视角出发,以母公司支付给职工的薪酬集中度作为集权指标的代理变 量,首次研究了决策权配置对股价崩盘风险的影响,然后分析和检验了其影响机理。实证结果显示： 企业集团的集权程度越高,未来股价崩盘风险越高;截面分组发现这种现象仅在民营企业、信息 不透明度较高的企业、外部监管较弱的企业、处于生命周期衰退阶段的企业存在。文章的研究结 果对于企业集团确定适当的决策权配置战略具有一定的参考意义。     

山高皇帝远:地理距离与上市公司股价崩盘风险的经验证据

鉴于信息不对称程度、制度实施成本和心理文化差异，文章提出"监管距离"假说，认为监管者和被监管者之间距离远近可以影响监管效果。实证分析中国沪深上市公司数据，文章从非对称风险视角出发，研讨了上市公司注册地距所在地中国证监会派出机构的地理距离对公司层面的股价崩盘风险的影响。我们发现，监管机构与上市公司总部的地理距离越远，该上市公司股价的崩盘风险越大。进一步分析发现，如果开通高铁或者上市公司所在地社会信任水平足够高，那么监管距离和崩盘风险的正相关关系是不显著的；如果监管负担严重或政府效率低下，那么监管距离和崩盘风险之间正相关关系更为显著。文章认为，地理距离具有监管信息效应、监管威慑效应和监管执行效应，能够影响股价崩盘风险。也就是说，"山高皇帝远"可以改变上市公司行为，提高金融监管效率不应忽视非正式制度的影响。     

CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk

This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence and future stock price crash risk. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and misperceive negative net present value (NPV) projects as value creating. They also tend to ignore or explain away privately observed negative feedback. As a result, negative NPV projects are kept for too long and their bad performance accumulates, which can lead to stock price crashes. Using a large sample of firms for the period 1993–2010, we find that firms with overconfident CEOs have higher stock price crash risk than firms with nonoverconfident CEOs. The impact of managerial overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced when the CEO is more dominant in the top management team and when there are greater differences of opinion among investors. Finally, it appears that the effect of CEO overconfidence on crash risk is less pronounced for firms with more conservative accounting policies.     

Accounting Conservatism and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm‐level Evidence

Using a large sample of U.S. firms during 1964–2007, we find that conditional conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of a firm's future stock price crashes. This finding holds for multiple measures of conditional conservatism and crash risk and is robust to controlling for other known determinants of crash risk and firm‐fixed effects. Moreover, we find that the relation between conservatism and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that conditional conservatism limits managers’ incentive and ability to overstate performance and hide bad news from investors, which, in turn, reduces stock price crash risk.     

Is Real Earnings Smoothing Harmful? Evidence from Firm‐Specific Stock Price Crash Risk

This study examines whether and when real earnings smoothing influences firm‐specific stock price crash risk. Using a sample of U.S. public firms for the years 1993 through 2014, we find real earnings smoothing to be positively associated with firm‐specific stock price crash risk. This finding is consistent with the view that real earnings smoothing helps managers withhold bad news, keep poor‐performing projects, conceal resource diversion, and engage in ineffective risk management, which increases crash risk. Further, we find a stronger relation between crash risk and real earnings smoothing when firm uncertainty is higher, product market competition is lower, and balance sheet constraint is higher. Overall, our study suggests that real earnings smoothing destroys shareholder value in that it increases stock price crash risk.     

货币政策、股票流动性与股票价格暴跌风险

目前中国股市还存在较多制度性缺陷,股价波动频繁且暴跌风险较高。本文以2003年至2013年中国A股上市公司为样本,检验作为激发机制的货币政策以及作为外部生成机制的股票流动性对中国股票价格暴跌风险的影响。研究发现：股票流动性与公司股票价格暴跌风险具有显著的敏感性,即随着股票流动性的下降,公司股票价格暴跌风险显著上升;货币政策越宽松,股票价格暴跌的风险越大;而且宽松的货币政策增强了股票流动性与股票价格暴跌风险的敏感性。区分市场势态的进一步分析表明,市场为熊市时,股票流动性对股票价格暴跌风险的影响更显著,货币政策的放松越容易激化股票价格暴跌风险,且对股票流动性与股票价格暴跌风险的敏感性的放大作用更为突出。     

Accounting Quality,Stock Price Delay,and Future Stock Returns*

In frictionless capital markets with complete information and rational investors, stock prices adjust to new information instantaneously and completely. However, a substantial body of research studies information imperfections such as asymmetric information and incomplete information. Information imperfections potentially hinder timely price discovery and are likely associated with delayed stock price adjustment to information. Our first research question therefore is whether the quality of accounting information (or “accounting quality”) is one such information imperfection that is associated with cross‐sectional variation in stock price delay. We define accounting quality as the precision with which financial reports convey information to equity investors about the firm’s expected cash flows. Poor accounting quality is likely associated with higher expected returns through uncertainty about stock valuation parameters and incomplete information. Our second research question therefore is whether the accounting quality component of price delay is associated with higher future stock returns. Consistent with our hypotheses, the results show that poor accounting quality is associated with delayed price adjustment and higher future stock returns. Thus, accounting quality plays a role in timely stock price discovery.     

Readability of 10‐K Reports and Stock Price Crash Risk

This study shows that less readable 10‐K reports are associated with higher stock price crash risk. The results are consistent with the argument that managers can successfully hide adverse information by writing complex financial reports, which leads to stock price crashes when the hidden bad news accumulates and reaches a tipping point. Cross‐sectional analyses show that the effect of financial reporting complexity on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with persistent negative earnings news or transitory positive earnings news, greater chief executive officer stock option incentives, or lower litigation risk. Finally, accrual manipulation appears to be positively related to crash risk, even since the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, if the manipulation is accompanied by complex 10‐K reports.     

Can Shareholders Be at Rest after Adopting Clawback Provisions? Evidence from Stock Price Crash Risk

Using a propensity score matched sample and a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find that stock price crash risk increases after a firm voluntarily incorporates clawback provisions in executive officers' compensation contracts. This heightened crash risk is concentrated in adopters that increase upward real activities‐based earnings management and those that reduce the readability of 10‐K reports. Based on cross‐sectional analyses, we also find that the increased crash risk is more pronounced for adopters with high ex ante fraud risk, low‐ability managers, high CEO equity incentives, and low dedicated institutional ownership. Collectively, our results suggest that the clawback adoption per se does not curb managerial opportunism but rather induces managers to use alternative channels for concealing bad news, which may contribute to a greater stock price crash risk; and the increase in crash risk is more likely in cases where incentives are strong or monitoring is weak. Our results should be of interest to regulators and policymakers considering the effects of clawback adoption on the investing public.     

Financial Reporting Opacity and Expected Crash Risk: Evidence from Implied Volatility Smirks

The recent financial crisis has stimulated a renewed interest in understanding the determinants of stock price crash risk (i.e., left tail risk). Recent research shows that opaque financial reports enable managers to hide and accumulate bad news for extended periods. When the accumulated bad news reaches a certain tipping point, it will be suddenly released to the market at once, resulting in an abrupt decline in stock price (i.e., a crash). This study extends this line of research by examining the impact of financial reporting opacity on perceived or expected crash risk. Prominent economists, such as Olivier Blanchard, argue that removing the perception of tail risks (in addition to realized tail risks) is crucial in restoring investor confidence and stabilizing the stock market. Using the steepness of option implied volatility skew as a proxy for perceived crash risk, we find that accrual management, the presence of financial statement restatements, and auditor‐attested internal control weakness are all positively and significantly associated with the level of perceived crash risk. Our results suggest that improving financial reporting transparency is an important mechanism for firms and policymakers to reduce the perception of tail risks and stabilize the stock market.