孕产妇人群对出生缺陷预防保健服务的利用及其影响因素

采用分层、系统和整群抽样相结合的多阶段抽样方法,对江苏省无锡市2002-2004年孕产妇及其孕28周以上的胎婴儿作了调查。采用问卷调查的方式对1628名调查对象进行了面访。调查地区属于较发达的地区,但孕前去过卫生服务机构进行出生缺陷预防保健知识咨询的孕妇并不多,且能够在怀孕后早期到医院进行检查的比例更低。为有效预防出生缺陷的发生,需要探索一种更为有效的模式,提高孕产妇对预防保健服务的利用。     

《促进法》的政策体现与推进中小企业发展的法律对策

深入分析我国中小企业发展政策体系，对外国通过加强法律制度的建设来促进中小企业发展的作法进行比较分析，进而对完善我国促进中小企业发展的相关政策和相关措施进行研究，是当前学术界值得关注的问题。     

The Cost-Effective Choice of Policy Instruments to Cap Aggregate Emissions with Costly Enforcement

We study the cost-effectiveness of inducing compliance in a program that caps aggregate emissions of a given pollutant from a set of heterogeneous firms based on emissions standards and the relative cost-effectiveness of such a program with respect to an optimally designed program based on tradable discharge permits. Our analysis considers abatement, monitoring and sanctioning costs, as well as perfect and imperfect information on the part of the regulator with regard to the polluters’ abatement costs. Under perfect information we find that (a) the total-cost-effective design of a program based on standards is one in which the standards are firm specific and perfectly enforced, and (b) the total cost of an optimally designed program based on standards is lower than the total cost of an optimally designed transferable emission permits system, except under special conditions. This is true when it is optimum to induce perfect compliance and when it is not. Under imperfect information, nevertheless, it is only by implementing a system of tradable permits and perfectly enforcing it with a constant marginal penalty tied to the price of the permits, that the regulator can surmount the informational problem and at the same time minimize the total cost of the program with certainty.     

The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina

Public policies are the outcomes of complex intertemporal exchangesamong politicians. The political institutions of a country constitutethe framework within which these transactions are accomplished.We develop a transactions theory to understand the ways in whichpolitical institutions affect the transactions that politicalactors are able to undertake, and hence the quality of the policiesthat emerge. We argue that Argentina is a case in which thefunctioning of political institutions has inhibited the capacityto undertake efficient intertemporal political exchanges. Weuse positive political theory and transaction cost economicsto explain the workings of Argentine political institutionsand to show how their operation gives rise to low-quality policies.