THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE R&D*

The precompetitive R&D literature has viewed cooperative and noncooperative R&D as substitutes. In this paper a more realistic approach is taken, where both cooperative and noncooperative R&D are performed in parallel. In the first stage, firms determine the optimal investments in both types of R&D and in the second stage they compete in output. It is found that information sharing between cooperating firms contributes not only to cooperative R&D, but also to noncooperative R&D. The two types of R&D reinforce each other. The level of cooperative R&D may be higher or lower than noncooperative R&D. In a Cournot duopoly, the share of cooperative R&D lies between 20% and 80% of total R&D and this share increases with spillovers and information sharing. It is always optimal to subsidize half the costs of cooperative R&D, while the subsidy to noncooperative R&D is unchanged from the standard model. Consumers prefer intermediate levels of spillovers and information sharing, while firms prefer higher levels of spillovers, which entail lower levels of information sharing.     

UNCERTAINTY AND THE POSITIVE THEORY OF THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE*

This paper extends the analysis of Rees (1984a) of a public enterprise pursuing a size-related objective in the face of uncertain demand to a situation where its managers may be risk neutral or risk averse and where the public enterprise may produce more than one output. The optimal pricing policy of the public enterprise is analysed and the importance of not only the expected profit constraint but also the attitude to risk of the public enterprise in determining its relative prices is demonstrated.     

BACKGROUND RISK AND THE THEORY OF THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER UNCERTAINTY*

This paper examines the optimal production decision of a firm under output price risk á la Sandmo when the firm also faces a dependent background risk. It is shown that standard risk aversion plus a non-negative association between the output price risk and the background risk are sufficient to ensure a reduction in the firms optimal output upon introduction of the background risk. The paper investigates the impact of a deterministic transformation of the background risk on the firms optimal production decision. It is shown that decreasing absolute risk aversion in Ross' sense is among the sufficient conditions that generate an unambiguous negative comparative static result.     

科技资源空间配置研究进展

在经济全球化和信息化的背景下,科技资源作为创新活动的基础和核心,对社会经济的持续发展起着至关重要的作用。科技资源在空间上的合理高效配置,对我国实现从资源驱动型向创新驱动型发展方式转变具有重要意义。文章总结了科技资源配置相关问题的研究现状,指出了当前研究的薄弱环节,并展望了未来的研究方向。研究认为,现阶段对于科技资源配置问题的研究,主要从管理学、经济学的角度作了大量的实证研究,体现在以下五个方面,分别是科技资源的空间分布现状、配置模式、配置效率、与区域创新体系的关系以及与区域经济发展的关系等。总的来说,在理论研究和空间视角方面重视不够,应当在今后加强地理学区位论和空间组织结构理论的指导,从空间视角出发对科技资源空间配置的模式、机制、效率等问题作进一步研究。     

ROY MODEL SORTING AND NONRANDOM SELECTION IN THE VALUATION OF A STATISTICAL LIFE*

Wage‐hedonics is used to recover the value of a statistical life (VSL) by exploiting the fact that workers choosing riskier occupations are compensated with a higher wage. Roy (Oxford Economic Papers 3 (1951), 135–46) suggests that observed wage distributions will be distorted if individuals choose jobs according to idiosyncratic returns. We describe how this type of sorting biases wage‐hedonic VSL estimates and implement two new estimation strategies that correct that bias. Using data from the Current Population Surveys, we recover VSL estimates that are three to four times larger than those based on the traditional techniques, statistically significant, and robust to a wide array of specifications.     

PERSISTENT IDEOLOGY AND THE DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC POLICY OVER TIME*

This article investigates how public policy responds to persistent ideological shifts in dynamic politico‐economic equilibria. To this end, I develop a tractable model to analyze the dynamic interactions among public policy, individuals’ intertemporal choice, and the evolution of political constituency. My main finding is that a right‐wing ideology may increase the size of government. Data from a panel of 18 OECD countries confirm that after controlling for the partisan effect, there is a positive relationship between the right‐wing political constituency and government size. This is consistent with my theoretical prediction, but hard to explain by existing theories.