The representation problem and the efficiency of the price mechanism

It is shown in this paper that the way in which an allocation is represented (net trades, final allocation, etc.) can affect the design of any realizing mechanism or incentive compatible system. The reason is that a poor choice of representation may be imposing superfluous conditions and demands upon the realizing mechanism. So, in this paper a technique is developed to (1) find the optimal representation of an allocation, and (2) to characterize the associated, realizing mechanisms. Although this approach is designed to be applied to any smooth economic model, it is illustrated and motivated here by applying it to the price mechanism. More specifically, there are assertions in the literature by Mount and Reiter and by Hurwicz that the price mechanism is informationally efficient over the class of Pareto seeking mechanisms. These proofs are incomplete because they consider only one choice of representation for the Pareto allocations. We use this technique to (a) reassert the dimensional efficiency of the price mechanism, (b) compare mechanisms for spaces of economics with and without externalities, (c) characterize for the space of quadratic functions the other dimensionally efficient allocation concepts, and (d) characterize those two agent economics where the price mechanism is dimensionally efficient.     

Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds

The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We consider the welfare bounds that are central to the fair allocation literature, namely, the identical-preferences lower-bound, individual rationality, the stand-alone lower-bound,   and k$k$-fairness. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate an object efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem of allocating a collectively owned indivisible good or bad when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are private information.     

Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents

We consider designing a mechanism to allocate objects among agents without monetary transfers. There is a socially optimal allocation, which is commonly known by the agents but not observable by the designer. The designer possibly has information about the existence of responsible agents. A responsible agent, when indifferent between his objects at two different allocations, prefers the first allocation to the second if the first allocation is closer to the optimal allocation than the second, in the sense that all the agents who are allocated their optimal objects in the second allocation are allocated their optimal objects also in the first allocation, and there is at least one more agent in the first allocation receiving his optimal object. We show that, if the designer knows that there are at least three responsible agents, even if the identities of the responsible agents are not known, the optimal allocation can be elicited.     

The central government grant allocation problem in the presence of misrepresentation and cheating

This study deals with the central government grant allocation problem under conditions of asymmetric information. Using a simple model, we examine herein the optimal design of random audit and incentive mechanisms to encourage the grantee (the local government authority) to report truthfully on local parameters required in the granting process. The local government authority must choose between two possibilities: a menu of contracts that could be considered as a matching grant programme with random auditing vs. a lump-sum grant without any audit mechanism. We will show that addressing the optimal grant system problem is similar to comparing slopes on the graph of the indirect local government welfare function at two distinct points.Received: January 2003, Accepted: November 2003, JEL Classification: H21, H23, H71, H77We would like to express our thanks to Howard Chernick and an anonymous referee for their extremely helpful comments.     

Local and global consistency properties for student placement

In the context of resource allocation on the basis of priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a consistency principle. Ergin (2002) formulates consistency as a local property based on a fixed population of agents and fixed resources—we refer to this condition as local consistency and to his condition on the priority structure as local acyclicity. A related but stronger necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a more standard global consistency property is unit acyclicity.     

User acceptance of complex electronic market mechanisms: Role of information feedback

This paper broadens the scope of evaluating the design of economic mechanisms that is traditionally done solely from an economic perspective. We introduce and demonstrate the application of acceptability to evaluate complex economic mechanisms. In particular, we apply our approach to the evaluation of continuous combinatorial auctions, which represent a complex, sophisticated market mechanism that has not been generally available in the online marketplace but has the potential to enhance the economic efficiency of trade for assets with interdependent values. Such auctions are being increasingly used in industry, e.g., to procure logistical services. Intuitively, acceptance and usage of a complex mechanism can be fostered by a design that provides information and tools that meet the users’ task demands. Based on prior research and an analysis of the auction tasks, we discuss practical and innovative information feedback schemes for reducing the cognitive burden of formulating bids in combinatorial auctions. Then, we use constructs from the technology acceptance model (TAM) – which have been consistently shown to be key determinants of technology acceptance in the extant literature – to compare the acceptability of the mechanism under three different information regimes. In addition, we borrow constructs from marketing theory to assess the potential growth in adoption of the mechanism. We compare user perceptions of the three alternative designs in a laboratory experiment with over 130 subjects. Our study constitutes a complementary and novel approach in evaluating the design of complex economic mechanisms. Results indicate a higher adoption and usage potential of the mechanism with advanced information feedback, supporting the potential of combinatorial auctions as a user-acceptable market mechanism with appropriate feedback.     

On the asymptotic behavior of stochastic economic processes : Two examples from intertemporal allocation under uncertainty

Some of the recently developed models to deal with economic problems involving uncertainty are based on simplifying assumptions on the nature of the stochastic law of the environment influencing economic decisions. Relying on the theory of martingales, we derive some general results on the asymptotic behavior of two dynamic processes that are of interest in the theory of intertemporal resource allocation. The first example is related to the ‘turnpike’ theory of optimal allocation. The second is addressed to the question of allocation of a scarce resource by using prices when the supply of the resource is random.     

Capabilities and utilities

This paper deals with the problem of looking for resource allocation mechanisms which would be accepted as just in Sen's capabilities framework. We start by suggesting a way of simplifying Sen's idea of capability by using acapability index which measures the ability of a person to function. Then we look for mechanisms providing allocations which could be deemedjust, in pure distribution problems. An allocation will be called just when its corresponding capabilities are leximin suprema. We provide a characterization result of this mechanism in a framework which mimics Roemer's bargaining in economic environments, in which the role of utility functions is now played by capability indices. When a positive relationship between capability indices and utilities exist, just allocations are optimal in utility terms.     

Property appraisal in high-rises: A cooperative game theory approach

The construction of the higher stories in a building is utterly contingent upon the construction of the lower ones, while the construction of lower stories does not require the construction of the higher ones. This rationale underlies our adoption of a cooperative game theory methodology for examining the value of units based on the cost approach of land appraisal. Particularly, we propose the Shapley value solution to examine the allocation of the land and construction cost among the stories of the building. We explore the allocation mechanism and derive several closed-form properties by which the value pattern of stories in a building is rationalized. The proposed cost allocation may, among other things, generate values when comparable market prices are unobservable (consistent with the cost approach); may be used by courts in order to compute compensations in cases of disputes regarding expansions and redevelopments of existing structures among co-owners; and may determine the rent cost allocation in an organization with several profit centers located on different floors of a building.     

完善节能减排体制机制和政策措施——以河南省为例

节能减排体制机制,主要是依靠行政手段,轻视经济手段和法律手段,没有充分发挥市场机制特别是价格传导机制作用,完善节能减排体制机制关键是建立起以经济手段为中心,使价格机制能够充分发挥作用的长效机制:一是发挥市场配置资源的基础性作用,建立促进节能减排目标实现的市场机制,二是按照市场经济规律的要求,完善促进节能减排的政策机制。     

Regional economic models and continuous programming

This paper is concerned with an optimal investment allocation problem in a simple N-regional economic model. The problem is described as a class of optimal control problem, and formulated into a continuous linear programming problem. Both the primal and dual problems are considered. The procedure finds an optimal regional allocation of investment derived in terms of continuous programming.     

The impact of organizational structure on time-based manufacturing and plant performance

The innovation and organizational theory literatures argue that implementing radical innovation can be facilitated or hindered by the organization’s structural design. As firms attempt to cope with an external environment that is changing from industrial to post-industrial, how do they implement change? This study develops a research framework that examines relationships among various structural dimensions (i.e. number of layers in the hierarchy, level of horizontal integration, locus of decision-making, nature of formalization, and level of communication), time-based manufacturing practices, and plant performance. Based on 224 responses from manufacturing firms, this study develops instruments to measure these organizational sub-dimensions using part of this sample (N=104), and it tests the structural relationships with the remaining responses (N=120). Results indicate that the nature of formalization, the number of layers in the hierarchy, and the level of horizontal integration have significant, direct, and positive effects on the locus of decision-making and level of communication. Locus of decision-making and the level of communication, in turn, have significant, direct, and positive effects on time-based manufacturing practices. Finally, time-based manufacturing practices have a significant, direct, and positive impact on plant performance.     

混合所有制改革是否有助于缓解人力资本配置扭曲

将人力资本在所有制企业间的配置扭曲（错配）理解为技术配置扭曲和规模配置扭曲两个方面,基于1998—2013年中国工业企业数据库的相关数据,探讨国有企业混合所有制改革影响人力资本配置扭曲的内生机理,结果表明：混合所有制改革鼓励非国有资本通过参股、控股和并购等方式参与到国有企业的生产决策中,这有助于完善国有企业的公司治理结构和利润分配机制,进一步缓解人力资本的技术配置扭曲和规模配置扭曲程度;相对于非行政垄断行业,行政垄断行业中国有企业混合所有制改革对于人力资本配置扭曲的缓解作用较小。     

建设项目协调管理机制研究

建设项目协调管理职能需要通过各种管理活动来实现,而协调管理职能的实现是由各项管理活动中蕴含的协调管理机制所决定的。文章在阐明建设项目协调管理机制内涵的基础上,提出了5种重要的建设项目协调管理机制:决策机制、合作机制、沟通机制、激励机制和约束机制,并由此构建了这5种协调管理机制的运行模式,以期为建设项目协调管理实践提供理论基础。     

A core equivalence theorem with an arbitrary communication structure

We formalize the concept of a communication structure by identifying it with a partition of the set of agents. Thus, a coalition can form if and only if it belongs to the given partition. Within this framework we are able to show that for every integer J≧2, if we put the uniform distribution on the space of partitions that contain exactly (or, no more than) J coalitions, the probability that such a partition will contain a blocking coalition for any Pareto optimal allocation which is bounded away from being competitive, is arbitrarily close to 1, as the number of individuals increases.     

Workflow process modelling and resource allocation based on polychromatic sets theory

In workflow management, studying the relationship between workflow process activities and resource allocation is one of the interesting research topics. Polychromatic sets theory (PST) is a relatively new mathematical theory which is especially suitable for treating such problems. Based on PST, this paper proposes a framework of workflow process modelling and resource allocation. As the theoretical foundation, polychromatic sets (PS), polychromatic graph (PG) and isolation operation (IO) of the PS are introduced. Special net structure (SNS), a special PG with colourless nodes and concolourous edges, is also introduced, and a new workflow process model and its verification algorithm are presented. Furthermore, a workflow resource model based on the entity of PS is developed. Based on IO of PS, the allocation mechanism that considers workflow process and workflow resource is proposed. Finally, a case study is provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the above-mentioned theory and method.     

A computational model of communication for reducing linguistic opacity based on the language-action perspective

This paper presents a communication model based on the language-action perspective aiming at reducing what is called linguistic opacity. In particular, the focus is on mechanisms supporting the maintenance of the contexts against which the interpretation of conversations occurs. The mechanisms are based on a communication model where two types of conversations are considered: conversations for action and conversations for possibility. They are used for negotiating commitments that shape the work arrangements in relation to the actions to be performed (the operational context) and the organizational space of possibility for future actions (the organizational context). The proposed computational model takes into account the dynamics of knowledge creation and sharing by describing how conversations modify the operational and organizational context as well as the partial views of them shaped by different actors.     

基于不对称Nash协商模型的多Agent造船供应链协商机制研究

供应链成员企业之间的协商是供应链管理的一个重要方面,供应链上节点企业通过协商才能进行有效的合作。本文在分析船舶制造企业与供应商协商机制的基础上,将多Agent技术运用到合作企业的协商过程中,利用Nash不对称协商模型,为造船供应链企业的利益分配提供有效参考。     

关联并购具有信息传递效应吗?——基于企业社会资本的视角

关联并购是否具有信息传递效应是一个全新的话题。基于社会资本的理论框架,从社会网络和信任机制两个维度讨论了关联方之间传递信息的优势,前者增加信息来源的广度,后者增加信息传递的深度。并进一步讨论了关联并购传递信息的具体机制。研究发现,在信息不对称程度较高的并购样本中,关联并购与企业绩效正相关,在信息不对称程度较低的样本中,两者不存在显著相关性,间接验证了关联并购中的信息传递效应;关联并购主要通过创造先验信息和信息交流两种机制实现信息传递,但并不能额外地创造专业信息。文章还补充证实了如果控股股东的共享收益而非私人收益占上风,关联并购的信息传递效应会更显著。