First-price auctions where one of the bidders’ valuations is common knowledge

We analyze a private and independent valuation first-price auction under the assumption that one of the bidders’ valuations is common knowledge. We show that no pure strategy equilibrium exists and we characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the bidder whose valuation is common knowledge randomizes her bid while the other bidders play pure strategies. In an example with the uniform distribution, we compare the expected profits of seller and buyers in this auction with those in a standard symmetric private valuation model.     

Pure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information

We introduce a new game form which allows the players’ strategies to depend on their strategy-relevant private information as well as on some publicly announced information. The players’ payoffs depend on their own payoff-relevant private information and some payoff-relevant common information. Under the assumption that the players’ strategy-relevant private information is diffuse and their private information is conditionally independent given the public and payoff-relevant common information, we prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for such a game by developing a distribution theory of correspondences via vector measures.     

Almost Common Value Auctions: An Experiment

In almost common value auctions one bidder has a higher (private) value for the item than the other bidders. Theory predicts that even a small private value advantage can have an explosive effect in English auctions, with advantaged bidders always winning and sharp decreases in revenue. These predictions fail to materialize for experienced bidders who have learned to avoid the worst effects of the winner's curse. Bidding is better characterized as proportional, with advantaged bidders tending to bid as in a pure common value auction after adding their private value advantage to their estimated value of the item.     

Pure Neoclassical Exploitation and the Level of Wages

A bstract . The neoclassical theory of labor exploitation is extended by identifying a pure exploitation which occurs when the wage rate is less than both labor's marginal factor cost (= marginal revenue product ) and its average revenue product. Pure exploitation is attributable to a labor market phenomenon alone and is unambiguously unfair from a Pigouvian perspective. It is argued that, contrary to a common belief, pure exploitation does not imply low wages. For example, pure exploitation and high wages are to be expected at least transitorily in the case of the economically profitable innovative firm.     

Education,job satisfaction and gender in Kuwait

This study explores the relationship between education (level and field) and job satisfaction among Kuwaiti women employees in the Kuwaiti private banking sector. The analysis is focused on the responses of the female employees to their own jobs as indicated by their level of job satisfaction. Specifically, the research involved a stratified sample of the Kuwaiti women employees in the whole private banking sector in Kuwait. This study differs from previous investigations of job satisfaction in two principal ways: in dealing with the private sector (rather than the more common public sector in studies of the Middle East) and in taking into account education (level and field) in the privatesector work setting. The major findings of this research indicate that a much broader approach towards increasing satisfaction than focusing on the job itself is required. The study shows that the respondents' education background is of substantial importance in affecting job satisfaction.     

Decreasing average cost in private schools,existence of majority voting equilibrium,and a policy analysis for Turkey

The existing models of mixed public–private school systems usually capture only the decreasing average cost faced by public schools, whereas empirical studies find evidence of it for private schools as well. Motivated by this, an equilibrium model of a mixed public–private school system is studied in this paper, whereby private schools also face decreasing average cost over enrollment. In the model, households, heterogeneous with respect to exogenously specified income and child’s ability, choose among a public and a private school. Private school charges tuition whereas public school is free. Public school spending is financed by income tax revenue collected from all households and the tax rate is determined via majority voting. Achievement of a child depends on its ability and education spending. Under the assumptions on the parameters of the model, a joint lognormal distribution of income and ability, and a Cobb–Douglas utility, majority voting equilibrium is numerically shown to exist. The model is calibrated to match certain statistics from the 2013 Turkish data. Using the calibrated model, we compare the benchmark for a mixed public–private school system with a pure public school system to understand the impact of shutting down some of the private schools in Turkey following the July 15 coup attempt. We find that mean achievement and variance of achievement after high school is \(0.039\%\) higher and \(0.013\%\) lower respectively in a pure public school system.     

审计定价与“中签者之祸”及其思考

鉴于对低价进入式审计定价策略的关注,本论文评述了一个审计市场二阶段竞价模型。在这个模型中,审计成本包括两个部分:对所有可能的审计人员一致的共同审计成本和因具体审计人员而异的个别审计成本。正是由于这部分共同审计成本的存在,导致了“中签者之祸”情况的产生。论文认为,经验丰富的审计者通过改变审计竞价策略,以补偿“中签者之祸”带来的损失。这一点,对于“低价进入式竞价策略”(第一阶段审计价格的降低)的程度和审计人员的变更,起着重要的作用。在二阶段审计竞价模型中,“低价进入式竞价策略”与审计质量损失无关。基于上述分析框架,作者简要地陈述了我国审计服务市场的收费情况并做出了相关评论。     

Should governments fund science?

Empirical evidence shows the flaws in the 'linear model' of economic growth - in which government funds pure science which leads to applied science and enhanced economic growth. Adam Smith's model - in which academic science flows out of applied science - is nearer the mark. Governent funding of science cannot be justified on economic grounds and indeed tends to crowd out private funding.     

The interaction between public and private governments: An empirical analysis

Private governments, found in planned developments and condominiums, are increasingly common methods of delivering local services to residents. This paper provides the first empirical study of their impact on local public finance. A novel data set of homeowners' associations allows construction of a panel of private governments in California. Panel methods test whether public expenditures respond to private government prevalence. Estimates indicate that local governments lower spending moderately in response to private government activity, consistent with strategic substitution. The paper then examines various mechanisms to explain this downloading and shows that the substitutability between public and private providers is key to which services are downloaded. Evidence also suggests that the economies of scale in service production in small cities temper the offloading of public services to private governments.     

Die Theorie globaler Spiele: Private Information als Mittel zur Vermeidung multipler Gleichgewichte

Investment decisions with network effects, refinancing illiquid firms, and speculative attacks are typical examples for coordination games with multiple equilibria. By introducing private information about payoff relevant parameters, the theory of global games embeds such coordination games in a stochastic environment, in which the game may have a unique equilibrium. This paper provides an introduction to the theory of global games and shows that it delivers a unique equilibrium if private information is sufficiently precise, while public information may lead to equilibria with self-fulfilling beliefs. This implies some criteria for optimal mechanisms of information dissemination. For example, a well-informed central bank can minimize the prior probability of currency crises by committing to provide information to private actors with small idiosyncratic errors.     

Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. We identify a class of two-way communication mechanisms which mirror those considered in the single principal analysis of Myerson (1982). In such mechanisms, every agent truthfully reveals her type to all principals, and obeys the private recommendations she receives from each of them. We show that there is a rationale in restricting attention to this class of mechanisms: if principals use these mechanisms, there is no unilateral incentive to deviate towards more sophisticated ones. We develop three examples to analyze possible extensions and limits of our approach. The first two examples show that the restriction to direct and incentive compatible mechanisms is not sufficient to provide a complete characterization of all pure strategy equilibria. The third one shows that private recommendations play a fundamental role in competing mechanism games, suggesting that one cannot safely restrict to one-sided communication mechanisms.     

Corporate Governance und Unternehmenswerteffekte bei Leveraged Buyouts – State of the Art der empirischen Forschung

This state-of-the-art paper systematizes and discusses the results of numerous empirical studies that deal with the effects of corporate governance on the value of leveraged buyouts. Moreover, additional need for research is derived. The article shows that leveraged buyouts share three common characteristics: significant management participation, the use of debt to discipline the management, and intensive monitoring of the private equity firm. Positive wealth effects through leveraged buyouts are beneficial for both the previous owners and the private equity firm. The studies yield evidence that the specific corporate governance of leveraged buyouts contributes to these positive value effects. Studies on reverse leveraged buyouts provide further evidence for this stream of thought. Main areas for future research comprise methodological issues of measuring wealth effects, its link to corporate governance in leveraged buyouts and the different types of buyouts. Alternative explanations of the wealth development as well as macroeconomic effects constitute further avenues for future research.     

CORRUPTION, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATESECTOR : WHY IT MATTERS AND WHAT CAN BE DONE

The author proposes a definition of corruption which requires five conditions to be satisfied simultaneously. The definition is applicable to both the state and private sectors. Empirical work shows that corrupt countries receive less inward investment, pay higher interest on borrowings and achieve lower rates of investment overall. Ways of combating corruption are suggested.     

Obtaining collaboration benefits: the role of collaboration-specific investment and absorptive capacity in China

This study examines the role of collaboration-specific investment and absorptive capacity on the attainment of interorganizational collaboration benefits. Grounded in the extended resource-based view, and using survey data from Chinese executives, we study the driver for, and test the impacts of, collaboration-specific investment and organizational learning on collaboration performance. Our findings indicate that resource similarity between the collaborative partners affects the level of collaboration-specific investment and learning, and demonstrate an approach that firms can use to obtain both abnormal common and private benefits from participation in an interorganizational collaboration. Specifically, the findings suggest that collaboration-specific investment has a direct effect on the enhancement of absorptive capacity and attainment of common and private collaboration benefits. Furthermore, due to the direct effect of absorptive capacity on attainment of collaboration benefits, commitment of collaboration-specific investment has an indirect effect on the attainment of common and private collaboration benefits. This study is the first to apply both the competence-capability framework and extended resource-based view to study interorganizational collaboration. In fact, this study aims to determine mechanisms for a collaboration-participating firm to obtain more benefit, whether common or private. Our findings provide support for the importance of learning capability as a factor in the acquisition of collaboration benefits.     

A model for sealed-bid auctions with independent private value and common value components

This paper shows how a decision-making model can be applied to a sealed-bid auction with both independent private value (IPV) and common value (CV) components. The model yields estimates for the winning bid and for the actual value and error components of the winning bid as functions of the number of bidders and the underlying value and error distributions, assuming that these distributions are normal. The winner's curse and the special cases of IPV and CV auctions are examined using the model.     

Rethinking the role of private capital in infrastructure PPPs: the experience of Ontario,Canada

Private capital has become a significant feature of infrastructure public–private partnerships (PPPs) on the premise that it incentivizes diligent risk management among private partners. This paper evaluates this claim by examining the PPP programme in Ontario, Canada, where the amount of long-term private capital in PPPs has been reduced. The paper shows that decreasing the amount of private capital after construction does not undermine performance, while producing cost savings for governments. This was achieved by deploying sophisticated procurement and monitoring strategies. These findings suggest that private capital is one of several tools available to achieve positive value for money in PPPs.     

Growth option,debt maturity and cash reserves with bank-tax-interaction

In this paper, we assume a small and micro enterprise(SME, henceforth) invests in a project, of which the investment cost is funded by the private lending and the bank-tax-interaction (BTI, henceforth). We build a tractable model of optimal investment, liquidity and default decisions based on cash flows with liquidity shocks and profitability uncertainty. In contrast to the case with pure private lending, we discover that BTI delays investment and increases the firm value. Furthermore, BTI causes the SME to retain more cash reserves. We also find that the SME prefers to select the BTI as the main financing policy under the higher liquidity risk and small profitability uncertainty. Besides, the impact of debt maturity on financial policies with BTI depends on liquidity shock.     

Trading equilibrium in a public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers

Lindahl and Nash equilibria are often used in the theory of public good. Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998) present an example of 2-person economy with one private good and one pure public good, where the core efficient Lindahl allocation does not Pareto dominate the (inefficient) Nash allocation. In this paper we introduce the new concept of Trading equilibrium for a general public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers. We obtain that this economy admits a unique Trading equilibrium. Moreover, the Trading equilibrium induces a core allocation that strictly Pareto dominates the Nash allocation.     

中国民营企业技术效率测算与影响因素研究

以异质性随机前沿分析模型为基础,本文对中国2001～ 2011年各区域民营企业技术效率与相关影响因素进行了实证研究.结果表明:中国民营企业技术效率仅发挥了37％ ～ 46％的潜力,各区域民营企业技术效率大致呈“波浪式”发展态势,且东部区域民营企业技术效率显著高于中西部区域;地区财政扩张和对外开放度均能缓解民营企业技术效率约束,但后者也对东部地区民营企业产出的稳定性造成不利影响;通货膨胀和国有经济发展均制约民营企业技术效率提升,但影响其产出稳定性因区域差异而各有不同.最后就提升民营企业技术效率给出简要的对策建议.     

Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions

We develop econometric models of ascending (English) auctions which allow for both bidder asymmetries as well as common and/or private value components in bidders’ underlying valuations. We show that the equilibrium inverse bid functions in each round of the auction are implicitly defined (pointwise) by a system of nonlinear equations, so that conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an increasing-strategy equilibrium are essentially identical to those which ensure a unique and increasing solution to the system of equations. We exploit the computational tractability of this characterization in order to develop an econometric model, thus extending the literature on structural estimation of auction models. Finally, an empirical example illustrates how equilibrium learning affects bidding during the course of the auction.