Immigration,Conflict, and Redistribution

In this paper, we analyze how the possibility of conflict between natives and immigrants shapes income redistribution in developed democracies. This possibility can generate income redistribution towards immigrants even if they have no voting rights. We show that the threat of conflict between natives and immigrants lowers vertical income redistribution (from the rich to the poor) as the level of immigration increases. The opposite holds for horizontal income redistribution (from natives to immigrants), which increases with the level of immigration. Income inequality weakens the negative effect of immigration on vertical redistribution, but it also reduces horizontal redistribution. These theoretical predictions are consistent with the results of our empirical analysis on data from 29 European countries: larger immigrant populations are associated with more redistribution towards immigrants and lower vertical redistribution.     

How Inequality Affects Trust in Institutions: Evidence from Indonesia

Trust is an important ingredient to improve economic performance and people's welfare by alleviating market failures caused by imperfect information, costly enforcement, or coordination failures. Using the World Values Survey 2018, we estimate the impact of village and district levels inequality on trust in institutions in Indonesia. We find that higher village level inequality has a negative effect only on trust in strangers, while higher district level inequality reduces trust in television, the press, the central government, the courts, and the police. The implication points to the importance of keeping inequality at the aggregate level in check to maintain people's trust in social, political and state institutions.     

Who trusts others more? A cross-European study

Using the European Social Survey, the paper documents the endowments and the individual determinants of trust across Europe. Self-declared trust is higher in northern countries, in particular Scandinavia; it is lower in southern countries, in particular Italy, Portugal and Greece. At the EU-15 level, we find that a number of factors, such as schooling, family background, labor market status, and a recent history of traumatic experiences, are associated with trust. We also find evidence of heterogeneity for some of the determinants across European countries.     

Government Size and Trust

This paper uses individual level data from the Japanese General Social Survey to examine how government size influences generalized trust. After controlling for the endogeneity of government size using instrumental variables, I found: (1) using all samples, government size is not associated with generalized trust, and (2) after splitting the sample into workers and non-workers, government size does not influence generalized trust for non-workers, whereas it significantly reduces generalized trust for workers. This suggests that workers, through their work experience, might have to face greater bureaucratic red tape coming from “larger government,” leading to negative externality effects on relationships of trust in the labor market.     

Neighbourhood effects,preference heterogeneity and immigrant educational attainment

This paper investigates differences between the educational attainment of immigrants, children of immigrants and native-born individuals in Australia by using Australian Youth Survey (AYS) data combined with aggregate Australian Census data. Differences in educational attainment are decomposed into: (i) typical demographic and socio-economic sources common to all ethnic groups; (ii) unobserved region of residence and region of origin effects; and (iii) neighbourhood effects such as degree and ethnic concentration of particular ethnic groups in different neighbourhoods. A theoretical model incorporating these effects is proposed but structural estimation is not possible for lack of appropriate data. Instead, a reduced form methodology is proposed and employed. The empirical results identify positive ethnic neighbourhood effects in high school completion and university enrolment for some immigrant groups in Australia, in particular first and second generation immigrants from Asia. The results indicate that it is not just the size of the ethnic network but the ‘quality’ of the network that is important.     

Induced heterogeneity in trust experiments

Several non-experimental studies claim that heterogeneity among individuals reduces trust. A few experimental studies have examined the effects of naturally-occurring differences among subjects on trusting behavior, and in contrast, most have not supported these claims. We adopt a novel approach by inducing heterogeneity among subjects in a canonical trust experiment. We accomplish this by varying the show-up payments given to subjects for participating in the experiment. We find that this induced inequality does not consistently affect first- or second-mover behavior in the classic trust game in the manner predicted by either previous theoretical work or empirical studies of survey-based measures of trust. Further, the effect of inequality on trust, in terms of both sign and significance, depends on whether show-up payments are awarded publicly or privately. JEL Classification C9, Z13     

OPTIMAL IMMIGRATION POLICY: WHEN THE PUBLIC GOOD IS RIVAL*

In this model, we characterize optimal immigration and fiscal policies in the presence of a rival public good and heterogeneous discounting. Surprisingly, even if the government is benevolent towards natives only, it is optimal to keep borders open. Indeed, in the long run, patient natives hold the whole stock of capital, while impatient immigrants work. Moreover, since capital intensity is stationary, capital per native, consumption and the public good increase with the number of (immigrant) workers. This positive effect offsets the disutility deriving from the congestion of the public good. However, when we account for the costs associated with cultural heterogeneity, we find that it is optimal to regulate immigration inflows. We also analyze the long‐run sensitivity of the optimal policy mix with respect to the fundamentals.     

宗教信仰与信任:一个实验经济学的研究

本文采用实验方法研究宗教信仰对个人信任行为的影响.本文首次以佛教徒、基督教徒、穆斯林和非宗教信仰者四类群体为研究对象进行信任实验,并通过虔诚度问卷调查,全面分析宗教影响个体信任行为的内在机制.研究结果表明:(1)当把三类宗教被试合并为一个整体时,其与非宗教信仰者在信任行为上没有显著差异,也不存在明显的组间效应;(2)但...     

Do stock prices react to immigration restrictions? Evidence from an event study in Switzerland

This article tests the effects of sudden immigration restrictions on stock prices of firms in industries with high shares of immigrants. It estimates the abnormal returns as a function of the share of migrants by industry. To do so, one specific event – a referendum on migration policy with an unexpected outcome – that will potentially cut off Swiss listed companies from the supply of foreign labour is studied. Although operating in an industry with a high share of immigrants is associated with lower returns, the effect is not very strong, which indicates that investors seem to trust the government to leave some leeway in the implementation of the constitutional amendment that was voted on.     

Precautionary savings by natives and immigrants in Germany

This article analyses the savings behaviour of natives and immigrants in Germany. It is argued that uncertainty about future income and legal status (in case of immigrants) is a key component in the determination of the level of precautionary savings. Using the German dataset, we exploit a natural experiment arising from a change in the nationality law in Germany to estimate the importance of precautionary savings. Using a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach, we find a significant reduction in savings and remittances for immigrants after the easing of citizenship requirements, compared to the pre-reform period. Our parametric specification shows that introduction of the new nationality law reduces the gap in marginal propensity to save between natives and immigrants by up to 80%. These findings suggest that many of the differences in terms of the savings behaviour between natives and immigrants are driven by the savings arising from the uncertainties about future income and legal status rather than cultural differences.     

Does trust favor macroeconomic stability?

This paper investigates the relationship between trust and macroeconomic volatility. An illustrative model rationalizes the relationship between trust and volatility. In this model, trust relaxes credit constraints and diminishes investment’s procyclicality. I provide empirical evidence for the basic predictions of the model. Then, I show that higher trust is associated with lower macroeconomic volatility in a cross section of countries. This relationship persists when various covariates are taken into account. I use inherited trust of Americans as an instrumental variable for trust in their origin country to overcome reverse causality concerns. Using changes in inherited trust over the 20th century, I do not find clear evidence that increasing trust is also associated with decreasing volatility across time at the country level.     

SUNSPOT EQUILIBRIA IN A PRODUCTION ECONOMY: DO RATIONAL ANIMAL SPIRITS CAUSE OVERPRODUCTION?*

We study a standard two‐period economy with one nominal bond and one firm. The firm finances the input with the nominal bond in the first period and its profits are distributed to the shareholders in the second period. We show that in the neighbourhood of each efficient equilibrium, a sunspot equilibrium also exists. It is shown that the equilibrium interest rate is lower than the efficient level and that there is overproduction in the sunspot equilibrium, under some conditions. However, there is no sunspot equilibrium if the profit share of the firm can be traded as well as the bond.     

Individual protection against property crime: decomposing the effects of protection observability

Abstract.  We re-examine the efficiency of observable and unobservable crime protection decisions with new results and insights. Observable protection is unambiguously associated with a negative externality. At the individual level, it reduces the crime effort, but its unit payoff remains unchanged. Conversely, unobservable protection reduces the unit payoff and has no effect on the crime effort exerted, though it deters crime globally. A decrease in the global crime payoff is detrimental to a victim if protection is observable, while it is beneficial when unobservable. While observable protection has a positive diversion effect, it has the opposite effect when unobservable.     

In government we trust: The role of fiscal decentralization

This paper looks whether fiscal decentralization is associated with trust of citizens in government related institutions. We expect a positive relationship based on the argument of governments' improved responsiveness to preferences of citizens that is perceived to result from more decentralized fiscal systems. Survey data from up to 42 countries over the period 1994–2007 confirm this positive relationship. It is robust to controlling for unobserved country heterogeneity and a wide array of other explanatory variables that are associated with trust in government related institutions. Moreover, we do not find that the positive association with fiscal decentralization extends to other, non-government related institutions.     

Effects of Islamic religiosity on bilateral trust in trade: The case of Turkish exports

Using a rich firm level data set for Turkish manufacturing, we test whether sharing similar religious beliefs with potential contracting parties drives a firm’s first time entry into export markets. We exploit variation in the practice of Islam across Turkish NUTS3 regions and we find that firms located in regions characterised by stronger religiousness are more likely to enter export destinations with a higher share of Muslims among their population. This result is robust to the control for past trade, common language, cultural and migration ties as well as for selective trade policy in favour of politically connected religious business groups. In particular, religious proximity eases export entry for producers of “trust intensive” goods, it favours subsequent foreign market entries and reduces the export exit probability. All in all, our evidence supports an export enhancing effect of religious proximity working through export sunk costs reduction rather than through similarity in preferences.     

“新农保”的福利效应与地方政府信任*

“新农保”的福利效应对提升政府信任和政府治理能力具有重要影响。本文采用中国家庭追踪调查数据（CFPS），从参保农民对地方干部信任的角度，实证分析了新农保这一公共政策实施对农村居民对地方政府信任的影响。研究结果表明：相较于非参保组，新农保明显提升了参保居民的政府信任；在考虑了遗漏变量、自选择等内生性问题后，这一结论依然稳健。异质性分析表明，新农保显著提升了中低收入家庭以及中西部地区参保组的政府信任水平。进一步，本文从“物质福利效应”“社交福利效应”和“心理福利效应”的角度考察了新农保福利效应增进地方政府信任的途径，结果表明，参保初期，新农保政策带来的物质福利增加、社交福利改善和心理福利满足均显著提高了参保居民对地方政府的信任。但从参保的长期效应来看，新农保的福利效应对政府信任的影响从长期看并不显著，这可能是由新农保的实际保障水平和人们预期的保障水平之间的差距所导致的。     

Whom do you distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement of trust

We advance the measurement of trust in economics in two ways. First, we highlight the importance of clearly identifying the target of trust, particularly for obtaining concordance between attitudinal and behavioral measures of trust. Second, we introduce a novel behavioral measure of (dis)trust, based on individuals? willingness to pay to avoid being vulnerable to the target of trust. We conduct an experiment in which we vary the target of trust among passersby at several locations around a city, measuring both behavioral distrust and trust attitudes towards these varying targets. We find that subjects discriminate based on perceived characteristics of different targets in determining whether to trust, in a manner consistent with trust elicited using attitudinal measures and with actual trustworthiness. Risk aversion and altruism do not correlate highly with our measure of distrust.     

Promoting entry of high-quality workers through US immigration policy

We examine how US immigrants would be affected by applying a simple point system for admission, as Canada does. Since US immigration policy emphasizes family reunification, immigrants have lower education and earnings than natives, with unauthorized immigrants’ education below legal ones. Using American Community Survey data, and Center for Migration Studies data, which allows us to distinguish legal from unauthorized immigrants, we examine the effects of requiring immigrants to meet 2 of 3 conditions: (1) a high school or college degree, (2) being less than 40 years old and (3) working in a professional occupation, while admitting the same numbers of immigrants. This policy changes the source countries of immigrants and there are large positive effects on immigrant earnings. Immigrants’ use of government transfer programs is reduced to below natives and income inequality falls. Finally, with existing policy, immigrant earnings growth is not enough to overtake natives given immigrants’ entering earnings disadvantage. With this point system, immigrants start at a higher level and surpass natives relatively quickly.     

Collective Trust Behavior*

This paper investigates trust behavior in situations where decision‐makers are large groups and the decision mechanism is collective. Theories from behavioral economics and psychology suggest that trust in such situations may differ from interindividual trust. The experimental results here reveal a large difference in trust but not in trustworthiness between the individual and collective setting. Furthermore, a field experiment captures the determinants of collective trust behavior among two Swedish cohorts. Beliefs about the other group and one's own group are strongly associated with collective trustworthiness and trust behavior.     

Social capital and political institutions: Evidence that democracy fosters trust

This paper finds evidence that more democratic political institutions increase trust. Second generation immigrants with ancestries from 115 countries are studied within 30 European countries. Comparing individuals born and residing in the same country, those whose father was born in a more democratic country express higher trust than those whose father was born in a less democratic country. The results are robust to individual, parental, and ancestral country controls.