Does financial globalization promote risk sharing?

In theory, one of the main benefits of financial globalization is that it should allow for more efficient international risk sharing. In this paper, we provide an empirical evaluation of the patterns of risk sharing among different groups of countries and examine how international financial integration has affected the evolution of these patterns. Using a variety of empirical techniques, we conclude that there is at best a modest degree of international risk sharing, and certainly nowhere near the levels predicted by theory. In addition, only industrial countries have attained better risk sharing outcomes during the recent period of globalization. Developing countries have, by and large, been shut out of this benefit. Even emerging market economies, many of which have reduced capital controls and all of which have witnessed large increases in cross-border capital flows, have seen little change in their ability to share risk. We find that the composition of flows may help explain why emerging markets have not been able to realize this presumed benefit of financial globalization. In particular, our results suggest that portfolio debt, which had dominated the external liability stocks of most emerging markets until recently, is not conducive to risk sharing.     

FEAR OF FLOATING IN EAST ASIA?

Abstract.  We examine the de facto exchange rate arrangements in eight East Asian countries during the post-Asian crisis period. The empirical results suggest that three countries adopted a hard peg or a peg with capital account restrictions, whereas five countries moved toward a more flexible exchange rate arrangement in the post-crisis period. Three of these five countries (Korea, Indonesia and Thailand) achieved a level of exchange rate flexibility close to the level accomplished in a free floater such as Australia. These results suggest that 'fear of floating' in East Asia is not prevalent in the post-crisis period, supporting the bipolar view of the optimal exchange rate regime.     

Risk sharing through capital gains

Abstract We estimate channels of international risk sharing between European Monetary Union (EMU), European Union, and other OECD countries, 1992–2007. We focus on risk sharing through savings, factor income flows, and capital gains. Risk sharing through factor income and capital gains was close to zero before 1999 but has increased since then. Risk sharing from capital gains, at about 6%, is higher than risk sharing from factor income flows for European Union countries and OECD countries. Risk sharing from factor income flows is higher for euro zone countries, at 14%, reflecting increased international asset and liability holdings in the euro area.     

Systems GMM estimates of the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle for the OECD countries and tests for structural breaks

A systems GMM estimation method is used to estimate the Feldstein–Horioka equation from 1960 to 2007 with a panel of 13 OECD countries. It is found that the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle exists in a weaker form with a much reduced saving retention coefficient. The Bretton Woods agreement in particular seems to have weakened the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle by significantly improving international capital mobility. In comparison the Maastricht agreement seems to have improved capital mobility only by a small magnitude. The Blundell and Bond systems GMM method and structural break tests of Mancini-Griffoli and Pauwels are used in this paper.     

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the role of trade costs

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have increased dramatically over the last two decades. This paper analyses the role of trade costs in explaining the increase in the number of cross-border M&As. In particular, we distinguish horizontal and non-horizontal M&As and investigate whether trade costs affect these two types of mergers differently. We analyse this question using industry data for 23 OECD countries for the period 1990-2001. Our findings suggest that while in the aggregate trade costs affect cross-border merger activity negatively its impact differs importantly across horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. The impact of trade costs is less negative for horizontal mergers, which is consistent with the tariff-jumping argument.     

Foreign portfolio diversification and risk-sharing

We investigate income smoothing associated with international portfolio diversification by decomposing the net factor income (NFI) channel into interests, dividends and retained earnings, for OECD and EU countries. We find that interest receipts and equity dividend payments contribute significantly to absorb domestic income shocks. Geographically concentrated portfolios and, in particular, biases toward EU markets have a strong negative effect on the degree of risk-sharing.     

A new approach to capital flows: Theory and evidence

This paper examines how an open economy determines its financial openness and deals with volatile capital flows when deciding to utilize them for output growth. We find that higher economic instability is an inevitable price paid for faster growth if a country permits wider openness without reversing its financial vulnerability. We prove that the country can leave its capital market wider open to achieve higher growth and lower instability if its financial system has been strengthened substantially. We show why some financially advanced countries request reluctant developing countries to liberalize their immature markets and how the conflict of interest between the two parties is formulated. The paper also presents a large sample of cross-country experiences with tradeoffs between growth and instability, with the observed evidence supporting our theoretical predictions.     

Changes in the second-moment properties of disaggregated capital flows

Using formal statistical tests, we detect (i) significant volatility increases for various types of capital flows for a period of changes in business cycle comovement among the G7 countries, and (ii) mixed evidence of changes in covariances and correlations with a set of macroeconomic variables.     

Reserves,Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Resilience of Global Imbalances

Reserves and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) assets should be jointly considered for the assessment of global imbalances, hence their denomination as sovereign external assets (SEAs): both are public capital outflows from developing to developed countries, both hinder adjustment in current account surplus and deficit countries and, therefore, both contribute to sustain global imbalances. They represented 135 per cent and 50 per cent of net and gross US financing needs, respectively, in 2007. Reserves contribute 80 per cent and SWFs 20 per cent. They will go on providing resilience to the global imbalances, and the relative importance of SWFs is set to increase if commodity prices stay high.     

Securitization of mortgage debt,domestic lending,and international risk sharing

Abstract Securitization makes mortgage‐related risks internationally tradeable and thus contributes considerably to the international diversification of macroeconomic risk: in the years 2003–2008, the increase in international cross‐holdings of securitized mortgage debt has lowered industrialized countries’ conditional consumption volatility (relative to the United States) by about 10–15 percentage points. We turn to the role of domestic credit in explaining this result. Domestic credit leads to better international risk sharing only if debt is securitized and traded internationally. Conversely, the risk‐sharing benefits from securitization seem to evaporate if credit dries up – as it did in the recent financial crisis.     

European monetary union, adjustment, and exchange rate variability

This paper uses a three-country, three-good, factor-specific model of trade with wage rigidities to investigate how European Monetary Union is likely to affect exchange rate variability. Focusing on international macroeconomic adjustment under both exogenous and optimizing monetary policies, it shows that the relative variability (against external currencies) of the euro and a basket of predecessor currencies depends on the relative sizes and specialization patterns of countries and the relative importance of different shocks. Monetary union is likely to decrease (increase) aggregate European exchange rate variability for shocks to industries in which large (small) euro area countries specialize.     

De facto financial openness and capital mobility

This paper shows that de facto financial openness does (does not) increase capital mobility in developing (developed) countries and that capital is (is not) freely mobile in the most financially open developing (developed) countries.     

Intra- and international risk-sharing in the short run and the long run

We investigate empirically how industrialized countries and US states share consumption risk at horizons between 1 and 30 years. US federal states share about 50% of their permanent idiosyncratic risk through cross-state capital income flows. While insurance against transitory fluctuations in output is virtually complete, OECD countries do not share any of their permanent idiosyncratic risk. Our results suggest that purely transaction cost based theories cannot explain the home bias, since the potential welfare gains from insurance against permanent shocks would by far outweigh that of insuring against transitory variation. We conclude that permanent and transitory shocks constitute two qualitatively different kinds of risk and that various forms of endogenous market incompleteness may render permanent shocks a lot harder to insure, in particular at the international level.     

Does WTO accession matter for the dynamics of foreign direct investment and trade?

The aim of this article is to study the impacts of World Trade Organization accession on the dynamics of foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade in Vietnam. In order to do this, we employ an augmented gravity model and use a panel data set covering bilateral trade and FDI between Vietnam and its 17 most important partner countries, over the period 1990–2008. Firstly, we find that WTO accession has a significantly positive effect both on Vietnam’s imports and on inward FDI. Secondly, even though we find no evidence to demonstrate convincingly that WTO accession influences Vietnam’s exports, this accession seems to indirectly encourage Vietnam’s exports through the FDI channel due to a strong connection between these two.