Mergers and the market for organization capital

In this paper, mergers are an equilibrium outcome in which acquirers “marry” targets so as to gain access to their organization capital. Firms with lower learning costs about the new technology are not necessarily those that manage it best once it is mature. Since there are gains from trade, a market for organization capital can arise through mergers. This model generates a merger wave after a shock to technology and is consistent with several other stylized facts on mergers documented in the literature.     

Subcontractors for tractors: Theory and evidence on flexible specialization,supplier selection,and contracting

Buyer–Seller networks are pervasive in developing economies yet remain relatively understudied. Using primary data on contracts between the largest tractor assembler in Pakistan and its suppliers we find large variations in prices and quantities across suppliers of the same product. Surprisingly, “tied” suppliers – those that choose higher levels of specific investments – receive lower and more unstable orders and lower prices. These results are explained by developing a simple model of flexible specialization under demand uncertainty. A buyer faces multiple suppliers with heterogeneous types to supply customized parts. Specific investments raise surplus within the relationship but lower the seller's flexibility to cater to the outside market. Higher quality suppliers have a greater likelihood of selling outside and so this cost is greater for them. Therefore even if a buyer typically prefers high types, some low type suppliers might be kept as marginal suppliers because of their greater willingness to invest more in buyer-specific assets. Further empirical examination shows that the more tied suppliers are indeed of lower quality.     

Investing in innovation to enable global competitiveness: The case of Portugal

The concept of leveraged innovation to create wealth within regions, countries and economies is not a new concept. Competitiveness of regions in the increasingly global economy now requires not only that innovation be present within a regional economy, but also that mechanisms exist to effectively transfer those developed innovations from the research laboratory to the marketplace. It is surmised that increased innovation, and the transfer of this innovation, can lead to increased prosperity of regions (Porter). As such, many developing countries around the world are looking at investments in innovation as a means to spur regional economic development and wealth creation while preserving national competitiveness. That said, innovation investment is by no means an exact science. Historically, typical “innovation investments” have been focused on “tangible” capital infrastructure projects such as the establishment of incubators and science parks. While many regions point to the existence of such tangible innovation assets as proof of investment in innovation, it has been discovered that in some cases, an investment in the capacity building of human networks to engage in technology transfer and commercialization related activities can act as a stronger facilitator for the transformation of economies and produce a larger return on investment in innovation for the country. Given not only Portugal's, but other regions throughout the EU-Zone, recent financial and economic woes, it bears examination on whether investing in the innovation and technology transfer knowledge and “know how” of key human networks within a struggling economy is a worthwhile investment for financially struggling countries during the current times of fiscal crisis.     

Is there a “reform fatigue” in the euro area?

The absence of monetary policy within a currency union increases the need for structural reforms that make the participating economies more flexible. However, the absence of exchange rate risk with respect to the other members of the union may reduce the urgency for such reforms. A number of other considerations also suggest that theory is ambiguous about the impact of participating in a currency union on progress in structural reforms. This paper addresses this issue empirically for the euro area. The results suggest that reforms in the euro area seem to have decelerated following the introduction of the euro, but from a fast pace. The paper discusses a number of possible explanations, including “reform fatigue,” the absence of “market punishment,” and “good-times” complacency. Estimates from an empirical growth model suggest that the slowing of reforms may slow down annual output growth by up to 0.2%. However, the results are preliminary and depend on the area of reform considered. Furthermore, the reform dynamics may change with the euro area starting slowing at the end of 2007.     

Competition and inter-firm credit: Theory and evidence from firm-level data in Indonesia

Using firm-level data we investigate the relationship between trade credit and suppliers' market structure and find a ∩-shaped relationship between competition and trade credit, with a discontinuous increase in credit provision between monopoly and duopoly. This “big jump” arises because monopolists are more likely to not offer any trade credit than firms in competitive environments. Our model exploits the fundamentally different nature between cash and trade credit sales, arguing that firms are unable to commit ex ante to a trade credit price. We show that monopolists will often sell only on cash, while credit is always provided in competitive environments.     

Law enforcement and transition

We present a simple model to analyze law enforcement problems in transition economies. Law enforcement implies coordination problems and multiplicity of equilibria due to a law abidance and a fiscal externality. We analyze two institutional mechanisms for solving the coordination problem. A first mechanism, which we call “dualism”, follows the scenario of Chinese transition where the government keeps direct control over economic resources and where a liberalized non-state sector follows market rules. The second mechanism we put forward is accession to the European Union. We show that accession to the European Union, even without external borrowing, provides a mechanism to eliminate the “bad” equilibrium, provided the “accessing” country is small enough relative to the European Union. Interestingly, we show that accession without conditionality is better than with conditionality because conditionality creates a coordination problem of its own that partly annihilates the positive effects of expected accession.     

Order Flows,Investor Sentiments and Feedback Trade in Index Futures Market

This paper examines the presence of feedback trading, and investor sentiment drove feedback trading by traders in the Nifty 50 index futures contract in India. The results of the study using high-frequency data sampled at 10 min interval using VAR and contemporaneous VAR model as applied to market microstructure settings reveals negative evidence of feedback trade and investor sentiment-driven feedback trade in Nifty 50 futures contract. Further, consistency with noise trading hypothesis, order flows in Nifty 50 futures contract is less informative when traders are overly optimistic.

     

Does a ‘non-committed’ government always generate lower social welfare than its ‘committed’ counterpart? Strategic trade policy when consumer surplus matters

We show that social welfare in the setup where the government lacks the full ability to commit to its trade policies may exceed the social welfare when the government possesses full commitment power if consumer surplus is part of the social welfare function. This is never the case in the standard, “third market” framework of strategic trade policy. We provide two examples in which consumer surplus matters: the “home market” and the “intra-industry trade” setup. The policy instruments under consideration are import tariffs and export subsidies and there are R&D spillovers from the domestic to the foreign firm.     

Estimating spatial differences in the Brazilian cost of living with household location choices

This paper uses a model of optimal household residential decisions to construct a comprehensive “true” spatial cost of living index with readily available Brazilian census data. We find evidence of a decreasing or U-shaped relationship (differing with education level and region) between the cost of living and urbanization, suggesting that both market disintegration and congestion play roles in raising costs. Controlling for spatial differences in the cost of living is shown to have important consequences for the determinants of poverty and (contrary to many previous results) to increase income inequality.     

Buyer investment, export variety, and intrafirm trade

This paper studies a model of buyer investment and its effect on the variety and vertical structure of international trade. A distinction is made between two types of buyer investment: “Flexible” and “specific”, which differ in the ability of a buyer to match with a seller. The interaction of buyer investment with the entry and pricing incentives of suppliers are analyzed. It is shown that (i) there can be multiple equilibria in the variety of products traded, and (ii) less product variety is associated with more intrafirm trade. The possibility of multiple equilibria is consistent with the observation that some similar economies, such as Taiwan and South Korea, differ substantially in their export varieties to the U.S. A cross-country empirical analysis confirms the negative correlation between export variety and intrafirm trade.     

Explaining efficiency differences among large German and Austrian banks

Cost-efficiency, scale efficiency, and productivity change are estimated by data envelopment analysis; and cost-efficiency is regressed on explanatory variables. No evidence is found for average productivity responding to deregulation over the period studied. State-owned banks are found to be more cost-efficient (likely owing to cheaper funds) and cooperative banks to be about as cost-efficient as private banks. Increasing economies of scale but decreasing economies of scope provide rationale for M&As among banks with similar product portfolios. Interbank and capital market funding is found to be more cost-efficient than deposits when the cost of retail networks is controlled.     

Endogenous market power

In this paper we develop a framework to study markets with heterogeneous atomic traders. The competitive model is augmented as we provide traders with correct beliefs about their price impacts to define equilibrium with endogenously determined market power and show that such equilibrium exists in economies with smooth utility and cost functions and is generically determinate. Traders? price impacts depend positively on the convexity of preferences or cost functions of the trading partners and are subject to mutual reinforcement. Compared to the competitive model, the volume of trade is reduced, and hence is Pareto inefficient. The price effects of non-competitive trading depend on the convexity of marginal utility or cost function.     

Development through synergistic reforms

For many less developed countries production of high quality output is a precondition for firms to become exporters. Institutional deficiencies that raise costs of high quality production therefore limit the positive impact that trade facilitation can have on income. Consequently, institutional reforms that reduce costs of high quality production and trade reform have synergistic effects. In contrast, institutional reforms that reduce costs of low quality production (e.g., reforms that disproportionately benefit small businesses) interfere with the impact of trade reform. We obtain these results in a heterogeneous firm model that displays standard “industry rationalization” responses to reduced trade costs.     

Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of “petty corruption” by government officials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic “tracks,” and the information among the participants. Entrepreneurs apply, in sequence, to a “track” of two or more bureaucrats in a prescribed order for approval of their projects. Our first result establishes that in a one-shot situation no project ever gets approved. This result leads us to consider a repeated interaction setting. In that context we characterize in more detail the trigger-strategy equilibria that minimize the social loss due to the system of bribes, and those that maximize the expected total bribe income of the bureaucrats. The results are used to shed some light on two much advocated anti-corruption policies: the single window policy and rotation of bureaucrats.     

Patent law and complementary innovations

This paper explores which patent policy should be applied to complementary innovations that are aggregated into broader technologies. I compare a setting in which complementary innovations must be bundled prior to patenting, with a second setting in which they can be patented separately. The first setting can improve static efficiency by avoiding the costs resulting from the scattering of complementary patents. But it also limits the disclosure of small innovations, which may lead to inefficient R&D cost duplications. A model capturing these effects shows that patenting complementary innovations separately is not efficient when innovations can be developed rapidly. This result justifies the enforcement of a severe “inventive step” or “non-obviousness” requirement in sectors where complementary innovations are frequent.     

Human capital, economic growth, and regional inequality in China

We show how regional growth patterns in China depend on regional differences in physical, human, and infrastructure capital as well as on differences in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. We also evaluate the impact of market reforms, especially the reforms that followed Deng Xiaoping's “South Trip” in 1992 those that resulted from serious hardening of budget constraints of state enterprises around 1997. We find that FDI had a much larger effect on TFP growth before 1994 than after, and we attribute this to the encouragement of and increasing success of private and quasi-private enterprises. We find that human capital positively affects output and productivity growth in our cross-provincial study. Moreover, we find both direct and indirect effects of human capital on TFP growth. These impacts of education are more consistent than those found in cross-national studies. The direct effect is hypothesized to come from domestic innovation activities, while the indirect impact is a spillover effect of human capital on TFP growth. We conduct cost-benefit analysis of hypothetical investments in human capital and infrastructure. We find that, while investment in infrastructure generates higher returns in the developed, eastern regions than in the interior, investing in human capital generates slightly higher or comparable returns in the interior regions. We conclude that human capital investment in less-developed areas is justified on efficiency grounds and because it contributes to a reduction in regional inequality.     

Short-term investment and equilibrium multiplicity

I study the effects of the heterogeneity of traders’ horizons in a 2-period NREE model where all traders are risk averse. Owing to risk premia, short-termism generates multiple equilibria. In particular two distinct patterns arise. Along the “low trading intensity equilibrium,” short termists anticipate a thinner second period market and, owing to risk aversion, scale back their trades. This reduces both risk sharing and information impounding into prices, enforcing a high returns’ volatility-low price informativeness equilibrium. Along the “high trading intensity equilibrium,” the opposite happens and a low volatility-high price informativeness equilibrium arises. Thus, in the presence of short-term behavior and traders’ risk aversion, periods of high volatility are a signal of poor price informativeness.     

Habit formation and strategic interactions: A new gain from trade?

A two-period duopoly model of trade with habit formation displays a “pre-entry pro-competitive effect” and the standard pro-competitive effect once trade is effective. Both effects are driven in a different way by transport cost. A trade liberalization affects ambiguously welfare.     

Sudden stops and the Mexican wave: Currency crises,capital flow reversals and output loss in emerging markets

Sudden stops are the simultaneous occurrence of a currency/balance of payments crisis with a reversal in capital flows. We investigate whether sudden-stop crises are a unique phenomenon and whether they entail an especially large and abrupt pattern of output collapse (a “Mexican wave”). Using a panel data set over 1975–1997 and covering 24 emerging-market economies, we distinguish between the output effects of currency crises, capital inflow reversals, and sudden-stop crises. Sudden-stop crises have a large negative, but short-lived, impact on output growth over and above that found with currency crises. A currency crisis typically reduces output by about 2–3%, while a sudden stop reduces output by an additional 6–8% in the year of the crisis. The cumulative output loss of a sudden stop is even larger, around 13–15% over a 3-year period. Our model estimates correspond closely to the output dynamics of the ‘Mexican wave’ (such as seen in Mexico in 1995, Turkey in 1994 and elsewhere), and out-of-sample predictions of the model explain well the sudden (and seemingly unexpected) collapse in output associated with the 1997–1998 Asian Crisis.     

Momentum in global equity markets in times of troubles: Does the economic state matter?

This paper investigates the profitability of momentum-based trading strategies pursued during the most recent economic downturns in global equity markets. In contrast to previous studies, it reveals that such strategies generated statistically significant negative returns during the most recent recessions. These “momentum crashes” happen during market reversals following exceptionally large market declines, as occurred in March and April 2009.