Cash-on-hand and demand for credit

Subprime consumers often use small-dollar credit products, such as payday loans, to meet short-term financial needs over pay cycles. However, relatively little is known about the income sensitivity of demand for credit in this market. This paper provides a causal estimate of the effect of tax rebates on the demand for small-dollar credit, using a unique proprietary loan-level dataset. Identification relies on variation in state Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) generosity for areas within the same commuting zones that span state borders. The results show that a $100 increase in EITC benefits leads to an 8.3% reduction in the number of loan applications and a 6.6% reduction in the number of borrowers. This could translate into sizable reductions in loan volume and savings in financial charges. More broadly, the results suggest that public programs with income benefits could help recipients with consumption smoothing in the presence of credit market frictions.     

Financial market participation and the developing country business cycle

I explore the implications of limited participation in financial markets on a standard small open economy business cycle model. Despite its parsimony, the limited participation model developed in this paper improves over the standard model in terms of explaining two important features of business cycle facts of developing countries: high volatility of consumption, and high negative correlation between the trade balance and output. Limited participation model is then used to inspect the effects of financial development and integration on macroeconomic volatility. Under a standard calibration, limited participation model leads to the conclusion that financial development and integration are associated with higher investment and output volatility. Effect of more participation on consumption volatility is dependent on the specification of the risk premium function.     

Green Electricity Markets as Mechanisms of Public-Goods Provision: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Utility-based green electricity programs provide market opportunities for consumers to reduce the carbon footprint of their electricity use. These programs deploy three types of public-goods contribution mechanisms: voluntary contribution, green tariff, and all-or-nothing green tariff (Kotchen and Moore, 2007). We extend the theoretical understanding of the all-or-nothing green tariff mechanism by showing that an assumption of warm-glow preferences is needed to explain widespread participation in programs deploying this mechanism. We conduct the first experimental test to compare the revenue generating capacity of a pure public good (based on the voluntary contribution mechanism) and an impure public good (based on the green tariff mechanism). In experimental play, the voluntary contribution mechanism raises 50% more revenue than the green tariff mechanism. With the all-or-nothing green tariff, experimental play and regression estimates show that a warm-glow preference positively affects participation, as predicted by the theory.     

The appeal of voluntary environmental programs: which firms participate and why?

Why do firms participate in the EPA's voluntary environmental programs? Possible reasons include: (1) to appeal to consumers who demand ‘green’ products; (2) to preempt government regulation; (3) to seek regulatory relief from the agency; and (4) to gain a competitive advantage over competitors. This article examines the determinants of participation in voluntary environmental programs, focusing on testing hypotheses 1 and 3. To test 2, a different approach is used than in previous literature. The focus is on a specified universe of firms (manufacturing firms in the Standard & Poor 500), and their participation in each of three EPA voluntary programs (33/50, Green Lights, and WasteWi$) referring to differently regulated pollutants is analyzed. Our empirical analyses reveal that (1) publicity is an important component of participation; (2) the worse the environmental track record of the firm, the more likely the firm is to participate, but only in programs directly related to highly regulated pollutants; and (3) firms that scrutinize their environmental performance more carefully are wary of newer programs with uncertain reach of the public and uncertain benefits. Firms appear to value the information/technology transfer aspect of joining a program.     

Forecasting Time Series Subject to Multiple Structural Breaks

This paper provides a new approach to forecasting time series that are subject to discrete structural breaks. We propose a Bayesian estimation and prediction procedure that allows for the possibility of new breaks occurring over the forecast horizon, taking account of the size and duration of past breaks (if any) by means of a hierarchical hidden Markov chain model. Predictions are formed by integrating over the parameters from the meta-distribution that characterizes the stochastic break-point process. In an application to U.S. Treasury bill rates, we find that the method leads to better out-of-sample forecasts than a range of alternative methods.     

The internalization of externalities in the production of electricity: Willingness to pay for the attributes of a policy for renewable energy

This paper investigates the willingness to pay of a sample of residents of Bath, England, for a hypothetical program that promotes the production of renewable energy. Using choice experiments, we assess the preferences of respondents for a policy for the promotion of renewable energy that: (i) contributes to the internalization of the external costs caused by fossil fuel technologies; (ii) affects the short-term security of energy supply; (iii) has an impact on the employment in the energy sector; and (iv) leads to an increase in the electricity bill. Responses to the choice questions show that our respondents are in favour of a policy for renewable energy and that they attach a high value to a policy that brings private and public benefits in terms of climate change and energy security benefits. Our results therefore suggest that consumers are willing to pay a higher price for electricity in order to internalize the external costs in terms of energy security, climate change and air pollution caused by the production of electricity.     

The prosumers and the grid

Prosumers are households that are both producers and consumers of electricity. A prosumer has a grid-connected decentralized production unit and makes two types of exchanges with the grid: energy imports when the local production is insufficient to match the local consumption and energy exports when local production exceeds it. There exists two systems to measure the exchanges: a net metering system that uses a single meter to measure the balance between exports and imports and a net purchasing system that uses two meters to measure separately power exports and imports. Both systems are currently used for residential consumption. We build a model to compare the two metering systems. Under net metering, the price of exports paid to prosumers is implicitly set at the price of the electricity that they import. We show that net metering leads to (1) too many prosumers, (2) a decrease in the bills of prosumers, compensated via a higher bill for traditional consumers, and (3) a lack of incentives to synchronize local production and consumption.     

On the Cost of Opportunistic Behavior in the Public Sector: A General‐Equilibrium Approach

This paper studies the wasteful effect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the link between opportunistic behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector wage bill. In particular, public officials are modeled as individuals competing for a larger share of those public funds. A simple extraction technology in the government administration is introduced in a standard real‐business‐cycle setup augmented with detailed public sector. The model is calibrated to German data for the period 1970–2007. The main findings are: (i) the model performs well vis‐à‐vis the data; (ii) due to the existence of a significant public sector wage premium and the high public sector employment, a substantial amount of working time is spent in opportunistic activities, which, in turn, leads to significant losses in terms of output; and (iii) the model‐based loss measures obtained for the EU‐12 countries are highly correlated to indices of bureaucratic inefficiency.     

Intertemporal production and intertemporal substitution in output supply and input demand

This article presents an intertemporal model of production with multiple inputs to investigate substitution opportunities facing firms over time. The firm’s intertemporal profit maximization problem is characterized with the familiar cost function, and various intertemporal substitution elasticities are delineated for output supply and input demand. The absence of intertemporal substitution in production can imply production smoothing, and allowance for intertemporal substitution in labour demand reinforces the prediction of the real business cycle model. For aggregate US manufacturing, we find substantial substitution in output supply and labour demand over time due to intertemporal changes in output price and wage rates.     

Tax and transfer programs,retirement behavior,and work hours over the life cycle

In this paper, we use a computable overlapping generations model economy to analyze the quantitative effects of some reforms on tax and transfer programs, aimed at easing the tax burden on the labor supply of older workers. We focus on retirement behavior, work hours over the life cycle, and efficiency gains. We find that the labor supply of older workers is very responsive to changes in tax and transfer programs and show that the gains, in terms of old-age work hours, are non-trivial. However, we also find that longer careers may not substantially increase aggregate hours because workers may reallocate labor supply over the life cycle in response to retiring later. Moreover, since longer careers may also reduce saving rates, we also find that changes in tax and transfer programs aimed at boosting the employment rates of the elderly may reduce output per head.     

Choosing and using payment instruments: evidence from German microdata

Germans are still very fond of using cash. Of all direct payments transactions in 2008, cash accounted for an astounding 82 % in terms of number and for 58 % in terms of value. With a dataset that combines transaction information with survey data on payment behaviour of German consumers, we shed light on how individuals decide on their cash usage. We employ a two-stage empirical framework which jointly explains payment card ownership and the use of cash. Our results indicate that cash usage is compatible with systematic economic decision making. Consumers decide on the adoption of payment cards and then use available payment media according to transaction characteristics, the relative costs of cash and card usage, socio-demographic characteristics and their assessment of payment instruments’ characteristics. Importantly, older consumers use significantly more cash than younger consumers. We show that this difference in payment behaviour is not attributable to age as such but largely to differences in the characteristics of older and younger consumers. This suggests that the high cash intensity of older consumers cannot fully be attributed to the role of habit or to their slow adoption to new payment technologies.     

On locally optimal programs in the Robinson–Solow–Srinivasan model

In the context of a model due to Robinson, Solow and Srinivasan (the RSS model), we report results on the existence and characterization of locally optimal programs, a concept taken from theoretical physics. In particular, we propose a (new) transversality condition under which all locally optimal programs are good. An extended introduction places our theorems in the context of previous work on the existence question, including that on agreeable programs. It appears that there is no completely rational way to attack [the] problem without considering development programmes over an infinite horizon (Gale in Rev Econ Stud 34:1–8, 1967). The analysis of simple models is essential if we are to understand the corresponding situation for more complex models of the economy (Mirrlees and Stern in J Econ Theory 4:268–288, 1972). The technical convenience, for clear and quantitative results, of using an infinite time horizon is rather great (Hammond and Mirrlees in Models of economic growth, Wiley, New York, pp 283–299, 1973).     

The Welfare Effects of Environmental Taxation on a Green Market Where Consumers Emit a Pollutant

This paper examines the welfare impact of emission taxes and subsidies in a green market where consumers emit a pollutant through their usage of products produced by duopolists. For this purpose, we employ a discrete?Ccontinuous model including both consumer choice and usage of an environmentally differentiated product in a utility-consistent framework. The findings indicate that an emission tax is always welfare dominant over a subsidy on consumer purchases of the clean product because of its contribution to a reduction in environmental damage. It does this by both inducing firms to improve the environmental qualities of their products and by constraining consumer usage of these products.     

Liquidity constraints, precautionary saving and aggregate consumption: an international comparison

This paper has three objectives. First, to expand Hall's [J. Polit. Econ. 86 (1978) 971] rational expectations permanent income/life cycle hypotheses (REPIH/RELCH) representative agent model to allow for current income consumers, the durable component of total consumer expenditures and for intertemporal substitution, which are often cited as the main reasons for the rejection of Hall's model. Second, to apply this modified model to 20 OECD countries over the post-World War II period. The GMM estimation method is employed. Third, to examine the relative influence of liquidity constraints and precautionary saving on the cross-country variation in the proportion of current income consumers, using cross-country regressions and a non-linear model of panel data. The presence of current income consumers, which is primarily due to liquidity constraints and to a lesser extent to precautionary saving, is the major factor for the rejection of the basic REPIH/RELCH model in all OECD countries.     

ESTIMATING TEMPTATION AND COMMITMENT OVER THE LIFE CYCLE

This article estimates the importance of temptation for consumption smoothing and asset accumulation in a life‐cycle model. We use two complementary estimation strategies: first, we estimate the model‐implied Euler equation; second, we match liquid and illiquid wealth accumulation using the method of simulated moments. In both cases, we find that the utility cost of temptation is one‐quarter of the utility benefit of consumption. Further, temptation is crucial for correctly estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS): EIS estimates are biased downward when ignoring temptation. Finally, the model only matches the share of illiquid wealth if temptation is in the preference specification.     

Competition and open source with perfect software compatibility

In this paper we study duopolistic competition between closed and open source software. Inspired by recent contributions on open source, we propose a two-stage game with perfect information and product differentiation, in which producers first set software quality and then determine prices (the price is zero for open source programs). We assume perfect software compatibility and model lock-in effects, a network externality component of software quality, and accumulation of experience in software use and implementation. In comparison to the monopolistic benchmark case, we argue that, in a duopoly created by the emergence of an open source program, the proprietary software producer will reduce its selling price if: (i) its network of users is larger than the open source network and its consumers are largely familiar with its program, (ii) it has a small network of unskilled consumers. On the other hand, the price of proprietary software will increase if its users form a large, but poorly-skilled network. Furthermore, we show that, in all of the above cases, the hedonic quality of proprietary software increases. Finally, by modeling experience accumulation processes through difference equations, we show that the ratio between the closed and open source programs’ opportunity costs for software learning and deployment plays a crucial role in shaping market outcomes. If open source software remains too complex and technical for unskilled or time-pressed users, a shared market solution, in which both programs are adopted, is likely to emerge. However, if opportunity costs in learning and understanding open source programs are particularly low, or at least equal to the opportunity costs of a closed-source program, then open source dominance emerges (i.e. markets tip to open source).     

Relational Goods and Associational Participation

Abstract *** :  In this paper, we focus on the role of interpersonal contact and the possibility of a relational motive to explain participation and volunteering in associations. Drawing on the relational goods theory, we show that associational activities are favorable to production and consumption of such goods. So, associational participants are expected to have more personal interactions. This theoretical hypothesis is tested using a cross‐sectional data set conducted in France in 1999. Our econometric analysis, which controls for endogeneity of associational participation using a simultaneous equations model, emphasizes a significantly positive relationship between this participation and preferences for relational goods .     

What Motivates Members to Participate in Co‐operative and Mutual Businesses?

Abstract *** : This article reports the findings of a project entitled ‘The participation of members in mutual businesses’. A previous project developed a theoretical model of what makes people participate, focusing on the participation of public service users in council housing and social care services. The current project builds on this work, applying the ‘mutual incentives model’ to a population sample of area committee members and a random sample of non‐participant members of a very large UK consumer co‐operative, the Co‐operative Group. Two arguments are presented as to why such research is needed. First, member participation in co‐operative and mutual businesses is becoming an important issue both for this sector and more generally for public policy. Second, a comparison between a public services setting and a co‐operative setting enables us to extend and further test the theoretical model. Two main features of the model are outlined: a ‘mutual incentives theory’ that goes beyond other models to combine individualistic and collectivistic motivations, and the ‘participation chain’, a synthesis of existing knowledge that joins motivations to three ‘links’ that we call ‘resources’, ‘mobilization’ and ‘dynamics’. The article then summarizes the project methodology, and reports the main findings. As in the public services project, on the ‘demand’ side, collectivistic incentives prove to be dominant over individualistic, but with some individual ‘internal’ benefits also being important. On the ‘supply’ side, skills derived from previous experience were important, as were a positive evaluation of opportunities to participate, and recruitment through existing networks. We then compare the findings to those from the public service users and from a regional co‐operative society; Oxford, Swindon and Gloucester Co‐op. Collective motivations are dominant in all three datasets, but are shown to vary in interesting ways that have important implications for member participation strategies.     

An experimental study of price dispersion

We report an experiment examining a simple clearinghouse model that generates price dispersion. According to this model, price dispersion arises because of consumer heterogeneity—some consumers are “informed” and simply buy from the firm offering the lowest price, while the remaining consumers are “captive” and shop based on considerations other than price. In our experiment we observe substantial and persistent price dispersion. We find that, as predicted, an increase in the fraction of informed consumers leads to more competitive pricing for all consumers. We also find, as predicted, that when more firms enter the market, prices to informed consumers become more competitive while prices to captive customers become less competitive. Thus, our experiment provides strong support for the model's comparative static predictions about how changes in market structure affect pricing.     

Web2.0环境下网络效应对价值共创的影响机理研究

Web2.0环境下,众多网络平台注重用户参与、交流互动与开放共享,为生产者、消费者等多主体协同参与价值共创提供了条件。为了深入探究网络外部性效应对Web 2.0价值共创模式的影响,研究构建了考虑网络效应的网络平台双边用户参与价值共创的理论模型,模型均衡解表明,消费者参与Web2.0网络平台进行价值共创会增加产品或服务的附加价值,提升消费者满意度,提高消费者对产品或服务的认知价值,进而吸引更多消费者参与价值共创,而消费者数量的增加会进一步提高该服务的价值,并吸引更多商户参与,由此产生正向网络外部性效应。建立了分析消费者剩余的经济模型,剖析了Web2.0环境下消费者无法参与价值分配却仍愿意参与价值共创的内在驱动因素。