Analyst Coverage and Financing Decisions

We provide evidence that analyst coverage affects security issuance. First, firms covered by fewer analysts are less likely to issue equity as opposed to debt. They issue equity less frequently, but when they do so, it is in larger amounts. Moreover, these firms depend more on favorable market conditions for their equity issuance decisions. Finally, debt ratios of less covered firms are more affected by Baker and Wurgler's (2002) “external finance‐weighted” average market‐to‐book ratio. These results are consistent with market timing behavior associated with information asymmetry, as well as behavior implied by dynamic adverse selection models of equity issuance.     

分析师跟踪对企业技术并购决策的影响研究

本文以2007—2018年中国A股上市公司技术并购事件为研究对象,考察分析师跟踪的信息效率效应和市场压力效应对企业技术并购决策的影响及其作用机制。研究发现：(1)分析师跟踪人数与企业技术并购决策之间存在显著的倒U型关系。这意味着分析师跟踪的信息效率效应和市场压力效应同时存在于企业技术并购决策之中,但随着分析师跟踪人数的增加,分析师跟踪对企业技术并购决策影响的主导效应由信息效率转向市场压力。(2)机制检验表明,信息效率效应和市场压力效应的大小受到分析师自身特征和企业外部环境的影响,表现为市场压力效应随着分析师实地调研次数、团队规模和企业股票流动性的增加而更加凸显,而信息效率效应则在产品市场竞争越弱的企业中越显著。(3)进一步分析发现,企业发起技术并购后显著提高研发投入强度并获得更多的发明专利授权量,说明技术并购与研发投入具有互补关系,共同促进了企业的创新产出。本文的研究揭示了分析师跟踪影响企业技术并购决策的内在作用机制,丰富了技术并购决策和分析师跟踪的相关研究,为我国构建技术创新体系和深化资本市场改革提供了重要的依据。     

技术类无形资产和技术类无形资产评估常见问题的探析

本文首先介绍了技术类无形资产的概念,重点对在评估实务中的一些常见的问题从评估方法、术阶段判断等做了较为详尽的剖析。进而详细地叙述了影响技术类无形资产价值的因素,文章选用参数、技术类无形资产定位、技术类无形资产所处技     

The Two Faces of Analyst Coverage

We find that positive excess (strong) analyst coverage is associated with overvaluation and low future returns. This finding is consistent with the view that excessive analyst coverage, driven by investment banking incentives and analyst self-interests, raises investor optimism causing share prices to trade above fundamental value. However, weak analyst coverage causes stocks to trade below fundamental values. This finding indicates that investors tend to believe that these firms are more likely to be plagued by information asymmetries and agency problems. The results remain robust after controlling for the possible endogenous nature of analyst coverage and analysts' self-selection bias.     

Intangible Assets and Corporate Signaling

Research and development (R&D) and advertising expenditures often result in patents, technologies and brand names which are difficult to accurately value. Under current generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) these intangible assets are generally not recognized in the financial statements, but instead are expensed in the period that they occur. Prior studies note that the market-to-book ratios of firms with significant levels of R&D and advertising expenditures suggest that investors, at least partially, value these assets. Researchers and practitioners argue that current GAAP, by not recognizing these intangible assets, reduces the usefulness and relevance of accounting reports.We investigate whether companies with significant levels of intangible assets are more likely to emphasize dividend increases and stock repurchases (which are generally perceived as signaling favorable investment opportunities), instead of traditional accounting disclosures, as a means of overcoming adverse selection. Because these assets are difficult to measure, cash distributions may be viewed as a more credible means of signaling firm value to investors. Using analysts' ratings of firms' accounting disclosures, we find that companies with higher levels of R&D and advertising expenditures are less likely to provide extensive accounting disclosures and instead tend to employ dividend and stock repurchase signals. We obtain these results even after controlling for other firm attributes, such as size, stock returns performance, leverage, liquidity and investors' expectations of growth opportunities. We also find that the market reaction to dividend increase and stock repurchase announcements is greater for firms with higher levels of R&D and advertising expenditures, indicating that these announcements are more informative for such firms.     

The First Analyst Coverage of Neglected Stocks

We examine the first analyst coverage of 549 “neglected” stocks that publicly traded at least one year without research coverage. The stocks experience a +4.86% abnormal return at initiation announcement. Positive returns are driven by positive coverage and not the mere introduction of coverage. Initiations from investment banks elicit lower announcement returns if the bank had a prior business relationship with the covered firm. Research firms paid by the covered company to provide coverage elicit announcement returns that are not significantly different from other analysts. Announcement returns are also influenced by liquidity increases and factors consistent with downward-sloping demand curves.     

对我国无形资产准则的一些思考

本文在对我国无形资产认识和核算中存在的问题进行分析的基础上 ,提出拓展无形资产的内容 ,改进研发费用核算方法 ,充分披露无形资产会计信息等若干建议。     

无形资产评估（上）——曼彻斯特商学院企业研究中心报告

我非常高兴地将这份无形资产评估研究报告介绍给大家,并对曼彻斯特商学院的研究工作表示衷心的感谢!英国皇家测量师学会(RICS)机器设备委员会对无形资产评估的研究具有前瞻性和开拓性,资产评估专业人士将从中受益匪浅。当今,企业界人士已经形成共识,在资产出售时应充分了解资产价值状况,而皇家测量师可以提供全面、灵活、专业的企业评估与不动产评估服务。在此,我想感谢以下参与本报告研究与撰写的集体或个人:FrancisChittenden教授,JulioMartins教授,曼彻斯特商学院企业研究中心,RICS机器设备委员会主任助理PaulBagust和RICS执行官…     

无形资产评估（下）——-曼彻斯特商学院企业研究中心报告

如何选择恰当的评估方法某些评估方法针对某些目的的评估最适当,下表列出无形资产评估的一些主要评估目的和适用的评估方法:依据<无形资产评估>(安达信公司1992年的特别报告P254号)分类无形资产评估版权评估版权,是指受法律保护的著作权所有人的各项专有权利。版权所有者通常是其作者,包括艺术家、作曲家或公司(如果作品是公司职员上班时间工作完成)。版权(文学、音乐、戏剧和艺术作品的)所有者有权允许或禁止有版权的出版物的发行。这包括再版全部或部分作品、出版、销售出版物或发表该项作品等。注意:作品并不是必须出版才享有版权。与专…     

无形资产会计问题探讨

在经济全球化和知识经济的时代背景下,现有的无形资产会计实操与理论已经不能完全适应知识经济的要求。所以改进现行无形资产会计的缺陷与不足,寻求与知识经济时代相吻合的无形资产会计处理方法成为当务之急。本文分析、总结了我国无形资产的确定、划分、计量和摊销,在此基础上提出了完善我国无形资产确认、计量、信息披露的改进策略。     

也谈无形资产评估的重要

两家规模、硬件设施、经营范围和方式大抵相当的企业几乎同时开业，没过多久，一家经营的红红火火（A公司），一家是奄奄一息，面临清算（B公司）。这时评估师接手对两家公司进行评估，从有形的资产层面来讲两家难分伯仲，但因无形资产的区别很大，他们的结局却是两重天。     

论无形资产价值及其评估风险

对无形资产的价值确认及存在的问题进行了阐述,对自创无形资产的评估方法及其风险进行了论述和分析,提出应以评估价值作为自创无形资产的入账价值。     

Intangible Assets and Firms' Disclosures: An Empirical Investigation

This study examines how research and development (R&38;D) and advertising expenditures affect firms' disclosures. Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) mandate that these expenditures be immediately expensed in financial reports, despite the fact that they often benefit the firm for longer periods. Prior studies find, however, that investors consider intangible assets in their valuation of firms. These studies argue that current GAAP, by not recognizing the value generated by these assets, severely impairs the usefulness of accounting reports. I investigate if firms with higher levels of R&38;D and advertising expenditures place greater reliance on voluntary, and therefore more flexible, disclosures such as voluntary publications and investor relations. Using analysts' ratings of firms' disclosures, I find that firms with higher levels of intangible assets are more likely to receive significantly higher ratings for their investor relations programs or voluntary publications than for their annual reports. These findings suggest that firms with higher levels of intangible assets emphasize supplemental disclosures because mandated accounting disclosures inadequately present their financial performance. These results have important policy implications for regulators and investors since they indicate that voluntary disclosures, which are unregulated and unaudited, are an important means of disclosure for these firms.     

文化产业的无形资产价值

随着我国文化体制改革的进一步深入,特别是2003年12月国务院颁发了《文化体制改革试点中支持文化产业发展的规定》和《文化体制改革试点中经营性文化事业单位转制为企业的规定》两个文件,文化资产管理领域投融资政策取得了很大的突破,一大批国有文化资本开始进入市场,国有文化企业的改制也成为了国有企业改制中的一个重要组成部分.     

Intangible Marketing Assets: A Managerial Accounting Perspective

Intangible marketing assets, such as brand strength, product image and reputation, appear to be of growing significance to companies. This paper seeks to offer a management accounting perspective on intangible marketing assets. A typology is developed that categorises related constructs, hitherto referred to, somewhat broadly, as marketing assets. The typology (1) redefines intangible marketing assets from an accounting perspective, and (2) identifies the inputs and outputs of the intangible marketing asset management process. The traditional accounting methods afforded to intangible marketing assets are noted, together with their adverse implications for asset development. It is suggested that management accounting should develop a method of accounting for such assets that is more consistent with supporting longer-term corporate objectives.     

Accounting for Intangible Assets: Thinking It Through

With the modern corporation investing more in intangible assets, the issue of appropriate accounting for these assets is very much at the fore and formally on the agendas of accounting standards boards. Some commentators advocate that internally generated intangible assets should be booked to the balance sheet, just like tangible assets. This paper explains that this apparently straightforward solution is not so simple. There are subtleties that, when recognised, indicate that such accounting would often make both balance sheets and income statements less informative. In response, the paper outlines an accounting for intangible assets that preserves, indeed enhances, the information conveyed by both the balance sheet and the income statement and satisfies the financial reporting objective of providing information to investors about ‘the amount, timing, and uncertainty of future cash flows’.     

Internally Generated Intangible Assets: Framing the Discussion

Two assertions dominate discussions about the intersection between the new economy and business and financial reporting. First, the economy of 2001 is fundamentally different from the economy of 1950 and before. Second, traditional financial statements do not capture — and may not be able to capture — the value drivers that dominate the new economy. Improved business and financial reporting of the "new economy" will require attention to recognition and measurement in financial statements, increased disclosure of non-financial performance metrics, and expanded use of forward-looking information. This paper₁ addresses the first of those areas — recognition and measurement of internally generated intangible assets.     

The Effect of Analyst Coverage on the Informativeness of Income Smoothing

This study examines whether analyst coverage affects the informativeness of income smoothing. I find that income smoothing enhances earnings informativeness more greatly for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage. The results suggest that income smoothing more efficiently communicates private information to investors when firms are followed by more analysts, consistent with the notion that analysts play an important information intermediary role in enhancing the informativeness of income smoothing.     

Do Initial Public Offering Firms Purchase Analyst Coverage with Underpricing?

We report that initial public offering (IPO) underpricing is positively related to analyst coverage by the lead underwriter and to the presence of an all‐star analyst on the research staff of the lead underwriter. These findings are robust to controls for other determinants of underpricing and to controls for the endogeneity of underpricing and analyst coverage. In addition, we find that the probability of switching underwriters between IPO and seasoned equity offering is negatively related to the unexpected amount of post‐IPO analyst coverage. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that underpricing is, in part, compensation for expected post‐IPO analyst coverage from highly ranked analysts.     

Intangible Assets, Information Complexity, and Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

Abstract:   We examine the relation between analysts' earnings forecasts and firms' intangible assets, including technology‐based intangibles, brand names, and recognized intangibles. We predict that high information complexity of intangible assets increases the difficulty for analysts to assimilate information and increases analysts' forecast error of intangibles‐intensive firms. We find a positive association between analysts' forecast error and the firm's intangible intensity that deviates from the industry norm. We also find that analysts' forecast errors are greater for firms with diverse and innovative technologies. In contrast, analysts' forecast errors are smaller for biotech/pharmaceutical and medical equipment firms that are subject to intangibles‐related regulation.