开源经济的现代价值分析

开源经济是基于开源软件基础上发展起来的一种新的生产方式,它之所以受到学界的关注是因为开源经济对现有的西方经济学理论提出了严峻的挑战:参与者利己与利他双重行为倾向违背了西方经济学的经济人假设;开源经济的生产组织方式和治理机制相比传统企业制度在某些方面表现出显著的高效性;开源软件生产克服了公共物品供给的难题等。但是,开源经济与马克思主义的社会主义经济学却具有很强的一致性。开源经济的研究对于在现时检验和发展马克思主义经济学具有重要的理论价值。     

国外人工智能开源生态运营模式剖析

开源正成为新一代人工智能发展的全球趋势。本文从开源政策、开源组织、开源基础设施三个方面,基于典型实践案例,总结了国外人工智能开源生态的运营模式和主要特征。研究发现,欧美等发达国家的人工智能开源生态已进入到一个元素基本完整、运营基本顺畅的发展阶段,并通过所有权中立、社区治理专业化、顶尖企业引领、商业模式创新等方式实现开源生态的可持续运营。建议围绕打造良好的人工智能开源政策环境、推动开源组织有序分工合作、夯实开源基础设施等方面,进一步完善我国人工智能开源生态。     

开放源代码创新社群中的激励机制研究

通过对开放源代码创新社群内部创新机制的研究,阐述了激发用户创新和有效利用创新成果的激励机制,并从静态与动态两个维度分析了社群成员之间的相互作用与激励。     

广义虚拟经济的测算范围初探

虚拟经济与实体经济的相互交融已经对国民福利产生了重大影响,这对已有的国民核算体系提出了理论和实践上的新挑战.因为传统的经济学无论是理论还是核算都主要关心的是确定性条件下的现货生产和交易所带来的实际财富变化,我们需要更适用的指标来度量广义虚拟经济与居民福利之间的关系.实体经济虚拟化有管理风险的价值,虚拟经济实体化具有的主...     

Licensing under convex costs

We show that both the outside and inside innovators license a new product (or drastic process innovation) to all potential licensees in the presence of convex costs, which occur under decreasing returns to scale technologies. An implication of our analysis is that a monopolist producer may prefer technology licensing in a homogeneous goods industry. We also show that an inside innovator’s incentive for innovation may be higher than that of an outside innovator.     

开源软件项目内成员间知识共享案例研究

以绩效相反的2个开源软件项目为例,探索开源软件项目内成员间知识共享的影响要素。以多案例分析为策略,采取案例内和案例间分析方法,研究发现,在开源项目中,开发员与用户是两大参与主体。开发员作为供给端,重点通过参与动机、社会网络、组织文化3大要素影响知识共享;用户作为需求端,通过用户创新作用于知识共享,继而影响开源软件项目创新绩效。     

技术外溢对研发机构许可策略的影响研究

研发机构拟利用一级价格密封投标拍卖方式,将其拥有的非显著工艺创新许可给下游的同质Cournot寡占厂商,以追求收益最大化。结合有无技术外溢,在博弈论架构内研究了不同情形下研发机构的许可比例,利用逆向归纳法求取博弈最优解。结果表明,技术外溢情形下研发机构的最优拍卖许可比例的取值范围窄于无技术外溢情形下的。     

Direct Foreign Investment Versus Licensing

This paper examines the choice among alternative modes of direct foreign investment, namely, the wholly owned subsidiary (the S option) and joint venture (the J option), vis-à-vis licensing (the L option). The focus is on the role of moral hazard, difference in risk attitude and the prospect of the host country's policy toward the venture. An apparently surprising result is that riskiness of the project is a factor against the J option. Moreover, in the absence of policy intervention, L is dominated by either S or J, whereas if there is an anticipation of policy intervention (i.e., there is a policy moral hazard) L may emerge as the best option.     

Licensing to a durable-good monopoly

This paper incorporates a durable-good monopoly model and re-examines the argument on licensing contracts. It shows that, from the perspective of the non-producing patent holder, the optimal licensing contract depends on the nature and the degree of the innovations. Specifically, for small cost-reducing or quality-improving innovations, charging a royalty is optimal. For large cost-reducing or quality-improving innovations, licensing by means of a fee and a royalty is superior to using either alone. However, for the case of horizontal product innovations, using a fee contract is optimal.     

Mixed Competition and Patent Licensing

This paper studies the patent licensing decision of an insider patentee when two firms engage in a mixed (Cournot–Bertrand or Bertrand–Cournot) competition where one firm adopts the quantity strategy while the other uses the price strategy and vice versa. If either the fixed fee or royalty is applied, then the licensor prefers the fixed fee when the licensor takes the quantity strategy, while the licensee uses the price strategy (Cournot–Bertrand). If the two‐part tariff is applied, then the two‐part tariff is more likely to be adopted by the licensor under Cournot–Bertrand than under Bertrand–Cournot competition.     

Licensing Under Bertrand Competition Revisited

This note indicates that the derivation of the royalty contract for licensing in Wang and Yang (Australian Economic Papers, 39 (1999) 106–119) is not correct. As a consequence, the profits of the innovator in the case of royalty licensing are underestimated.     

On Licensing Under Bertrand Competition

This paper considers licensing by an innovating firm to its competitor in a differentiated duopoly with Bertrand competition. A principal finding is that royalty licensing may be superior to fee licensing for the innovating firm both when the innovation is drastic and when the innovation is non-drastic.     

The Capital Idea and the Scope of Economics

This paper traces the idea of Capital from Adam Smith to modern times and shows how different conceptions of Capital give rise to different approaches to economics and the range of problems that can be investigated. A structural, as opposed to a stock, approach to Capital is shown to be more conducive to a studies of business institutions and practices, and to rules, institutions and standards in a changing world.     

Endogenous Market Structure and Technology Licensing

This paper analyses the optimal licensing strategy of a licensor firm that competes with potential licensee firms in an industry with endogenous entry. The optimal licensing strategy of the licensor firm is to have zero royalty and positive fixed fees, which is a result that sharply contrasts with the existing literature whereby licensor firms tend to charge positive royalties to their rival licensees. Under the optimal licensing strategy, the licensor firm and the licensee firms are active in the market, but not the non‐licensed firms. This equilibrium market structure is socially desirable if the fixed production cost is not too small.     

On Patent Licensing in Spatial Competition

We consider the optimal licensing strategy of an outsider patentee as well as an insider patentee in a linear city framework where firms compete in price. We show that offering royalty is best for an outsider patentee for both drastic and non-drastic innovations. For an insider patentee, offering no license is the best when the innovation is drastic, while royalty is optimal when the innovation is non-drastic. The incentive for innovation is higher for an outsider patentee compared to an insider patentee. The overall increase in welfare due to an innovation is the same for both outsider and insider patentees.     

Enhancing Vertical Efficiency Through Horizontal Licensing

This paper examines the role of patent licensing in the age of outsourcing. When firms rely on outsourced inputs, a patent holder’s decision to license has both competitive and supplier pricing effects. By issuing a license, the firm increases competition in the product market. At the same time, the need to make royalty payments “weakens” the firm’s rival, making it more sensitive to supplier pricing. The supplier responds by softening pricing terms, and the firm benefits by siphoning some of these gains via the license fee. Not only can the licensor gain, but all other parties (the licensee, supplier, and consumers) can also benefit. This role of licensing presents additional considerations for regulators shaping patent laws. We thank Michael Crew, John Fellingham, Sharon Oster, David Sappington, Doug Schroeder, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Anil Arya acknowledges support from the John J. Gerlach Chair.     

Licensing policies for a new product

This paper studies licensing policies for the owner of a new product and addresses their welfare impact in the assessment of market failures. We show that the best licensing policy for the patent holder is fixed fee licensing with an exclusive territory clause. Consumers are also better off with fixed fees but do not prefer the exclusive territory clause. Social welfare is higher under exclusive territories when fixed costs are not too large. As for efficiency, the number of licences in the private market equilibrium falls short of the socially optimal solution. Our analysis discloses that (i) any policy measures aimed at enhancing the diffusion of technology, in terms of the number of licences, would be welcomed and, (ii) the permissive treatment received by licensing agreements with exclusive territories is justified.     

行政许可制度与市场经济

行政许可制度是现代国家管理的重要手段 ,已被世界各国广泛运用于政治、经济、文化等众多行政领域 ,但行政许可制度在市场经济条件下暴露的弊端 ,已严重影响了我国经济的进一步发展。本文作者针对这一问题 ,对行政许可制度的改革提出清除不适当的行政许可 ,将行政许可权纳入立法范畴、科学界定许可范围、建立简便公正的许可程序 ,建立许可机关与收费机构相分离的制度等五点建议