推进循环经济发展的制度创新

从本质上说,发展循环经济就是在生产、流通、消费、分配的每一个环节实现废弃物减量化、资源化,无害化,实际上就是废弃物资源的有效配置问题。基于此,本文以界定废弃物是以资源为前提,从微观经济学角度,通过探讨废弃物资源有效配置机制,透析当今资源短缺和环境恶化的制度根源,寻求实现废弃物资源有效配置即发展循环经济的制度切入点——绿色经济制度体系,以期为循环经济的发展奠定经济学理论基础。一、废弃物是一种“因多而少”的间接稀缺性资源废弃物是人们在开发利用自然资源的经济行为(包括生产、流通、消费)过程中产生的,只是生产和生活…     

我国循环经济的发展现状与战略选择

发展循环经济,必须以科学发展观为指导,以优化资源利用方式为核心,以提高资源生产率和降低废弃物排放为目标,以技术创新和制度创新为动力,加强法制建设,完善政策措施,形成政府大力推进、市场有效驱动、公众自觉参与的机制,逐步建立适合我国国情的、有利于循环经济发展的宏观调控体系和运行机制,形成中国特色的循环经济发展模式。     

发展农村循环经济相关问题研究

农村循环经济就是把可持续发展思想和循环经济理念应用于农业生产体系。实现农业产业链物质能量梯次和闭路循环使用，农村循环经济以经济活动生态化、资源利用节约化、废弃物资源化的资源利用方式，在实现农业可持续发展，遏制农业污染，保护生态环境，提高资源利用效率上发挥重要作用。     

循环经济与绿色物流

通过分析循环经济与绿色物流产生的共同理论背景,指出绿色物流包括为实现资源再利用而进行的废弃物循环物流,而物质闭环流动型经济就是循环经济;通过阐述循环经济与绿色物流的区别与联系,指出循环经济中既包含物流中的回收物流和废弃物流,又涵盖了节能减排的内容;循环经济在生产源头就考虑节省资源,因而达到了从末端治理到源头控制、从利用废物到减少废物的环境与发展协调的更高目标。     

日本废弃物回收政策对资源化率影响效果的计量分析

循环经济已成为当今全球性的关注热点。如何有效地将废弃物中的有用资源再回收利用是构建循环经济系统、实现可持续性发展的关键。而资源化率则是衡量循环经济系统效率的关键性指标之一。本研究首次运用计量手段研究了日本一般废弃物的资源化率的诸影响因素,并在此基础上分析了各项回收政策对资源化率影响效果。结果表明,废弃物回收政策对资源化率有重大影响。对废弃物详细分类后回收以及对资源类废弃物增加回收频度有利于提高资源化率。以混合类废弃物为实施对象的计量回收制对提高资源化率最为有效,对资源类废弃物不宜实施有偿回收制。     

“制度幻觉”初探

“制度幻觉”初探徐德信制度在经济社会发展中至关重要。可是在新制度经济学（ＴｈｅＮｅｗＩｎｓｔｉｔｕｔｉｏｎａｌＥｃｏｎｏｍｉｃｓ）之前，发展一般被解释为资源、技术和人的偏好的函数，制度被远远地置于一旁。究其原因，一个重要方面也许就是人们深深处于＂制度...     

循环经济的经济学解释

循环经济强调经济效益、环境效益和社会效益的统一。循环经济的本质是强调减少资源消耗,走内涵发展道路,不断提高资源利用效率,提高经济增长的质量和效益。循环经济倡导的是一种建立在物质不断循环利用基础上的经济发展模式,它要求把经济活动按照自然生态系统的模式,组织成一个“资源一产品一再生资源”的物质反复循环流动的过程,使得从整个经济系统以及生产和消费的过程基本上不产生或者只产生很少的废弃物。环境经营是循环经济的战略核心。     

发展循环经济的重大战略意义

循环经济是一种新的发展理念。它是一种以资源的高效利用和循环利用为核心，以“减量化、再利用、资源化、无害化”为原则，以低消耗、低排放、高效率为基本特征，符合可持续发展理念的经济增长模式。具体讲就是要在生产和生活全过程中，加强资源的节约和有效利用，以减少资源的投入，节能降耗；对生产和消费产生的废弃物进行综合利用，变废为宝；对不能循环再生的废弃物进行无害化处理，减少污染，是对‘大量生产、大量消费、大量废弃”的传统增长模式的根本变革。发展循环经济，可以有效解决经济社会发展与资源环境之间的矛盾，促进全面协调可持续发展，是加快全面建设中国特色小康社会和现代化进程的必然选择，也是中华民族长远发展的根本大计。     

区域循环经济建设中的工业园区合作

工业园区是推进循环经济的主要载体之一,以工业生态学原理为依据建立的生态工业园,在长期的发展中出现了产业结构同构化严重等诸多问题,影响着区域资源利用率和生态效益的提高。从区域经济的视角,提出依靠工业园区合作,发展区域循环经济,实现区域资源的优化配置;并分析了园区合作模式和园区合作有效运行的激励、约束机制以及相应的制度保障体系,以期为推进区域循环经济发展提供理论依据。     

吉林省发展循环经济的路径选择与制度创新

循环经济作为一种新的发展模式被世界各国广泛采用。作为老工业基地的吉林省，要发展循环经济必须转变观念，加大制度创新，准确把握实际情况，从国情、省情出发探索新的有效路径，确保循环经济的顺利实施，实现吉林省社会经济的可持续发展。     

新制度经济学的新发展:历史比较制度分析

新制度经济学在完全理性与有限理性之间左右摇摆,限制了制度理论的发展。以格雷夫为代表的历史比较制度分析,在有限理性前提下,通过大量案例研究,提出了自己关于制度及其变迁的真知灼见:(1)克服两个“两分法”,发展了统一的制度概念;(2)将制度理解为博弈均衡,重点解释古典博弈论成为制度分析有用工具的条件;(2)研究制度在变化的环境中如何存续、内生的制度变迁以及过去制度影响后续制度的原因和作用机制;(3)提出了独具特色的互动的特定历史情景分析,将重复博弈理论与特定历史情景结合起来去识别制度,解释其出现、存续和变迁。     

Entrepreneurship and institutional change

Entrepreneurs do more than just buy low and sell high; they sometimes also change our institutions, including our categories of thought. New institutional economics has been examining incentives that drive individuals to bring about market-supporting institutional arrangements. There is, however, an aspect of entrepreneurship conducive to institutional changes that has been neglected by contemporary institutionalist theories and that remains underdeveloped in entrepreneurship research. When and how does entrepreneurship bring about institutional change? I suggest that entrepreneurs are agents of institutional change when cultural categorization is ambiguous with regard to the proper and permissible applications of novel artifacts. Motherhood, for example, used to be a simple category, but surrogacy changed that radically. Examining newspaper evidence, social surveys, statutory law, and judicial cases, I show how entrepreneurs, by provoking a change in interpretation and judgment, challenged the existing institutional legal ordering of procreation turning a technically feasible method of surrogacy into current practice.     

Leadership effectiveness and institutional frames

Leadership mechanisms provide a potential means to mitigate social dilemmas, but empirical evidence on the success of such mechanisms is mixed. In this paper, we explore the institutional frame as a relevant factor for the effectiveness of leadership. We compare subjects’ behavior in public-goods experiments that are either framed positively (give-some game) or negatively (take-some game). We observe that leader and follower decisions are sensitive to the institutional frame. Leaders contribute less in the take-some game, and the correlation between leaders’ and followers’ contribution is weaker in the take-some game. Additionally, using a strategy method to elicit followers’ reactions at the individual level, we find evidence for the malleability of followers’ revealed cooperation types. Taken together, the leadership institution is found to be less efficient in the take- than in the give-frame, both in games that are played only once and repeatedly.     

制度变迁的成本——收益分析

像任何人工物一样,作为人的创造物,制度也像物质产品和思想产品一样,同样具有收益和成本两个方面。采用精致的有限理性(有限知识,有限信息,有限思维资源)的广义经济人假设,自然要引入收益和成本的概念。追求目标值最大化,实际上就是追求收益超过成本的差额最大化。     

Endogenous institutional change after independence

Independence from colonial rule was a key event for both political and economic reasons. We argue that newly independent countries often inherited sub-optimal institutional arrangements, which the new regimes reacted to in very different ways. We present a model of endogenous changes in property rights institutions where an autocratic post-colonial elite faces a basic trade-off between stronger property rights, which increases the dividends from the modern sector, and weaker property rights that increases the elite's ability to appropriate resource rents. The model predicts that revenue-maximizing regimes in control of an abundance of resource rents and with insignificant interests in the modern sector will rationally install weak institutions of private property, a prediction which we argue is well in line with the experience of several developing countries.     

Cryptodemocracy and its institutional possibilities

The Review of Austrian Economics - Democracy is an economic problem of choice constrained by transaction costs and information costs. Society must choose between competing institutional frameworks...     

Is institutional improvement possible?

A substantial literature shows that economic prosperity is dependent on the quality of economic institutions. Countries with low-quality institutions remain poor while countries with high-quality institutions prosper. Improvement in institutional quality brings with it economic growth. Poor countries must improve their economic institutions to escape poverty; so, if a poor country’s institutional structure is unlikely to improve, that suggests dismal prospects for economic growth and an escape from poverty. An examination of institutional quality over 30 years indicates that countries with low-quality institutions have improved their institutional quality, which demonstrates that poor countries are not stuck with low-quality institutions. They can improve their institutions, and consequently, can generate economic growth and escape poverty.     

Monetary and fiscal institutional designs

Two investment decisions in economic institutions are feasible; investments in monetary institutions in the form of delegation of monetary policy to a more conservative or independent central bank, and investments in fiscal capacity, in the form of combating bureaucratic corruption and its consequent fiscal revenue leakages. Within this framework, we investigate the interactions among those two institutional decisions and the obtained institutional structure. The findings provide support of strategic complementarities; investments in monetary and fiscal institutions reinforce each other. In addition, we identify a set of determinants that impact on the government’s decisions to improve economic institutions, particularly, the structure and intensity of the initial corruption level, the amount of distortions caused by taxation and the policymaker’s goals and preferences across its objectives.     

Trade liberalization and institutional reforms1

The accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the European Union (EU) is expected to lead to the new member countries becoming more like the older members, including in terms of trade. In this paper, we focus on two factors promoting CEE–EU trade integration: trade liberalization and institutional reforms. Measures of trade liberalization undertaken by both parties during the 1990s were very substantial, but did not always produce the expected upsurge of regional trade flows. Much less progress has been made in improving the functioning of CEE institutions (e.g., progress in the privatization process or in reducing corruption). Countries where most important changes at the institutional level occurred were also those that most increased their trade with the EU. Comparing the impact of these two factors, we find that improving institutions in CEE countries can generate as much trade as the removal of all tariff and non‐tariff barriers. The paper also addresses the issue of the presence of reversed causality between trade and institutions, and the pro‐trade effect of institutional similarity.