University Audit Departments in the United States

Internal auditors of public and private universities were asked about their selection processes, supervisors, and activities. At public institutions, the governing board selects the internal auditor, the president supervises the work and more audit findings are implemented. Private institutions have more audit committees that are involved with the internal auditors' activities and their auditors perform more program audits. Thus, although public universities are following professional guidelines more closely, suggesting more accountability, private universities have greater access to audit committees and perform more value-added audits.     

Can multitasking influence professional scepticism?

Motivated by concerns about the adverse effects of multitasking in audit practice and research that highlights the effects of mindset orientation on professional scepticism, we investigate how the performance of tasks consistent with different mindset orientations affects auditors’ professional scepticism in a subsequent, unrelated task. Results show that auditors who first complete a task that requires concrete (abstract) thinking display greater professional scepticism during a subsequent, unrelated task that involves evaluating a narrow and complete set of evidence (a broad and incomplete set of evidence). We discuss the implications for professional scepticism in multitasking environments.     

经济责任同步审计评价问题探析

经济责任审计评价是审计人员确认被审计对象经济行为价值的业务活动,是界定经济责任的基础。审计评价作为审计报告的重要板块和核心内容,不仅承载着审计监督客观公正的基本原则和社会责任,而且体现着经济责任审计明确的目的性。经过多年探索实践,经济责任审计评价架构逐步清晰、内容渐趋合理、稳妥性明显增进,但仍有部分项目目标体现不明确、公正性和客观性表现不足、谨慎性不够充分、文书运用混乱,严重影响着审计的质量。本文试图就经济责任监督价值观、审计评价范围、评价体系、评价方法等方面存在的问题进行成因剖析、理论阐述和业务探讨,认为需要进一步优化审计环境,强化理论研究,细化能力培训,尽快改善和提升经济责任审计整体质量。     

New development: Breaking out or hanging on? Internal audit in government

Public audit is in transition. On the one hand, professional organizations claim it is time ‘to break out’ and develop new roles for auditors that ‘add more value’. On the other hand, critics are concerned about public sector accountability deficits necessitating more control and urging auditors to hold on to their traditional role. This article discusses tensions and relevance between these positions and their implications for auditing in government. The article will help policy-makers in their strategic decision-making on the role and focus of internal audit in government.     

Auditors’ scepticism in response to audit committee oversight behaviour

We use two experiments and a survey to examine how audit committee (hereafter, AC) oversight behaviour, particularly AC sceptical attitude and proactive behaviour, affects auditor scepticism, and whether the influence is driven by the risk aspect of auditors’ assessment of AC oversight behaviour. We find that when ACs exercise insufficient scepticism, auditors (junior auditors, managers, and partners) perceive AC oversight as weak, and increase their scepticism. However, AC proactive behaviour does not significantly influence auditor scepticism. Our findings suggest auditors view weak AC oversight as a risk indicator and respond by exercising greater scepticism.     

AN INVESTIGATION OF AUSTRALIAN AUDITORS’ USE OF THE MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATION LETTER

Auditors’ use of the management representation letter has assumed renewed significance because Australian, UK, US and International auditing guidelines recommending that auditors obtain appropriate representations from management have now been adopted as standards. Results from this exploratory survey confirmed that auditors’ use of the representation letter to obtain audit evidence was generally consistent with the professional guidance, but two anomalies were noted. First, one-third of respondent auditors did not use the letter to provide sole audit evidence. Comments from some auditors indicated doubt about the legal acceptability of such evidence. While past litigation might justify such caution, auditors should consider whether it is efficient to neglect the use of the management representation letter to provide primary audit evidence. Second, there was evidence that some auditors use management representations as sole audit evidence when other appropriate audit evidence is available. This suggests the need to inform these auditors about the danger of over-reliance on management representations. Finally, results showed that most auditors use the representation letter to inform management of their responsibilities. This informative use is consistent with professional guidance and with the corporate governance literature that recommends clarifying management’s understanding of their responsibilities and enhancing management’s sense of accountability. This informative use is most important to auditors belonging to smaller audit firms, and suggests that these firms’ clients have greater information needs.     

A Consideration of Literature on Trust and Distrust as they Relate to Auditor Professional Scepticism

With a view to expanding the discussion on professional scepticism, and motivating a broader perspective in research undertaken with the aim of helping auditors meet ongoing demands for an elevated level of professional scepticism, we consider the literature on trust and distrust as it relates to auditor professional scepticism. We draw on literature from a range of disciplines, and highlight new opportunities and previously unidentified challenges in helping auditors exercise an elevated level of professional scepticism. We distinguish between trust and distrust and note that the issue of professional scepticism is likely to be as much about auditors being insufficiently distrusting as it is about auditors being overly trusting. A number of potentially fruitful means by which professional scepticism might be enhanced are highlighted but we also encourage caution in that lower levels of trust in management, and increased distrust in management, may have unintended negative consequences.     

Can Auditors Predict the Choices Made by Other Auditors?

An implicit assumption of prior literature on strategic behavior of auditors is that auditors know the preferences of their colleagues. In this study, we conduct an experiment to investigate the validity of this assumption. In our experiment, we match a manager with a pair of top and mediocre audit seniors, as assessed by their firm. Each auditor predicts the choices that will be made by other auditors on two tasks that differ in their level of ambiguity. Our results show no difference in the accuracy among managers, top seniors, and mediocre seniors when they predict the choices made by specific individual auditors for both tasks. When predicting the number of managers and seniors who will choose a specific option on the high-ambiguity task, managers outperform top seniors, who in turn outperform mediocre seniors. For the low-ambiguity task, we find no difference among managers, top seniors, and mediocre seniors. Our results provide some limited support for models of strategic auditor behavior, and indicate that the ability to predict the choices of others is a dimension of an auditor's expertise.     

Undetected Deviations in Tests of Controls: Experimental Evidence of Nonsampling Risk*

The objective of the study was to examine the effects of three independent variables ‐ accountability, audit workpaper structure, and type of control deviations ‐ on auditors' detection failure rates during control tests in a purchases, payables, and payments cycle. The experimental design used a between‐subjects manipulation of accountability and workpaper structure, and a within‐subjects manipulation of deviation type. Consistent with prior research, we observed an alarmingly high detection failure rate of 42.3 percent. This failure rate was not affected by levels of accountability or workpaper structure, although postexperiment evidence suggests that these variables were successfully manipulated. Failure rates did depend on the type of seeded control deviation, with nonmonetary deviations being overlooked most frequently. In addition to replicating prior research, our study makes two further contributions. First, we provide empirical evidence that supports Hirst's (1992) speculation that successful manipulations of accountability may not affect auditor performance because auditors may self‐induce levels of accountability that create a ceiling effect on auditor performance. Second, we observe that although auditors perceived that highly structured workpapers allowed them to be more effective and efficient when performing tests of controls, their actual audit performance was not more effective and, on average, was less efficient.     

Accountability and auditors’ materiality judgments: The effects of differential pressure strength on conservatism,variability, and effort

This study investigates the effects of differential accountability pressure strength on auditors’ materiality judgments. We evaluate whether incremental levels of accountability (i.e., review, justification, feedback) increase judgment conservatism, decreases judgment variability, and increases effort. One hundred sixty auditors participated in a between-subjects experiment that included a planning materiality task and a proposed audit adjustment materiality task. As predicted, auditors under higher levels of accountability pressure (i.e., justification, feedback) provided more conservative materiality judgments and had less judgment variability than auditors under lower levels of pressure (i.e., review, anonymity). The results also indicate that accountability strength was positively related to the amount of time spent on the task, explanation length, and consideration of qualitative materiality factors. Finally, the results show that use of a planning materiality decision aid influenced the accountability effects for the planning materiality judgment. These judgments were more conservative and less variable when the planning materiality decision aid was available. We consider implications for research, practice, and policy in the context of the study’s limitations.     

Auditors’ self-perceived abilities in conducting domain audits

This study investigates the extent to which auditors’ ratings of self-perceived abilities correspond with their actual performance, and whether these perceptions are influenced by audit experience and effectiveness when conducting audits within their domain of specialization. One hundred forty-four (144) industry-specialized audit seniors and managers reviewed two sets of audit working paper cases, one in banking and one in healthcare. At the end of the review, the auditors rated their ability to perform an audit in their domain. The analysis of these ratings shows that auditors significantly inflated their perceived abilities relative to actual performance. The results indicate that differences in auditor rank are insignificant in terms of this propensity to overestimate self-perceived abilities relative to actual performance; however, above median effective auditors are far less overconfident than below median effective auditors. These results have implications for the audit profession in terms of training, assignments, performance evaluation, and the use of decision aids to mitigate the propensity toward overconfidence.     

An accountability framework for financial statement auditors and related research questions

We address the following overarching questions: What kind of accountability framework could regulators use to (a) motivate auditors to improve audit quality, and (b) evaluate how well auditors have carried out their duties? We draw on research in accounting, economics, psychology, and neuroscience to critique the accountabilities, incentives, and learning opportunities embedded in auditors’ extant regulatory environment. We first establish that forward-looking estimates are the basis for most financial statement information and that some of these estimates are highly uncertain, which increases the challenges faced by auditors. We propose an accountability framework with two dimensions: rewards versus penalties and processes versus outcomes. We show that auditors’ current regulatory accountabilities generally are in the form of penalties rather than rewards and primarily depend on audit outcomes rather than attributes of auditors’ judgment processes. We provide evidence from a range of disciplines that questions the suitability of the present system for improving the quality of auditors’ judgments and the quality of evaluations of those judgments made by inspectors. We identify four potential changes for improvement in audit quality based on our framework. Each of these identified changes has an impact on one or both of the two dimensions in our framework. For each of these changes, we outline JDM research questions that could be addressed to inform our overarching questions and to provide empirical evidence to help refine our accountability framework and improve audit quality.     

The Politics of Accountability: Institutionalising Internal Auditing in Israel

Israel's attempt at strengthening public sector internal audit is found to have limited success, conforming with experiences of other countries. The adopted internal audit policy had little more than symbolic value, being devoid of stipulations to affect significant change. This is confirmed by implementation data that reveal low scores for most organizations across dimensions of structure, process and outcome. Politics of accountability and policy change models help to explain the causes of ineffectual internal audit legislation and of weak implementation. Findings suggest that top–down approaches to strengthening public sector internal audit are misplaced.     

Explaining municipal audit costs in Sweden: Reconsidering the political environment,the municipal organisation and the audit market

With the purpose of explaining professional audit costs in Swedish municipalities, we hypothesised that audit costs are partly driven by various signalling and monitoring incentives in order to manage stakeholder relationships. Our model of the determinants of audit costs was tested on data from Swedish municipalities, thus extending the study of audit costs to political organisations in a Scandinavian institutional context. The test supported to some extent the traditional propositions of organisational complexity, risk and market determinants, as well as the proposition of the political environment. Our results indicate that audit costs are used to signal accountability, thereby suggesting that audit as a signal could be managed without managing professional auditors.     

Quis Auditoret Ipsos Auditores? Can Auditors Be Trusted?

This article explores the extent to which the audit profession and its practices promote public trust in audits. Differences between auditors and non‐auditors as to beliefs about the role of a financial report audit have long been discussed under the term ‘expectations gap’. However, this prior debate has tended to focus on non‐auditors’ alleged misunderstanding of audit processes without a corresponding understanding on the part of the profession as to why the public might place its trust in auditors. The study explores the nature of trust in an auditing context and notes that like any profession, auditing faces practical limitations but the inability to directly observe the conduct of audits combined with professional status create an ‘over trust’ expectation in the public. Changes in audit practices and culture have also exposed the profession to criticism. The article seeks to offer one approach by which the auditing profession can restore public confidence; namely, evidence‐based practice, which has proven effective in improving the quality of practice in medicine. Adoption of a reflective evidence‐based approach to audit practice offers the promise of greater audit quality and an improvement in the profession's accountability and public confidence.     

经济责任审计运行效果实证研究

经济责任审计以评价领导干部为主,在我国已经运行多年。根据经济控制论和免疫系统观,经济责任审计通过加强经济责任审计力量、强化经济责任审计执行力度和加大经济责任审计业务量,能够预防和惩治领导干部腐败,提高财政收支财务收支绩效。实证研究表明,经济责任审计力量越强,经济责任审计执行力度越大,越能够预防领导干部职务犯罪;审计人员数量越多,审计力量越强大,单位国内生产总值耗费的行政管理费越少。为了提高经济责任审计运行效果,应当构建经济责任审计监控体系。     

Auditor litigation: Evidence that revenue restatements are determinative

This study extends the Palmrose and Scholz (2004) general litigation and general restatements study by focusing on auditor litigation and revenue restatements. We investigate all potential accounting issues, individually, instead of by their group method, with regard to auditor litigation. The impact of the individual accounting issues implicated in restatements is of concern to auditors and audit standard setters in gauging auditor litigation risk and audit risk. It also is important for financial analysis and securities valuation because investors' losses are greater, and recovery of losses on a percentage basis is lower, when the auditor is a defendant, and especially when the auditor has a more severe, negative litigation experience (Commolli et al., 2012). We examine financial reporting lawsuits filed from 2001 to 2008 and find that revenue restatements—far more than any other kind of restatements—are associated with auditors being named defendants and also auditors experiencing a more severe, negative outcome in the litigation.     

Busy auditors,financial reporting timeliness and quality

We investigate whether audit partners with multiple clients are able to complete their audits in a timely fashion, an important but largely unexplored area of academic research. One view is that having multiple clients increases the knowledge and experience of the audit partner resulting in a more efficient and therefore, quicker audit. On the other hand, having multiple clients may over-burden an audit partner resulting in a slower audit process and longer completion times. We find that audit partners with multiple clients take longer to complete their annual audit. More importantly, we also find that companies with busy auditors who take longer to complete their audits also have poorer levels of financial reporting quality. Additionally, in terms of consequences for busy auditors, firms with lengthy audit report lag switched their auditors the next year suggesting that busy audit partners may lose clients if their workload is excessive and they are not able to maintain audit quality. Our results are robust to alternative measures for both audit report lag and audit partner busyness and a range of endogeneity tests. We also undertake simultaneous quantile regression to assess changes in audit report lag depending on the number of audit clients per partner where we find preliminary evidence of a knowledge spill-over effect. Consequently, our results have implications for companies, audit firms, regulators and other key stakeholders.     

How does the executive pay gap influence audit fees? The roles of R&D investment and institutional ownership

Using a sample of US firms from 2003–2014, this study examines how the executive pay gap affects audit fees for firms with different levels of R&D investment and institutional ownership. Consistent with managerial power theory, we find that the executive pay gap is positively associated with audit fees, and that the positive association is attenuated by intense R&D investment and higher institutional ownership. We also find that the executive pay gap more strongly affects audit fees after the passage of the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act and the PCAOB's 2012 call to identify the audit risk related to executive incentive compensation. Additional analyses show that the moderating effects of R&D investment and institutional ownership on the pay gap–audit fees association are not conditional on auditor tenure, but the moderating effect of institutional ownership is stronger for firms hiring specialist auditors. Collectively, our findings suggest that auditors consider the business context, such as innovation initiative and external monitoring, when assessing audit risk related to the executive pay gap.     

党政领导干部经济责任同步审计的实践与思考

党政领导干部经济责任同步审计的优势已经脱颖而出,并成为各级审计机关不断探索的方向。本文认为,我国政治体制、党的以经济建设为中心的路线、促进领导干部履职尽责、合理界定领导干部经济责任、提高审计效率等客观要求党政领导干部经济责任审计应同步进行。继而从审计管理、组织组合方式、审计内容、审计方法、审计评价原则等方面介绍了吉林省在党政领导干部经济责任同步审计中所进行的探索。最后从如何明确党委书记的主要职责,规范审计评价标准,加强审计结果的运用,延伸责任追究,提高审计干部素质等方面提出建议。