Screening Discrimination in a Broader Context

I employ simulations to investigate the impact of screening discrimination, which addresses discrimination in hiring. I extend a well‐known model of screening discrimination by including minority firms, wages, worker preferences and competition among the firms for workers. The Gale–Shapley algorithm is used to find a stable matching of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous firms. Screening discrimination gives majority applicants an advantage in the hiring process, but this advantage is reduced by the presence of minority firms. In this broader context, screening discrimination produces segregated firms but has little impact on median wages or employment probabilities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Public Oversight of Audit Firms: The Slippery Slope of Enforcing Regulation

This study uses the slippery‐slope framework to understand how an oversight regulator's enforcement style influences audit firm compliance. Using data from interviews with audit regulators and audit partners, we find that partners perceive the regulator's enforcement style has shifted from being more collaborative to being more coercive. A consequence of this shift is that partners believe the development of trust between the two parties has been inhibited and a forced compliance climate has emerged. In response, firms have mandated strategies to increase the visibility of compliance, such as increasing mandatory use of checklists. Audit partners express some concern that oversight of the profession has resulted in firms adapting their audit process in ways aimed at minimizing inspection risk and not necessarily improving audit quality.     

Proposals to Establish a Partnership Bankruptcy Regime in China: With Lessons from the UK and USA

Following in the steps of the USA and UK, China introduced partnerships with limited liability in 2006, the same year that a market‐oriented bankruptcy statute was enacted. Although the bankruptcy statute enshrines basic elements of modern bankruptcy law, it fails to stipulate specific rules for partnership bankruptcy. As partnership with limited liability acquires increasing importance, especially limited partnerships as a popular form of private equity firms, a partnership bankruptcy regime becomes indispensable. This article considers the experience of the UK and USA in order to make proposals to establish a partnership bankruptcy regime in China. Although partnership bankruptcy law can be formulated by analogy to corporate bankruptcy law, special considerations must be given to the characteristics of partnership such as unlimited liability and lack of separation of management from ownership. Further, as partnership bankruptcy may lead to partner bankruptcy and vice versa, conflicts between partnership creditors and partners' personal creditors must also be considered. Copyright © 2014 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

The welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets: the case of bargaining

This article examines the welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power. One of the downstream firms (the “chain store”) can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals. Bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits, bargaining weights, and concession costs. If the chain's integration threat is not credible, price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms.     

AUDITOR PREFERENCES FOR LIABILITY LIMITATION

Debate over statutorily limiting auditor civil liability has implicitly assumed auditors are homogeneous in their preferences for capping liability. This study examines the preferences of auditors for limiting auditor liability and investigates reasons for the preferences. The study uses an Australian setting in which there has been a persistent debate for a decade or more over regulatory intervention in this area. The study provides a background to the debate over this issue and addresses the effects of two factors suggested by the extant literature, namely auditor size and the business risk of an auditor's client portfolio. These factors are argued to affect the expected costs of litigation facing auditors and therefore their preferences on capping liability. Using the submissions by audit firms on an Australian Companies and Securities Law Review Committee Discussion Paper on limiting auditor liability, the study finds larger audit firms that have greater capacities to lobby and greater expected costs of litigation from unlimited liability than smaller firms, dominate the respondents on the Paper and tend to be more supportive of liability limitation than smaller audit firms. Within the array of possible methods of capping liability canvassed by the Discussion Paper, the study documents evidence of diversity in preferences among audit firms. Larger audit firm size is associated with a preference for a group of methods that provides such firms with opportunities to benefit from the capping at the expense of the smaller audit firms. The method most preferred by the larger audit firms is the multiple of fee with a prescribed minimum. Perhaps not surprisingly, this is also the preferred method of the professional accounting bodies in Australia. As to the effect of the riskiness of the client portfolio on preferences for methods of limiting liability, the study finds that higher business risk in an auditor's portfolio is associated with a preference for methods that give greater control over their liability exposure. The study has implications for the impact of regulation of capping liability on competition in the audit services market.     

The effect of gender and firm identification on auditor pre-negotiation judgments

This paper extends current auditor negotiation research by considering the effects of two dimensions of auditors' identity that are posited to be relevant to auditors' negotiation: gender and audit firm identification. Women earn over half of college degrees in accounting, and hold more than half of accounting and auditing positions in the US, yet the balance of the gender of partners at audit firms is currently not equal (AICPA, 2017). However, as more women advance into partnership positions in firms, it is increasingly important to have an understanding of how gender affects the behaviors, processes and outcomes of negotiation, and thus the quality of financial statements. The auditor-client negotiation context has features, such as ambiguity and representation of others that can “trigger” the salience of auditors' gender and firm identity. Once salient, these two dimensions of auditors' identity shape auditors' motivational orientation towards negotiations, which, in turn, affects the auditors' negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes.The study finds that male and female auditors approach the negotiation over audit adjustments differently. Although many negotiation studies find that males negotiate more aggressively than do females, auditor-client negotiation offers a unique setting that has been found to reverse this common trend. We hypothesize and find that female auditors recommend higher audit adjustments than males. However, the level of firm identification moderates female's recommended audit adjustments such that at higher levels of firm identification, the larger audit adjustments recommended by females decrease. This finding is consistent with the growing research on gender differences in auditing and the research on gender and risk tolerance, which find females to be more risk averse, but contrary to much of the negotiation research which shows males as more aggressive and achieving higher negotiated outcomes. In supplemental analysis, we find that our results hold in the senior manager subsample but not in the partner subsample. This result is consistent with theory on gender differences which suggests that the differences will disappear with increased occupational socialization (Smith & Rogers, 2000). Practical implications are discussed.     

Approved routes and alternative paths: The construction of women's careers in large accounting firms. Evidence from the French Big Four

Despite decades of gender-balanced recruitment and clear-cut criteria for promotion based on meritocracy, women in public accounting firms remain proportionally fewer in number in the highest levels of the hierarchy than men. This paper aims to explore the mechanisms fostering women's rarity in top positions within French accounting firms in terms of organizationally constructed approved paths. Drawing on 23 semi-structured interviews with both male and female accountants, the specificities of these approved paths, alongside the construction of alternative, feminized routes, lacking the legitimacy of the former and often implying a derailment of women's careers from a very early stage, will be explored. It is suggested that more than a matter of only lifestyle preferences or practical constraints, this rarity is constructed by the interplay between the two, often resulting in “unintended and unwanted consequences, which retroactively may become unacknowledged conditions of future actions” (Giddens, 1984: 76). The focus of this study is to understand how the discursive and practical components of daily routines contribute to the reproduction of Big Four's gendered culture. Furthermore, this paper challenges the concept of the glass ceiling and instead conceives of the construction of women's careers in the accounting profession in terms of a labyrinth.     

Financing constraints and share pledges: Evidence from the share pledge reform in China

Financing constraints are important to triggering controlling shareholders' share pledges. However, the related literature faces two major challenges: the endogeneity problem and the lack of direct evidence of why and how individual share pledges can ease corporate financing constraints. Based on China's Share Pledge Reform (SPR) in Q4 2012 and the phenomenon that private firms face discrimination when obtaining bank loans, this paper studies the impact of financing constraints on share pledging behavior and its mechanisms by building a difference-in-differences (DID) model. The SPR makes it more convenient for shareholders to raise money through share pledges, and shareholders of private firms facing stronger financing constraints are more vulnerable to this reform than are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). After the SPR, the probability of share pledging by controlling shareholders of private firms is approximately 23.04% higher than that of controlling shareholders of SOEs, and the pledge ratio is approximately 16.53% higher. Further tests reveal that, after the SPR, controlling shareholders of private firms are more inclined than those of SOEs to provide loans to the company to alleviate its financing constraints. Heterogeneity tests further corroborate the finding that this effect is more significant in private firms that are smaller and do not have shareholders of banking and institutional firms among their top ten shareholders.     

Firm culture and internal control system

The corporate culture within firms is a significant concern for regulators, shareholders and other stakeholders. Drawing on a large sample of US firms, we use the political preferences of the top management team (TMT) to proxy for a firm's culture and examine whether it influences the decision to implement an effective internal control system (ICS) and whether the ICS plays a mediating role between the culture created by the TMT and financial reporting quality. We find that a Republican-leaning TMT with a more conservative ideology is associated with a more effective internal control system. In addition, the TMT's political preferences affect financial reporting quality, both directly and indirectly, via the internal control system. A range of robustness tests reinforces our main findings.     

Renegotiation of cash flow rights in the sale of VC-backed firms

Incomplete contracting theory suggests that venture capitalist (VC) cash flow rights, including liquidation preferences, could be subject to renegotiation. Using a hand-collected data set of sales of Silicon Valley firms, we find common shareholders do sometimes receive payment before VCs’ liquidation preferences are satisfied. However, such deviations from VCs' cash flow rights tend to be small. We also find that renegotiation is more likely when governance arrangements, including the firm's choice of corporate law, give common shareholders more power to impede the sale. Our study provides support for incomplete contracting theory, improves understanding of VC exits, and suggests that choice of corporate law matters in private firms.     

Audit Firm Attributes and Auditor Litigation Risk

This study examines the association between auditors' litigation risk and audit firm attributes. Using professional liability insurance premiums as a proxy for auditors' litigation risk, we present evidence that the risk is lower in audit firms having: (1) separate non-audit and audit divisions; (2) a higher proportion of partners; and (3) a higher annual growth in number of CPAs employed. Additionally, we find that the risk is higher in audit firms having: (1) operating losses; and (2) high revenue growth. Our results are consistent with the idea that audit firms' financial condition and organizational structure affect their independence/ expertise, and, in turn, their litigation risk. Our results are broadly supportive of the PCAOB's (2015) and US Department of Treasury's (2008) views that investors, audit committees, management, and other regulators could benefit from having access to financial and organizational information about audit firms.     

Nonlinear pricing and exclusion:II. Must‐stock products

Dominant firms often are unavoidable trading partners. Buyers may consider switching a fraction of their requirements to rival products, but that fraction is highly uncertain in rapidly evolving industries. Nonlinear pricing serves to adjust the competitive pressure placed on rival firms, depending on the joint distribution of the buyer willingness to pay for the rival's good and the share of contestable demand. Concave price‐quantity schedules erect barriers to entry. Convex parts in schedules introduce barriers to expansion. Dominant firms use all‐units discounts to create high entry barriers for rival firms with intermediate levels of contestable demand.     

Mandatory audit partner rotation,audit market concentration,and audit quality: Evidence from China

This research examines the audit quality consequences of China's mandatory audit partner rotation (MPR) regulation, which became effective in 2004. The rule requires firms to rotate signing audit partners of audit reports every five years. We find that audit quality improves in the three years immediately following a client firm's MPR during the 2004–2011 period for a sample of 273 Chinese publicly listed firms. Specifically, we find that the improvement is most pronounced in those Chinese provinces with both low levels of audit market concentration and low levels of legal development. However, MPR does not improve audit quality in jurisdictions where legal conventions are more developed and/or where audit markets are highly concentrated with a handful of large audit firms dominating the market.     

The association between dividend payout and firm growth: Australian evidence

We report that whereas firms with high earnings distributions tend to have low‐to‐moderate growth (consistent with conventional theory), firms with low earnings distributions run the range between high and low performers. We interpret our findings for firm growth and payout policy in relation to the firm's location on the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) matrix that combines high/low growth with high/low market share. Our findings suggest that the market has difficulty in distinguishing between these types of firms. A concern is that investor preferences as an outcome may be focussed on dividend‐paying firms at the expense of younger growing firms in need of retained earnings.     

Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of International Listings

In this paper, we examine the economic impact of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) by analyzing foreign listing behavior onto U.S. and U.K. stock exchanges before and after the enactment of SOX in 2002. Using a sample of all listing events onto U.S. and U.K. exchanges from 1995–2006, we develop an exchange choice model that captures firm‐level, industry‐level, exchange‐level, and country‐level listing incentives, and test whether these listing preferences changed following the enactment of SOX. After controlling for firm characteristics and other economic determinants of these firms' exchange choice, we find that the listing preferences of large foreign firms choosing between U.S. exchanges and the London Stock Exchange's (LSE) Main Market did not change following the enactment of SOX. In contrast, we find that the likelihood of a U.S. listing among small foreign firms choosing between the NASDAQ and LSE's Alternative Investment Market decreased following the enactment of SOX. The negative effect among small firms is consistent with these marginal companies being less able to absorb the incremental costs associated with SOX compliance. The screening of smaller firms with weaker governance attributes from U.S. exchanges is consistent with the heightened governance costs imposed by SOX increasing the bonding‐related benefits of a U.S. listing.     

Morgan Stanley Roundtable on The State of Global Private Equity

In this discussion led by Alan Jones, Morgan Stanley's head of Global Private Equity, the University of Chicago's Steve Kaplan begins by surveying 25 years of academic research on private equity. Starting with Kaplan's own Ph.D. dissertation on leveraged buyouts during the 1980s, finance academics have provided a large and growing body of studies documenting the ability of private equity firms to make “sustainable” (that is, maintained over a three‐ or four‐year period) improvements in the operating performance of their portfolio companies, whether operating abroad or in the U.S. Even more impressive, the findings of Kaplan's new study (with Tim Jenkinson of Oxford and Bob Harris of the University of Virginia) suggest that these improvements have been large enough to enable PE funds raised between 1990 and 2008 to deliver returns to their limited partners that have averaged 300 to 400 basis points higher per year than the returns to the S&P 500. And given the “persistence” of PE fund returns—the tendency of the funds of the same PE firms to show up in the top quartile of performers year after year—that Kaplan has documented in earlier work, the performance of private equity seems notably different from that of mutual funds and hedge funds, where there has been little if any consistency in the returns provided by the top performers. Following Kaplan's overview of the research, four representatives of today's leading private equity firms explore questions like the following:

• ? How do the best PE firms, after paying premiums to acquire their portfolio companies and collecting large management fees, provide such consistently high returns to their limited partners?
• ? How did PE portfolio companies perform during the last recession, when many popular business publications were predicting the death of private equity—and what, if anything, does that tell us about how private equity adds value?
• ? What can PE firms do to avoid, or at least limit the damage from, the overpricing and overleveraging that tend to occur near the end of the boom‐and‐bust cycle that appears to be a permanent feature of private equity?

As Jones notes in his opening comments, the practitioners' answers to such questions “should help investors distinguish between the alpha that the firms represented at this table have generated through active management from the ‘closet beta’ that critics say results when private equity firms simply create what amounts to a levered bet on the public equity markets.”     

The choice of equity selling mechanisms: PIPEs versus SEOs

We examine the firm's choice between an SEO and a PIPE, an innovation in follow-on equity selling mechanism seen in the late 1990s. Our primary finding indicates that the rapid rise of the PIPE market fills the capital needs of firms which may not have access to more traditional alternatives. This lack of access is driven mainly by information asymmetry and weak operating performance. We also show that firms are more likely to choose PIPEs when the general market and the firm's stock are performing poorly. Furthermore, we find that selected firms with access to the public market may prefer a PIPE due to specific cost considerations.     

The Capital Structure of PE‐Funded Companies (and How New Debt Instruments and Investors Are Expanding Their Debt Capacity)

The capital structures and financial policies of companies controlled by private equity firms are notably different from those of public companies. The concentration of ownership and intense monitoring of leveraged buyouts by their largest investors (that is, the partners of the PE firms who sit on their boards), along with the contractual requirement of PE funds to return their capital within seven to ten years, have resulted in capital structures that are far more leveraged than those of their publicly traded counterparts, but also considerably more provisional and “opportunistic.” Whereas the average U.S. public company has long operated with roughly 30% debt and 70% equity, today's typical private‐equity sponsored company is initially capitalized with an “upside‐down” structure of 70% debt and just 30% equity, and then often charged with working down its debt as quickly as possible. Although banks supplied most of the debt for the first wave of LBOs in the 1980s, the remarkable growth of the private equity industry in the past 25 years has been supported by the parallel development of a new leveraged acquisition finance market. This financing innovation has led to a general movement away from a bankcentered funding base to one comprising a relatively new set of institutional investors, including business development corporations and hedge funds. Such investors have shown a strong appetite for new debt instruments and risks that banks have been unwilling or, thanks to increased capital requirements and other regulatory burdens, prohibited from taking on. Notable among these new instruments are second‐lien loans and uni‐tranche debt—instruments that, by shifting the allocation of claims on the debtor's cash flow and assets in ways consistent with the preferences of these new investors, have had the effect of increasing the debt capacity of their portfolio companies. And such increases in debt capacity have in turn enabled private equity funds—now sitting on near‐record amounts of capital from their limited partners—to bid higher prices and compete more effectively in today's intensely competitive M&A market, in which high target acquisition purchase prices are being fueled by a strong stock market and increased competition from corporate acquirers.     

Market power,price discrimination,and allocative efficiency in intermediate‐goods markets

We consider a monopolistic supplier's optimal choice of two‐part tariff contracts when downstream firms are asymmetric. We find that the optimal discriminatory contracts amplify differences in downstream firms' competitiveness. Firms that are larger—either because they are more efficient or because they sell a superior product—obtain a lower wholesale price than their rivals. This increases allocative efficiency by favoring the more productive firms. In contrast, we show that a ban on price discrimination reduces allocative efficiency and can lead to higher wholesale prices for all firms. As a result, consumer surplus, industry profits, and welfare are lower.     

Dynamic pricing: when to entice brand switching and when to reward consumer loyalty

This article develops a theory of dynamic pricing in which firms may offer separate prices to different consumers based on their past purchases. Brand preferences over two periods are described by a copula admitting various degrees of positive dependence. When commitment to future prices is infeasible, each firm offers lower prices to its rival's customers. When firms can commit to future prices, consumer loyalty is rewarded if preference dependence is low, but enticing brand switching occurs if preference dependence is high. Our theory provides a unified treatment of the two pricing policies and sheds light on observed practices across industries.