Boards of Directors,Innovation, and Performance: An Exploration at Multiple Levels

This work reports on an investigation of the dynamics of governance over breakthrough innovation within Fortune 1000 firms. The primary research question investigates the boundary of agency theory within the firm. Using agency and stakeholder theoretic perspectives, the study tests the hypothesis that innovation will thrive in firms that combine a board of directors operating in accordance with a high agency theoretic focus in addition to an innovation governance board operating deeper within the firm that employs a strong stakeholder theoretic orientation in its behavior. The model is tested with data from 98 large firms. Results suggest that the relationship between board of directors' behavior and the firm's overall innovativeness is mediated by innovation decision‐making boards that (1) promote projects that are breakthrough in scope, (2) incorporate input of diverse constituencies within the firm, (3) exhibit patience with financial results, and (4) engage in frequent, informal interactions with project teams. Firms exhibiting high board of director agency orientation in combination with loyalty to mandate, patient financial capital disposition, inclusiveness, and project team interaction as described above for innovation governance board decision‐making prove to be the most innovative as measured by external indicators. For firm innovativeness, consolidated managerial power and behavior is frequently present at the upper levels of the firm, but must be broken down at deeper levels of the firm. This research offers implications to innovation decision‐makers as to how to proceed if the intent is to offer commercializably successful breakthrough innovations.     

Government support of clean technology research in West Germany: some evidence

The authors have set out to review the procedures used in the allocation of public money by the Federal German government for research into 'clean' technologies. Public sponsorship of this kind of research is necessary as industrial firms rarely see enough return for their R&D investment to warrant their carrying it out. The authors have surveyed the methods used by the government funding agency (BMFT) to identify projects and to allocate money to them. 82 projects were included in the survey in the fields of low-emission processes.
Projects were segmented in five ways: Status of the receiver; Type of technology; R&D stage (from basic through demonstration plant); Cooperative versus non-cooperative, Environmental medium. Their broad conclusions are that (a) most of the funds went to projects for the development of 'end-of-the-pipe-cum-recycling' technologies and integrated technologies, (b) where there was cooperation between a firm and a university the R&D concentrated on studying basic principles, and (c) success depends on the existence of a clear strategy for the research as a whole rather than on ad hoc monitoring against a narrowly conceived plan. The authors also summarise the problems met in ensuring that money allocated in this way is effectively used.     

Testing Low-Balling Strategy in Rural Road Procurement

A “low-balling strategy” by bidding contractors has increasingly been recognized as an important issue in public infrastructure procurement. Public works contracts are often imperfect and renegotiated after the contract award. Given the expectation for ex post adjustments, bidders seem motivated to take advantage of the low-balling strategy. This paper analyzes the endogeneity between the bid strategy and ex post adjustments. Using procurement data on rural road projects in Nepal, it shows that the bid strategy and adjustments are determined endogenously in the system. Anticipating cost and time overruns, firms would likely undercut normal bid prices. Then, ex post contract adjustments actually happen, because of their too aggressive bids.     

Financial reporting quality and investment decisions for family firms

This study investigates the association between investment decisions and financial reporting quality in the context of family firms versus non-family firms. Building on the classic agency theory and the behavioral agency theory, we argue that financial reporting quality may play a different role on investment decisions for family and non-family firms. We address our research question by using a sample of listed firms in Taiwan from 1996 to 2011. Consistent with the behavioral agency theory, our findings suggest that family firms are more likely to under-invest than non-family firms in order to protect their socioemotional wealth, and financial reporting quality is more negatively associated with family firms’ under-investment behavior. The existence of internal financing channels attenuates this negative association. However, this study does not find a significant role on such association when a family member serves as the chief executive officer. These results are robust after controlling for the potential endogeneity issue of financial reporting quality, alternate measures of inefficient investment as well as internal financing channels, family firm subsample, and different industry groups. This study contributes to the literature on the relation between financial reporting quality and investment decisions by highlighting the unique characteristics of family firms.     

PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND AGENCY COSTS*

We model the effects of competition on managerial efficiency and isolate the agency effect of competition, present only in firms subject to agency costs, from the direct pressure effect of competition, which is present in all firms. Using a unique set of Canadian data that surveys both firms and their employees, we then evaluate the empirical significance of these two effects. We find that competition has a significant direct pressure effect as well as a significant agency effect. Both effects increase the importance firms place on quality improvements and cost reductions as well as on contractual incentives and employee effort.     

Planning the Bakalori irrigation project

The development of the Sokoto-Rima river basin as a network of irrigation projects was first envisaged by the FAO in a report published in 1965. It is through this organ of the United Nations that the planning for agricultural development in this part of Nigeria became intimately linked with the desire of the industrial firms in Western Europe, North America and Japan to find export markets for industrial products in agriculture. By 1975, when the first contract for the irrigation project at Bakalori was signed and a company (IMPRESIT Bakalori, Nigeria) was formed, the FAO had already within it an agency (the Industry Cooperative Programme) whose purpose was to promote the penetration of agricultural planning in Africa, Asia and Latin America.     

The effects of funding source and management ownership on the productivity of R&D

This study investigates the influence of the source of R&D funds and management ownership on R&D productivity. The lagged effect of the source of R&D funds on R&D output is investigated for a sample of US manufacturing firms in five industries over the 1996–99 period. Estimates based on 779 firm-years show that R&D productivity increases with the proportion of stock held by managers and directors of firms primarily in the Other Electronics industry. The estimates also show that recipients of government-sponsored R&D funds in the Chemicals industry have lower levels of output (sales) for each dollar committed to R&D. In addition, output for firms in the Chemicals industry worsens as management stockholding increases, implying an agency cost rationale for the observed difference in output. The implication is that firms with high manager-owner content are less productive with government-sponsored R&D than with company-financed R&D. The reported results suggest that potential agency costs should be incorporated in government-sponsored R&D contracts. It also suggests that the source of R&D funds should be disclosed and incorporated into the valuation of intangible assets attributable to research and development.     

The free cash flow hypothesis for sales growth and firm performance

business is business! And business must grow –Dr. Seuss, The Lorax The paper investigates the agency argument that sales growth in firms with free cash flow (and without strong governance) is less profitable than sales growth for firms without free cash flow. It also tests whether strong governance conditions improve the performance of firms with free cash flow and/or limit the investments in unprofitable sales growth. Consistent with agency theory, firms with free cash flow gain less from sales growth than firms without free cash flow. But different governance conditions affect sales growth and performance in different ways. Having substantial management stock ownership mitigates the influence of free cash flow on performance, despite allowing higher sales growth. In contrast, outside blocks held by mutual funds reduce sales growth substantially, but does not increase performance from sales growth. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How capital structure influences diversification performance: A transaction cost perspective

Extant theories agree that debt should inhibit diversification but predict opposing performance consequences. While agency theory predicts that debt should lead to higher performance for diversifying firms, transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that more debt will lead to lower performance for firms expanding into new markets. Our empirical tests on a large sample of Japanese firms support TCE by showing that firms accrue higher returns from leveraging their resources and capabilities into new markets when managers are shielded from the rigors of the market governance of debt, particularly bond debt. Furthermore, we find that the detrimental effects of debt are exacerbated for R&D intensive firms and that debt is not necessarily harmful to firms that are either contracting or managing a stable portfolio of markets. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time compression (dis)economies: An empirical analysis

Research Summary: To investigate time compression diseconomies (TCD), this study estimated time–cost elasticities using 459 oil and gas global investment projects (1997–2010). Results show that the average cost of accelerating investments is negative: a firm could cut $6.3 million in costs of a single project by accumulating asset stocks 1 month faster. About 88% of the projects exhibit negative time–cost elasticities with over 39% of unrealized economies of time compression. Only 12% of the projects are subject to TCD. These time inefficiencies or frictions do not negate the existence of TCD, but suggest they are less prevalent than assumed in the literature. Management experience, R&D investment, firm size, economic development, and political stability are shown to be associated with greater time compression efficiency. Managerial Summary: How fast should firms invest? The conventional view is that acceleration increases market revenues but also inflates costs. However, there is no recent empirical evidence of this tradeoff. Our article systematically investigates the costs of compressing time in investment projects. Results show that most firms in the oil and gas industry are significantly time inefficient in their operations. Specifically, by accelerating investments, firms would also substantially decrease costs. We estimate the magnitude of these time inefficiencies for specific oil and gas industries and firms and study which strategies might mitigate this problem. This fine‐grained analysis should help firms assess their financial incentives to accelerate projects and prove informative to stock market analysts’ valuations of firm investment timing.     

Budgets for research and development: an empirical study of 69 Swedish firms

Questionnaires were sent out to 124 large Swedish firms, asking how they determined budgets for research and development (R & D) and who decided about the size of these budgets. 94 firms answered and 69 of these undertook R & D.
It was found that, as a rule, firms decide upon individual projects and do not specify in advance a fixed level for the R & D budget. The decision about individual R & D projects and/or the R & D budget was most frequently made by the president of the company.
The implication of our results for various kinds of research on the economics of R & D are discussed.     

Risk abatement as a strategy for R&D investments in family firms

The behavioral agency model suggests family firms invest less in R&D than nonfamily firms to protect their socioemotional wealth. Studies support this contention but do not explain how family firms make R&D investments. We hypothesize that when performance exceeds aspirations, family firms manage socioemotional and economic objectives by making exploitative R&D investments that lead to more reliable and less risky sales levels. However, performance below aspirations leads to exploratory R&D investments that result in potentially higher but less reliable sales levels. Using a risk abatement model, our analyses of 847 firms over 10 years supports our hypotheses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Temporary Agency Work and Firm Competitiveness: Evidence from German Manufacturing Firms

This paper addresses the relationship between the utilization of temporary agency workers by firms and their competitiveness measured by unit labor costs, using a rich, newly built, dataset of German manufacturing enterprises. We conduct the analysis by applying different panel data models while taking the inherent selection problem into account. Making use of dynamic panel data models allows us to control for firm‐specific fixed effects as well as for potential endogeneity of explanatory variables. The results indicate an inverse U‐shaped relationship between the extent that temporary agency workers are used and the competitiveness of firms.     

Is family leadership always beneficial?

There has been much debate concerning the performance of family firms and the drivers of their performance. Some scholars have argued that family management is to blame when family firms go wrong; others claim that family management removes costly agency problems and encourages stewardship. Our thesis is that these disagreements can only be resolved by distinguishing among different types of family firms. We argue that family CEOs will outperform in smaller firms with more concentrated ownership and underperform in larger firms with more dispersed ownership; they will do neither where firms are smaller and ownership is more dispersed or firms are larger and ownership is more concentrated. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Family firms and internationalization‐governance relationships: Evidence of secondary agency issues

This article documents that blockholders with both ownership and management control in family firms have different goals compared to blockholders with only ownership (but no management) control. We theorize and find evidence that family controlled and family managed (FCFM) firms negatively moderate the relationships between internationalization and governance mechanisms, while family controlled and nonfamily managed (FCNFM) firms do not. The findings indicate that family owners in FCFM firms have greater opportunities to reap private benefits of control indicating the presence of secondary (principal‐principal) agency problems, while these problems are mitigated in FCNFM firms. In emerging economies like India where family firms are ubiquitous, they highlight the need to recognize differing blockholder influences on internationalization‐governance relationships and to develop more nuanced theorizing for understanding them. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Innovation Management Practices Compared: The Example of Project‐Based Firms*

The importance of project‐based firms is increasing, as they fulfill the growing demands for complex integrated systems and knowledge‐intensive services. While project‐based firms are generally strong in innovating their clients' systems and processes, they seem to be less successful in innovating their own products or services. The reasons behind this are the focus of this paper. The characteristics of project‐based firms are investigated, how these affect management practices for innovation projects, and the influence of these practices on project performance. Using survey data of 203 Dutch firms in the construction, engineering, information technology, and related industries, differences in characteristics between project‐based and nonproject‐based firms are identified. Project‐based firms are distinguished from nonproject‐based firms on the basis of organizational configuration, the complexity of the operational process, and the project management capabilities of the firm. Project‐based firms also differ with regard to their level of collaboration and their innovation strategy, but not in the level of autonomy. A comparison of 135 innovation projects in 96 of the firms shows that project‐based firms do not manage their innovation projects different from other firms. However, the effects of specific management practices on project performance are different, particularly the effects of planning, multidisciplinary teams and heavyweight project leaders. Differences in firm characteristics provide an explanation for the findings. The implication for the innovation management literature is that “best” practices for innovation management are firm dependent.     

Firms' technological resources and the performance effects of diversification: a longitudinal study

While agency theory claims managerial self‐interest creates a diversification discount, strategic theory explains that firms with certain kinds of resources should diversify. Longitudinal data on 227 firms that diversify between 1980 and 1992 reveal that the sample firms invest less in R&D and have greater breadth of technology (based on patent citations) than their industry peers prior to the diversification event. Also, acquiring firms may appear to have lower performance because of accounting conventions and because firms that use internal growth rather than acquisition pursue less extensive diversification. These findings help explain how diversification and financial performance are endogenous. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managing radical innovation: an overview of emergent strategy issues

Despite differences in definitions, researchers understand that radical innovation within an organization is very different from incremental innovation , and and that it is critical to the long-term success of firms. Unfortunately, research has also shown that it is often difficult to get support for radical projects in large firms [14], where internal cultures and pressures often push efforts toward more low risk, immediate reward, incremental projects. Interestingly, we know considerably less about the effective management of the product development process in the radical than in an incremental context. The purpose of this study is to explore the process of radical new product development from a strategic perspective, and to outline key observations and challenges that managers face as they move these projects to market. The findings presented here represent the results of a longitudinal (since 1995), multidisciplinary study of radical innovation projects. A multiple case study design was used to explore the similarities and differences in management practices applied to twelve radical innovation projects in ten large, established North American firms. The findings are grouped into three high-level strategic themes. The first theme, market scope, discusses the challenges associated with the pursuit of familiar versus unfamiliar markets for radical innovation. The second theme of competency management identifies and discusses strategic challenges that emerge as firms stretch themselves into new and unfamiliar territory. The final theme relates to the people issues that emerge as both individuals and the project teams themselves try to move radical projects forward in organizations that are not necessarily designed to support such uncertainty.A breadth of subtopics emerge within and across this framework relating to such ideas as risk management, product cannibalization, team composition, and the search for a divisional home. Taken together, our observations reinforce the emerging literature that shows that project teams engaging in radical innovation encounter a much different set of challenges than those typically faced by NPD teams engaged in incremental innovation.     

Does Strategic Planning Enhance or Impede Innovation and Firm Performance?*

Does strategic planning enhance or impede innovation and firm performance? The current literature provides contradictory views. This study extends the resource‐advantage theory to examine the conditions in which strategic planning increases or decreases the number of new product development projects and firm performance. The authors test the theoretical model by collecting data from 227 firms. The empirical evidence suggests that more strategic planning and more new product development (NPD) projects lead to better firm performance. Firms with organizational redundancy benefit more from strategic planning than firms with less organizational redundancy. Increasing R&D intensity boosts both the number of NPD projects and firm performance. Strategic planning is more effective in larger firms with higher R&D intensity for increasing the number of NPD projects. The results reported in this study also consist of several findings that challenge the traditional views of strategic planning. The evidence suggests that strategic planning impedes, not enhances, the number of NPD projects. Larger firms benefit less, not more, from strategic planning for improving firm performance. Larger firms do not necessarily create more NPD projects. Increasing organizational redundancy has no effect on the number of NPD projects. These empirical results provide important strategic implications. First, managers should be aware that, in general, formal strategic planning decreases the number of NPD projects for innovation management. Improvised rather than planned activities are more conducive to creating NPD project ideas. Moreover, innovations tend to emerge from improvisational processes, during which the impromptu execution of NPD activities without planning spurs “thinking outside the box,” which enhances the process of creating NPD project ideas. Therefore, more flexible strategic plans that accommodate potential improvisation may be needed in NPD management since innovation‐related activities cannot be planned precisely due to the unexpected jolts and contingencies of the NPD process. Second, large firms with high levels of R&D intensity can overcome the negative effect of strategic planning on the number of NPD projects. Specifically, a firm's abundant resources, when allocated and deployed for NPD activities, signal the high priority and importance of the NPD activities and thus motivate employees to acquire, collect, and gather customer and technical knowledge, which leads to creating more NPD projects. Finally, managers must understand that managing strategic planning and generating NPD project ideas are beneficial to the ultimate outcome of firm performance despite the adverse relationship between strategic planning and the number of NPD projects.