Effects of Technology Transfers on the Provision of Public Goods

In this paper, we examine the viability ofcooperative policies oriented to the resolution oftransboundary pollution problems using the theory ofprivate provision of public goods in a two-countrymodel. We analyze the effects on economic welfare ofvoluntary technological transfers oriented to reducingthe emission of pollutants.Our analysis shows that when the atmosphere istaken as a pure public goods, ``a strong paradox' emerges:the advanced country, in spite of the transfer, seesits economic welfare improved while the developingcountry sees it worsen. Moreover, if both a technicaland an income transfer occur, this paradox mightnot be solved. Furthermore, ``a paradoxicalimprovement' occurs when the advanced country does nottake any policy towards the environment but thedeveloping country does: an improvement in the levelof technology in the developing country allows for anexpansion of the level of utility in both countries.On the other hand, in the case where the atmosphere istaken as an impure public goods, when both countriespursue an abatement policy, the transfer of technologyleads to an improvement in welfare in bothcountries.     

Should the Carbon Price Be the Same in All Countries?

International differences in fuel taxation are huge, and may be justified by different local negative externalities that taxes must correct, as well as by different preferences for public spending. In this context, should a worldwide uniform carbon tax be added to these local taxes to correct the global warming externality? We address this question in a second best framework à la Ramsey, where public goods have to be financed through distortionary taxation and the cost of public funds has to be weighted against the utility of public goods. We show that when lump‐sum transfers between countries are allowed for, the second best tax on the polluting good may be decomposed into three parts: one, country‐specific, dealing with the local negative externality, a second one, country‐specific, dealing with the cost of levying public funds, and a third one, global, dealing with the global externality and which can be interpreted as the carbon price. Our main contribution is to show that the uniformity of the carbon price should still hold in this second best framework. Nevertheless, if lump‐sum transfers between governments are impossible to implement, international differentiation of the carbon price is the only way to take care of equity concerns.     

International Technology Transfer: Who Gains and Who Loses?*

When one country has a superior technology in all commodities, a Ricardian model with two goods and two countries is used to examine uncompensated transfers of superior technology in one or both goods. A transfer of the superior but second‐best technology always benefits the advanced country because it was improting that good initially and now gets it cheaper. But the free gift of the first‐best technology can also benefit the advanced country if a certain productivity condition is satisfied because that country may now export its former import good at an even better terms of trade.     

AN OPTIMAL TAX TREATMENT OF LEVIATHAN*

This paper constructs a model in which taxation and public expenditure decisions are made by two decision makers: a “benevolent planner,” who treats all consumers equally in the measurement of welfare; and a “Leviathan planner,” who places more weight on the utilities of “favored consumers.” The benevolent planner can restrict the Leviathan planner's power to tax, but cannot control the allocation of expenditures between desirable public goods and income transfers to favored consumers. Several types of tax restrictions are shown to be welfare-improving from the benevolent planner's viewpoint. These restrictions include a reduction in the size of the tax base, although administrative costs already prevent the Leviathan planner from taxing all commodities.     

Efficient Migration and Income Tax Competition

This paper examines the consequence of the brain drain for the income tax systems of the source and destination countries for the migration, if the two countries' policies are set noncooperatively by self–interested voters. It is assumed that the brain drain does increase the value of world output: workers with the highest income–earning ability are assumed to be more productive in one country than in another. There are costs to migration of these high–ability workers, costs that are less than the gain in the value of their production. However, for lower–ability workers, the gains in production in moving from the low–productivity country to the high–productivity country are assumed to be less than the migration costs. Voters in the high–productivity country want to capture rents from migrants. These voters are aware of the influence their tax policy has on people's migration decisions. Voters in the low–productivity country also behave strategically. I solve for the Nash equilibrium income tax rates. Increased mobility of highly skilled workers cannot decrease, and may increase, progressivity in the income tax system of the destination country, if migration actually occurs. Finally, the effects of transfers between countries on their income tax systems are examined. Redistribution between countries tends to lead to less redistribution within countries. If transfers between countries are set by a vote of all residents of both countries, then the transfer chosen will be the one that leads to the least progressive tax possible being chosen in each country.     

Divergence,Convergence, and the Gains From Trade*

This paper is about a country which has enjoyed a comparative advantage in producing some good(s) and suddenly finds its trading partners increasing their productivity in producing precisely those same goods; e.g., the US with its big lead in many kinds of manufacturing production in the 1950s and 1960s, and the rest of the world catching up in the same kinds of goods in the 1970s and 1980s. This is what the paper means by “convergence.” We show that such convergence results in an absolute loss of real income and standard of living for the original “leader” country.     

Foreign aid and weakest-link international public goods: An experimental study

In this paper, we investigate efficiency differences between income and in-kind transfers as distribution mechanisms of foreign aid to weakest-link international public goods in a laboratory environment. We find that if there is relatively small difference in country size, then income transfers seem to provide a higher provision of the international public good, and thus higher overall welfare level than that of in-kind transfers. However, if there is a large disparity in country size, then in-kind transfers appear to provide a higher level of IPG provision and higher accompanying global welfare.     

Can fiscal redistribution undo skill-biased technical change?: Evidence from the French experience

The inequality of labor earnings among working-age individuals has gone up in all western countries during the past 25 years, either through rising wage inequality (US, UK) or through rising unemployment (Continental Europe). Policy regimes did matter a great deal, however, as far as the inequality of disposable income is concerned. In a country like France, transfers to the unemployed were sufficiently massive to prevent income inequality from rising. This paper argues that the way fiscal redistribution has managed to counteract skill-biased technical change in countries like France is somewhat paradoxical. The same distributive stability could have been obtained at a lower cost by following a job subsidies strategy rather than an income maintenance strategy, simply because it is always less costly to have people at work producing something. We explore several potential explanations for this paradox.     

Optimal mixed taxation,public goods and the problem of high-skilled emigration

The optimal income tax model under the threat of migration of Simula and Trannoy (J Public Econ 94:163–173, 2010; Soc Choice Welf 39(4):751–782, 2012) is extended to include indirect taxes and public goods. This enables us to conclude that: (1) optimal income tax rates are higher than in the absence of indirect taxation, and may be positive at the top of the skills distribution; (2) indirect taxes, à la Corlett and Hague, may help mitigate the loss of redistributive capacity arising from income taxation caused by migration threats; (3) migration encourages the provision of the public goods preferred by the most productive workers; (4) optimal tax and public goods provision policies against the emigration of the highly-skilled are connected through the conditions for Pareto efficiency; (5) if the number of potential migrators is large, it may be desirable to violate classical tax rules to retain the most able in the home country; (6) when migration costs are exogenously given and utility is weakly separable, Simula and Trannoy’s results are restored; (7) if migration costs are endogenous, the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem breaks down and the taxation of country-specific goods becomes desirable, even if utility is strongly separable.     

Testing structural benefit transfer: The role of income inequality

How the valuation of environmental goods is related to income is a key question for economics, but the role of income inequality is often neglected. We study how income inequality affects the international transfer of the estimated value of environmental goods from a study to a policy site—a practice called value or benefit transfer. Specifically, we apply theory-driven, structural transfer factors to test whether adjusting for income inequality affects errors made in benefit transfer, drawing on a multi-country valuation study on water quality improvement. Our convergent validity analysis shows that the structural income inequality adjustment reduces benefit transfer errors by between 1.5 and 1.8 percentage points on average across all transfers. We therefore find that adjusting for income inequality offers only a minor improvement of benefit transfers as compared to adjusting for differences in mean income. Overall, our results shed light on the potential of structural approaches to benefit transfer for environmental valuation and public policy appraisal.     

Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision with Endogenous Interest Groups

This paper studies public goods provision when agents differ in earning abilities as well as preferences. Heterogeneity in skills makes redistribution desirable and generates an equity-efficiency trade-off. If tax revenues are devoted to a public good, this trade-off is affected in such a way that income transfers are less desirable. High-skilled individuals thus have an incentive to exaggerate their preferences for public goods. Analogously, low-skilled individuals lobby against public good provision. A requirement of collective incentive compatibility eliminates these biases. It implies that income transfers are increased whenever a public good is provided and are decreased otherwise.     

Public Good Mix in a Federation with Incomplete Information

We analyze a model of resource allocation in a federal system in which the center transfers real resources between member states. The center is assumed to be unable to observe the precise value of the cost differences across jurisdictions that motivate the transfers. Moreover, the center cannot observe the output levels of the individual local public goods provided by the jurisdictions, but must condition its transfers on a coarse aggregate of expenditures on public goods. We find that when the jurisdiction with private information realizes a high unit cost, it is generally worthwhile for the center to allow it a level of expenditure on public goods that differs from the "first best" level. However, whether that level is higher or lower than its first best level depends on the magnitudes of demand parameters for the local public good.     

COSTLY INTERMEDIATION AND THE POVERTY OF NATIONS*

This article has two goals: (i) to reduce the 7‐fold productivity differential required to explain the observed 33‐fold income difference between the richest and poorest countries of the world; and (ii) to explain cross‐country differences in the capital‐output ratio. To achieve the first goal we modify the production function of the standard neoclassical growth model to include public capital whose provision is subject to intermediation costs. For the second goal we distort private investment by introducing credit frictions. The model, quantified using cross‐country data, generates an income gap of 33 with productivity differences of only 3 under the measured variations in public and private capital. The required productivity gap declines even further, to 2.1, when we introduce a home‐production sector. On the second goal, however, credit frictions do a poor job of explaining cross‐country variations in the capital‐output ratio.     

Keynesian Multipliers, Direct Crowding Out, and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods

This paper studies Keynesian multipliers in a macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition. We allow public and private consumption goods to be perfect substitutes in private utility. This enables us to study the effect of direct crowding out on the size of national income, profit and employment multipliers for a given rise in real public spending. A positive real national income multiplier is obtained if consumers value public consumption less than private consumption. In addition, we determine the effective marginal cost of public funds and the optimal provision of public goods, both in the short run and in the long run.     

Changes in income distribution and welfare from greater immigration of unskilled workers

This paper considers the consequences of greater immigration of unskilled labor on income distribution and welfare in the receiving country. To address these issues, both the sending and receiving countries are represented in a static general equilibrium model which distinguishes between skilled and unskilled labor and which allows prices to be determined endogenously. In this framework an inflow of unskilled labor is likely to reduce wages of unskilled labor, but whether capital or skilled labor benefits depends upon demand elasticities, elasticities of substitution in production, and differences across countries in the productivity of unskilled labor. National welfare in the receiving country is likely to rise, to the extent that the relative price of importable goods falls, non-residents already in the country receive lower wages, immigrants receive lower wages than those paid to domestic workers, and immigrants cause little increased demand for public services and transfer programs.     

Trade Gains, Paretian Transfer and the Tragedy of the Commons

Consider trade liberalization between two countries, each of which produces two private goods and provides on a voluntary basis one public good (the common). In these circumstances, what are the consequences of trade liberalization on the production of the public good and on welfare in both countries? Using a Ricardian framework, we first show that the opening of trade increases the opportunity cost of producing the public good in both countries and will therefore reduce the aggregate supply of the public good. On the other hand, at the autarky equilibrium, only one country supplies the public good, the other “free rides”. The analysis of the welfare incidence of the opening of trade then reveals that the country which provides the public good under autarky always enjoys a welfare gain from trade while the free rider under autarky does not unless the terms of trade are sufficiently in its favour to compensate for the reduction in the supply of the common. Finally, if all countries involved in trade liberalization can without cost coordinate their supplies of the common, then the implementation of the first-best outcome is shown to be possible with a conditional Paretian transfer scheme.     

Factor Heterogeneity,Factor Market Imperfection and Trade

This paper develops a tractable model of examining how factor heterogeneity and imperfect factor market interact for determining a pattern of trade. Institution plays a crucial role for the interaction. In my work, firm productivity is defined as a composition of factor productivity and technology. Thus, input selection should affect the pattern of Melitz’s intra-industry allocation due to the incurring transaction cost. For a simple model, I assume two factors (labor and capital) and two sectors, which are relatively less institution-dependent and relatively more institution-dependent. When the economy is open, effect of the transaction cost on income distribution is more drastic for an institutionally underdeveloped country. Depending on institutional quality, the economic openness reallocates resource across countries through job creation or job destruction. The job turnovers redistribute income between heterogeneous labors within countries. The income redistribution is catalyzed by international mobility of capital. As a result, income disparity is widened between the institutionally developed country and the institutionally underdeveloped country. This paper can contribute to the literature of institution and international trade.     

Health and infrastructure in a model of endogenous growth

This paper studies the optimal allocation of government spending between infrastructure and health (which affects labor productivity as well as household utility) in an endogenous growth framework. A key feature of the model is that infrastructure affects not only the production of goods but also the supply of health services. The rate of time preference is also endogenously related to health outcomes. The first part considers the case where health enters as a flow in production and utility, whereas the second focuses on a “stock” approach. Growth- and welfare-maximizing rules for income taxation and the allocation of public spending are derived.     

Salience and social choice

The axioms of expected utility and discounted utility theory have been tested extensively. In contrast, the axioms of social welfare functions have only been tested in a few questionnaire studies involving choices between hypothetical income distributions. In a controlled experiment with 100 subjects placed in the role of social planners, we test five fundamental properties of social welfare functions to determine the efficacy of traditional social choice models in predicting social planner allocations when presented with choice sets designed to test the axioms of the theory. We find that three properties of the standard social welfare functions tested are systematically violated, producing an Allais paradox, a common ratio effect, and a framing effect in social choice. We find support for scale invariance and a preference for tail-increasing transfers. Our experiment also enables us to test a model of salience-based social choice which predicts the systematic deviations and highlights the close relationship between these anomalies and the classical paradoxes for risk and time.

     

公共物品自发供给与个体的偏好异质性效应分析

考察一期同时行动时,个体的偏好差异对公共物品自发供给的影响。模型在对数柯布-道格拉斯效用函数的基础上,设定了反映偏好(偏好差异量)程度的参数,分析个体们的总收入在未达到和越过公共物品生产的最小捐赠水平两种均衡状态下,个体的最佳决策及偏好异质性效应。研究结果表明:个体的偏好差异对公共物品产出的作用依赖于成员们的收入预算开支与公共物品固定成本的比较,“U”型曲线之说不合适。