UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC‒PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND INNOVATION

While the contemporary academic discourse regards innovation as an inherent feature of infrastructure public?private partnerships (PPPs), the conceptual link between infrastructure PPPs and innovation is narrowly understood. While most existing studies conceptualize the innovation processes and effects within the context of PPP projects, we argue that the relevance of innovation in infrastructure PPPs goes beyond specific projects. In this conceptual article, we examine why and how infrastructure PPP innovations can shape the evolution of the involved private and public sector organizations – and therefore the respective sectors – more broadly. We show that innovation in the context of PPPs has much broader implications and potential outcomes than as emphasized in the literature so far.     

EVALUATING THE COSTS,QUALITY, AND VALUE FOR MONEY OF INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: A SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW

Public?private partnerships (PPPs) are often promoted as a means to lower the costs and increase the quality and value for money (VfM) of public construction and infrastructure projects. While the increasing capital stock of PPPs warrants evaluation of their performance there has until now been limited systematic assessment of PPP versus conventional public procurement. This article contributes to the literature by presenting the findings of a systematic review of empirical peer‐reviewed studies comparing the costs, quality, and/or VfM of infrastructure PPP projects with conventional public procurement. The international literature suggests that PPPs are on average more costly and provide approximately similar VfM as conventional procurement. The number of empirical evaluations is limited, however, and evidence on the quality of infrastructure facilities is particularly scarce. While infrastructure PPPs continue to proliferate, systematic assessment of their performance is warranted to assist policy‐makers in choosing the procurement method that offers best value for taxpayers, users and society.     

Contestability, Complementary Inputs and Contracting: The Case of Harbour Towage

It has been argued that competitive tendering for contracts can be used to overcome problems of natural monopoly and to make markets 'contestable'. The recent Productivity Commission (2002) report into harbour towage in Australia noted the potential benefits of competition for contracts. Using the example of harbour towage, we investigate these claims when competitive tendering involves one segment of a vertical production chain. We show that direct customer contracting will not result in a perfectly contestable outcome if there is a complementary input provider with market power. We consider whether this situation improves when customers delegate the contracting process. Delegation only improves the outcome from the customers' perspective if the authority is able to receive side payments from the towage operators. Such side payments a priori would appear to be against the interests of the customers. We show, however, that side payments help the port authority to overcome the problems of market power, benefiting both the port authority and the customers. Further, these contracting outcomes are socially preferred to the unregulated outcome where port authorities and towage operators set prices and quality independently. This analysis sheds light and generally supports the Productivity Commission's recommendations.     

The law of small numbers: investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement

A commonly accepted view in the academic literature is that dispensing with competition may only be beneficial when tendering complex contracts. However, restricted auctions are frequently used among EU member states to procure small contracts. In this article, we investigate this paradox. Using an original data set of 180 contracts used by a local public buyer of social housing between 2006 and 2009, we show that limiting competition may enable economies to be made on transaction costs while the most efficient bidders still come forward, and that abuses such as corruption or favouritism do not result. To our knowledge, this article is the first to shed light on the advantages of using restricted auctions when tendering small simple contracts.     

The Protection of the Public Interest in the Context of Competitive Tendering

Public contracts increasingly have to be awarded through a procedure of public competitive tendering. State and other public bodies awarding public service contracts use this mechanism to require bidders to meet specific public interests, for example, certain environment standards, the promotion of women, or the employment of long-term unemployed persons. Such requirements impose upon bidders criteria not explicitly related to the contract, the implementation of which increases the project's cost and thus precludes the selection of the most economic offer, contrary to what is required by European recommendations. However the European Court of Justice has accepted such practice by Member States, considering it their right to organize themselves, within certain conditions, which are reviewed in this paper.     

The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions

A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller's valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state's internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers’ cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.     

Competition and Costs: Evidence from Competitive Tendering in the Scottish National Health Service

This paper estimates the impact of competitive tendering on cleaning costs in Scottish National Health Service hospitals. Unlike previous studies, which have relied on cross‐sectional data, a five‐year balanced panel of 176 hospitals is used to estimate a series of fixed effects regression models. These panel estimates suggest that previous studies have likely over‐estimated the cost‐savings associated with competitive tendering. The findings also suggest that the lower costs associated with competitive tendering have more to do with auction theory than with any intrinsic efficiency of the private sector.     

Competitive provision of public services: cost savings over successive rounds of tendering

We study the evolution of the cost of public service provision when subjected to a competitive tendering process. We add to the existing literature by analysing cost savings over successive rounds of tendering. Previous results in the literature show that initial cost savings tend to disappear over time with the age of the contract. Our findings suggest that each additional round of tendering will be followed by a renewal of cost savings. Thus, keeping competitive pressure via periodic tendering appears to address the problem.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR SOCIAL VALUE*

ABSTRACT: This article applies political economy theory to public‐private partnerships (PPPs). First, we propose that social welfare is the appropriate normative evaluation criterion to evaluate the social value of PPPs. Second, we specify the goals of PPP participants, including private‐sector partners and governments. Third, we review the observed outcomes of PPPs and analyze them from both a political economy perspective and a social welfare perspective. Fourth, based on a comparison of the actual outcomes of PPPs to normatively desirable social welfare outcomes, we propose some ‘rules for governments’ concerning the design of government PPP institutions and the management of PPPs. We argue that if governments were to adopt these rules there would be fewer PPPs in total, they would be more like traditional government contracts and there would be a greater likelihood of improved social welfare. However, political economy theory also explains why implementation of any reform will be difficult.     

The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment

We examine the relevance of an auction format in a competitive environment by comparing uniform and discriminatory price auctions with many bidders in a private values setting. We show that if the number of objects for sale is small relative to the number of bidders, then all equilibria of both auctions are approximately efficient and lead to approximately the same revenue. When the number of objects for sale is proportional to the number of bidders, then the particulars of the auction format matter. All equilibria of the uniform auction are efficient, while all of the equilibria of the discriminatory auction are inefficient. The relative revenue rankings of the auction formats can go in either direction, depending on the specifics of the environment. These conclusions regarding the efficiency and revenue ranking are in contrast to the previous literature, which focused on the case of independent information across agents.     

Financial crises and dynamic linkages across international stock and currency markets

This paper investigates contagion across stock and currency markets of China, Eurozone, India, Japan and US during global financial crisis and Eurozone crisis. The crisis periods are selected using Markov-switching models for US and Eurozone markets. We, then, utilize the DCC-GARCH model to estimate conditional correlation among the assets and test for contagion/flight to quality effects during the crises. The results show significant contagion as well as flight to quality effects both across and within asset classes. We examine the impact of financial stress index on the correlation across markets and find that portfolio diversification benefits for equity markets may be non-existent.     

Why Financial Deregulation?

Over the past six years, financial markets in Australia have been deregulated almost completely. This article attempts to explain why Australia's financial markets have been deregulated and why financial deregulation has occurred so quickly. It suggests the answers lie in changed perceptions of the usefulness of regulation as a means to specific ends. Exogenous developments in the financial environment altered the impact of regulations on financial institutions. The result was a weakening in the competitive position of regulated financial institutions relative to unregulated financial institutions and direct financiers. This led simultaneously to a reduction in the ability of the monetary authorities to control the growth of total financing and a growing perception amongst regulated institutions that the costs of regulated status outweighed the benefits. The rapid demise of the regulations can be traced to the joint realisation by the monetary authorities and the regulated institutions that the regulations no longer served their respective ends. This conjunction of 'public interest' and 'private interest' in financial deregulation can in turn be traced to the unique ability of financial markets to generate close substitutes for existing financial products at low cost.     

How do financial cycles affect public debt cycles?

We employ the duration framework to study determinants of public debt cycles in 57 advanced and emerging economies over the 1960–2014 period, with a particular focus on the impact of financial cycles. The results suggest that the association between financial and debt cycles is asymmetric. Debt expansions preceded by overheating in credit and financial markets tend to last longer than other expansions, but there is no significant association between financial cycles and debt contractions. There is strong evidence of duration dependence in both phases of the cycle, with the likelihood of expansions and contractions to end increasing with the length of their respective spells. Higher initial level of debt increases the spell of contractions (persistence of adjustment effort hypothesis) and reduces the spell of expansions (debt sustainability hypothesis). The results are robust to the inclusion of global factors, openness, political stability, and debt crisis indicators as additional controls.     

Public Procurement at the Local Level in Austria: The Economic Consequences of Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Public Services

This paper looks at possible problems concerning the economic effects of the introduction of an compulsory competitive tendering for general economic interest services at the local level. It examines the framework in Austria and some fundamental problems of competitive tendering. An obligation binding local authorities to put general economic interest services up for competitive tender, as currently intended by the European Commission (i.e. service concessions), would have considerable medium- and long-term effects on both the process of municipal service provision and the economic position of municipal (public) enterprises. The paper concludes that, from an economic point of view, procurement through competitive tendering does not appear to be effective or tenable for all general economic interest services in (all) different areas. The introduction of compulsory competitive tendering for service concessions in all areas of public services is therefore something best forgotten.     

INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT – THE EMERGENT PPP EQUITY MARKET

Increasingly governments are looking to private sector actors to invest in infrastructure projects. An emergent mechanism for such investment is the market in PPP equity. This is an aspect of PPPs that has to date had little empirical attention. This paper reports on the size and scope of the market in PPP equity sales within the UK. In the process, the nature of PPP projects and the existing rationales for the policy are critiqued. The paper concludes by laying out a number of potential research agendas focused on PPP equity sales including a call for reassessing theoretical perspectives.     

THE STRATEGIC PROCESS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE OUTCOME OF A TENDER

ABSTRACT ** :  A competitive tendering process within a public organization does not always render the anticipated results, i.e., the intended strategy is not always realized. This paper shows that the way the strategy process is managed by the parties involved in the tender is of importance to the outcome. Previous research has mainly focused on the situation ex ante the tendering process. This paper contributes to the research on competitive tendering by focusing on the management that takes place ex post the tendering process. For this purpose a theoretical framework consisting of a process-based approach on strategy formation is applied to the analysis of two case studies of competitive tendering in the Swedish water and sewage sector.     

The high/low divide: Self-selection by values in auction choice

Most prior theoretical and experimental work involving auction choice has assumed bidders find out their value after making a choice of which auction to enter. We examine whether or not bidders knowing their value prior to making a choice of which among multiple alternative auction formats to enter impacts their choice decision and/or the outcome of the auctions. The results show a strong impact on auction choice. Subjects with low values choose the first price sealed bid auction more often while subjects with high values choose the ascending auction more often. The number of bidders in each auction, revenue, efficiency and average bidder surplus all end up equalized.     

Questions About the Initiative of the European Commission Concerning the Awarding and Compulsory Competitive Tendering of Public Service Concessions

The ruling of the European Commission is that the award of contracts by regional or local authorities for the provision of services of general economic interest must be done by way of competitive tendering. Such contracts must not be awarded to the authority's own public enterprises or to any other enterprise, including by means of unilateral State act, without a call for tenders, a practice that had previously been common in many Member States. Public service concessions are also subject to the competition rules of the EC Treaty. Should the European Commission enact a directive concerning compulsory competitive tendering, this would result, for several Member States, in a serious change of paradigm as regards the awarding of public service concessions. Against this background, this article will attempt to find answers to the following questions: —How is the present relationship of the regional or local authority with its own public enterprise to be considered? —Are there any limits to applying the rules on competition of the EC Treaty to public service concessions? —What kind of positive and negative effects concerning economic efficiency and supply of specific public services result from the awarding of public service concessions and from compulsory competitive tendering? —What kind of, and what amount of, transaction costs result from compulsory competitive tendering and from the awarding of concessions? —Does competitive tendering work properly, and are public tenderers given equal opportunities? —Are there any alternatives to compulsory competitive tendering that would achieve an efficient market performance and provide sufficient supply?     

Rating agencies’ signals during the European sovereign debt crisis: Market impact and spillovers

The ongoing financial crisis has drawn considerable attention to the role of credit rating agencies in the financial system. We examine how the foreign exchange market reacts to sovereign credit events prior to (2000–2006) and during the crisis (2006–2010). The sample includes a broad set of countries in Europe and Central Asia in order to investigate spillover effects. We find that rating agencies’ signals do affect the own-country exchange rate and we identify strong spillover effects to other countries’ exchange rates in the region. In both cases, the impact of outlook and watch signals is stronger than the impact of actual rating changes. Market reactions and spillovers are far stronger during the financial crisis period than pre-crisis. Negative news from all three major agencies has an impact, whereas only Moody's positive news produces a reaction. Negative news from Fitch tends to have the strongest effect. The findings are important in enhancing understanding of the role of rating agencies and the market response to their signals.     

JOINT BIDDING,GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT COSTS:A CASE OF ROAD PROJECTS*

ABSTRACT *** : To utilize public resources efficiently, it is important to take advantage of competition in public procurement auctions to the maximum extent. Joint bidding is a common practice that potentially facilitates competition. By pooling financial and experiential resources, more firms are expected to enter the market, but it will also directly reduce competition if more than one bidder who is solely qualified makes a coalition. In theory joint bidding may or may not be beneficial to auctioneers, depending on the model. The paper empirically examines the impacts of joint bidding on firms' entry as well as bidding behaviour, using data on public road projects in developing countries. It shows that coalitional bids, in particular by local firms, would be competitive, but foreign joint ventures would undermine competition. It is also found that good governance can encourage firms' entry into the tendering and facilitate joint bidding practices.