证券市场托管制度优化研究

当前我国法规层面定义了证券"中央登记、二级托管"模式,但实质属于一级托管。证券托管制度的弊端逐渐显现,主要包括:一是交收主体错位不利于DVP结算制度的实施,二是无法有效组织券源满足市场融券需求,三是抑制证券公司的金融产品及业务创新,四是在一定程度上影响了市场的证券结算效率,五是不利于我国证券市场与国际接轨。本文建议:一是构建"看穿式"证券二级托管机制;二是优化顶层设计,健全与完善证券托管法规体系;三是建立证券公司二级托管业务内部管理体系;四是加强对证券公司开展二级托管业务的外部监督管理。     

CONTINGENT CAPITAL: INTEGRATING CORPORATE FINANCING AND RISK MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

Financial executives of companies that face a sharp increase in business or financial risks have two basic ways of protecting the solvency and strategic viability of their organizations: they can transfer those risks using insurance or derivatives; or they can raise additional capital, typically by issuing equity, to cushion the firm against the higher expected volatility. But CFOs now also have a third means of managing risk, known as "contingent capital," that effectively combines capital raising and risk management.
A contingent capital facility gives a company the right to raise capital after the realization of a loss arising from one or more specified risks, thus ensuring access to capital in potentially difficult times. For example, Swiss Re recently granted Michelin a five-year right to issue ten-year subordinated debt at a fixed spread over LIBOR, though only under conditions in which the tire maker expects its own earnings to be down. To the extent that it eliminates the need to keep more capital on the balance sheet, the use of such contingent capital has the potential to increase shareholder value by reducing a company's overall cost of capital. This article provides an introduction to some recent innovations in contingent capital, along with discussion of their role in integrating corporate finance and risk management.     

The Rise and Evolution of the Chief Risk Officer: Enterprise Risk Management at Hydro One

This article describes the five-year implementation of enterprise risk management at Hydro One, a Canadian electric utility in a newly deregulated market. Starting with the creation of the position of Chief Risk Officer and the implementation of a pilot risk study involving one of the firm's subsidiaries, the ERM process has made use of a variety of tools and techniques, including the "Delphi Method," risk trends, risk tolerances, and risk rankings.
Among the most tangible benefits of ERM at Hydro One are (1) a better coordinated and more effective process for allocating capital and (2) a favorable reaction to the program by Moody's and Standard & Poor's, which has arguably improved the company's credit rating and lowered its cost of capital. But perhaps equally important is the company's progress in realizing the first principle of its ERM policy—namely, that "risk management is everyone's responsibility, from the Board of Directors to individual employees." As a result, Hydro One's management feels that the company is much better positioned today to respond to new business developments than it was five years ago.     

Regulatory Capital of Financial Institutions: A Comparative Analysis

This study analyzes regulatory capital requirements of banks, thrifts and securities firms. Regulatory capital has traditionally guarded against credit risk and has been set on an asset‐by‐asset basis. Regulators now recognize the need to guard against a wider range of risks and to measure risk in a portfolio context rather than on an asset‐by‐asset basis. However, the measurement of portfolio risk in the presence of a wide variety of financial instruments and the complexity of financial institutions requires a level of sophistication that regulators are unlikely to possess. Consequently, it is important to reassess the purpose of regulatory captial. Regulatory capital now guards against the failure of the entire financial institution, while regulatory responsibility extends only to the insurance fund that guarantees bank deposits or brokerage accounts. Narrowing the regulatory focus to protect only insured accounts would reduce the need to consider all the activities of a financial instituion as is now necessary in order to establish regulatory capital.     

我国证券登记结算法律的进展与疑惑

修订后的《证券法》及证监会制定的《证券登记结算管理办法》通过确立共同对手方、分级结算、货银对付等原则，完善了我国证券登记结算法律，然而对于诸如存管概念、《管理办法》效力权限的不同认识，仍将在实践应用中构成疑问。登记结算机构试图在自己和证券买卖者之间设立防火墙的愿望得到一定程度的实现，但在分离的明晰度上结算环节要好于登记托管环节，证券公司的交易通道功能整体上没有改变。立法应在维护系统稳定与保护投资者间寻求平衡。     

INTEGRATING RISK MANAGEMENT AND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

Capital management and risk management are two sides of the same coin. But by treating them separately, the conventional theory and practice of corporate finance fails to account for important connections between them. Moreover, an exclusive focus on debt and equity ignores the full range of capital resources available to a corporation, thus distorting management's view of the firm's cost of capital (and its return on equity).
An understanding of the role of corporate capital–including off-balance sheet as well as paid-up capital—and its relationship to the riskiness of a firm's activities provides the foundation on which the author builds a corporate finance framework that ties together both the insurance and capital markets. This framework, called the "Insurative Model," captures the economics of both conventional insurance and corporate finance instruments and embraces a wide variety of solutions and instruments—be they debt, equity, insurance, derivative, contingent capital, or any other—and allows managers to evaluate their effectiveness in a consistent, unified way.
The Insurative Model demonstrates that a company's decisions on insurance and risk retention can be just as important as its decisions about its debt-equity mix. In fact, the determination of a firm's optimal debt-equity ratio should be the last in a series of capital and risk management decisions. Earlier decisions should address risk retention, risk transfer, and the optimal amounts and structure of off-balance-sheet capital used to support the company's retained risks.     

Solvency II,asset liability management,and the European bond market – theory and empirical evidence

It is already foreseeable that Solvency II will tie capital requirements to a very comprehensive risk definition including underwriting and market risks. The new regulatory framework will demand more sophisticated tools to detect interest rate risks on both sides of the balance sheet in an integrated approach. Efforts by life insurers to level these risks could lead to an increased demand for long term fixed income securities. At this point the question arises if this industry wide change in asset demand will have or already has had an impact on prices of long-term bonds and the yield curve in the Euro-Zone?     

On the role of arbitrageurs in rational markets

We investigate the role of “arbitrageurs,” who exploit price discrepancies between redundant securities. Arbitrage opportunities arise endogenously in an economy populated by rational, heterogeneous investors facing investment restrictions. We show that an arbitrageur alleviates these restrictions and improves the transfer of risk amongst investors. When the arbitrageur behaves noncompetitively, taking into account the price impact of his trades, he optimally limits the size of his positions due to his decreasing marginal profits. When the arbitrageur is subject to margin requirements and is endowed with capital from outside investors, the size of his trades and capital are endogenously determined in equilibrium.     

Liquidity risk and policy options

On the basis of a liquidity management model, liquidity risks, defined as the probability of payment failures in a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) payment system, may either stem from liquidity management inefficiencies or insufficient cash balances. I will show that penalties charged on the amount of payment failures minimise liquidity risks without interfering with the bank’s technology preferences. I will instead show that liquidity requirements, although as effective as penalties to contain the risk of liquidity shortage, may distort the bank’s technology preferences and cannot stem liquidity management inefficiencies. I will also show that liquidity risks within RTGS payment systems are potentially smaller because they depend more on the liquidity management efficiency than on the randomness of cash inflows and outflows.     

Who's bringing you hot ideas and how are you responding?

There's an unsung hero in your organization. It's the person who's bringing in new ideas from the outside about how to manage better. These aren't your product and service innovators--those people are celebrated loudly and often. This is the manager who, for instance, first uttered the phrase "balance scorecard" in your hallways, or "real options," or "intellectual capital." Managerial innovation is an increasingly important source of competitive advantage--especially given the speed with which product innovations are copied--but it doesn't happen automatically. It takes a certain kind of person to welcome new management ideas and usher them into an organization. The authors recently studied 100 such people to find out how they translate new ideas into action in their organizations. They discovered that they are a distinct type of practitioner; that is to say, they resemble their counterparts in other organizations more than they resemble their own colleagues, and they share a common way of working. "Idea practitioners," as the authors call them, begin by scouting for ideas. All of them are avid readers of management literature and enthusiastic participants in business conferences; many are friendly with business gurus. Once they've identified an idea that seems to hold promise, they tailor it to fit their organizations' specific needs. Next, they actively sell the idea--to senior executives, to the rank and file, to middle managers. And finally, they get the ball rolling by participating in small-scale experiments. But when those take off, they get out of the way and let others execute. In this article, the authors identify the characteristics of idea practitioners and offer strategies for managing them wisely.     

Corporate Finance and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism

We analyze the transmission effects of monetary policy in ageneral equilibrium model of the financial sector, with banklending and securities markets. Bank lending is constrainedby capital adequacy requirements, and asymmetric informationadds a cost to outside bank equity capital. In our model, monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bankliquidity; rather, it operates through changes in the spreadof bank loans over corporate bonds, which induce changes inthe aggregate composition of financing by firms, and in banks’equity-capital base. The model produces multiple equilibria,one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch."     

THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT: A DECADE OF INNOVATIONS IN PROCESS AND PRODUCTS

The explosion of corporate risk management programs in the early 1990s was a hasty and ill‐conceived reaction by U.S. corporations to the great “derivatives disasters” of that period. Anxious to avoid the fate of Barings and Procter & Gamble, most top executives were more concerned about crisis management than risk management. Many companies quickly installed (often outrageously priced) value‐at‐risk (VaR) systems without paying much attention to how such systems fit their specific business requirements. Focused myopically on loss avoidance and technical risk measurement issues, the corporate risk management revolution of the '90s thus got underway in a disorganized, ad hoc fashion, producing a curious amalgam of policies and procedures with no clear link to the corporate mission of maximizing value. But as the risk management revolution unfolded over the last decade, the result has been the “convergence” of different risk management perspectives, processes, and products. The most visible sign of such convergence is a fairly recent development called “alternative risk transfer,” or ART. ART forms consist of the large and growing collection of new risk transfer and financing products now being offered by insurance and reinsurance companies. As just one example, a new class of security known as “contingent capital” gives a company the option over a specified period—say, the next five years—to issue new equity or debt at a pre‐negotiated price. And to hold down their cost, such “pre‐loss” financing options are typically designed to be “triggered” only when the firm is most likely to need an infusion of new capital to avoid underinvestment or financial distress. But underlying—and to a large extent driving—this convergence of insurance and capital markets is a more fundamental kind of convergence: the integration of risk management with corporate financing decisions. As first corporate finance theorists and now practitioners have come to realize, decisions about a company's optimal capital structure and the design of its securities cannot be made without first taking account of the firm's risks and its opportunities for managing them. Indeed, this article argues that a comprehensive, value‐maximizing approach to corporate finance must begin with a risk management strategy that incorporates the full range of available risk management products, including the new risk finance products as well as established risk transfer instruments like interest rate and currency derivatives. The challenge confronting today's CFO is to maximize firm value by choosing the mixture of securities and risk management products and solutions that gives the company access to capital at the lowest possible cost.     

Risk and concentration in payment and securities settlement systems

What drives the intraday patterns of settlement in payment and securities settlement systems? Using a model of the strategic interaction of participants in these systems to capture some stylized facts about the Federal Reserve's Fedwire funds and securities systems, this paper identifies three factors that influence a participant's decision on when to send transactions intraday: cost of intraday liquidity, extent of settlement risk, and system design. With these factors, the model can make predictions regarding the impact of policy on the concentration of transactions, amount of intraday overdrafts, central bank credit exposure, costs to system participants, and other risks.     

RAROC AT BANK OF AMERICA: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

In 1993, Bank of America's Risk and Capital Analysis Group was charged with the task of developing and instituting a single corporate-wide system to allocate capital to all the bank's activities. Since 1994, that system has been providing quarterly reports of risk-adjusted returns on capital (RAROC) for each of the bank's 37 major business units. By 1995, B of A had also developed the capability to calculate RAROC down to the level of individual products, transactions, and customer relationships. RAROC systems allocate capital for two basic reasons: (1) risk management and (2) performance evaluation. For risk management purposes, the overriding goal of allocating capital to individual business units is to determine the bank's optimal capital structure–the proportion of equity to assets that minimizes the bank's overall cost of funding. This process involves estimating how much the risk (or volatility) of each business unit contributes to the total risk of the bank, and hence to the bank's overall capital requirements. For performance evaluation purposes, RAROC systems assign capital to business units as part of a process of determining the risk-adjusted rate of return and, ultimately, the “economic profit” of each business unit. The objective in this case is to measure a business unit's contribution to shareholder value, and thus to provide a basis for effective planning, capital budgeting, and incentive compensation at the business unit level. Concerns about capital adequacy, along with the Basel risk-based capital requirements, have played some role in the growth of RAROC among commercial banks. But the most powerful impetus to bankers' use of more systematic risk measures is coming from increasingly activist institutional investors. Besides giving senior management an economic basis for evaluating the bank as a portfolio of businesses and for making resource allocation decisions that improve the bank's risk/reward profile, RAROC systems are also expected to produce better performance by holding managers accountable for the amount of investor capital they are putting at risk.     

Assessing Systemic Risk Exposure from Banks and GSEs Under Alternative Approaches to Capital Regulation

A key function of capital regulation is to mitigate the potential for systemic financial risk by maintaining public confidence in the ability of regulated market participants to honor their financial obligations in times of market stress. While it is well known that the portfolios of banks and non-banks, especially those intermediaries specializing in mortgage securitization or in specialized mortgage lending, differ in important respects, debate over alternative capital regulations has yet to recognize the implications of these differences, despite the increasing importance of non-bank intermediaries in risk-sharing markets. This paper uses a simple two-date discrete state space exchange economy with opportunities for moral hazard on the part of financial intermediaries to investigate the design of capital regulations to control systemic risk. Holding constant asset risks, we show that intermediaries that issue contingent liabilities may exhibit low or no risk of insolvency while holding significantly less capital than deposit-taking institutions because banks primarily issue claims that promise fixed payments in all states of nature. We also show that, rather than raising capital requirements, the control of systemic risk may involve lowering capital requirements and extending guarantees to liability-holders, without a necessary increase in expected subsidy payments, if such requirements account for shareholder incentives. Specifically, we analyze an example of regulatory policy in which lower capital requirements and an ex post penalty schedule reduce systemic risk by increasing the volume of tradable securities exchanged and by offering a credible mechanism by which intermediaries can signal the true riskiness of their portfolios to liability-holders.     

THE INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR

In this paper I address several phenomena that arise from the limited information possessed by individual investors. This limitation focuses attention on the channels by which investors receive information about securities. I find this perspective to have implications for the marketing of financial products, the dissemination of information by brokers, the commissions of brokerages, the role of investment analysis in the pricing of securities, the pricing of the services provided by financial intermediaries, and the equilibrium of pricing of capital assets.     

我国证券公司风险处置问题探析

证券公司的风险处置是化解金融风险的最重要环节之一。本文通过介绍我国证券公司风险处置的几种主要模式，分析了我国证券公司风险处置过程中存在的主要问题，如证券公司风险处置相关法律法规不完善、行政化手段多于市场化手段、过多行政干预成本高昂等，提出了完善我国证券公司风险处置工作的政策建议，如完善并加强证券公司风险处置的相关立法、建立并完善责任追究制度、创造良好的监管环境、完善投资者保护制度等。     

我国券商风险管理问题及风险控制研究

金融创新的不断深化为我国券商经营发展带来了机遇,也对券商的风险管理提出了更高的要求。本文对我国券商风险管理中存在的问题进行梳理,通过借鉴国外券商风险管理经验,在制度、组织和模型建设上为我国券商风险管理提出对策。     

Incorporating Strategic Risk into Enterprise Risk Management: A Survey of Current Corporate Practice

Since ERM is a relatively recent activity and has yet to be fully implemented in most companies, there has been little academic research about its accomplishments and about the obstacles to further progress. In particular, very little has been published about corporate attempts to identify and manage corporate strategic risks while integrating them into a corporate‐ wide ERM framework. This article uses responses collected from a survey of 271 risk and financial executives in North American and European companies to address the following questions: What forces are behind this push for a more organized and integrated management of significant risks? What challenges are companies encountering as they implement implement ERM? Once fully in place, how does ERM affect the company's ability to implement its strategy? The primary drivers of ERM are said to be corporate governance requirements and other regulatory pressures, and management and investor demand for greater understanding of strategic and operating risks. The benefits of full ERM implementation are increased management accountability and better governance practices, greater managerial understanding of and consensus about corporate strategy, and, in some cases, higher credit ratings and hence a lower cost of capital. The tools and techniques to measure the impact of strategic risks appear to vary, depending on the stage of ERM implementation. For advanced ERM companies, the most frequently used tools and techniques are key risk indicators, self‐assessments, and scenario analysis.     

You have more capital than you think

Senior executives typically delegate the responsibility for managing a firm's derivatives portfolio to in-house financial experts and the company's financial advisers. That's a strategic blunder, argues this Nobel laureate, because the inventiveness of modern financial markets makes it possible for companies to double or even triple their capacity to invest in their strategic assets and competencies. Risks fall into two categories: either a company adds value by assuming them on behalf of its shareholders or it does not. By hedging or insuring against non-value-adding risks with derivative securities and contracts, thereby removing them from what the author calls the risk balance sheet, managers can release equity capital for assuming more value-adding risk. This is not just a theoretical possibility. One innovation-the interest rate swap, introduced about 20 years ago-has already enabled the banking industry to dramatically increase its capacity for adding value to each dollar of invested equity capital. With the range of derivative instruments growing, there is no reason why other companies could not similarly remove strategic risks, potentially creating billions of dollars in shareholder value. The possibilities are especially important for private companies that have no access to public equity markets and therefore cannot easily increase their equity capital by issuing more shares. The author describes how derivative contracts of various kinds are already being employed strategically to mitigate or eliminate various risks. He also shows how companies can use the risk balance sheet to identify risks they should not bear directly and to determine how much equity capacity they can release for assuming more value-adding risk.