Asymmetric Information,Auditing Commitment,and Economic Growth

We analyze in this paper the growth and welfare consequences stemming from the lack of auditing commitment in a credit market with costly state verification. By studying two endogenous growth models, one of which allows lenders to commit to costly auditing strategies, whereas the other does not, we show that the inability to commit serves as a source of informational friction that results in more stringent contractual terms, which, in turn, result in lower capital accumulation, growth, and welfare. From the policy perspective, our analysis suggests a new micro‐economic channel through which institutional failings hinder economic growth and social welfare.     

Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market

Summary  The neoclassical model of labor market discrimination assumes the presence of either prejudiced preferences, biased assessments of worker productivity, or monopsony power. We show that when market agents control asymmetric information, strategic behavior can induce discriminatory hiring practices even when these market features are absent. Moreover, strategic interaction many distort public policies to the point of harming the segments of the work force they were designed to support. Received: January 3, 1996 revised version April 29, 1996     

Implementing the Mortensen rule in a frictional labor market

We show that, in settings where meetings can be multilateral, the allocation rule proposed by Mortensen (1982) can be relatively straightforward to implement: as a local auction conducted by sellers. The implications of using this mechanism in a simple model of the labor market are then explored. We characterize the equilibrium properties of this model, which include wage dispersion, and examine its implied Beveridge curve. A dynamic version of the model is calibrated to the US labor market, and we show that the model can account for observed vacancy rates, given parameters that are chosen to match the average wages and the natural rate of unemployment, although the implied wage dispersion is quite small. Finally, in the limit, as the time between offer rounds in the model approaches zero, the equilibrium approaches the Walrasian competitive equilibrium.     

Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition

This paper studies a class of one-dimensional screening problems where the agent's utility function does not satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees condition (SMC). The strength of the SMC for hidden information problems is to provide a full characterization of implementable contracts using only the local incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. These constraints are equivalent to the monotonicity of the decision variable with respect to the agent's unobservable one-dimensional parameter. When the SMC is violated the local IC constraints are no longer sufficient for implementability and additional (global) IC constraints have to be taken into account. In particular, implementable decisions may not be monotonic and discretely pooled types must have the same marginal utility of the decision (or equivalently, get the same marginal tariff). Moreover, at the optimal decision, the principal must preserve the same trade-off between rent extraction and allocative distortion measured in the agent's marginal rent unit. In a specific setting where non-monotone contracts may be optimal we fully characterize the solution.     

Industry structure and labor market flexibility in the South African manufacturing sector: A time series and panel data approach

This paper presents a joint analysis of labor market flexibility and product market structure. Our investigation confirms earlier results of imperfect competition in South African manufacturing where we find an average mark-up of 50% for the period 1970 to 2004 that is without consistent trend over time. The contribution of the paper is to provide a theoretically grounded means of linking output market conduct to labor market flexibility. We infer the proportion of labor associated with rigidities in the labor market from the mark-up, and find that two thirds of total labor employed in South African manufacturing is associated with rigidities. We find that this proportion falls during the 1980s and rises during the 1990s, suggesting an increase in labor flexibility followed by a decrease.     

The Labor Contract Law,Macro Conditions,Self‐Selection,and Labor Market Outcomes for Migrants in China

China introduced a new Labor Contract Law (LCL, 2008) to protect employees’ working conditions and welfare. Early evaluations of labour market outcomes suggest positive effects for workers. In the same period, however, China faced labor market tightening, which facilitated the LCL's introduction and enforcement. Existing evaluations of the LCL treat the introduction of the LCL as being exogenous. We show that labor market tightening and individuals’ self‐selection into jobs whichcomply with the Law have affected migrant labor market outcomes. Taking these factors separately into account suggests that, the LCL has had varying effects on labor market outcomes: a negative effect on wages and hours; an unclear effect on having a written contract, and a positive effect on social insurance participation. Data inadequacies prevent us from considering these factors simultaneously.     

Labor supply, home production, and welfare comparisons

We consider the collective model of labor supply with marketable domestic production. We first show that, if domestic production is mistakenly ignored, the ‘collective’ indirect utility functions that are retrieved from observed behavior will be unbiased if and only if the retrieved from observed behavior will be unbiased if and only if the profit function is additive. Otherwise, in the non-additive case, the direction and the size of the bias will depend on the complementarity-substitutability of spouses' time inputs in the production process. We then show that, even if domestic labor supply functions are not observed, valid welfare comparisons are possible. This identification result generalizes that in Chiappori [Chiappori, P.A., 1992. Collective labor supply and welfare. Journal of Political Economy 100, 437-467].     

The labor market and corporate structure

We analyze the impact of labor demand and labor market regulations on the corporate structure of firms. Higher wages are associated with lower monitoring, irrespective of whether these high wages are caused by labor market regulations, unions or higher labor demand. We also find that the organization of firms has important macroeconomic implications. In particular, monitoring is a type of “rent-seeking” activity and the decentralized equilibrium spends excessive resources on monitoring. Labor market regulations that reduce monitoring by pushing wages up may increase net output or reduce it only by a small amount even though they reduce employment.     

Banking crises,labor reforms,and unemployment

Using a sample of 97 countries spanning the period 1980–2008, we estimate that banking crises have, on average, a large negative impact on unemployment. This effect, however, largely depends on the flexibility of labor market institutions: while in countries with more flexible labor markets the impact of banking crises is sharper but short-lived, in countries with more rigid labor markets the effect is initially more subdued but highly persistent. These effects are even larger for youth unemployment in the short term, and long-term unemployment in the medium term. Conversely, large upfront, or gradual but significant, comprehensive market reforms have a positive impact on unemployment, albeit only in the medium term.     

Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents

For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if agents' payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs. The contrary result of Neeman [Z. Neeman, The relevance of private information in mechanism design, J. Econ. Theory 117 (2004) 55-77] rests on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them.     

Managerial risk-taking incentives, product market competition and welfare

Managers’ compensation may increase with the variance of the firm's profits. This paper investigates how this affects their choice of strategic variables, and how that affects managerial compensation. The social welfare aspects of this interaction are analyzed in a duopoly setting with uncertain linear demand and linear marginal cost. Compared to a situation in which the managers’ compensation does not depend on the variance of profits, social welfare may be either higher, lower, or remain unaffected, depending on the slope of the marginal cost curve and whether the competing firms produce goods that are demand substitutes or complements.     

Revisions to US labor market data and the public’s perception of the economy

Using the monthly “Employment Situation” reports for 1994–2013, this paper studies the revisions to US employment data. The paper shows that the first press release underestimates net job creation in expansions and overestimates it in downturns. The “errors” in reporting the data on the labor market can distort the public’s perception about the stance of the labor market and have some political consequences. This is well reflected by the finding that the job approval rating of President Obama, the index of consumer confidence, and the economic conditions index of Gallup have all been responding to the initial news on the US labor market as they were published in the Employment Situation reports.     

The relevance of private information in mechanism design

Recent results in mechanism design show that as long as agents have correlated private information and are sufficiently risk neutral, it is possible to design mechanisms that leave agents with arbitrarily small information rents. We show that these full-rent-extraction results hinge on the implicit assumption that the agents’ beliefs uniquely determine their preferences. We present an example of the voluntary provision of a public good in which this assumption is relaxed, and consequently, even in highly correlated environments, if agents’ beliefs do not uniquely determine their preferences, then the extraction of the agents’ entire information rents is impossible.     

OVERTIME WORK AS A SIGNALING DEVICE†

This paper provides an explanation for the empirically proven relationship between overtime and future benefits. We suggest an internal signaling model, in which a worker signals his value to the employer by supplying unpaid overtime. In our empirical analysis, we examine whether overtime has in fact a signaling component. Variations in collectively bargained hours between industries are exploited, as they imply different overtime thresholds for workers with the same number of actual hours. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel Study for the years 1993–2004, a positive signaling value of unpaid overtime is found for West German workers.     

Labor market cycles, unemployment insurance eligibility, and moral hazard

If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to working, so, by itself, it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, then there is a UI contribution scheme that eliminates any effect of UI on employment decisions. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the effects of UI to violations of its premises. Our baseline simulation shows that if the neutral contribution scheme derived in this paper were to be implemented, the average unemployment rate in the United States would fall from 5.7 to 4.7 percent. Also, the results show that with endogenous UI eligibility, one can simultaneously generate realistic productivity driven cycles and realistic responses of unemployment to changes in UI benefits.     

Uncertainty and the specificity of human capital

This paper studies the choice between general and specific human capital. A trade-off arises because general human capital, while less productive, can easily be reallocated across firms. Accordingly, the fraction of individuals with specific human capital depends on the amount of uncertainty in the economy. Our model implies that while economies with more specific human capital tend to be more productive, they also tend to be more vulnerable to turbulence. As such, our theory sheds some light on the experience of Japan, where human capital is notoriously specific: while Japan benefited from this predominately specific labor force in tranquil times, this specificity may also have been at the heart of its prolonged stagnation.     

A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination

We study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium. The interaction between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize. Discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. The dominant group gains from discrimination, rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate discrimination. The model is also consistent with “reverse discrimination” as a remedy against discrimination since it may be necessary to decrease the welfare of the dominant group to achieve parity.     

Estimating labour market transitions and continuations using repeated cross sectional data

This paper proposes a population cohort approach for estimating labour market continuations (or transitions) using repeated cross sectional data. This approach allows for the construction of consistent standard errors that account for the full variability of cross sectional data.