Credit quality and technical efficiency in banking

We estimate banks’ technical efficiency using directional distance functions, a generalization of the radial distance functions that allow us to credit banks for their efforts to increase outputs and decrease resource use and bad loans. We find that once bad loans are considered, banks’ efficiency increases significantly. In addition, omitting bad loans may result in the underestimation of the performance of good credit quality banks. These results suggest that a significant aspect of banking production, credit quality, needs to be considered when evaluating banks’ performances for regulatory purposes.     

Money, credit and banking

In monetary models where agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex post inefficiency since some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained. This problem creates a role for financial intermediaries, such as banks, who accept nominal deposits and make nominal loans. In general, financial intermediation improves the allocation. The gains in welfare come from the payment of interest on deposits and not from relaxing borrowers’ liquidity constraints. We also demonstrate that when credit rationing occurs increasing the rate of inflation can be welfare improving.     

Deregulation, market power and risk behaviour in Spanish banks

This paper provides empirical evidence on the effects of regulatory changes in the market power of Spanish banks. It also analyses the response of banks, in terms of risk-taking behaviour, as a result of a reduction in economic profits. We find that liberalisation measures have increased competition and eroded banks’ market power. We observe that banks with lower charter values tend to have lower equity-assets ratios (lower solvency) and to experience higher credit risk. The last evidence is new in the literature and calls for strengthening regulatory concerns about credit risk management by banks in situations of increased competition.     

Capital regulation, bank competition, and financial stability

We analyze capital requirements if banks compete for loans and deposits. Banks and firms are subject to a risk-shifting problem. The ambiguous effect of competition on banks’ risk-taking translates into an ambiguous effect of capital requirements on financial stability.     

Industrial loans and market structure

Based on the observation that financing is one of the main obstacles to create new firms, this paper deals with the interactions between the market structure of both the banking sector and the borrowing industries. We consider that firms’ installation costs are financed by means of industrial loans from specialized banks. With endogenous entry in banking activity as well as in the borrowing industry, we find that a natural oligopoly emerges in both sectors if the entry cost in the industrial sector is small enough, relative to the banks’ entry cost.     

How do banks set interest rates?

This paper studies cross-sectional differences in banks interest rates. It adds to the literature in two ways. First, it analyzes systematically the micro and macroeconomic factors that influence the price-setting behaviour of banks. Second, by using banks’ prices (rather than quantities) it provides an alternative way of disentangling loan supply from loan demand shift in the “bank lending channel” literature. The results suggest that heterogeneity in the banking rates pass-through - depending on liquidity, capitalization and relationship lending - exists only in the short run.     

Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Bank Lending: Evidence for Germany and the Euro Area

Abstract. This paper analyzes the dynamic response of loans to the private sector and of economic activity to aggregate supply, demand and monetary policy shocks in Germany and the euro area based on a standard macroeconomic VAR using sign restrictions to identify the structural shocks. The main results of this analysis are that (i) with the exception of the response to the supply shock in Germany, the response of loans to the three macroeconomic shocks is rather weak and in most cases insignificant; (ii) the 2000–05 credit slowdown and weak economic performance in Germany were primarily driven by adverse supply shocks; and (iii) the marked slowdown in credit creation in Germany over this period actually represents a realignment of the outstanding stock of loans with its deterministic level. In order to assess the role of bank lending in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks, we further perform counterfactual simulations and analyze the dynamic responses of German loan subaggregates in order to test the distributional implications of potential credit market frictions. These exercises do not indicate that credit market frictions play an amplifying role in the transmission of macroeconomic fluctuations.     

The bank lending channel of unconventional monetary policy: The impact of the VLTROs on credit supply in Spain

We assess the impact on the credit supply to non-financial corporations of the two very long term refinancing operations (VLTROs) conducted by the Eurosystem in December 2011 and February 2012 for the case of Spain. To do so we use bank–firm level information from a sample of more than one million lending relationships during two years. Our methodology tackles three main identification challenges: (i) how to disentangle credit supply from demand; (ii) the non-random assignment of firms to banks; (iii) the endogeneity of the VLTRO bids, as banks with more deteriorated funding conditions were more likely both to ask for a large amount of funds and to restrain credit supply. Our findings suggest that the VLTROs had a positive moderate-sized effect on the supply of bank credit to firms. We also find that the effect was greater for illiquid banks and that it was driven by credit to SMEs, as there was no impact on loans to large firms. By contrast, strong firm–bank relationships were less sensitive to the positive liquidity shock caused by the VLTROs, which is consistent with the studies that find that relationship lending is a more stable source of credit than transaction lending. Finally, the VLTROs had no impact on either the degree of loan collateralisation or the probability of making loans to new borrowers, while they decreased the probability of renewing old ones, which suggests that those funds were not used for loan “evergreening”.     

Does corruption hamper bank lending? Macro and micro evidence

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of corruption in bank lending. Corruption is expected to hamper bank lending, as it is closely related to legal enforcement, which has been shown to promote banks’ willingness to lend. Nevertheless the similarities between the consequences for bank lending of law enforcement and corruption are misleading, as they consider only judiciary corruption. Corruption can also occur in lending and may then be beneficial for bank lending via bribes given by borrowers to enhance their chances of receiving loans. This assumption may be validated particularly in the presence of pronounced risk aversion by banks, resulting in greater reluctance on the part of banks to grant loans. We perform country-level and bank-level estimations to investigate these assumptions. Corruption reduces bank lending in both sets of estimations. However, bank-level estimations show that the detrimental effect of corruption is reduced when bank risk aversion increases, even leading at times to situations wherein corruption fosters bank lending. Additional controls show that corruption does not increase bank credit by favoring only bad loans. Therefore, our findings show that while the overall effect of corruption is to hamper bank lending, it can alleviate firm’s financing obstacles.     

Market structure and credit procyclicality: Lessons from loan markets in the European Union banking sectors

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the market structure has an impact on procyclicality in the European Union bank loan markets. The cyclical responses of three types of bank loans (residential mortgage loans, consumer loans, and corporate loans) are quantified separately using the interacted panel vector autoregression model at the country level and the single-equation panel regression model at the bank level. Using a sample of 26 European Union countries, we find that the procyclical responses of residential mortgage loans and consumer loans are significantly stronger and prolonged when the banking sector is more concentrated or dominated by foreign banks. However, we find that there are nonlinear relationships between the market structure and credit procyclicality based on bank-level data. We also find some heterogeneities between advanced and transitioning European Union banking sectors. Finally, our findings confirm the leading role of residential mortgages in intensifying credit fluctuations.     

The Presence of Multinational Banks and the Supply and Quality of Credit in Emerging Economies

Barriers to entry for multinational banks (MNBs) have been reduced in many countries. This paper studies the effect of the presence of MNBs on the supply and quality of credit in emerging economies. This study uses data from the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund. The results indicate that the credit supply declines in response to increased competition from MNBs. However, the adverse effect of MNBs on the credit supply is less pronounced when the presence of MNBs is larger. The paper also provides some tentative results on the effect of MNBs on the quality of loans. The results suggest that banks shift their portfolios away from loans as a result of increased international financial competition, thereby reducing default risk, which is also reflected in a negative relationship between MNB presence and the chance of a banking crisis occurring.     

Interest rate pass-through in Morocco: Evidence from bank-level survey data

We investigate the relationship between banks’ marginal cost and retail lending rates in Morocco. The data covers the rates of new business loans for four market segments broken down by institutional sector between 2006Q2 and 2016Q4. We examine the pass-through mechanism using recently developed heterogeneous panel cointegration framework. Our findings suggest that there is a high degree of pass-through heterogeneity over bank products. The weak adjustment for short-term credit facilities and consumption loans can be explained by credit risk compensation allowing banks to reduce their exposition to systemic risks. Corporate loans are priced more competitive than household and individual entrepreneur products, suggesting that negotiation power or the competition from the borrower side matters. Overall, our results indicate that banking market contestability has improved during the last decade.     

SOME NEW EVIDENCE ON COMPETITION IN PAYDAY LENDING MARKETS

A critical question in the policy debate about payday lending is whether other financial institutions can plausibly provide attractive and lower‐priced substitutes for standard payday loans. I present several new pieces of evidence addressing the question, focusing on whether credit unions, which are often held as the strongest potential competitors to payday lenders, do (or might) viably compete in the payday loan market. National payday loan offerings by credit unions show that very few credit unions currently offer payday loans. Credit union industry reports suggest that those credit unions offering such loans seem unwilling or unable to undercut substantially the prevailing prices set by payday lenders. Those industry reports also reveal that lower‐priced credit union loans generally ration riskier borrowers out of the market by imposing greater restrictions on approval and repayment; risk‐adjusted prices for credit union payday loans may not be lower at all. Survey evidence suggests that most current payday borrowers prefer higher‐priced but less restrictive standard payday loans to lower‐priced but more restrictive alternatives offered by credit unions. The combined demand‐ and supply‐side evidence suggests that one should not expect credit unions (or by extension banks) to offer lower‐priced, higher‐quality alternatives for consumers who currently use payday loans. (JEL G2, L0, L5)     

INTERNATIONAL CREDIT CHANNEL OF MONETARY POLICY: AN EMPIRICAL NOTE

A longstanding macroeconomic issue is how monetary policy affects the real economy. There are economists placing an emphasis on the role of bank lending in monetary transmission. Their view, called the credit view, is that a monetary tightening shifts the supply schedule of bank loans left, thereby forcing bank‐dependent borrowers to cut back on expenditures. In the literature, the credit view is typically studied in a closed‐economy context. In reality, however, banks make international loans through their overseas branches and subsidiaries. This suggests that the credit view should be studied in an open‐economy context. This paper proposes the international credit view: a monetary‐policy shock originated in one country propagates to another through banks’ reallocation of funds between the two countries. For testing the hypothesis, Australia and New Zealand provide an excellent case to study. This is because Australian‐owned banks dominate the banking market in New Zealand. This paper aims to test the international credit view within a framework of vector auto‐regression models. A significant and robust finding is that the supply schedule of loans shifts left in New Zealand after a monetary tightening in Australia.     

Credit creation under multiple banking regulations: The impact of balance sheet diversity on money supply

Since the recent financial crisis along with more concentration of banking supervision, we have stepped into a new regulatory regime where multiple regulations are at play simultaneously. In this paper, we study the collective impacts of multiple regulations on credit creation in a heterogeneous banking system. Each single regulation imposes a constraint on credit creation for each bank, while with multiple regulations, only the most stringent one plays the determinant role on money supply. For the homogeneous banking system with identical balance sheets, they share the same binding regulation. In contrast, for the heterogeneous banking system with diverse balance sheets, the binding regulation for each bank may be different from other's. Those banks, who are bound by different regulatory constraints from homogeneous banks, would bring about an overall reduction in money supply, because those binding regulations impose a lower capacity (compared with the one in the case of homogeneous banks) for the banks to extend their balance sheets in this condition. We put forward an agent-based model of commercial banks integrated with two processes: credit creation and fund transfer, to demonstrate the reduction effect. The results facilitate the understandings of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy via banks and its interaction with prudential regulations.     

Meltdown Iceland: Lessons on the World Financial Crisis from a Small Bankrupt Island

The paper reports that no statistically significant empirical relationship can be shown between total bank credit and the US broad money supply in the period after 1995. It argues that the growing prevalence of non-bank deposits in the form of mutual money market funds and asset securitization are the main culprits for this result. Prior to financial liberalization, the connection between total bank credit and broad money supply was simple enough: new bank deposits were created when banks made loans and were extinguished when loans were paid back. In banks' consolidated balance sheet, total deposits made up total liabilities and were basically equal to the broad money supply. However, in the age of financial liberalization not all deposits bank loans created returned as deposits, whether in banks or non-banks, as deposits could be swapped for non-deposit liabilities without a corresponding draw down on the asset side. Moreover, loans could be extinguished in banks' balance sheets through asset securitization.     

Enforcing the 1988 Basel Capital Requirements: Did it Curtail Bank Credit in Emerging Economies?

We examine whether the enforcement of bank capital asset requirements (CARs) curtailed the supply of credit in emerging economies. Preliminarily, we identify 16 emerging economies that – according to official and impartial reports – enforced the 1988 Basel standard during the 1990s. Then we perform our twofold econometric analysis. In the former part, we use macro data to test whether, controlling for economic fundamental variables, the enforcement brought about a slowdown in aggregate credit in these countries vis-a-vis other emerging economies. We find some support for our hypothesis. In the latter part, we employ individual bank data to better identify the 'capital crunch' effect of the enforcement. Here, we find that CAR enforcement – according to the 1988 Basel standard – significantly curtailed credit supply, particularly at less well-capitalized banks. The two empirical parts together suggest that the CAR enforcement did curtail aggregate credit in the examined emerging countries and that this result is rooted in the attempt by under-capitalized banks to reduce their loans. We argue that among developing countries – where banks are often the only source of financial intermediation – the positive effect of higher capital requirements, represented by the reduction of poor quality lending, may be offset by their negative impact on bank liquidity and on the level of economic activity. Hence, our results suggest that particular care is required to avoid potential negative macroeconomic effects when phasing in new and higher capital requirements in emerging economies.
(J.E.L.: G18, G21, G28)     

Cross-country differences in monetary policy execution and money market rates’ volatility

Volatility patterns in overnight interest rates display differences across industrial countries that existing models—designed to replicate the features of individual countries’ markets—cannot account for. This paper presents an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that matches cross-country differences in patterns in interest volatility by incorporating differences in how central banks manage liquidity in response to shocks. Our model is consistent with central banks’ practice of rationing access to marginal facilities when the objective of stabilizing short-term interest rates conflicts with another high-frequency objective, such as an exchange rate target.     

Credit and inflation under borrower?s lack of commitment

In this paper we study the effects of monetary policy on privately supplied credit in model economies where money is needed for transaction purposes and agents who default on their loans cannot participate in the credit market but are allowed to accumulate money. In our deterministic benchmark economy where agents alternate in productivity, credit has the role of smoothing consumption. We show that deflation crowds out credit completely. The reason is that deflation increases the value of being excluded from the credit market and eliminates the incentive to repay loans. When inflation is positive but low, credit, consumption smoothing and welfare increase with inflation, until inflation reaches a threshold at which the allocation is efficient and money becomes superneutral.     

A micro data approach to the identification of credit crunches

This article presents a micro data approach to the identification of credit crunches. Using a survey among German firms which regularly queries the firms' assessment of the current willingness of banks to extend credit, we estimate the probability of a restrictive loan supply policy by time taking into account the creditworthiness of borrowers. Creditworthiness is approximated by firm-specific factors, e.g. the firms' assessment of their current business situation and their business expectations. After controlling for the return on the banks' risk-free investment alternative, which is also likely to affect the supply of loans, we derive a credit crunch indicator, which measures that part of the shift in the loan supply that is neither explained by firm-specific factors nor by the opportunity costs of providing risky loans.