Gordon Tullock and the Virginia School of Law and Economics

In 1999 Gordon Tullock became Professor at the George Mason University Law School. Tullock’s arrival at George Mason brought the economics department and the law school close together. The work that resulted during those years consolidated the methodological foundations for a different way of thinking about the economic analysis of law—the “functional” approach to law and economics. The functional law and economics approach espoused by the Virginia School was not attacking any of the results of the Chicago School or the Yale School, but rather proposing a methodological shift. This paper presents some of the results developed by this school and illustrates Tullock’s controversial positions on trials and on the common law system, through anecdotes, Tullock’s own work and related scholarly contributions.     

Value and exchange in law and economics: Buchanan versus posner

Meir Kohn’s Exchange and Value claims that economics can be organised around two opposed paradigms, the exchange and the value paradigms. In this paper, we apply this dichotomy to characterize the analyses proposed by economists in the field known as “law and economics”. We compare and contrasts the perspectives proposed by two prominent scholars—James Buchanan and Richard Posner—and argue that they, respectively, represent the exchange and the value paradigm in law and economics. More precisely, we show that Buchanan sticks to a definition of economics based on the exchange paradigm, and this leads him to define law and economics in a rather specific, different, narrower than Posner’s way to define law and economics—a definition that corresponds to a conception of economics based on the value paradigm.     

John R. Commons’s Foundations for Policy Analysis

Psychological insights have been present in institutional economics since its beginning. Recently, cognitive aspects of institutional economics have been highlighted. The proposal of this paper is to offer other psychological insights related to institutional economics, which are complementary to a cognitive approach. The goal is to emphasize elements of Psychological Social Learning Theory as a possible foundation of Institutional Economics. This paper argues that people vicariously learn by the observation and interpretation of exemplary behaviors. Vicarious learning relies on the comprehension of people about who/what models are. Vicariously, people are motivated to behave as a model; when they succeed, models are reinforced. As something socially and cumulatively acceptable and/or desirable, exemplary behaviors can take place repetitively and become a habit. Institutions arise as outgrowths of those habits. In this logic, a working definition of institution is a cognitive inertia about the typifications of foreseeable regularities in behaviors of people in a society.     

The Institutional Economics of Karl Polanyi

Economists tend to see the market as a default option for social order and a role for government only when markets fail. Developing a convincing analysis of the role of government in economic processes, however, needs to start by considering government failure in its own terms. Drawing on insights from institutional economics, law and economics and the philosophy of law, emphasizing the necessity of rules for the economy, this paper develops the concept of government failure. The paper identifies and develops four different types of government failure. Government can set rules for economic processes and actors that are (1) too specific, (2) too broad, (3) that are arbitrary, or (4) that conflict with other rules it has set out to address other, related issues (possibly primarily non-economic). Government failure is illustrated in the context of Intellectual Property Right (IPR) law as it relates to Anti-Trust law.     

论法经济学建立的经济学基础

法经济学体系的建立,依赖于两大理论作基础,一是经济学理论,二是法理学基础。在经济学方面,古典自由主义的经济学说为法经济学提供了思想武器,新古典经济学为法经济学提供了重要的理论基础,新制度经济学则直接为法经济学提供了方法论基础。     

基于不同视角的法律经济学研究: 一个文献综述

法律经济学是20世纪后半期经济学界乃至法学界最重要的学术成果.但是,法律经济学的研究视角并不统一.基于经济学、法律、哲学、批判法学、女性主义、比较分析、博弈论和心理学不同视角的法律经济学研究,在不断修正法律经济分析存在的局限性的基础上,提高了法律经济学的解释力和预测力,使法律经济学的触角几乎遍及了法律和法学的每一个领域,并使法律经济学的研究成果日益充实和拓展.随着中国经济市场化改革的深入,不同视角的法律经济学的研究成果,为我们体察和审视中国经济改革中的法律制度的变革与演进,提供了富有启发性的理论结构.     

法经济学：法学和经济学半个世纪的学科交叉和融合发展

法经济学至今已经走过了近半个世纪,法经济学的发展不仅表现为经济学与法学的跨学科交融和经济学的研究范式对传统法学的巨大冲击与整合,也表现为其对司法实践的重要影响。文章通过对这一研究领域文献资料的整理,梳理出了学科发展的理论脉络和演化逻辑,可以为国内研究者的法经济学规范化和本土化的理论探索提供线索。首先,文章在对法经济学理论与实践的回顾与总结基础上,对该学科的性质、基本理论及研究方法做一简单的描述与总结;然后,选择法经济学研究中最重要且最受关注的财产、合同、侵权及犯罪四个领域,对其国内外研究现状,尤其对20世纪80年代后,国内学者对法经济学在中国的本土化研究加以详细的梳理与评述;最后,在对法经济学的成就与不足的总结与评述基础上,结合20世纪90年代后法经济学的学科演变趋势,提出了对法经济学未来发展趋势的基本判断。     

An Austrian approach to law and economics, with special reference to superstition

This paper has two purposes. First, it considers what the components of an ??Austrian?? law and economics might consist of. I argue that Ronald Coase??s conception of law and economics precludes the economic analysis of legal institutions and, in particular, the beliefs that support them. In doing so, Coase??s conception precludes an Austrian law and economics. In contrast, Richard Posner??s conception of law and economics makes such analysis the core of its study. In doing so, Posner??s conception provides a productive foundation for an Austrian law and economics. Second, to illustrate what some aspects of an Austrian law and economics might look like in practice, I consider several examples of the economic analysis of beliefs of import for the law. I focus on objectively false beliefs, or superstitions, and argue that some such beliefs are socially productive.     

Between a rock and a soft place: Ecological and feminist economics in policy debates

The field of ecological economics includes both economic analysis on the one hand, and discussions of normative values and visions for society, on the other. Using feminist insights into cultural beliefs about the relative “hardness” and “softness” of these two sides, this essay discusses how ecological economists can use this unique “between” space in order to better inform policy. The current crisis of global climate change, it is argued, requires that economists move beyond modeling and measurement, while ecological thinkers need to re-examine beliefs about markets and profit.     

Whither Monetary Economics?

I argue that monetary economics should be pursued by applying implementation theory to models which contain explicit frictions that make money essential. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that models in which real balances are assumed to be productive—models with money in utility or production functions or with cash-in-advance constraints—contain hidden inconsistencies. Second, I argue that the approach advocated is capable of providing new insights about some of the main issues in monetary economics: the effects of monetary shocks, the welfare cost of inflation, and the roles of inside and outside money.     

The irrelevance of normative considerations for founding an Austrian law and economics: Reply to Marciano

In a comment on my paper, ??An Austrian approach to law and economics, with special reference to superstition?? (Leeson 2012), Marciano contends that Posnerian foundations ??may be problematic for an Austrian approach to law and economics??. In this reply I argue that the differences between Posner and Austrians that Marciano uses as the basis for his contention are normative. If, as Austrians claim, Austrian economics is purely positive, those differences are irrelevant to the appropriate foundations for an Austrian law and economics. They pose no problem for a Posnerian founding.     

法经济学及其在中国的应用

“法经济学”迄今并没有一个大家一致认可的、标准的定义。法经济学可从狭义和广义两个角度进行区分。广义地理解法经济学可以使我们的视野变得更为开阔，同时也拓展了法律与经济这个主题所涵盖的范围。法经济学在20世纪七八十年代得到了蓬勃发展，但进入90年代后则鲜有突破，所以，法经济学未来的发展方向已经成为当前法经济学面临的最主要的理论问题。最近几年来，越来越多的中国学者加入到法经济学的研究中来。法经济学在中国的兴起，与中国正在经历一个制度变迁的时代有关。     

On a fallacy in the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency–equity analysis

This paper shows that implicit assumptions about the numeraire good in the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency–equity analysis involve a “same-yardstick” fallacy (a fallacy pointed out by Paul Samuelson in another context). These results have negative implications for cost-benefit analysis, the wealth-maximization approach to law and economics, and other parts of applied welfare economics—as well as for the whole vision of economics based on the “production and distribution of social wealth”.     

制度分析的误区及其校正——制度分析的最新发展与《制度经济学三人谈》

这是一篇批评性和讨论性学术书评。文章概括了侃书和写书的优劣,说明了该书所取形式和所论内容的紧张,指出了该书与其说是一本制度经济学著作,不如说主要讨论的是制度哲学问题,批评了该书作者关于理论只是和只能解释理论,不是也不能解释实际的观点,在评介现代制度经济学最新发展的同时,揭示了该书作者在讨论过程理性和情景理性、均衡分析和秩序描述、哈耶克的法律观和规则观中的推进之处和不当之处,通过这些评论,旨在校正关于经济学制度分析可能出现的误区。     

A Kantian critique of neoclassical law and economics

Abstract

This paper outlines a critique of neoclassical law and economics based on the ethics of Immanuel Kant, focusing on four central topics: efficiency as the sole evaluative criterion for policy-making, hypothetical compensation in Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, the instrumental nature of rights and the assumption of reciprocal causation, and the role of punishment to both society and the individual. This overview addresses issues of concern not just to Kantians, but to anyone dissatisfied with the utilitarian foundations of law and economics and the amoral view of law upon which it is based.     

The individual and the market: Paul Samuelson on (homothetic) Santa Claus economics

Paul Samuelson often used the term “Santa Claus economics” for mathematical models with empirically unrealistic assumptions. I focus on one particular member of the Santa Claus family that Samuelson was very sceptical about: homothetic general equilibrium models (where all agents have identical homothetic preferences). I argue that Samuelson's concerns about these models provide insights into how he viewed the relationship between the individual and the market, a relationship that has implications for not only his economic theorising, but also his broader political–economic vision. His criticisms are also relevant to some ongoing debates within contemporary economic theory.     

资本流动对中部崛起的作用分析

世界经济发展史证明,资本流动有特定的规律,与经济发展之间有着一定的关系,通过分析两者间的相互作用关系,探讨运用经济规律指导中部崛起战略的实施。     

The Legal-Economic Nexus from the Perspective of New Institutional Economists and Original Institutional Economists

There are two institutional economics approaches to law and economics. New institutional economists prescribe that arbitrators foster efficiency in setting economic disputes and original institutional economists focus on creating reasonable values – that is, balancing efficiency and justice. Disequilibrium between desired efficiency and perceived fairness triggers agency and is a source of coevolution of law and economics.     

Coevolution of economic behaviour and institutions: towards a theory of institutional change

Traditionally, economics has regarded institutions, notably norms and regulations, as fixed or exogenous. Surprisingly few insights on institutional evolution from natural and social sciences have made their way into economics. This article gives an overview of evolutionary theories of institutions in biology, sociology, anthropology and economics. These theories are subsequently compared with non-evolutionary theories of institutions. Next, the insights and approaches are integrated into a framework for analysis of institutions based on the notion of coevolution.JEL Classification: B52, D10, D70, D64, Z13J.C.J.M. van den Bergh     

Methodological interactionism: Theory and application to the firm and to the building of trust

Recent insights from the “embodied cognition” perspective in cognitive science, supported by neural research, provide a basis for a “methodological interactionism” that transcends both the methodological individualism of economics and the methodological collectivism of (some) sociology and is consistent with insights from social psychology. It connects with a Mengerian exchange perspective and Hayekian view of dispersed knowledge from Austrian economics. It provides a basis for a new, unified social science that integrates elements from economics, sociology, social psychology, and cognitive science. This paper discusses the roots of this perspective, in theory of cognition and meaning, and illustrates its application in a summary of a social–cognitive theory of the firm and an analysis of processes by which trust is built up and broken down.