Reliability planning for solar electric power generation

Planning for electric power system reliability requires strategic changes when large-scale use of solar electric generation technologies is contemplated. Bulk storage will be required in any long-term evolution of power systems that are dominated by baseload central station plants. The basic relations among loads, conversion technologies, storage, and reliability are characterized. The responses of systems to exogenous uncertainties are studied. Solar electric technologies produce a more diffuse risk profile than systems dominated by central station plants. This makes solar electric power generation more resilient to unplanned disturbances.     

Divestiture policy and operating efficiency in U.S. electric power distribution

Divestiture of generation assets by vertically integrated electric utilities has been a key element of restructuring in the U.S. The resulting generation sector has received much attention, but the standalone distribution sector that has been simultaneously created has received very little. This paper addresses the effects of divestiture policy on the operating efficiency of the resulting distribution utilities. Using data envelopment analysis to measure operating efficiency, we examine 73 utilities in the period 1994–2003 and find that the major divestitures that were required by state regulators had large adverse effects on efficiency, whereas utilities that divested at their own initiative had at worst neutral efficiency outcomes. These results raise serious questions about one of the centerpieces of electricity restructuring.     

Contract networks for electric power transmission

A contract network extends the concept of a contract path to address the problem of loop flow and congestion in electric power transmission systems. A contract network option provides an internally consistent framework for assigning long-term capacity rights to a complicated electric transmission network. The contract network respects the special conditions induced by Kirchoff's Laws; accommodates thermal, voltage, and contingency constraints on transmission capacity; and can be adopted without disturbing existing methods for achieving an economic power dispatch subject to these constraints. By design, a contract network would maintain short-run efficiency through optimal spot-price determination of transmission prices. Through payment of congestion rentals, the contract network makes a long-term capacity-right holder indifferent between delivery of the power or receipt of payments in a settlement system. to]Everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does anything about it.Often attributed to Groucho Marx, but earlier from Charles Dudley Warner, Hartford Courant, Editorial, August 24, 1897.     

A market mechanism for electric power transmission

As competition is introduced into the electric power industry, access and pricing policy for transmission will play a pivotal role in shaping future market structure and performance. The externalities associated with the loop flow phenomenon in an electric power network constitute a significant barrier to the formation of efficient markets for electricity and transmission services. In this paper, we present a new approach to the design of an efficient market mechanism for transmission access that resolves these externalities. Under a trading rule that combines the Coasian and the Pigouvian principles to resolution of externalities, property rights are defined so that a competitive market could be established for transmission services and electricity to achieve a social optimum within a power pool. We characterize a dynamic trading process which is Lyapunov stable and always converges to a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we discuss some practical applicability and long-term investment issues.The authors are indebted to Charles Clark, Shmuel Oren, Pravin Varaiya, Robert Wilson, Felix Wu, and two referees for helpful comments and suggestions and particularly to William Hogan for many incisive comments and constructive suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of International Association of Energy Economists in Washington D.C., June 20, 1995, and at the Joint LBS/IFORS International Symposium on Energy Models for Policy and Planning in London on July 18–20, 1995. This paper does not represent the views of EPRI or its members. The authors remain solely responsible for the errors in this paper.     

Cogeneration and electric power industry restructuring

In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in response to the energy crisis of the early 1970s. One of the unintended results of PURPA has been to show that electric generation was not a natural monopoly and could be opened to competition. Both the theoretical and empirical determinants of cogeneration and how they may be affected by future electric power industry restructuring are important for future industrial generation decisions. This paper explores these determinants and identifies differences between industrial cogenerators which sell power back into the electricity grid (commercial generators) and those which keep all of their electricity generation for internal purposes (self generators). The empirical results indicate that increases in industrial firm technical capabilities tends to increase their probabilities of both commercial and self generating. In addition, the models indicate that increases in retail electricity prices and industrial output increases industrial generation probabilities. The ability to switch fuels enhances industrial generation probabilities, as does a decrease in the price of natural gas. The results also imply that under electric restructuring a number of industrial generators may find that they face a stranded cost problem much like the one faced by their electric utility counterparts.     

Efficient menu structures for pricing interruptible electric power service

A menu of interruptible service offerings provides a means for matching the reliability of electric power to the preferences of consumers with diverse interruption costs. Appropriately designed pricing induces a distribution of customer service selections such that the welfare loss (i.e., total interruption cost) of all customers is minimized, when averaged over a distribution of shortfall situations. This paper derives one and two dimensional price menus that consider lost service time and interruption frequency as separate attributes. The relative efficiencies of three types of menus are compared and discussed.     

Entry into the electric power industry

Entry of new firms into the electric power industry is becoming commonplace. The entrants typically are unregulated firms that compete with regulated electric utilities only in the generation stage of the latter's vertically integrated structure. Because of the asymmetric regulatory treatment of the incumbents and entrants, there is the possibility of biases either against efficient entry or for inefficient entry. A model of a vertical integrated utility subject to rate-of-return regulation is used to illustrate the biases, and several implications for regulatory policy are discussed.     

基于委托—代理理论的电力工业"厂网分开、竞价上网"改革的交易成本分析

在针对电力工业“厂网分开、竞价上网”这一改革方案，基于委托-代理理论，对电力工业改革前后的内部交易成本和市场交易成本进行数学刻画，并对这两种成本进行定量比较后，我们发现：在一般情况下，电力工业内部交易成本要大于市场交易成本。根据交易成本理论得出结论：我国电力工业进行“厂网分开”改革，在经济上是可行的。     

中国生物质发电问题探讨

生物质能是一种脱颖而出的新能源,生物质发电产业前景广阔.中国生物质发电产业蜿蜒前行,任重道远.为了促进生物质发电产业在中国健康持续、又好又快地发展,笔者建议:第一,做好资源调查和评价,精心编制发展规划;第二,培育生物质发电产业链;第三,完善生物质发电的标准与规范;第四,完善我国生物质发电定价和费用分摊机制;第五,推行并完善绿色配额制度;第六,制定促进生物质发电产业发展的财税政策和投融资政策,建立稳定的投入机制;第七,支持技术研究开发和设备制造,加强生物质发电产业技术创新;第八,开展生物质发电的宣传和培训工作,等等.     

资产的不同分类与权利配置

在传统的产权经济学中，认为企业资源所具有专用性的大小是企业权利的源泉，企业的控制权应当由重要的专用性资产的所有者掌握。这一论点引起了诸多争议，从资产专用性、依赖性、惟一性分类的角度出发，企业权利的配置需要进行进一步探讨。     

Regulatory regimes in the electric power industry: Implications for capacity

We construct a model of the electric power industry which consists of two utilities faced with uncertain demand and a variety of regulatory regimes. Two technologies are considered, base-load and peaking, and the transfer of bulk electricity among utilities is permitted. The purpose of the paper is not to determine optimal regulatory regimes but to provide a framework for analyzing existing and contemplated regulatory initiatives. The conclusions are that long run survival mandates an authorized rate of return above the cost of capital and that excess investment will result. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that current regulatory instruments such as Used and Useful, distribution of profits from bulk sales, and pricing of wholesale electricity can lead to a socially optimal capital stock.     

Bidder cost revelation in electric power auctions

Competitive auctions for electric power sources whose operation will be based upon economic dispatch raise new challenges for auction designers. The efficient selection and operation of such generation sources requires revelation of bidder types over two-dimensions, fixed and variable costs. The way in which fixed and variable prices are combined into a net score, which determines the winning bids, plays a key role in influencing bidders behavior. This paper analyzes bidder strategies and develops necessary conditions of bid scoring systems for the existence of equilibrium strategies that will result in efficient operations. Existing and proposed bid scoring systems are examined using our results.     

The costs of distribution in the UK life insurance market

The cost of direct and independent distribution in the UK life insurance sector over the period 1990–1997 is examined. This is a novel contribution to the literature that until now has focused almost solely on distribution in the non-life sector. Unlike the non-life sector the distribution of life insurance is complicated by the existence of investor protection policies. Which in the UK are believed to have increased the use of independent agents. Using a pooled data set of 44 companies between 1990 and 1997, this study finds little evidence for such a view. Cost benefits are found for firms focusing in one mode of distribution. From a modelling of the distribution decision this finding maybe attributed to firms choosing distribution systems which match the transactional problems associated with their product mix and/or mode of corporate governance.     

Portfolio risk management and carbon emissions valuation in electric power

The context is an electric power company with regulated load obligations and a spot market for energy sales and purchases, as well as liabilities incurred by carbon emissions from generation units or power contracts controlled by the company. Against the backdrop of the existing carbon cap and trade system in the European Union, this paper develops a framework for integrating energy portfolio risk management with liabilities associated with the company’s carbon emissions. The multi-period VaR-constrained portfolio approach of Kleindorfer and Li (Energy J 26(1): 1–26, 2005) is first extended to cover the implied liabilities arising from carbon emissions. This entails some changes to account for the fact that dispatch/bidding/execution decisions will be affected by carbon liabilities for some generation units and contracts. The paper then develops a dynamic programming framework for optimizing the timing of carbon trades (i.e., the timing of the acquisition of the required carbon certificates to cover carbon emissions liabilities of the company), given banked credits or allocations of carbon credits at the start of the planning period and the emissions liabilities resulting from the company’s joint energy and carbon portfolio optimization problem.     

Network costs and the regulation of wholesale competition in electric power

We characterize the cost function for electric power transmission. It is complex and non-linear, exhibiting scale economies over its range. The social planning problem for network transmission expansion is illustrated with a simple numerical example. The regulatory problem for joint generation and transmission cost minimization is addressed. It is shown that information asymmetries about the transmission cost function can lead to coordination losses when there is competition in the generation segment. We parametrize the tradeoff between potential coordination losses in transmission planning and benefits of competition and examine some potential alternatives for improved regulation of the transmission planning process.     

Market power in distribution and pass‐through for consumers and producers

We examine the differential pass‐through of import prices into consumer and producer prices. We develop a framework with distribution costs and distribution market power. We then examine pass‐through from import prices to consumer and producer prices in the euro area using the U.S. import price as instrument. We find that pass‐through rates to producer prices are more sensitive to changes in distribution margins than pass‐through to consumer prices. Furthermore, only a portion of import price changes translate into domestic price changes limiting potential consumer benefits from tariff liberalization, with market power in distribution services being one important factor reducing pass‐through.