中国电信产业管制机构与反垄断机构的协调博弈分析

随着中国电信产业竞争程度的不断提高,反垄断机构对电信产业的介入将逐渐加强,从而使电信产业管制机构与反垄断机构的协调问题逐渐凸显。本文引入协调博弈的分析方法,通过构建两类机构的协调博弈模型,对直接影响协调成功的策略互补性进行了描述,分析了协调失败的原因及其改进方法。在此基础上,本文得出了加强策略互补性的动力机制,最后提出了促进两类机构协调的政策建议。     

中外反垄断执法机构比较与研究

法律的实施与一个良好的执法机构有着密不可分的关系,只有一个良好的反垄断执行机制才能使反垄断从应然走向实然,反垄断法的独立性及现实的复杂性也告诉我们,只有一个独立、权威、有效的执行机构才能对反垄断执行过程中的难题做出及时、正确的反应。本文分析了我国反垄断机构的现状及缺陷,并结合世界各国的反垄断模式进行比较分析,提出了完善我国反垄断执行机构的原则性措施和具体的建议,力求促进我国反垄断执行机构的完善。     

英国会计和审计行业独立管制机构的最新变革

最近,英国的贸工部正积极对会计和审计行业的管制机构进行变革,以提高管制效率,重建投资者对资本市场的信心。该变革的实施将结束2000年成立的审计行业独立管制机构——会计师基金会的短暂使命,一个囊括了会计和审计行业监管的独立管制机构——财务报告理事会将在英国形成。本     

论政府管制下财务报告的目标导向

戴奈尔·F·斯巴尔珀(Daniel.F·Spulber)在《管制与市场》一书中将"管制"定义为"行政机构为直接或通过改变消费者和厂商供求决策而直接干预市场分配机制而颁布的通则或采取的特定行动"。我们认为,管制是政府或代表政府的机构通过颁布法律和采取特定行动而对市场进行干预的行为。会计管制即为政府对会计信息市场的干预,包括对会计信息的供求关系及会计信息质量、数量与     

管制会计的目标 要素与报告分析

一、绪论 新管制经济学的基本理论认为,管制机构与垄断企业之间存在着信息不对称,信息不对称的形式包括隐藏信息（逆向选择）和隐藏行为（道德风险）。在双方签订合约后,垄断企业可以通过一些管制机构无法观察到的行为影响最后的结果。由于垄断企业的特殊产品具有市场势力,当垄断企业为谋求自身利益提高产品价格时,导致了会计信息失真,使得管制机构与垄断企业之间的会计信息不对称。     

浅谈中国反行政性垄断机构的设置

随着市场经济的不断发展,行政性垄断对经济发展的制约越来越显著,但是我国设置的反垄断机构面对严重的行政性垄断却几乎无能为力。本文试着在分析中国反垄断机构现状的基础上,借鉴国外一些相应机构的先进经验,提出设置新型反垄断机构的构想。该机构在组织体制上可以设立最高的反垄断级别,体现统一性和专业性,并设立中央和地方两层级别。同时该机构还应当拥有调查检查权、行政处罚权、行政裁决权和行政执行能力,此外还应建立完善的反行政性垄断机构的监督体系。     

反垄断法执行机构比较研究

随着反垄断法的颁布,目前国务院反垄断委员会规定了由国家发改委、国家工商总局、商务部的多部门分别执法的格局,这种"三足鼎立"的局势不利于反垄断法的统一执行.反垄断执法机构应当成为一个精干的、权威的、能够执法的机构,而不是一个"戴帽的、协调式的、虚设机构."国外反垄断执法机构的诞生与发展已经历了一个较长的过程,深入比较研究、科学借鉴国外反垄断执法体制,对我国反垄断执法机构的建立和完善,必然起到促进作用.     

工商机关反垄断区域性执法构想

随着反垄断法的实施．反垄断执法机构逐步明确。作为获得反垄断执法权力的工商机关．要充分利用自己的资源和智慧．寻找反垄断执法权力的实现途径．让中国特色的反垄断执法在目前的环境和条件下发挥最大的效力。     

我国激励性管制改革对管制体制的需求

我国自然垄断产业的激励性管制改革,存在着先进的管制方式与落后的管制体制之间的矛盾。这一矛盾决定了我国激励性管制改革对管制体制的需求,即要建立独立性管制机构、推进管制的司法审查、加强管制的公众参与。     

建立国家反垄断机构 加快推进垄断行业改革

据悉,中央政府正计划组建国家反垄断机构,旨在加快推进垄断行业改革,确保市场的公平竞争。这充分表明中国顺应经济全球化潮流,扩大对外开放.进一步完善市场经济体制的决心。无疑,新组建的国家反垄断机构将推动进一步开放政府垄断的行业和市场,扩大市场竞争的范围,对于在国家经济命脉部门实施大刀阔斧的结构性改革,是一项关键之举。     

Monopoly and Anti‐Monopoly in China Today

For three decades after liberation in 1949, the Chinese economy consisted almost entirely of state monopolies. Economic reforms, starting in 1979, sought to increase the efficiency of the economy by introducing competitive practices in many sectors of the economy. But the Chinese economy has been partially administered by the state for over two millennia. As a result, both state‐managed and private monopolies are still an intrinsic part of the Chinese economy today. Despite two decades of anti‐monopoly reforms, state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to dominate key sectors of the economy, particularly in resource extraction and financial services. The government is aware of the inefficiencies and corruption caused by monopolies, both public and private. But Chinese tradition takes a balanced view of social harms and weighs the damage caused by monopoly against the stability that SOEs have provided China in recent decades. There is less reason for China to tolerate private monopolies, but most of them have arisen in conjunction with digital technology because of its distinctive cost structure (high entry costs, low marginal costs). China has made some use of antitrust law, but most economic regulation in China is administrative. Thus the anti‐monopoly activities that are used to restrain monopoly power in China are different from Western practices.     

西方国家应用规制理论的经验对规制我国垄断行业收入分配行为的启示

近年,垄断行业职工收入畸高,严重偏离市场规律,已成为我国收入分配领域的一个敏感突出而亟待解决的社会问题。但在较长时期内,想通过破除行政垄断、解决"所有者缺位"问题这两个途径来解决垄断行业收入分配问题是不可行的,改革政府监管才是解决垄断行业收入分配问题的现实选择。     

亚马逊开放物流背后的阴影

电商企业在疯狂"烧钱"之后的尴尬,也呼吁其亟需从"做规模"向"做赢利"的转变。3月29日,亚马逊中国宣布,正式推出"全球开店"业务,即亚马逊的物流系统向国内众多电商中小企业开放,为更多的中小型企业提供国际化电子商务解决方案。亚马逊中国称,此举是欲借助其完整的     

制定成本会计准则的必要性——基于价格管制和政府采购的视角

文章运用垄断价格管制理论和福利经济学相关理论分析了当前出现垄断行业的"三高"以及政府采购成本偏高的现象,指出成本会计准则的制定是对垄断行业进行价格管制的前提,同时成本会计准则的制定必将有利于对政府采购成本实行有效控制,最后就如何制定成本会计准则提出了一些建议。     

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Economists have long recognised that government may serve as a vehicle to create and maintain monopoly power and hence generate economic rents for a favoured few. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has a government-provided monopoly of the allocation of top-level domains (TLDs) on the A-root server and so generates economic rents. The A-root server is the only computer network that links registered TLDs to the Internet. This paper uses insights of the economics of regulation and rent seeking to explain how existing technology may bypass ICANN and thus restore a competitive market in domain names.     

Regulation of road accident externalities when insurance companies have market power

Accident externalities that individual drivers impose on one another via their presence on the road are among the most important external costs of road transport. We study the regulation of these externalities when insurance companies have market power. Some of the results we derive have close resemblance to the earlier literature on externality regulation with market power in aviation and private roads, but there are important differences, too. Using analytical models, we compare the first-best public welfare-maximizing outcome with a private profit-maximizing monopoly, and oligopoly. We find that insurance companies will internalize some of the externalities, depending on their degree of market power. We derive optimal insurance premiums, and regular parametric taxes as well as “manipulable” ones that make the companies set socially optimal premiums. The latter take into account that the firm tries to exploit knowledge of the tax rule applied by the government. Finally, we also study the taxation of road users rather than that of firms.     

新媒体背景下卷烟市场监管模式研究

本文从探索新媒体形势下专卖市场监管出发,结合行业当前形势,分析了目前专卖市场监管存在的问题和原因,提出了新媒体形势下市场监管的措施和办法,从而为实现"卷烟上水平"提供强有力的保障。     

自然垄断与规制理论的演进

通过对自然垄断的含义及技术经济特征的阐述,然后基于规制理论的演进过程的分析和研究,认为我国自然垄断产业规制改革,关键要纵览全局,摆脱以往国有经济的固有框架,打破垄断行为依托的行政特权,充分利用激励机制和约束机制的作用,有效发挥竞争主体作用,并形成动态调整模式。     

卖方垄断市场结构下的价格管制研究

以价格自由和信息不对称下,垄断厂商的最优销售合同为基准,研究存在价格管制和信息不对称时,垄断厂商的最优销售合同。通过比较价格管制与价格自由两种情况下,垄断厂商最优销售合同及不同类型消费者剩余,发现不同的价格管制不影响垄断厂商的最优销售量和销售客户的决策,但影响不同类型消费者的剩余,产生不同的经济后果。提出政府应根据垄断厂商的定价策略进行相机价格管制的思想。     

Efficiency and regulation: A basis for reform: 2nd annual MDE lecture,Pace University,Graduate School of Business,New York City,USA

This paper reviews the nature and consequences of regulation and attempts to provide a framework for reform. The paper argues that regulation, in addition to direct effects on the efficiency of the firm, causes changes in management orientation. These effects are analyzed for monopoly regulation and the implications for the A-J effect examined. They may be more important than A-J effects and may explain why A-J effects are not always significant. Finally, the paper discusses some proposals for reform, focusing on ways in which the transactions costs of regulation can be reduced while preserving it as a governance structure.