Bank valuation and accounting discretion during a financial crisis

This paper shows that banks overstate the value of distressed assets and their regulatory capital during the US mortgage crisis. Real estate-related assets are overvalued in banks' balance sheets, especially those of bigger banks, compared to the market value of these assets. Banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion over the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks and provide suggestive evidence of regulatory forbearance and noncompliance with accounting rules.     

The cooperative bank difference before and after the global financial crisis

We compare characteristics of the banks' specialization (cooperative versus non-cooperative) at the world level in a time spell including the global financial crisis. Cooperative banks display higher net loans/total assets ratios, lower shares of derivatives over total assets and lower earning volatility than commercial banks. With a diff-in-diff approach we test whether the global financial crisis produced convergence/divergence in these indicators. We finally document that, in a conditional convergence specification, the net loans/total assets ratio is positively and significantly correlated with value added growth in some manufacturing sectors but not in others.     

Non-performing loans,moral hazard and regulation of the Chinese commercial banking system

Non-performing loans (NPLs) represent a major obstacle to the development of banking sector. One of the key objectives of the banking sector reforms in China has therefore been to reduce the high level of NPLs. To do so, Chinese regulatory authorities have injected significant capital into the banking system and scrutinized NPLs since 2003. This paper examines the impact of NPLs on bank behavior in China. Using a threshold panel regression model and a dataset covering 60 city commercial banks, 16 state-owned banks and joint-stock banks, and 11 rural commercial banks during 2006–2012, we test whether lending decisions of Chinese banks exhibit moral hazard. The results support the moral hazard hypothesis, suggesting that an increase in the NPLs ratio raises riskier lending, potentially causing further deterioration of the loan quality and financial system instability. Policy implications of findings are evaluated.     

The Determinants of Nonperforming Loans Before and After the Crisis: Challenges and Policy Implications for Turkish Banks

This article examines the determinants of nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the Turkish banking sector via panel data estimation techniques. In order to see the effect of the global crisis and whether this effect changes across ownership, the analysis is conducted in subperiods covering the precrisis and the postcrisis periods and estimations are repeated by an ownership breakdown. Findings show that the determinants of NPLs have changed, and macroeconomic and policy-related determinants have higher significance after the crisis. Accordingly, strong economic activity and sound fiscal policy improve loan quality, while higher policy rate induces NPLs. Meanwhile, the significance of bank-specific determinants depends on ownership. Yet, a common theme applies suggesting that asset size should grow in favor of loans, but this should be backed with efficient loan monitoring, while capital adequacy is stringent enough to limit NPLs.     

资产结构、资本结构与盈利能力相关性研究——基于我国稀土类上市公司经验数据

稀土企业盈利状况极不稳定是当前我国稀土产业面临的严峻问题之一.资产结构与资本结构是否合理直接关系着企业的盈利状况.本文以我国13家稀土类上市公司为研究样本,首先采用主成分法对影响企业盈利能力的财务指标进行综合,再通过回归分析法对稀土企业资产结构、资本结构与盈利能力之间的关系进行回归分析.研究表明：稀土类上市公司资产结构与资本结构不够合理,优化资产结构与资本结构是提高稀土类上市公司盈利能力的重要途径.     

A perspective on the symptoms and causes of the financial crisis

Prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis, banking sector profits were very high but the profitability of financial intermediation was poor. Using a novel model of banking, this article argues that the high profits were achieved through balance sheet expansion and growing default, liquidity, and term risk mismatches between assets and liabilities. As a result, large banks’ financial leverage rose as they became less liquid, setting the conditions for a systemic banking crisis. This article argues that the increase in financial leverage was possible due to misguided changes in the regulatory framework, specifically, the Basel I capital accord and reductions in reserve requirements. Finally, this article overviews and assesses the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis.     

The industry effect and the decision to integrate vertically in a crisis context

ABSTRACT

The objective of this work is twofold: firstly, to study if the characteristics of the industry affect certain financial and strategic decisions of manufacturing firms and, secondly, to determine if the strategy of diversifying the activity through vertical integration generates good financial results in times of crisis, depending on the industry. To this end, an analysis is carried out with panel data from 9,523 firms in the period between 2008 and 2013. The results show that there are different strategies that firms must follow, depending on the industry to which they belong. In sectors with lower operational risk, those firms characterized by greater specificity and better product quality obtained higher profitability. However, in riskier sectors, firms with more specific assets assumed too many risks and in times of crisis have seen their profitability fall. Likewise, it is observed that the decision to integrate vertically has mitigated the weak points of each sector, allowing firms to better weather the economic–financial crisis in which this research is framed.     

Ability of accounting and audit quality variables to predict bank failure during the financial crisis

We examine the ability of selected accounting and audit quality variables measured in a period prior to the financial crisis (i.e., the four quarters of 2006), to predict banks that subsequently failed during the financial crisis. We employ two sets of samples from the US: a troubled banks sample that includes banks that failed in or after 2007 as well as banks classified as being troubled based on profitability, loan quality, and balance sheet position in 2007, and a full sample that includes all banks with available required data. Using the troubled banks sample, we identify six reliable predictors of bank failure: auditor type, auditor industry specialization, Tier 1 capital ratio, proportion of securitized loans, growth in loans, and loan mix. For the larger full sample of banks, we identify the following ten predictors of bank failure: auditor type, Tier 1 capital ratio, proportion of securitized loans, nonperforming loans, loan loss provisions, growth in commercial loans, growth in real estate loans, growth in overall loans, loan mix, and whether the bank is a public bank.     

What determines the profitability of banks? Evidence from Spain

This paper empirically analyses the factors that determine the profitability of Spanish banks for the period of 1999–2009. We conclude that the high bank profitability during these years is associated with a large percentage of loans in total assets, a high proportion of customer deposits, good efficiency and a low doubtful assets ratio. In addition, higher capital ratios also increase the bank’s return, but only when return on assets (ROA) is used as the profitability measure. We find no evidence of either economies or diseconomies of scale or scope in the Spanish banking sector. Finally, our study reveals differences in the performance of commercial and savings banks.     

The impact of opacity on bank valuation during the global financial crisis: A channel analysis

Prior literature suggests that opacity in the banking industry is mainly caused by a lack of informativeness in the assessment of the quality of bank assets. Examining a sample of bank holding companies in the United States, we find that there is a negative relationship between opacity and bank valuation during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. We further attempt to identify two potential channels through which opacity negatively affects bank valuation during the financial crisis: a cash flow channel and an expected return channel. We show that one channel flows from bank profitability, measured by return on equity and return on assets, confirming a cash flow channel, whereas an expected return channel, proxied by the implied cost of capital, only works for small banks. Overall, this study sheds light on the relationship between in-transparency and bank value discount during a global recession.     

TARP funds distribution and bank loan supply

This paper investigates the determinants of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds distribution to banks and the stimulus effect of TARP investments on credit supply in the economy. Using banks’ political and regulatory connections as instruments, this paper finds that TARP investments increased bank loan supply by an annualized rate of 6.36% for banks with below median Tier 1 capital ratios. This increase is found in all major types of loans and can be translated into $404 billion of additional loans for all TARP banks. On average, TARP banks employed about one-third of their TARP capital to support new loans and kept the rest to strengthen their balance sheets. Furthermore, there is little evidence that loans made by TARP banks had lower quality than those by non-TARP banks. In sum, this paper shows a positive stimulus effect of TARP on credit supply during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.     

CEO EXTRAVERSION AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF FIRM DYNAMICS,PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION,AND FINANCIAL CRISIS

Using panel data of U.S. firms, we focus on an important yet understudied facet of the chief executive officer's (CEO) personality—extraversion—and how it affects corporate capital structure decisions. We examine how this relation is moderated by financing (tax) benefits, financial crisis, firm size, growth opportunities, and collateralization. The results show that firms managed by extraverted CEOs use greater financial leverage, adjusting toward target leverage levels at a faster speed, with about half-life within a year for book and market leverage. In addition, the positive extraversion–leverage relation is enhanced for firms that are large, have greater collateralizable assets, and are more vulnerable to external shocks (financial crisis). Last, although the positive extraversion–leverage relation holds particularly when product market competition is high, the effect is attenuated for high-growth opportunity firms.     

Is ex-post credit risk affected by the cycles? The case of Italian banks

The objective of this research is to empirically examine if both credit and business cycle affect the ex-post credit risk (i.e. non-performing loans) in the banking system of Italy for the period 1995Q1–2014Q1. The increase in NPLs post-2008 has put into question the robustness of many European banks and the stability of the whole sector. It still remains a serious challenge, especially in Italy which is one of the countries that hit by the financial crisis. By employing fixed and random effects and a dynamic GMM estimation as econometric methodologies I find results that underline common causes for NPLs. Higher NPLs in Italy are mostly due to worse macroeconomic conditions (i.e. bad phase of business cycle) and due to excess credit. Through a Granger causality test, my arguments found even more support. Such findings can be helpful when designing macro-prudential as well as NPL resolution policies.     

十二五期间如何优化商业银行信贷结构

为了应对国际金融危机,2009年中国政府采取了投资拉动政策,商业银行也加大了信贷投放,信贷资产规模急剧增加,存量资产和新增资产的结构发生了一些变化。尽管股改以来商业银行信贷结构趋于优化,但是仍存在房地产业、地方政府融资平台、部分风险较高行业的贷款规模偏大等问题,未来商业银行调整信贷结构应从以下六方面着手:科学配置信贷资源;通过信贷增量优化带动存量优化;创新中间业务,带动传统业务发展;依托产业价值链,引导信贷资金投向;关注金融生态变化,明确信贷优先投放区域;紧紧围绕"十二五"规划,把握贷款行业投向。     

The Determinants of Bank Capital Ratios in a Developing Economy

This paper reports new findings on the determinants of bank capital ratios. The results are from an unbalanced panel data set spanning eight years around the period of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. Test results suggest a strong positive link between regulatory capital and bank management’s risk-taking behaviour. The risk-based capital standards of the regulators did not have an influence on how regulatory capital is adjusted by low-capitalized banks, perhaps due to the well-documented banking fragility during the test period. Finally, bank capital decisions seem not to be driven by bank profitability, which finding is inconsistent with developed country literature that has for long stressed the importance of banks’ earnings as driving capital ratios. Although the study focuses only on one developing economy, these findings may help to identify the correlates of bank capital ratios in both developed and developing economies since this topic has received scant attention of researchers. These findings are somewhat consistent with how banks engaging in risky lending across the world could have brought on the 2007–2008 banking liquidity and capital erosion crisis.     

IAS 39 reclassification choice and analyst earnings forecast properties

In October 2008, the International Accounting Standards Board amended IAS 39 to allow banks to retroactively reclassify financial assets that previously were measured at fair value to amortized cost. By reclassifying financial assets, a bank can potentially avoid recognizing the unrealized fair value losses and thereby increase its income and regulatory capital during a market downturn. We examine the implications of the reclassification decision by banks for the properties of financial analyst earnings forecasts during 2008–2009, when economic conditions were highly volatile. We find that the reclassification choice during the financial crisis reduced analyst forecast accuracy and increased forecast dispersion. We also find that the observed decline in analyst forecasting ability is limited to the year of adoption when the economic environment was highly volatile.     

Reclassification of Financial Assets under IAS 39: Impact on European Banks' Financial Statements

In response to the financial crisis, the IASB issued on 13 October 2008 an amendment to IAS 39 which enables entities to reclassify non-derivative financial assets held for trading and financial assets available-for-sale. This paper examines the influence of this controversial amendment on the 2008 financial statements of 219 European banks which apply IFRS. I find that approximately one-third of the sample banks have taken extensive advantage of these reclassification opportunities. The mean reclassification amount is 3.9% of total assets and 131% of the book value of equity, respectively. I further document that reclassifying banks avoid substantial fair value losses, and hence, report significantly higher levels of return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), book value of equity and regulatory capital. In particular, the mean ROE switches sign from a negative ROE of ?1.4% to a positive ROE of 1.3% due to gains from reclassifications. Overall, this paper documents a substantial impact of the amendments on banks' financial statements and suggests analysing these reclassifications with particular caution.     

Small Firm Capital Structure and the Syndicated Loan Market

We show that small firms using syndicated loans for their mid- and long-term financial needs have significantly higher leverage than firms that do not borrow in this market. This difference cannot be attributed to firm characteristics like the availability of growth opportunities, asset tangibility, R&D spending, profitability and net sales that are known to influence capital structure. We also find that the capital structure of other firms that borrow in the syndicated loan market is not different from those that do not. We show that already highly leveraged small firms are more likely to borrow in the syndicated loan market than other firms. The higher debt in the capital structure of small firms that rely on syndicated loans consequently can be attributed to the availability of capital rather than demand for capital, as shown more generally by Faulkender and Petersen (Rev Financ Stud 19(1):45?C79, 2006).